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Abstract 
 
This is a study about the policy design of the European Union’s Smart Specialisation policy 
(2014- 20) in shaping regional economic development in diverse regions of Europe. Unlike 
earlier work in the field of economic geography that has contributed greatly to the analysis 
of the policy using quantitative approaches, here the focus is exclusively on providing a 
qualitative analysis of the strengths and challenges associated with the overarching design of 
the policy. 
Using a case study methodology, the study first examines documentary data to explore the 
implications of implementation given the design of Smart Specialisation policies at the level 
of the EU and three regions; secondly it draws on interview data that seeks to provide parallel 
evidence gained from official documents about the strengths and challenges associated with 
the policy; and thirdly it considers how the policy may or may not improve the performance 
of long-term innovation outcomes in different regional contexts. 
This research objective will be achieved through analysis of three elements of the policy: 
firstly, through addressing the implications of successful implementation of the policy given 
the quality of regional governance; secondly, addressing the implications of whether an MNC 
is embedded or disembedded within a regional innovation system (and where the MNC sits 
within the governance of GVC/GPN); and thirdly, the extent to which the particular 
characteristics of a RIS determine provide a barrier. 
This study has found that under the three sets of criteria outlined, there are significant barriers 
to policy implementation, suggesting that less developed regions (LDR) located in Central 
and Eastern Europe (CEE) face governance challenges; economic constraints associated path 
dependence due to the historical circumstances of those countries and the role played by 
multinational corporations and finally the weakness of their regional innovation systems. 
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Introduction 
This is a study about the policy design and implementation of the EU Smart Specialisation 
policy (2014-2020) in shaping regional economic development in diverse regions of Europe. 
Unlike earlier, largely quantitative work in the field of economic geography, here the focus 
is exclusively about providing a qualitative analysis of the strengths and challenges 
associated with policy development processes. 
 
Utilising a case study methodology, the study first examines documentary data to explore the 
implications of RIS3 policy design at the level of the EU and the region; second interview 
data is examined that seeks to provide parallel evidence gained from official documents about 
the strengths and challenges associated with the policy design; and thirdly it considers how 
the policy may or may not improve the performance of innovation outcomes in diverse 
regional contexts. This introductory chapter explains how interest in this topic developed; 
describes the institutional context of the evolution of the policy; and gives a brief outline of 
the analytical frameworks which are drawn upon.  
 
This topic is of interest given that, internationally, governments are seeking to find public 
policy solutions to try and influence regional economic development. The Smart 
Specialisation policy represents an innovative decentralised industrial policy experiment that 
has the potential to bridge the ‘core-periphery’ dynamic in Europe. The Smart Specialisation 
policy focuses on integrating regional and innovation policy agendas to assist regions to boost 
regional innovation to achieve economic growth. The new approach encourages regions to 
focus in on their strengths based on an analysis of regional assets and technology as well as 
analysis of potential partners in other regions and between businesses, public entities and 
knowledge institutions. 
 
The evolution of EU regional policy demonstrates how the focus of the policy has gradually 
shifted from a subsidy-led approach, which was underpinned by compensation for 
weaknesses in lagging regions, towards a competitiveness-oriented approach favouring 
growth in all regions. Thus during the 1960s and 1970s, EU Regional Policy projects 
concentrated on redistributing wealth from wealthier regions to poor regions through 
traditional infrastructure led economic and social projects. Over the past two decades, with 
the onset of large economic and social challenges such as the global financial crisis, 
unemployment and poverty and climate change, the policy logic has shifted from a 
‘redistributive logic’ to an overall economic strategy that is focused on a more explicit set of 
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economic and environmental policy objectives.  
 
Thus, Regional policy since the 1990s is said to be increasingly informed by an ‘innovation 
systems’ approach to regional development where the role of ‘place’ has become increasingly 
important as a setting for policy design and implementation. The new emphasis of the policy 
is now about encouraging business innovation and climate change initiatives. Increasingly 
social inclusion goals have been perceived as intrinsically linked to economic goals. The 
embrace by the EU of the new paradigm of Regional Policy has often been linked to the 
development of the Lisbon strategy in the year 2000, which explicitly stated the new central 
aim of the policy agenda to be about increasing the competitive position of EU regions in the 
world economy by placing growth, jobs and competitiveness at the top of a newly constituted 
policy agenda.  
 
This shift in focus is significant, as infrastructure projects led to the transformation of many 
less developed regions (LDRs) located for instance in Central and Eastern Europe after the 
fall of socialism. This study is particularly interested in whether the policy can play the same 
role in transforming economic fortunes and new economic pathways for these kinds of 
regions. This is particularly the case due to these regions experiencing the potential for ‘path 
dependency’ along traditional economic lines,  given industrial regions located in the CEE 
are often dominated by large MNCs who have the potential to either contribute to regional 
economic competitiveness through participation in regional innovation systems, or provide a 
blockage to innovation and path renewal. This issue provides one of the major themes and 
research questions explored in this study. That is, how does the extent to which an MNC is 
‘embedded’ or ‘disembedded’ within a regional innovation system impact on policy 
implementation? 
 
Furthermore, while EU innovation policy is not ‘new’ and there have been many precursor 
innovation policies to Smart Specialisation implemented in Europe, the policy is said to have 
a great potential to transform regions through its Entrepreneurial Discovery Process (EDP) 
which is the main reform on previous policy approaches. A second theme explored in this 
study is the extent to which the devolved governance arrangements of the policy can be 
executed in centralised political environments. This has led to a second major theme and 
research question asking will the quality of governance at the level of place affect the 
policy’s chance of success? 
 
Finally, the study will address the issue of institutional capacity at a regional level. To what 
extent does an institutionally weak regional innovation system militate against policy 
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success? This is a key question for policy implementation. 
 
An interest in this topic was first developed in the context of the work of economic 
geographers Kevin Morgan (1997) Michael Storper (1997) and Michael Porter (1990) who 
have extensively explored the role of public policy in the establishment of regional 
innovation systems that may stimulate place based regional economic growth. These authors 
have challenged the views of liberal theory espoused by the ‘globalisation’ school (Amin & 
Thrift 1994) who have maintained scepticism about the capacity of regions to challenge 
global multinational corporations (MNCs) in determining the fate of regional economic 
development. This study seeks to explore this theoretical tension to assess whether the role 
of the Smart Specialisation policy as a public policy instrument is capable of shaping the 
development of a regional innovation policy at the level of place. 
 
Knowing that there is already a substantial body of work within the economic geography 
discipline addressing policy design and implementation challenges associated with the RIS3 
policy, the focus of this study reflects a preference for it to have practical value in adding to 
recent literature that suggests reform of policy design processes directed at regions associated 
with industrial production located in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). CEE regions face a 
problem of lacking depth of formal knowledge assets (public and private R&D) (McCann & 
Ortega-Argiles 2013). These regions also face governance challenges with centralised 
political systems often militating against the decentralised model of policy development 
(Morgan 2017; Rodrik 2003). 
 
Despite recognition of the importance of these, there is still a need for additional research to 
support these contributions to the literature. There have been few studies that have addressed 
the barriers to the policy being implemented in periphery regions that include detailed 
qualitative methods such as document analysis and interview data within regions located in 
CEE. A further contribution to the existing research is to encompass the views of a 
representative of a major multinational subsidiary in regional context. This may be 
considered an original contribution to the existing literature in incorporating the view of a 
Volkswagen (VW) plant in each region, about the extent to which the plant is being 
influenced by the new policy direction; away from what the liberal theorists may describe as 
representing an isolationist positioning to a more ‘regional’ perspective in relation to 
operational decisions. 
 
In the light of all of these points, it is hoped that the context has been outlined in which this 
research study may be of some value.  
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Chapter 1 
Background EU Regional Policy 
 
 
Introduction 
European Union regional policy accounts for the single largest part of the EU budget for 
2014–20 (351.8 billion euros out of a total 1082 billion euros) and therefore is the main 
investment arm of the EU. Regional policy has been seen traditionally as an expression 
of solidarity between EU countries as the bulk of funding is dedicated to less developed 
regions. It helps these regions to fulfil their economic potential, despite regional 
disparities across the EU and within member countries. During the 1960s and 70s, EU 
regional policy projects concentrated on redistributing wealth from wealthier regions to 
poorer regions through traditional infrastructure-led economic and social projects. Over the 
past two decades, with the onset of large economic and social challenges, such as the global 
financial crisis, unemployment, poverty and climate change, the policy logic has shifted; the 
EU now links policy settings to an overall economic strategy focused on a more specific set 
of economic and environmental policy objectives. The new emphasis is more about 
encouraging business innovation and climate change initiatives. Additionally, social 
inclusion goals are now increasingly linked to economic goals. 
The policy environment in Europe can be discussed under distinct policy phases. This chapter 
reviews the evolution of EU regional policy from 1957 to 2014 and describes how policy 
goals have evolved over time, and the political, economic and social context in which they 
were determined. 
 
Treaty of Rome period (1957–1969) 
The main aim of Cohesion policy is to reduce regional and economic and social disparities 
across EU states and regions. The ambition to reduce development gaps between regions 
dates back to the foundation of the European Economic Community in 1957 with the Treaty 
of Rome, which declared that the signatory states were “anxious to strengthen the unity of 
their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences 
6 
 
existing between various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions”, and 
fostering “a harmonious development of economic activities” throughout the European 
Economic Community (European Economic Community 1957, Art 2 in Brunazzo, 2016, 
p.17). However, it has been contended that regional issues were largely addressed indirectly 
through a series of provisions concerning specific sectoral policies, such as agriculture, 
transport and state aid. In addition, the only financial instrument created to directly promote 
regional development was the European Investment Bank, which had among its tasks that of 
granting loans “which facilitate the financing of projects for developing less developed 
regions” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p.5). 
During this period, there were a range of significant political and economic factors that 
contributed to this cautious approach in the development of regional policy when the EC was 
founded. The policy context was politically sensitive to ceding important responsibilities to 
Europe (Manzella and Mendez, 2009). This led to a perspective at the time that “creating a 
proper European Cohesion policy was considered at that time politically divisive, 
unnecessary and too ambitious” (Brunazzo p.17). In addition to this, there was at the time “a 
prevailing economic orthodoxy that was generally not supportive of the creation of a 
comprehensive regional policy at Community level.” It was a time where there was also as 
well as an optimistic view of the “role of the newly established public investment banks to 
activate dynamics of growth in underdeveloped contexts” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p.6). 
Therefore, in this period, the “outcome of these various elements was that the regional issue 
was dealt with through a series of provisions which bore little, if any, resemblance to what 
could be termed a coherent supranational approach to regional policy” (Manzella and 
Mendez, 2009, p.6). For instance, at this time the European Investment Bank (EIB) was 
deliberately designed as an intergovernmental body, owned and governed by the Member 
States. Accordingly, “it’s statute was clear in assigning the Member States the final say 
concerning the admissibility of projects for loans, and the Bank had only functional links 
with the European Commission” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p.6). In addition to this, the 
exemptions regarding state aids for regional development under competition policy 
highlighted the extent to which Member States were autonomous from the European 
Commission in policy directed at supporting underdeveloped areas (Manzella and Mendez, 
2009). 
 
Growing internationalisation of EU regional policy (1970-1974) 
 
At the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, increased pressure was building for 
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the internationalisation of an EU regional policy. This was generated by both political and 
economic factors. Politically, the enlargement process prompted the European Commission 
to promote the adoption of a new approach. The accession of Denmark, the UK and Ireland 
in 1973 exacerbated regional disparities and the enlarged coalition of national governments 
became in favour of the establishment of a common regional policy. In particular, the UK 
became a net contributor to the Community budget upon accession, requiring the adoption of 
partial economic compensation to persuade a British public that was sceptical about the 
benefits of European integration (Brunazzo 2016). 
In addition to this, the “regional question” was “not anymore perceived to be an almost 
exclusively southern Italian problem with the advent of demographic, labour market and 
sectoral challenges increasingly being recognised to be facing all regions across Europe to 
varying degrees” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p.9). Finally, there was a “deepening of the 
debate on economic and monetary union, which had been launched in the late 1960s, with 
the outcome of this debate was an argument that compensation should be provided for all 
economic rigidities imposed on state budgets by the path of monetary unification” (Manzella 
and Mendez, 2009, p.9). 
Economically, a global oil crisis over this period raised social issues to the fore within EC 
debates, leading to increased attention to the “close link between declining industries and 
specific territorial areas” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p. 9). The EC became convinced of 
the “necessity of a solidarity policy in order to help rural periphery and the least prosperous 
regions of the new integrated countries, mainly Ireland” (Dall’Erba, 2003, p. 2). In addition 
to this “the UK was also afraid of losing out to its continental competitors and of an 
unbalanced financial support allocated to the agricultural industries of the Member States. It 
then obtained in the negotiation of accession an assurance that the European regional policy 
would be set up” (Dall’Erba, 2003, p. 2). 
The EC determined that the policy instruments established by the policy were “not working 
well”, leading Commissioner George Thompson to declare in the mid-1970s that “forms of 
community aid, useful and well justified as individual acts of policy, when looked at as a 
whole….appear to be widening the regional gap rather than closing it” (Thompson as cited 
in Brunazzo, 2016, p.17). The EC underwent a period of restructure of administrative 
arrangements including, in 1968, the creation of a specific Directorate General dedicated to 
regional policy (Manzella and Mendez, 2009).  
The EC’s reform proposals were outlined in the Report on Enlarged Europe of May 1973. It 
was immediately clear, from the perspective of the commission at least, that the setting up of 
a Community regional policy needed to be “much more than a mere compensatory tool for 
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integration spill overs”. The report argued that reducing the differences existing between the 
various regions and the backwardness of the less-favoured regions was “a human and moral 
requirement of the first importance” (Manzella & Mendez, p.9). The report stated that “these 
regional imbalances comprised those that arose from the absence of modern activity or the 
over-dependence (…) on agriculture or declining industrial activities” which could be 
logically found in specific geographic areas with a preponderance of agriculture, in areas of 
industrial change and of structural under-employment.” (Manzella & Mendez, 2009). In the 
context of the review of future policy interventions, ideas that emerged included “the setting 
up of a Regional Development Fund granting interest rate subsidies and guarantees; the 
preparation of regional development plans by Member States and the Commission; the 
creation of a Regional Development Committee; and the setting up of a regional development 
company acting as an information centre for European public and private investors” 
(Manzella & Mendez, 2009, p. 7). 
 
European Regional Development Fund (1975-1979) 
 
In the context of the proceeding policy period, Community Structural Funds were established 
in 1975 with the creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); “the explicit 
aim [of the new policy instrument] was to reduce disparities in development between 
advanced and least favoured regions (LFR) of the Community by strengthening the local and 
regional structures of the latter” (Sharp, 2003, p.48). It aimed to assist the least favoured 
regions and focused mainly on productive investments, infrastructures and small business 
enterprises development (Dall’Erba, 2003). 
In this sense, regional policy was now perceived as a “crucial instrument for the identity of a 
European model of society, and for the legitimacy and viability of the whole political process 
of integration” with the link to the European Monetary Fund also clear where it was said by 
the Commission that “no Member States can be expected to support the economic and 
monetary disciplines of the Economic and Monetary Union without Community solidarity 
involved in the effective use of such instruments; equally Member States must be prepared 
to accept the disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union as a condition of this Community 
support” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p. 19). 
The legal framework of the ERDF was the outcome of lengthy negotiations between Member 
States and the Commission. The total agreed budget for the fund was 1.3 billion European 
Units of Account over a 3-year period (1975–1978), representing around 5 per cent of the 
Community budget. The distribution of resources to each Member State was determined on 
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the basis of a system of national quotas, setting out the percentage share allocated to each 
Member State. The shares were largely worked out on the basis of inter-state bargaining, 
linked to net budgetary balances, and did not have a direct, explicit link to Community 
regional development needs (Manzella and Mendez, 2009). It was ultimately determined that 
the ERDF would function according to “objective community indicators”. However, the 
national governments retained the right to determine eligible regions (Brunazzo 2016, p.18). 
In the end, “not only was the ERDF’s budget and distribution calculated on an 
intergovernmental basis, but Member States also retained direct control over every aspect of 
the Fund’s management and implementation” (Manzella and Mendez 2009, p.10). 
Initially, the ERDF achieved “only modest results for three main reasons: it was considered 
a compensatory measure for net contributors to the Community budget; its budget of 1.3 
billion euros (around 5 per cent of the Community budget) was considered too small to play 
a significant role; and the Council of Ministers was in charge of defining the budget on the 
basis of national quotas annually negotiated between the Member States, without targeting 
regions that were lagging behind in terms of development, leading Member State 
governments to dominate ERDF management” (Brunazzo, 2016, p.20). The ERDF reflected 
the strong role that Member States took in negotiations with governments, dominating all 
aspects of the process. Thus during this period, the “institutionalisation of a truly European 
regional policy was, therefore, far from attained” (Brunazzo, 2016, p.20) 
 
The 1979 and 1984 reforms and the gradual Europeanisation of 
Community regional policy (1979–1987) 
 
In 1979 and 1984, two minor reforms took place. In 1979, the Commission approved a 50 
per cent increase of the ERDF budget in response to the growth of regional imbalances due 
to the Greek accession. In the same year a ‘non-quota’ section was added, which had the 
political outcome of enabling the Commission to use funds more autonomously, to support 
development projects in areas not designated by the national governments. This reform also 
created the possibility of ‘integrated’ development programs, supported by different funds 
with a regional dimension, such as the ERDF, the European Social Fund (ESF), the European 
Agriculture Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and European Investment Bank loans. The new 
legislation also granted the Commission a strategic role in periodic reporting on the economic 
and social conditions of the regions, and suggesting new regional priorities and guidelines 
(Brunazzo, 2016). In October 1981, the Commission tabled the first set of proposals for 
regional policy reforms. The regulations were finally agreed upon by the Council in June 
1984 and introduced several important changes, primarily aimed at increasing the 
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Community orientation of the policy (Manzella and Mendez, 2009). 
In 1984, a second revision of EU regional policy introduced more substantial changes. The 
reform progressively increased the economic resources allocated to the ERDF (from about 
7.5% of the European Community budget in 1984 to 9.1% in 1986). The system of national 
quotas was replaced by a system of indicative (minimum and maximum) ranges, although a 
minimum amount of ERDF funding was guaranteed to the Member States of they submitted 
a sufficient number of acceptable applications by a specific deadline. Integrated programs 
were further strengthened. The reform also allowed the Commission to initiate negotiations 
with Member States to finance specific national programs of Community interest. Although 
these reforms “enhanced the Community orientation of the policy and gave the Commission 
greater autonomy in deciding which regions to target, European Community Regional policy 
essentially remained a transfer-of-payment system until 1988” (Brunazzo 2016, p.20). 
In 1986, the number of citizens living in less-developed regions (i.e. per capita GDP lower 
than 75% of the Community average) doubled. The accessions of Spain and Portugal 
occurred in 1986, a development that “was regarded with great concern by some Member 
States” (Brunazzo, 2016, p.20). Also at that time, Greece threatened to veto the enlargement 
if the EU did not adopt measures to protect its agricultural production. As a consequence, the 
Council of Ministers created the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, a budgetary 
commitment established for seven years (1986–1992), in order to help “the southern regions 
of the present Community” – defined as the whole of Greece, parts of southern France and 
most of southern Italy – “to adjust under the best conditions possible to the new situation 
created by enlargement” (Brunazzo, 2016, p.20). Thus the Commission aimed to overcome 
a situation where Structural Funds were seen as a redistribution mechanism by redefining the 
objectives of the instrument towards support and structural conversion of regions in difficult 
economic contexts (Brunazzo, 2016). 
Overall, the mid-to-late 1980s saw growing ‘Europeanisation’ over policy influences, with 
increased EU control of national regional aids combined with significant change to EU 
regional policy with the 1988 Structural Funds Regulations representing a “major 
breakthrough from this perspective, resulting, for the first time, in a European-wide typology 
of regions for which the Commission had power of initiative in area designation”. In this 
period, the Commission was able to “increasingly control the distribution of Structural Funds 
under regional policy mechanisms as well as control national regional aid approval under 
competition policy, leading to a perception by Member States that they were being 
increasingly constrained in their capacity to address their own regional problems” (Wishlade, 
Yuill and Mendez, 2003). 
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These developments signalled the evolution of EU regional policy from “a Member State 
controlled model, where the Commission’s role was effectively restricted to that of a treasurer 
signing blank cheques, policy moved to one involving a more cooperative relationship 
between both levels and became more grounded on Community objectives, priorities and 
experimentation, at least for part of the Cohesion policy budget”. In addition, accordingly the 
regulatory reforms, along with the agreement on the [Integrated Mediterranean Programmes], 
were argued to have “provided lessons, if not a blueprint, for some of the principles which 
were to underpin the landmark reforms of 1988” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p.13). 
 
The 1988 reform: the beginning of a new era in European Union regional 
policy (1988) 
 
The year 1988 marked the beginning of a new era for the Community’s regional policy, often 
described as a “watershed moment in the evolution of EU regional policy” (Durova, 2007). 
“Under the leadership of its new president Jacques Delors, the importance attached to the 
policy by the Commission was immediately clear, with one bold objective in mind: to 
transform it from an essentially intergovernmental budgetary transfer to that of a genuine 
regional development tool, with the potential to provide effective solutions to the problems 
faced by the Community’s regions” (Manzella and Mendez, 2009). 
In the 1980s, there were only 12 EU member states. In 1989, state socialism collapsed in 
Poland and Hungary, and then throughout Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The central 
goal of the former Soviet bloc countries was to join Europe as fast as possible. Their 
economies worked as non-market systems and were nearly completely state-owned. They 
have been described as “debt-ridden and economically bankrupt, their environmental record 
‘tragic’, and their infrastructure remaining at least half a century behind” (Berend, p.83). The 
income level of the region, on average, reached only 32 per cent of the EU’s average in 1995. 
None of these countries would be a net contributor to the EU budget and they required huge 
amounts of assistance. Agriculture still represented an enormous part of their economies. The 
agricultural population accounted for 22 per cent of the active population in CCE (Berend 
2009). 
European Commission President Jacques Delors argued at the time that there was more 
reason than ever to deepen integration. His speech reflected the thinking of a generation of 
European leaders who still thought of political unification and federalisation, the 
indivisibility of European security, and further economic integration as a “bridge towards 
political integration”. Delors also believed that “all the countries of Europe will benefit from 
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the stimulus and advantages of the single market… and that [the Community has to help] the 
countries of Eastern Europe modernise their economies” (Delors cited in Berend, 2009, p.84). 
Thus, Europe’s readiness to consider the future membership of CEE countries was not just a 
moral question; a new incentive, perhaps an imperative, was globalisation. In the same 
speech, Delors stressed that “nations cannot act alone [as there is] a growing interdependence 
of our economies [and] the internationalisation of the financial world [making] full national 
sovereignty a fiction” (Delors cited in Berend 2009, p.84). 
The policy genesis of EU Structural Funds, therefore, has always combined attempts to 
meet both economic and social objectives. The key elements of the policy reflect the view 
that redistribution between richer and poorer regions across the different member states was, 
and is, needed in order to both support and ameliorate the effects of further economic 
integration (Wilson 2012). Politically, the power acquired by the Commission in the 1988 
reform “did not encounter opposition from the Member States … the wealthier Member 
States, in particular, looked at the Commission as a guardian of efficient spending in the 
poorer Member States, where the bulk of Structural Funds were being spent and considered 
the increased importance of the Commission as a natural side-effect of the doubling of 
financial resources dedicated to the policy” Brunazzo 2016, p.23). 
Aiming at improving the efficiency of regional policy, the 1988 reform provided a significant 
increase in regional funding by doubling Structural Funds commitments, which by 1993 
would amount to 30.7 per cent of the total European budget (14 billion Euro). This reform 
was based on five new regulations, which came into effect in January 1989. The new 
regulations introduced four basic principles: (Brunazzo, 2016). 
• Concentration: the EU assistance shall be focused on a limited number of objectives 
in the least-developed regions;  
• Programming: the EU assistance supports multi-annual programmes based on 
analysis, strategic planning and evaluation;  
• Additionally: the EU funds shall be added (and not substituted) to Member States  
• Partnership: Community operations shall be established through close consultations 
between the Commission, the Member States concerned and the competent authorities 
designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party 
acting as a partner in pursuit of a common goal  
Before 1988, the Structural Funds paid little attention to R&D, but with the reforms of that 
year, greater attention was given to innovation. In the period 1989–1993, 3.9 per cent of 
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spending under Structural Funds was devoted to R&D, mostly from spending under 
Objectives 1 and 2 (and Objective 6 when this was introduced) (Sharp, 2003). The Structural 
Funds RTD objective for 1989–1993 was targeted primarily at strengthening infrastructure, 
with many Member States using the re-direction of objectives as an opportunity to make good 
the inadequacies of previous funding of Regional Technological Development innovation 
investments and greater emphasis on stimulating the demand side (i.e. corporate R&D, 
especially in small and medium enterprises). In addition to this, there were significant new 
investments allocated to tackling the supply side of economic development, especially in 
terms of new facilities for public research laboratories and universities, many of which had 
little obvious linkage into the local economy. Although such facilities can, in the long run, 
bring stable highly paid employment into an area, unless they also act as the nucleus for a 
cluster of activities – attracting other similar laboratories from public and private sectors and 
spinning off specialist small firms – then their impact on the local economy can be very 
limited (Sharp, 2003).  
In addition, the 1988 reform created a new fund directed towards Community Initiatives 
(CIs), accounting for about 8 per cent of the Structural Fund budget for the period 1989–
1993. CIs were managed directly by the Commission and focused on issues like “economic 
and social conversion of the coal mining areas, the improvement of the environment, the 
strengthening of innovation capacity and technological development, cooperation between 
regions on different sides of national borders and others” (Brunazzo, 2016, p.23). 
The reform of Cohesion policy in 1988 introduced new governance arrangements, which 
emphasised the importance of changes such as a new ‘partnership’ principle that required 
formal involvement of relevant regional and local authorities in program formulation and 
implementation Thus, a key innovation was the creation of a multi-level governance model 
involving the collective participation of vertical partners (community, national, regional and 
local authorities) and horizontal stakeholders (business representatives, trade unions, non-
governmental organisations etc) in the design and implementation of programs in accordance 
with a common set of organisational and functional criteria and rules (Durova, 2017). This 
emphasised the increasingly shared and interlinked nature of decision-making between 
Community, national and subnational actors, in contrast to state-centric accounts of policy-
making. The reform enshrined the principle of subsidiarity, which enabled sub-national 
governments to participate in the making of regional policies (Bailey and De Propis, 2002).  
In relation to the legal framework, in this time period, the legal basis for policy was 
progressed in relation to financing and the regulatory framework. The legal basis was 
addressed through the Single European Act of 1987 (SEA 1987). A major revision 
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constitutionalised Cohesion policy by introducing the specific title ‘Economic and Social 
Cohesion’. The policy objective was defined as promoting the “overall harmonious 
development” of the community and “strengthening economic and social cohesion”, 
particularly by “reducing disparities between the various regions and the backwardness of 
less-favoured regions” (SEA 1987, Article 130a). The key policy instruments for delivering 
this objective were the three Structural Funds (the European Regional Development Fund 
[ERDF], the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund-Guidance Section and the 
European Social Fund), although the Member States’ economic policies and other 
Community policies also contributed in a coordinated fashion (SEA 1987, Article 130b). The 
key task of the ERDF was “to redress the main regional imbalances in the Community 
through participation in the development and structural adjustment of regions whose 
development is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions” (SEA 
1987, Article 130c) (Manzella and Mendez, 2009, p. 15). 
Thus, the 1988 reform promoted the creation of a truly European regional policy, “from an 
essentially intergovernmental budgetary transfer to a genuine regional development tool with 
the potential to provide effective solons to the problems faced by the Community’s regions” 
(Brunazzo, 2016). Moreover, since 1988 Cohesion policy has assumed an economic and a 
political dimension regarding the greater involvement in sub-national institutions in 
Community policy-making (Brunazzo, 2016). It is also important to note that most EU 
Member States had been operating regional policies since before the EEC came into being; 
historically, a major strand of policy has involved the use of government subsidies (state aids) 
to encourage investment in designated problem regions by firms. In contrast, “regional policy 
at the European level was a ‘comparative newcomer’ with a distinct EC regional policy (in 
the form of the revised Structural Funds) not emerging until the late 1980s” (Wishlade, Yuill 
and Mendez, 2003). 
 
The 1993 and 1999 reforms (1993–1999) 
 
In the next policy phase (1993–1999), two subsequent reforms occurred, described as “more 
modest in scope” with a focus on fine-tuning the new governing principles, particularly to 
improve policy effectiveness and decentralise responsibilities to Member State authorities 
(Manzella and Mendez 2009). Politically the reforms occurred in the context of Treaty reform 
and had the effect of deepening integration (through the completion of the internal market 
and progress with Economic and Monetary Union) and two enlargements (Manzella and 
Mendez, 2009). 
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The first reform occurred in 1993, in the context of a major Treaty revision. After the 
completion of the internal market, the Maastricht Treaty (approved in February 1992) marked 
a new age in European integration by providing for the establishment of the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU). It also reinforced the priority attached to economic and social 
cohesion by making it a core EU objective, on par with the internal market and EMU. 
Community funds allocated to the poorest countries over the 1993–1999 Delors II package 
(154.5 billion Euros) were increased during the negotiations that occurred with the advent of 
this reform (Manzella & Mendez, 2009). 
In this context, a new instrument, the Cohesion Fund, was introduced to co-finance 
infrastructure projects in the poorer Member States (Greece, Ireland, Spain and Portugal) and 
support them in fulfilling the EMU convergence criteria. In addition, the Maastricht Treaty 
required the Commission to publish a Cohesion Report every 3 years, to examine progress 
made towards achieving economic and social cohesion and presenting reform proposals (if 
deemed necessary). (Manzella & Mendez, 2009). In addition, policy objectives were 
restructured. Following the accession of Sweden and Finland in 1995, a new Objective 6 was 
introduced in consideration of the problems of sparse population. A new Financial Instrument 
for Fisheries Guidance was also created to assist in the restructuring of the fisheries sector. 
Second, spatial coverage increased from 42 per cent of the Community population to 52 per 
cent (most of the increase was due to the inclusion of the new German Lander), and a greater 
role was given to the Member States in the Objective 2 and 5b area selection process. Third, 
the programming process was streamlined by introducing the possibility of adopting a Single 
Programming Document (instead of a CSF and OP involving two decisions). Fourth, the 
scope of the partnership principle was broadened by specifying a role for economic and social 
partners in the regulation, within the framework of domestic practice. 
It is important to note that in addition to the 90 per cent of funds dispersed under the CSF 
framework in the 1994–1999 programming period, most of the action in RTD and innovation 
has to come under the SME initiative (co-operation between SMEs, but including cooperation 
over R&D, technology transfer and with research centres). With 99 per cent of funds spent 
under the CSF and CIP programmes, the Commission retained 1 per cent of the Structural 
Funds to finance what are known as Innovative Action. The concept behind the initiative was 
that the regional level is the best location for developing plans and programmes relating to 
local/regional economic development due to the better knowledge of local factors. These 
were pilot projects focused on general initiatives including Regional Innovation Strategies 
(RIS). At the time DG X11 launched its Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer 
Strategies (RITTS) programmed under the 4th Framework Programme Innovation Initiative. 
This, unlike the RIS, was not restricted to designated regions (Sharp, 2003). 
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The two programs were run in conjunction with each other, with open calls for proposals to 
interested regions, and proposals evaluated by the Commission. Successful applications were 
co-funded to the tune of 50 per cent on a budget of approximately 500,000 Euros. The aim 
was to provide a framework within which national, regional and community authorities could 
work together on local/regional issues and to improve the capacity of local actors to play a 
constructive role in such programs. There was an increasing number of local/regional 
authorities who participated in such exercises and, by the late 1990s, feedback was positive. 
The 1999 Thematic Evaluation of the Structural Funds, for example, concluded of the pilot 
programmes “that they were ultimately beneficial for Objective 1 regions because it helps 
them to modernise institutions and triggers new thinking” (Sharp, 2003 p.51). It was felt that 
the impact of the programs would not be much more than that, until linked with 
implementation mechanisms. 
The next reform took place in 1999 to cover the 2000–2006 programming period. In terms 
of the political context, the reforms were developed and agreed during enlargement 
negotiations, although “exactly when and how many of the new Member States were to join 
was uncertain at the time” (Manzella & Mendez, 2009, p.15). However, the EU certainly 
intended to continue to support the accession of the CEE countries. Enlargement bought 
about changes to Regional policy, allowing for the accommodation of new members whose 
levels of wealth were considerably lower than those of the EU15; Eastern enlargement 
represented a more serious challenge for the EU than previous enlargements. For instance 
“the richest candidate country, Slovenia, had a per capita income around 70 per cent of the 
EU average” (Brunazzo, 2016, pp. 25-6). This had the practical effect of meaning that most 
the entire territory of the candidate countries would be eligible for Objective 1 assistance 
(Brunazzo, 2016). 
The economic context was characterised by an internationally deteriorating economic 
situation, resulting in high rates of unemployment across Europe. This led to the addition of 
a new title on employment in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, and strong fiscal 
consolidation pressures across the EU, partly associated with the introduction of the Euro. It 
has been argued that the bleak economic conditions help to explain why, different from 
previous reforms, the share of funding allocated to Cohesion policy for the 2000–2006 period 
remained stable. Against this backdrop, an agreement on the reform was reached during the 
Berlin European Council of March 1999, allocating 213 billion Euros to Cohesion policy, 
39.6 billion Euros of which was accounted for by post accession assistance (Manzella & 
Mendez, 2009, p.16). 
The Commission’s plan for addressing these challenges included the need to maintain 
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Cohesion policy; pursue the reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP); strengthen 
growth, employment and living conditions through the EU internal policies; and to allow for 
the accession of new members, whilst maintaining budgetary discipline. The 1999 reform did 
not foresee increasing spending on the Structural Funds but was instead focused on the 
stabilisation of total expenditure, with “concentration, efficiency and simplification” 
becoming the cornerstones of this reform (Brunazzo, 2016, p.26). This included a reduction 
to three of the Objectives, stricter eligibility rules, and the addition of a new efficiency 
principle to the existing five principles. The new regulations were approved by the Council 
between May and June 1999. Four main aims underpinned the reforms. The first was to 
increase the concentration of support leading to a reduction in the number of priority 
Objectives (from seven to three) as well as in the proportion of the Community population 
eligible for support under the two territorial Objectives 1 and 2 (from 51.3% to 40.7% of the 
Community population) (Brunazzo 2016). 
European Union jobs and growth agenda (2007–2013) 
Brunazzo argued that the regulatory package approved in July 2006 represented the most 
radical reform of Cohesion policy since 1988. The reforms introduced under the 2007–2013 
period should be viewed within the context of a mix of political, economic and financial 
considerations, which had profound implications for the shape and content of policy 
(Brunazzo 2016). Politically, an important factor was the EU’s enlargement in 2004 to 
incorporate 10 new Member States with significantly lower levels of income, a development 
consolidated by the anticipated accessions of Romania and Bulgaria. This resulted in the 
“politically sensitive consequence” of a budgetary shift in Cohesion policy resources from 
the EU15 towards the new Member States (Manzella & Mendez, 2009 p.18). 
Economically, the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 marked a turning point in the 
thinking about the policy logic that had underpinned EU Regional policy since the 1960s. EU 
Regional policy gradually embarked on a new direction, underpinned by a new theoretical 
approach to regional development. The EU worked closely with the OECD to develop the 
new policy direction and the changed approach was centred on building innovation through 
establishing institutional architecture at the level of the region. There came to be a new 
emphasis on encouraging closer interaction between regional stakeholders to encourage 
competitiveness. This shift has been described as “representing a significant transition away 
from EU Regional Policy focused on purely redistributive aims to regional economic-
development policies, not just to promote the convergence of lagging or restructuring regions, 
but to feed into EU- wide advances” (Begg 2010, p.80). 
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Another important contextual factor was the increased importance being attached to the EU 
growth and jobs agenda in the context of the ongoing impact of the GFC. The Commission 
argued at the time that “although EU Regional policy is designed as a long-term structural 
policy, action was required to adapt to a widely different economic context and respond to 
unexpected challenges” (European Commission 2014, p.271). The Lisbon Strategy, adopted 
in 2000, was aimed at boosting the competitiveness and knowledge-intensity of the EU 
economy by, for example, increasing investment in innovation. The European Council 
argued that in order to achieve this objective, measures at Community level should 
concentrate on key actions and areas such as supporting knowledge and innovation in Europe; 
reforming state aid policy; better regulation; developing the internal market for services; 
completing the Doha round of international trade negotiations; removing obstacles to 
mobility; developing a common approach to economic migration; and managing the social 
consequences of economic restructuring. The Lisbon Strategy led to a “profound reframing 
of Cohesion policy” (European Council as cited in Brunazzo 2016, p.28). 
The Lisbon Strategy was relaunched in 2007 with a stronger focus on growth and jobs. In 
addition, the Gothenburg Strategy, adopted in 2001, focused on sustainable development (i.e. 
meeting the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs). This was followed by a comprehensive Sustainable Development 
Strategy for an enhanced EU in 2006 (European Commission 6th Cohesion report). The link 
between Cohesion policy and the Lisbon and Sustainable Development Strategy was 
strengthened for the 2007–2013 programming period. New ‘earmarking’ requirements 
ensured that a large part of Cohesion policy funding went to support projects that contributed 
to the two strategies, marking a further shift towards aligning Cohesion policy with the 
overall policy agenda of the EU. The primary goal of reducing economic disparities, 
however, remained intact in the process. The bulk of funding continued to go to less-
developed regions and the earmarking requirements were less stringent for these than for 
more developed regions (European Commission 2014). As of 2007, three new Objectives 
defined Cohesion policy: Convergence, Regional Competitiveness and Employment, and 
European Territorial Cooperation (Brunazzo 2016). 
In 2009, the European Commission commissioned the influential Barca Report, which 
outlined how a re-launched Cohesion policy required reform of the priorities and governance 
of the policy (Barca, 2009). Barca reviewed EU experiments in the 10 years before 2009 that 
devolved economic development programming. He found that while the EU policy intention 
was certainly becoming well established in the policy frameworks of each Member State, 
there had been a deficit in strategic planning and in developing the policy, especially the 
coherent adoption of a place-based, territorial perspective (Barca, 2009, p. xvii):  
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[N]ew core priorities for the policy were needed and that a case should be made for 
selecting innovation as a key focus of the new direction. In this sense, place-based 
interventions should build on strengths and take account of weaknesses of previous 
experiences of Cohesion policy and attempt to replicate policies modelled on the 
earlier policy of establishing a European Research Area (ERA), for instance, by 
selecting in each region a limited number of sectors in which innovation could most 
readily occur and a knowledge base be built up. 
The Barca Report recommended a new approach to Regional policy to make the most of the 
diversity of industrial agglomerations and networks. Their ‘openness’ beyond regional or 
national boundaries should be promoted. In the report, Barca noted there was a risk that local 
actors, public research centres or universities, or firms or innovation ‘intermediaries’, could 
seek to profit unduly from public intervention. This was in part due to a lack of information 
about specific targets, but Barca believed there were ways to create incentives to avoid such 
an outcome. The transfer of funds to Member States and regions would be made conditional 
“on their committing to using these incentives” (Barca 2009). The new Regional policy 
direction ultimately adopted many of the Barca Report recommendations and would take the 
form of a ‘Smart Specialisation’ development perspective based on a systems way of thinking 
about innovation and growth. Smart Specialisation emphasised the economic potential of a 
region given its place within a complex regional system (McCann & Ortega-Argiles, in 
Thissen et al. 2013). 
The Barca Report was commissioned in the context of a growing international trend since 
the 1990s, towards the devolution of Regional policy to the level of place. Internationally, 
public policy makers were shifting from an approach that sought to reduce disparities in 
income and infrastructure, to reducing disparities in employment as well. Regional policy 
was evolving from a top-down subsidy-based group of interventions designed to reduce 
regional disparities, into much broader policies designed to improve regional 
competitiveness. This shift is often described as a shift from ‘vertical’ to ‘horizontal’ 
policy processes to promote regional growth over redistribution. Regional policy 
instruments have become much broader in scope and are increasingly being tailored to 
the specific requirements of individual regions. Regional strategic programs and 
programming have grown in prominence, reflecting a general policy shift towards 
support for endogenous development and the business environment, building on regional 
potential and capabilities, and aiming to foster innovation-orientated initiatives. At the 
same time, multi-level governance approaches involving national, regional and local 
governments, as well as third-party stakeholders such as private actors and non-profit 
organisations, have increased in importance. The interdependencies of sectoral policies 
became better recognised and the impacts on regions have facilitated cooperation. The 
OECD observes that as a result, Regional policy, long marginal, has now become more 
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central in member countries. Comprehensive regional policies are increasingly regarded 
as complementary to national economic and structural policies in generating growth 
(OECD 2010). 
Along with this new devolved governance focus of Regional policy, was a trend across 
the OECD countries for regional development policies to focus on innovation-driven 
growth. The subsidy-led approach, compensating for weaknesses in lagging regions, has 
thus progressively evolved towards a competitiveness-oriented approach favouring 
growth in all regions. With this shift, regional development policies have included more 
integrated policy portfolios to promote the complementarity of policies in a given place 
(place-based approaches) and to leverage regional assets (OECD 2013b). As a result, 
European Cohesion policy places an increasing emphasis on innovation, and expects 
regions to engage in ‘smart specialisation’ strategies to support knowledge-based 
development (EC in OECD 2013b). Regions have thus been required to rethink their 
portfolio of innovation-related policies (OECD 2013b). 
In this international context, the Barca Report also made the case for the region to be at the 
centre of policy making under the future direction of Regional policy (Barca 2009): 
…in a place-based policy, public interventions rely on local knowledge and are 
verifiable and submitted to scrutiny, while linkages among places are taken into 
account … this strategy is superior to alternative strategies that do not make explicit 
and accountable their territorial focus, or even hide it behind a screen of self-
proclaimed space-blindness, fail to integrate services, and either assume that the 
State knows best or rely on the choices and guidance of a few private actors. The 
lessons of the recent crisis reinforce this argument. 
The Barca Report distinguished between policy interventions aimed at increasing income 
and growth (‘efficiency objectives’ in the terminology of the Report) and those aimed at 
reducing inequalities (‘social inclusion objectives’). Core priorities were identified and 
defined in order to ensure greater coherence with the place-based or territorial policy concept 
in three important policy areas: innovation and climate change, migration and children, and 
skills and ageing. The report argued that by concentrating “on a few issues of key importance 
for the EU and its people (that this will) create a Europe-wide critical mass of interventions 
on commonly agreed priorities, attract political and public attention to the measures 
implemented and enable the Commission to better focus its human resources and efforts and 
play a more strategic role” (Barca, 2009, p vii). The Barca Report laid the foundations for 
the 2014 reform of EU Regional policy and the development of the Smart Specialisation 
policy. 
 
The 2014 reform: Smart Specialisation (2014–2020) 
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Over the most recent policy cycle of 2014–2020, the EU has increasingly made the allocation 
of ERDF funds conditional on a requirement that regions develop a Smart Specialisation 
strategy. The Smart Specialisation policy focuses on integrating regional and innovation 
policy agendas to assist nations and regions to boost regional innovation to achieve economic 
growth. The new approach encourages regions to develop strategies that will produce an 
integrated, place-based economic transformation agenda. It has four important elements: to 
focus policy support and investments on key national/regional priorities; to engage with 
challenges and needs for knowledge-based development, including ICT-related measures; to 
build on the strengths, competitive advantages and potential for excellence of each 
country/region; to support technological as well as practice-based innovation and aim to 
stimulate private sector investment and to get stakeholders fully involved and encourage 
innovation and experimentation.  
Overall the Smart Specialisation policy envisages structural transformation of regional 
economies based on a ‘systems innovation’ analysis being undertaken in the region. Policies 
should be developed based on a “sound analysis of the regional economy, society and 
innovation structure”, and should aim to assess both existing assets and prospects for future 
development. The principles embodied in the Smart Specialisation concept are central to the 
Europe 2020 agenda, which aims to foster smart growth that is both sustainable and inclusive. 
The principles are now enshrined with the place-based regional development objectives 
inherent in the new reforms to EU Cohesion policy (Foray 2015). 
It was determined that the Commission would invest around one-third of the EU budget in 
key areas in line with the Europe 2020 strategy of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
To this end, 11 thematic objectives corresponding to the Europe 2020 priorities have been 
defined in the new legal framework. To maximise the impact of investment, Member States 
and regions need to concentrate EU funding on a limited number of these objectives 
considering the specific territorial challenges they face and their development needs (Future 
of Cohesion report 11). The EU has made it an imperative for regions and countries to 
develop Smart Specialisation strategic plans. States and regions are required to develop such 
policies, and then to engage in ongoing monitoring and evaluation of the progress of their 
policies (McCann & Ortega-Argiles 2013).  
Based on the work of the EU with the OECD, the new policy encourages regional 
stakeholders to come together in a process of ‘entrepreneurial discovery’ to identify regional 
knowledge assets that can be developed and deployed across multiple global value chains. 
Regions are being encouraged to gain a better understanding in an area about the intersection 
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of global value chains (GVC) on the one hand, and increasingly mobile labour markets on 
the other, and being able to see that the relevance of place and opportunities for innovative 
production are crucial for regions to be able to build capability for value adding (Wilson et 
al. 2014). As the OECD indicates (OECD 2009, p. 20). 
Governments are increasingly realising that investing in the regional dimension 
of innovation is crucial to strategies to promote growth. Research and 
technology driven innovation is highly concentrated but public policy can 
generate new dynamics of innovation.... high technology regions such as Silicon 
Valley suggest that that innovation led public investment can drive economic 
modernisation and help regions move up global value chains. 
 
Public policy interventions have traditionally supported innovation in a single business 
through subsidies for R&D or technology acquisition. The new policy direction reflects a 
turn towards theories of economic geography with uptake of a model that holds that 
successful innovation depends on interactions between a variety of public and private 
organisations and drawing on diverse skills and capabilities, including smaller and larger 
companies, universities, public agencies and business intermediaries. Building an innovation 
system at the level of place seeks to motivate all these players in the ways in which they 
interact with each other and tackle socio-economic or, increasingly, environmental challenges 
(European Union 2012a). 
The Smart Specialisation concept originated in the literature that analysed the productivity 
gap between the US and Europe, a gap which had become evident since 1995. The 
transatlantic productivity differences appeared to be paradoxical, in that they became most 
evident precisely when they were least expected (McCann & Ortega-Argiles 2013). Out of 
this development emerged an ICT-related explanation of the transatlantic productivity gap, 
including the technological disadvantage of the EU relative to the US, best proxied by ICT-
based R&D investment. What ultimately constrains the demand for human capital, in this 
explanation, is the combination of the diffusion of ICTs, the diffusion of innovative 
organisational and management practices and the diffusion of innovation through embodied 
technology in new capital formation. Thus, Europe was falling behind in the transmission of 
new knowledge, ideas and applications throughout the economy. According to McCann and 
Ortega-Argiles, the “transmission linkages between sectors, places and institutions were 
much more limited in speed and strength, thereby reducing the scale and availability of 
knowledge spill overs and diffusion effects”. Further to this, they argued that “while the 
Single Market had encouraged much progress in the area of goods markets, energy markets, 
transportation markets and some financial markets, in many service industries in particular, 
the EU market were still highly fragmented, and this fragmentation limits the flow of 
knowledge, ideas, new techniques and systems” (McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2013, p.1410). 
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In terms of reform relating to the overall administration of Cohesion policy, it is now 
conditional upon receiving funds that regions and Member States target EU investments to 
four key areas for economic growth and job creation: research and innovation; information 
and communication technologies (ICT); enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs); and supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy (European 
Commission, Future of Cohesion Policy Report I). This followed on from a 2-year 
negotiation on the reform of Cohesion policy that was concluded in December 2013.  
To improve performance, new conditionality provisions have been introduced to ensure that 
necessary framework conditions for effective investment are in place before investment starts 
(ex-ante conditionalities) and that the impact of cohesion funding is not undermined by an 
unsound fiscal and macroeconomic framework (macroeconomic conditionality). The policy 
will address the needs of Member States identified in the European Semester and encourage 
budget consolidation by helping to preserve growth-friendly expenditure. It will provide 
resources to undertake structural reforms, including administrative capacity building. 
Common provisions have been established for all EU funds supporting economic and social 
development (i.e. the ERDF, ESF, Cohesion Fund, European Agricultural Fund for Rural 
Development (EAFRD) and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF), to improve 
coordination and harmonise the implementation of what are now termed the European 
Structural and Investment (ESI) Funds. This should also simplify their use by recipients and 
reduce the potential risk of irregularities (Future of Cohesion Report ii). In his period, there 
will be more effective coordination between the ESI Funds and other EU policies and 
instruments (such as Horizon 2020, the Connecting Europe Facility and the Programme for 
the Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs), which is another important element of the 
reform (EU 2019). 
To draw on EU funding, each Member State has to prepare a Partnership Agreement stating 
how they will respond to the relevant country-specific recommendations under the European 
Semester and to reaching the Europe 2020 objectives, and set out the arrangements for 
managing the funds effectively. The procedures for programming, management, monitoring 
and control then need to be described in more detail in national or regional programs (EU 
2019). To strengthen ‘ownership’ of the programs on the ground, a new European code of 
conduct lays down the main principles of how Member States and regions should organise 
partnerships and gives guidance on how best to do this. The new legislative and policy 
framework encourages further expansion and strengthening of the use of financial 
instruments as a more efficient and sustainable alternative to traditional grant-based 
financing. In addition, a number of new ways of implementing policy have been developed 
to tackle particular territorial development challenges, such as Integrated Territorial 
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Investments (ITI), community-led local development (CLLD) and multi-fund programs 
combining finance from the ESF, ERDF and the Cohesion Fund (European Union 2019). 
 
Conclusion 
 
As discussed in this chapter, the goals of Cohesion policy have evolved over time. 
Regional policy had been seen traditionally as an expression of solidarity between EU 
countries, as it dedicated the bulk of funding to less-developed regions. It helped these 
regions to fulfil their economic potential, in the light of regional disparities both across 
the EU and within member countries. During the 1960s and 70s, EU Regional policy 
projects concentrated on redistributing wealth from wealthier regions to poorer regions 
through traditional infrastructure-led economic and social projects. Over the past two 
decades, with the onset of large economic and social challenges such as the global financial 
crisis, unemployment, poverty and climate change, the policy logic shifted, with the EU now 
linking policy settings to an economic strategy that is focused on a more specific set of 
economic and environmental policy objectives. The new emphasis is more about encouraging 
business innovation and climate change initiatives. Social inclusion goals are now 
increasingly being perceived as linked to economic goals.  
The embracing by the EU of the new paradigm of Regional policy has often been linked to 
the development of the Lisbon Strategy in the year 2000, which explicitly stated that the new 
central aim of the policy agenda was to be about increasing the competitive position of EU 
regions in the world economy by placing growth, jobs and competitiveness at the top of a 
newly constituted policy agenda. In this context, in the most recent policy cycle (2014–2020) 
the Smart Specialisation policy has been developed to focus on integrating regional and 
innovation policy agendas to assist nations and regions to boost regional innovation to 
achieve economic growth.  
The next chapter will provide a review of the conceptual and theoretical framework 
underpinning Smart Specialisation, and a survey of empirical studies that have addressed the 
implementation challenges associated with the new policy direction. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
 
Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to discuss the implementation challenges associated with Smart 
Specialisation policy in diverse regions of Europe: first, the theoretical underpinnings of the 
policy, then a review of the theoretical and empirical literature relating to policy 
implementation challenges. This literature coverage is valuable for the subsequent policy 
analysis in subsequent chapters. 
 
The Smart Specialisation policy concept 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Smart Specialisation has become a prominent policy tool in the 
context of EU Regional policy. The overall Smart Specialisation policy envisages the 
structural transformation of regional economies based on a “sound analysis of the regional 
economy, society and innovation structure”, which aims to assess both existing assets and 
prospects for future development (EC 2012a, p.9). The policy encourages regions to identify 
development opportunities and induce suitable structural change. It targets the integration of 
existing specialisations with new developing specialisations, and thus diversification into 
areas related to regional strongholds. For this reason, some theorists argue that ‘smart 
diversification’ would be a more appropriate expression for this approach (Asheim et al. as 
cited in Isaksen 2018). The policy also aims to build capabilities in fields in which a region 
has the potential to develop a unique selling proposition and competitive advantage in the 
near future (Foray, 2015). Such a new development path is typically initiated by an 
entrepreneurial vision, also termed entrepreneurial discovery, which can be understood as a 
result of interactions and knowledge exchange between RIS actors (Asheim et al as cited in 
Isaksen, 2018). 
 
Central to the policy is the need for a devolved policy development and implementation 
process, focused upon the strategic interaction between public and private actors in the RIS, 
including researchers, policy makers and entrepreneurs (Isaksen 2018). As Landabaso has 
argued, “Smart Specialisation is about empowering regions to help themselves; encouraging 
key regional players to interact, share a vision and jointly commit efforts and resources, is of 
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paramount importance for the development prospects of a region” (Landabaso as cited in 
Cooke et al. 2012, p.21). The policy process follows a complex and iterative logic that cannot 
be described either as essentially "top down" or essentially "bottom up". As Foray and Hall 
explain, this “bi-directional dynamic process is one in which the principle of entrepreneurial 
discovery plays an essential role and yet so does public policy intervention, which may occur 
at several distinct stages in the identification, evaluation and targeted support for new, 
emerging lines of regional specialisation” (Foray & Hall, 2011, p.2). 
 
As Foray and Goenaga have argued, “Smart Specialisation is a policy concept which 
emphasises the principle of prioritisation in a vertical logic (to favour some technologies, 
fields, population of firms) and defines a method to identify such desirable areas for 
innovation policy intervention” (Foray & Goenaga, p.1, 2013). A key concept of Smart 
Specialisation, described in detail in Chapter 2, is about identifying sectors that can achieve 
critical mass. To achieve this, policy design should take into account the concepts of regional 
embeddedness, relatedness and connectivity (EC 2012). Foray and Goenaga (2013, p. 1) have 
clarified that Smart Specialisation is not a planning doctrine that requires a region to 
specialise in a particular set of industries, rather a: 
…robust and transparent means for nominating those new activities, at regional level, 
that aim at exploring and discovering new domains for constructing regional 
competitive advantages. Thus, rather than offering a method for determining if a 
hypothetical region has a ‘strength’ in a particular set of activities, e.g., tourism and 
fisheries, the crucial question is whether that region would benefit from and should 
specialise in certain R&D and innovation projects in some lead activities such as 
tourism or fisheries, 
 
Foray suggests that priorities should be precise and focused, such as being limited to the 
involvement of a group of 10–20 firms and institutions only (Foray, 2015). The Guide also 
advises that priority areas should not be presented in a “too generic way….to be credible, 
effective and suitable for a concrete action plan, the priorities need to be expressed (…) 
precisely”, such as ICT-based innovation for active ageing, innovative solutions to reduce 
city congestion, wood-based solutions for eco-construction, etc. The Commission is 
particularly anxious for the new policy direction to not repeat common approaches from the 
past, including “spreading the money across powerful lobbies with the frequent outcome that 
there were too many priorities aimed at preserving the status quo rather than looking at future 
opportunities” as well as repeating the past policy problem of regions “imitating other 
regions”’ (EC 2012, p. 51).  
 
The Smart Specialisation policy was developed in the context of a concern that previous 
policy programs promoting innovation advances – particularly in less developed regions 
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(LDR) – had been inadequate in quantity and quality. The Smart Specialisation policy shares 
many of the same features as the Constructing Regional Advantage (CRA) concept in 
informing European policy that promotes economic diversification of regions. Like Smart 
Specialisation, the CRA concept underpinned the development of Regional Innovation 
Strategies thorough the Regional Innovation and Technology Transfer Strategies (RTTS), 
Regional Technology Plans (RTP), RIS (Regional Innovation Strategies) programs of the 
1990s and into the 2000s as a precursor to Smart Specialisation. The CRA policy concept has 
been implemented to some extent by policy makers at the regional level in the EU since the 
mid-1990s, often implicitly (e.g. in the form of the RIS, RITTS and RTP strategies) and in 
some cases explicitly, as in platform policy initiatives in regions located in West Wales and 
Finland (OECDa, 2010).  
 
However, according to Landabaso these programs did not meet economic development needs 
and were not adapted for the process of innovation in different regional contexts. The 
innovation effort by both the public sector and the private sector was inadequate. Programs 
were poorly adapted to the specific needs and conditions in less developed regions (due to a 
lack of understanding of innovation processes at the regional level), which helped to increase 
the 'technology gap' between regions and tended to perpetuate or even increase economic 
disparities between regions. It was increasingly understood by policy makers that a practical 
way to approach this problem might be to encourage regions to develop their own regional 
innovation strategies. These strategies “could promote public/private and inter-firm 
cooperation and create the institutional conditions (e.g. consensus among the key regional 
players) for a more efficient use of scarce public and private resources for the promotion of 
innovation (i.e. bigger and better spending through regional policy)” (Landabaso, 1997, p.1). 
 
In addition, Boschma argues that the key difference between the two approaches is that the 
Smart Specialisation policy explores in more detail the devolved governance policy processes 
associated with identifying areas of economic growth (Boschma, 2013). In this sense, as 
Foray has pointed out, “the key input to the Smart Specialisation concept is the process of 
entrepreneurial discovery that details exactly how the policy process must “select and 
priorities fields or areas where a cluster of activities should be developed, and to let 
entrepreneurial discovery determine the right domains of future specialisation” (Foray et al. 
as cited in Boschma, p.4) Foray has argued that it is these governance processes that will 
improve capacity for the avoidance of vested local stakeholder interests, and enable new 
economic players to emerge to avoid regional lock-in” (Foray et al. as cited in Boschma, 
2013, p.4). 
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The European Commission have developed a policy guide to assist regions with policy 
implementation. The Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisation 
(RIS 3) (hereafter referred to as the Guide) provides detailed analysis of the concept of Smart 
Specialisation (EC 2012a). Many of these ideas will be explored in the next section of this 
chapter. For instance, central to Smart Specialisation is the adoption of a wide view of 
innovation that spans economic activities and involves many sectors of civic society. A vision 
for major structural economic change is explicit in the policy. First, a transition from an 
existing sector to a new one based on cooperative institutions and processes (i.e. the collective 
research and development, engineering and manufacturing capabilities that form the 
knowledge base for development of the new activity). Second, modernisation or the 
technological upgrading of an existing industry, involving the development of specific 
applications of a Key Enabling Technology (KET) to improve efficiency and quality in an 
existing (perhaps traditional) sector. Third, economic diversification. In such cases, the Guide 
argues, the discovery concerns the finding of potential synergies (economies of scope and 
spillovers), are more likely to materialise between an existing activity and a new one (EC 
2012a). A further key concept is that of economic differentiation, which is one of the central 
principles of Smart Specialisation. The key to successful differentiation is to exploit related 
variety; thus a regional economy can build its own competitive advantage by diversifying its 
unique, localised know-how into new related combinations and innovations. These new 
combinations need to be feasible and accessible, given the existing assets, so as to exploit the 
experience accumulated by regional actors (EC 2012a). 
 
The Guide outlines how the Smart Specialisation policy is also about identifying sectors that 
can achieve critical mass. To achieve this, policy design should take into account the concepts 
of regional embeddedness, relatedness and connectivity. Embeddedness refers to the 
existence of industries that are in tune with the relevant socioeconomic conditions, and can 
rely on a trained local labour force and a history of cooperative relations with other regional 
actors. However, the Guide argues that by concentrating only on embeddedness, a regional 
development strategy may risk increasing vulnerability to changing economic conditions. 
Accordingly, it is important that relatedness is also taken into consideration. This concept 
describes the diversification of firms into related areas based on new and innovative 
techniques or processes. This is a strategy of diversifying within a specialisation, which 
enables firms to build on the skills, assets and capabilities within a region, while adapting 
and improving on them through innovation (EC 2012a). 
 
Another key concept relevant to Smart Specialisation policies is connectivity, which holds 
that the policy should aim to link emerging knowledge-based industries to other actors within 
and outside the region. Face-to-face interaction in particular places is also seen as crucial in 
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nurturing innovation, and there are “many examples of regions that have used what can be 
described as social capital to create knowledge-based growth” (EC 2012a). However, the 
policy Guide notes that local interaction can also be negative, can create protectionism and 
rent seeking. Interaction can be most beneficial between different groups, and across classes 
and power structures. Connections to outside regions are only beneficial when ideas are 
internalised to the benefit of local firms. Being connected to the outside, both digitally (with 
information communications technology (ICTS) and physically (with transport 
infrastructure) may lead to a flow of human capital out of the region. Finally, the policy aims 
for regions to identify a “radical foundation of a new domain”. The Guide explains that the 
notion here is that R&D and innovation in a certain field can make previously low-growth 
activities become attractive with the co-emergence of R&D/innovation areas and a niche 
market (EC 2012a). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Europe 2020 dimensions: integrated regional typologies 
(European Commission 2012a) 
 
 
The Guide sees that the elaboration of an overall economic vision for a region requires an 
assessment of which typology captures the major features associated with Europe 2020 
challenges. For the Europe 2020 smart growth typology, the Guide recommends the regional 
innovation framework provided by the OECD (EC 2012a), which provides a typology in 
which regions are grouped into three broad types: knowledge regions, industrial production 
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zones and non-science-and-technology-driven regions, within which there are various sub-
categories. According to the EC, these three broad categories describe the main observed 
differences in terms of relationships between knowledge, innovation and regional 
characteristics. EU regions can be classified into one of these broad smart-growth groupings 
according to the role played by knowledge in fostering their local innovation processes (EC 
2012a). 
 
The combination of the smart growth, sustainable growth and inclusive growth typologies 
(Figure 2.1) allows for 24 possible tripartite types of place characteristics, each of which is 
depicted by a different cell in the three-dimensional box of regions. Underpinning the 
“systems innovation” approach to regional innovation policy is an understanding by the EU 
that European regions can be categorised by three main territorial patterns of innovation with 
regional specificities, an understanding of which is essential to build targeted strategies for 
policy goals: 
 
• strong knowledge-producing regions, which are either science-based or applied-
science-orientated – indigenous innovation takes place in scientific networks, local 
conditions support the creation of knowledge, local diffusion, transformation into 
innovation and widespread local adaption 
• regions specialised in a smart technological application or smart and creative 
diversification – high product innovation rates and high creativity exist to translate 
external basic knowledge and applied science knowledge into innovation 
• imitative innovation regions with local knowledge and innovation intensity – 
creative actors identify where knowledge is lacking outside their region and seek to 
adapt the existing innovation (EC 2012a). 
 
According to the EU, for knowledge-producing regions there is a need to foster R&D 
incentives to attract inventors, innovators and highly skilled labour. Incentives for creative 
applications through cooperative research activities or the search for new technological 
solutions are best suited for the smart technological specialist regions. For the imitative 
innovation regions, support of the development of creative projects with multinational 
corporations may best foster the economic base. Thus, the EU is concerned that “knowledge 
cannot be equated with innovation”, which emphasises the importance of the knowledge-
producing regions in European R&D. To the EU, these regions are critical in achieving R&D 
breakthroughs, whereas regions with low levels of R&D should perhaps be investing in 
intangible assets to make their contribution to innovation outcomes (EC 2012a). 
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For instance, in relation to “intangible assets” the Smart Specialisation policy emphasises a 
wide view of innovation – innovation may occur anywhere and everywhere, in different 
forms, and not just as high-technology development in metropolitan areas (EC 2012a; OECD 
2013b). This concept of innovation encourages policies to go beyond the simplistic notion of 
innovation as solely about investment in research or the manufacturing sector, to include 
innovation as about building competitiveness through design and creative industries, social 
and service innovation, new business models and practice-based innovation. According to 
the EC, all regions have a role to play in the knowledge economy, provided that they can 
identify comparative advantages and have the potential and ambition for excellence in 
specific sectors or market niches (EC 2012a, p. 34). 
 
The EC’s ‘systems innovation’ approach and wide view of innovation encompasses 
innovation in services and in the public sector, in addition to innovation in the manufacturing 
sector, which most other policies target. It also encompasses innovation based on different 
types of knowledge, leading to different modes of innovation: (a) the ‘STI’ (Science, 
Technology, Innovation) mode, based on analytical knowledge/basic research (science 
push/supply-driven approach) and synthetic knowledge/applied research (user-driven 
approach), emphasising product and process innovations; and (b) the ‘DUI’ (Doing, Using, 
Interacting) mode, based on synthetic and symbolic knowledge (market/user-driven), 
emphasising competence building and organisational innovations (EC 2012a). 
 
According to the Guide, this broad concept of innovation means that public policy outcomes 
are complex and difficult to measure over time (EU 2012a, p. 34): 
Innovation is an ever-changing phenomenon. It takes place in a dynamic and mix of 
legislation, user needs, consumer demand, marketing strategies and new 
technologies and organisational practices drive innovation in manufacturing and 
service sectors as well as in social enterprises and the public sector. 
 
Public policy interventions have traditionally supported innovation in a single business 
through subsidies for R&D or technology acquisition. The broad systems view of innovation, 
as promoted by the Smart Specialisation policy, focuses instead on the interactions between 
a variety of public and private organisations, drawing on diverse skills and capabilities, 
including smaller and larger companies, universities, public agencies, business, and 
innovation and financial intermediaries. Innovation measures would therefore seek to 
motivate all of these players, and improve the ways in which they interact with each other 
and the collaboration modes they use to tackle socioeconomic or, increasingly, environmental 
challenges (EC 2012a, p. 34) Thus the ‘innovation’ public policy intervention is “more than 
the sales of an innovative product, reduced process costs or enhanced labour productivity” 
(EC 2012a). Firms may gain new partners, implement organisational change or acquire new 
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methods or competence. There may be spillover to other firms and society from the diffusion 
of new technologies or organisations’ practices. The Guide encourages regions to seek to 
encourage investors to invest in riskier innovative ventures or they may attempt to raise the 
awareness of young people about careers in science and technology and innovation, to ensure 
a future supply of skilled personnel (EC2012a). 
Finally, the Smart Specialisation policy has at its core a commitment to GVC/GPN analysis 
at the level of the region. This acknowledges that greater innovation outcomes at the level of 
the region requires analysis of the fragmentation of production; the mapping of regional 
capabilities; proactive GVC governance and transfer of knowledge across public and private 
domains; and effective monitoring of value creation and capture at the regional level (Todvea 
& Rakhmatullin, 2016). 
The concepts underpinning the Smart Specialisation policy framework have been developed 
over many years in the context of different strands of theory within the economic geography 
discipline. The next section summarizes key developments within the theoretical literature. 
Theoretical underpinnings of Smart Specialisation 
The Smart Specialisation policy envisages structural transformation of regional economies 
based on a ‘systems innovation’ analysis being undertaken in the region. The regional 
innovation system (RIS) concept is grounded in the literature on innovation systems. There 
are different variants of such systems, including, in addition to regional, national, 
technological and sectoral innovation systems. The theoretical foundations of these 
approaches are found in models of interactive innovation, evolutionary economics and 
institutional schools of thought. Consequently, system approaches conceptualise innovation 
as the outcome of non-linear, collaborative and cumulative learning processes that are shaped 
by formal and informal institutions at various spatial scales (Isaksen et al., 2018). 
The systems innovation approach builds on the ideas developed by these economic 
geographers and an extensive body of empirical research that has examined learning, 
innovation and the role of institutions in regional development. This theoretical framework 
synthesises ideas and insights from a range of literature sources within the economic 
geography discipline, including economic agglomeration theories on industrial districts as 
well as institutional theory and, most recently, evolutionary economic geography (EEG). It 
also includes theoretical insights from business studies literature that explore the global value 
chain/global production chain (GVC/GPN) debate and the role of embedded and 
disembedded multinational company (MNC) within a RIS. 
A RIS can be thought of as the institutional infrastructure supporting innovation within the 
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production structure of the region. The two central components of a RIS are the knowledge 
generation sub-system (consisting of universities and other research-generating bodies) and 
the knowledge exploitation sub-system (consisting of firms and industries). Regional 
innovation performance is often attributed to how well (or badly) these two sub-systems are 
aligned and perform (Cooke et al. cited in Marques & Morgan 2018). This understanding 
provides a sophisticated approach to encouraging innovative advances and challenges 
conventional models of innovation based on a science or technology innovation paradigm. 
Science and technology innovations are considered insufficient to address the system 
innovation that new social challenges and mission-led agenda seem to require (Jensen et al. 
as cited in Marques & Morgan, 2018). 
Economic agglomeration theories on industrial districts 
The RIS notion emphasises the superiority of place-based, customised and broad innovation 
system policies over spatially blind and narrow R&D policies, The RIS approach is also 
closely connected to other territorial innovation models, such as innovative milieus, industrial 
districts, learning regions and clusters. Since the 1980s people have used these models to 
offer deep explanations for the uneven geography of innovation, and the endogenous factors 
and processes that shape the knowledge generation and innovation capacities of regions. 
These concepts build on Alfred Marshall’s early ideas on the innovation-enhancing effects 
associated with the geographical concentration of firms (as a particular form of localisation 
economics) and share a common interest in explaining how socio-institutional and cultural 
factors at the regional level enable or constrain localised circulation of knowledge and 
economic coordination (Marshall as cited in Isaksen et al. 2018). Marshall first developed 
the concept of an ‘industrial district’ in 1890 to explain spatially concentrated industrial 
development in different place-based contexts. He argued that “the leadership in a special 
industry, which a district derives from an ‘industrial atmosphere’, had shown more vitality 
than might have seemed probable in view of the incessant changes of technique” (Marshall 
as cited in Simmie 1997, p.18). 
The neo-Marshallian School that emerged in the 1980s, led by the work of Piore and Sabel, 
looked at the features of economic development in selected industrial districts of Europe. The 
central argument of Piore and Sabel challenged the widespread belief that firms are 
independent entities, and that small firms are linked in competitive markets, whereas large 
firms are organised as oligopolistic hierarchies constituting entire industries. They argued 
that these were neither an exhaustive nor accurate description of current configurations. In 
addition, they argued that firms, particularly those organised in industry-embracing 
hierarchies, were saturating markets with traditional, standardised mass-produced goods – 
which mass production systems, typically, cannot supply. In response, consumers were 
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demanding more specialised and differentiated goods (Piore and Sabel, 1984). 
Piore and Sabel maintained that the response of some firms to these changed circumstances 
was the development of flexible specialisation. “Flexible specialisation” refers to a strategy 
of permanent innovation: firms accommodate ceaseless change, rather than try to control it 
that is based on “flexible multi-use equipment, skilled workers, and the creation, through 
politics, of an industrial community that restricts the forms of competition to those favouring 
innovation” (Piore and Sabel, 1984, p.17). Flexible innovation amounts to a revival of craft 
forms of production that were marginalised in the first industrial divide usually referred to as 
‘The Industrial Revolution.’ According to Piore and Sabel, the spread of flexible 
specialisation represented a major change to industrial organisation of economies leading to 
craft-based industries from Italy, Germany and Japan, “to support what they argued to be a 
new paradigm” (Piore and Sabel, in Simmie 1997). There have been many empirical studies 
arising out of the Piore and Sabel seminal work, including for instance Michael Storper’s 
study of the high-fashion areas of Paris, that illustrate the main characteristics of flexible 
specialisation (Storper, 1993). 
 
Learning, innovation and the role of formal and informal institutions in 
regional development 
 
Kevin Morgan has argued that “learning and innovation are now considered pivotal for 
ensuring competitiveness and prosperity of regional economies. Innovation – understood in 
the broad sense to include product, process and organisational innovation in the firm or 
institution – is increasingly seen to have a spatial dimension: practical innovations and 
technological developments take place somewhere” (Morgan 1997, p.492). Thus, as Morgan 
also notes, since 2000, “the concept of innovation has assumed a central role in theories of 
economic development and is now seen as a driving force [and]… innovation capacity is now 
seen as an important variable in explaining uneven development, and spatial considerations 
are seen as relevant to understanding technological change” (Morgan 1997, p.492). 
Morgan argues that in relation to the concept of innovation and its application to economic 
development within a regional innovation system, that it important to understand the role of 
social capital within the dynamics of a system. He argues that a RIS is shaped by a variety of 
formal and informal institutional routines and social conventions and that there has been a 
growing interest within economics in the role and nature of social institutions, the most 
elemental form of a business institution is a production routine that is “a habitual pattern of 
behaviour embodying knowledge that is often tacit. As Morgan explains, Putman has defined 
the concept of social capital as standing in contrast to “notions of physical capital and human 
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capital, which are tools and training, respectively that enhance individual productivity” 
(Putman as cited in Morgan 1984, p17). According to Putman, social capital includes 
organisations such as networks, norms and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation 
for mutual benefit (Putman, 1993). Morgan argues that the concept of social capital has” 
enhanced the benefits of investment in physical and human capital leading to the concept 
coming to be seen as a vital ingredient in economic development around the world” (Morgan, 
1997, p.502). 
As Doeringer and Terkla and Freeman have indicated, ideas about the role of therefore of 
social capital and tacit knowledge have formed part of a wider argument about the role of 
intangible or invisible factors in economic development (Doeringer & Terkla; Freeman as 
cited in Morgan 1997, p.502). Lundvell has also argued that it is accepted that intangible assets 
– knowledge, competence, skill, organisational culture – are important to development, but
difficult to measure, and that social capital has played a major role in the economic success
of Germany, for instance where there can be found strong relationships between educational
institutions and firms (Lundvell 2006).
 Storper has maintained that it is the role of social capital that explains why regional 
economies have become important players in the global economy in shaping development 
(Storper, 1993). This view is in contrast to that of the ‘globalist school’ who maintain that 
“globalization and localization, far from being mutually exclusive processes, are actually 
much more interwoven than is generally acknowledged because foreign direct investment is 
often attracted to and has a reinforcing effect upon, ‘innovation clusters’ in a targeted 
country” (Morgan 1997). Storper argues that the concept of social capital applied to the 
connection between organisational and technological learning explains a successful model of 
regional economic development. He argues that localised input-output relations or traded 
interdependencies constitute webs of user-producer relations essential to information 
exchange and that untraded interdependencies (e.g. labour markets, norms and values, public 
or semi-public institutions, regional conventions) attach to the process of economic and 
organisational learning and coordination (Storper, 1997). Storper asserts that “untraded assets 
are a central form of scarcity in contemporary capitalism, and hence a central form of 
geographical differentiation in what is done, how it is done, and in the resulting wealth levels 
and growth rate of regions” (Storper 1997, p.5). 
In addition to the ‘relational perspective’ (and emphasis upon social capital to the success of 
a regional innovation system) outlined in the theoretical literature reviewed so far, there is 
also an emphasis in the literature on the importance of formal regional institutions to 
operationalise the policy in the generation of learning and knowledge transfer to encourage 
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economic development. For instance, Michael Porter has maintained that “competitive 
advantage is created and sustained through a highly localised process and the differences 
within national economic structures, values, cultures, institutions and histories contribute 
profoundly to competitive success” (Porter 1990, p.19). Porter argues that role of the home 
nation is as strong as ever and, while globalisation of competition might appear to make the 
nation less important, it makes it more so. According to Porter “with fewer impediments to 
trade that shelters uncompetitive firms and industries, the home nation can take on growing 
significance simply because it is the source of the skills and technology that underpin 
competitive advantage.” (Porter, 1990, p.19). He argues that while firms compete, it is 
governments which create the market conditions to allow firms to exploit the inherent 
competitive advantage of each economy. This contribution to the literature starts from the 
premise that there should be a microeconomic, productivity and output-related 
conceptualisation of regional competitiveness (Porter 1990). 
 
As with firms, Porter (1990) states that regional competitiveness and productivity are equal 
terms: a region’s standard of living (wealth) is determined by the productivity with which it 
uses its human, capital and natural resources, and therefore the appropriate definition of 
competitiveness is productivity. He has developed a model of how regions may improve their 
competitiveness in localised clusters and explains that a ´competitive diamond´ of factors 
influence a country´s competitive performance in international markets. Interactions in the 
competitive diamond are more intensive and therefore more effective when firms operate in 
close proximity. He argues that globally, the most successful firms are likely clustered ones 
as there exists a relationship between domestic or regional rivalry in technological terms and 
therefore the ongoing presence of competitive advantage of an industry. In this context, Porter 
maintains that the local operating environments of firms can play an important role, for 
example, in the diffusion of new product and process technologies. He ultimately argues that 
the geographic concentrations of rival firms enhance the benefits of strong competition 
(Porter, 1990). 
 
Mariana Mazzacato has emphasised that generating an effective innovation system is not just 
about spending on R&D, but also about establishing a set of institutions at the level of place 
to allow new knowledge to diffuse throughout the economy. She maintains that regions need 
a systems perspective that links the role of the individual actors, and linkages between actors. 
(Mazzacato, 1994). She argues that “the state should assist in establishing horizontal systems 
of diffusion to establish open innovation systems that enable the breaking down of barriers 
between public and private collaboration.” This she argues they “must also bridge … the 
knowledge gap that exists to explain how state investments catalyse, influence and connect 
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to the growth of business organizations on which we rely, ultimately, to deliver new 
technologies on a broad scale” (Mazzacato 1994, p. 194). Henry Chesbrough, has also 
highlighted the importance of companies looking beyond their own organisations for new 
sources of innovation and he emphasises the need for new models of R&D, and the shifting 
roles of internal central R&D labs and their external relationships with entities such as 
university research centres (Chesbrough 2017). 
 
Evolutionary economic geography 
 
Evolutionary approaches emphasise the importance of history as an explanation for the 
persistent patterns of uneven regional development. According to Dosi and Nelson, the 
“spatial distribution of economic activity is an outcome of largely connected and path-
dependent historical processes” (Dosi & Nelson as cited in Kogler 2015, p.1). Despite this, 
according to Scott and Storper, “although local technological trajectories may be, for the 
most part, rigid and path dependent, pockets of innovation can enable the opportunity for 
places and regions to elevate their knowledge, production and innovativeness under 
particular circumstances”(Scott & Storper as cited in Kogler 2015, p.1).  
Tödtling and Trippl have pointed out that in this context, in more recent years, studies have 
begun to focus on the conditions and factors that drive new regional path development and 
RIS transformation (Tödtling & Trippl, 2013). According to Isaksen and Trippl, this new 
body of research “connects the RIS approach with evolutionary economic theories on path 
dependence to examine how RIS promote or hinder economic diversification and moves (it) 
beyond overly micro-focused and firm-focused models of evolutionary economic geography, 
by advocating a broader, more comprehensive view on regional industrial path development” 
(Isaksen and Trippl 2016, p.80). Isaksen points out that these studies (Strambach 2010; 
Tödtling and Trippl; Asheim et al. 2016; Isaksen and Trippl 2016) have tended to focus on 
firms and their innovation activities, and on a wide range of actors, institutions and policy 
actions in a region (Isaksen et al, 2018 pp 4-5). 
According to Martin and Trippl (Martin and Trippl 2018, pp. 13-14): 
While path renewal places most emphasis on policy-supported intensification of 
knowledge creation and re-combination between firms, new path creation puts main 
emphasis on science-driven modes of innovation, for which the organisational 
support structure and knowledge infrastructure of the RIS is vital. Subject to the 
organisational and institutional endowment, the degree of related variety and the 
openness towards external knowledge sources, different RIS require different 
policies to stimulate new path development. This implies that the role of policy is 
mostly to identify, facilitate and strengthen combinatorial knowledge dynamics 
between firms and the knowledge infrastructure of the RIS  
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As Isaksen et al explain, “while more recent conceptualisations of RIS vary, it is generally 
agreed that these systems are made up of three core elements, that is, actors, networks and 
institutions.” They argue that key actors of RIS are the firms and industries located in the 
region as well as organisations that belong to the knowledge and support infrastructure such 
as research institutes, educational bodies and knowledge transfer agencies (Isaksen et al, 
2018):  
Networks that facilitate knowledge flows and interactive learning between these 
actors are seen as eminently important for dynamic innovation activities to unfold. 
The ‘functioning’ of RIS is seen as being influenced by an institutional framework 
of formal rules and informal norms. A central argument in the RIS approach is that 
innovation does not take place in isolation, it includes interactive learning in 
localised innovation networks that are embedded in specific socio-cultural settings. 
It is also emphasised that RISs are open systems in which organisations source 
knowledge through extra-regional production and innovation networks  
 
Isaksen and Trippl argue that different characteristics of RIS can be found in different regions 
as they “exhibit distinctive development potentials and challenges.” (Isaksen & Trippl 2016, 
p. 80). They argue that therefore “path dependence” of alternatively “new path development” 
directly or indirectly “builds on the situation in dynamic core regions with organisationally 
thick and diversified RIS.” (Isaksen & Trippl, 2016, p. 80). However, new research on RIS 
with implications for the success of the Smart Specialisation policy have highlighted the 
importance of distinguishing between system-based and actor-based policies in different 
types of RIS, which could constrain new path development. System-based policies aim to 
improve the functioning of a RIS by targeting system failures, whereas actor-based strategies 
support entrepreneurs and innovation projects by firms and other stakeholders. Isaksen et al 
argue that these strategies will only have a limited effect when applied alone, and need to be 
combined to effectively support structural change in different types of RIS (Tödtling & Trippl 
as cited in Isaksen 2018). 
Lawton Smith et al have maintained that the studies have “tended to overlook the important 
role of agency for regional economic change” and that entrepreneurship is suggested as a 
driving force behind regional evolution and new path development (Lawton Smith et al cited 
in Isaksen et al, 2018, p.16). Furthermore it is maintained by other studies that there needs to 
be more consideration of multi scalar policy in research on new path development and RIS 
(Lawton Smith, Trippl, Waters and Zukauskaite in Isaksen, 2018). Finally, Isaksen maintains 
that “evolutionary approaches can improve our understanding of how historically shaped 
factors contribute to our understanding of the development of regional industries and the 
configuration of RIS through work on the role of institutional characteristics of regions on 
the complexity of RIS systems.” In this way, the importance of understanding the interplay 
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of local and global knowledge flows and links, including in peripheral regions and the role 
that RISs play in accessing and anchoring global knowledge is emphasised (Isaksen, 2018). 
 
The global value chain/global production network framework 
The global value chain/global production network (GVC/GPN) framework is a powerful tool 
for understanding the changing economic geography of the world and the challenges facing 
companies integrated into these networks”(Gereffi 1999; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2004; 
Humphrey, 2006 cited in Blazek 2016). Over the past 25 years, there has been considerable 
debate over the role of GVC/GPN frameworks in the global economy and they are at the 
centre of a number of policy debates on regulation of global trade, incentives for foreign 
direct investment (FDI), or stimulus policy interventions for economic development (Gereffi 
1999; Henderson et al. 2002; Todeva & Rakhmatullin 2016) A key argument of the 
GVC/GPN framework approach is that a “sizeable part of the world’s production is organised 
by large enterprises that command networks of suppliers at different tiers providing various 
intermediate goods, and that these networks are governed by different modes of governance” 
(Blazek 2016). Todeva & Rakhmatullin argue that the “fragmentation of production and the 
international outsourcing of tasks and dispersion of activities across countries have led to the 
emergence of complex and borderless production systems, driven by MNCs, where states 
and global corporations are entangled in complex scenarios for long-term growth” (Todeva 
& Rakhmatullin 2016, p.3).  
Thus, the “globalization school” argues that the decisions of MNCs on where they conduct 
activities – such as R&D and production – determine to a large extent where economic 
activities agglomerate in certain places (Hudson as cited in Amin & Thrift 1994). 
Internationally controlled markets determine regional economic trajectories, rather than 
regional stakeholders (Wilson et al. 2014). Globalisation has eroded differences between 
places through the international reach of its technological and socioeconomic forces. 
Locations seem to be emptied of their particular characteristics and local actors 
fundamentally lose the capacity to shape regional destinies (Ascani et al. as cited in 2012). 
The magnitude of these processes has led to commentators conceiving of the globalized 
world as a ‘flat world’ (Friedman cited in Ascani et al. 2012) and as constituting ‘the end of 
geography’ (O’Brian as cited in Ascani et al. 2012). 
Thus globalisation has led to a spatial division of labour and a spatial division of innovation 
emerging where “the MNC is able to split its activities into units and then localise and 
disperse those units in the most favourable places for them as regards work and industrial 
culture” (Massey; Aydalot as cited in Simmie 1997, p.3). This has generated a core-periphery 
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international economic divide to occur where it is said that “some regions of the global 
network have much autonomy, but the further they lie from the centre, the more the regions 
are locked into the international division of labour. In this sense, regions start to resemble the 
old Fordist branch centres” (Amin & Robins as cited in Simmie 1997, p.3). This dynamic has 
led to the observation that for Eastern countries, a key task is to widen the circle of 
beneficiaries of an FDI-led growth pattern, to increase the benefits of domestic actors while 
maintaining and increasing the competitiveness of their economies. MNCs in CEE countries 
control up to 80 per cent of productive assets, yet they still only employ no more than 30 per 
cent of the labour force and it is far from certain as to whether the segments of society not 
directly employed by the MNCs actually directly benefit from this economic model (Bruszt 
& Vukov 2015, p. 29). 
 
In relation to the automotive industry, Grabher argues that under this regional economic 
development model, an associated tightly integrated supplier network characteristic of this 
sector will militate against a differentiated regional sectoral structure. Grabher maintains that 
for investors in the automobile industry, the economic and social industrial context of Eastern 
Germany has provided an almost ideal field for experiment with the most advanced 
management practices and production techniques where in plants, the European versions of 
the new management techniques of lean production were implemented and further, that while 
that development may end up in the decentralisation of competencies and hence some local 
autonomy at the operative level, that the plants will continue to be a part of a European 
network of production plants that is controlled by western headquarters” (Grabher as cited in 
Amin & Thrift 1994). He argues that this sort of external control will be replicated within the 
regional supplier network of the East German plant: although the demand for flexibility and 
logistic competence favours local supplier autonomy on the operative level, a considerable 
share of the eastern German supplier firms will probably remain at the level of second-tier or 
sub-suppliers belonging to western patent firms which, in turn, are largely dependent on a 
few large western first-tier suppliers (Grabher as cited in Amin & Thrift 1994). He notes that 
the dependence of these production complexes on the strategies of a single automobile 
corporation makes these regions equally vulnerable to external shocks and observes that these 
dynamics many end up in very few prospects for self-sustaining regional development in 
LDRs.  He predicts that the end result for ‘periphery regions’, which have inherited 
institutional and social networks, is that “it will take a long time to create the cultural and 
institutional foundations for a new entrepreneurship which taps into local resources and 
strengths” (Grabher as cited in Amin & Thrift 1994, p. 21). 
Before addressing the key components of the GVC/GPN literature, it is useful to distinguish 
between the terms ‘value chain’ and ‘production networks’. Analysis that takes the entire 
41 
 
chain of productive activities into account has been variously referred to as value-chain, 
commodity chain, activities chain, production network, value network and input-output 
analysis (Sturgeon et al. 2008). Sturgeon maintains that it is important to note that while these 
terms have a great deal in common, an important distinction should be made by contrasting 
the various ‘chains’ to the various ‘networks’, where a chain maps the vertical sequence of 
events leading to the delivery, consumption and maintenance of goods and services – 
recognising that various value chains often share common economic actors and are dynamic 
in that they are reused and reconfigured on an ongoing basis – while a network highlights the 
nature and extent of the inter-firm relationships that binds sets of firms into larger economic 
groups (Sturgeon et al. 2008). 
In relation to GVC analysis, Gereffi et al note that “international trade in goods and services 
should not been seen as solely, or even mainly, as a multitude of arm’s-length market-based 
transactions….where an important part of global trade is conducted within multinational 
enterprises or through systems of governance that link firms together in a variety of sourcing 
and contracting arrangements” and  also argue that “firms are predominately located in 
developed countries and include not only multinational manufacturers, but also large retailers 
and brand-name firms (and) that these lead firms play a significant role in specifying what is 
to be produced, how and by whom” (Gereffi et al. 2001, p.1). The value-chain view of global 
economic integration highlights that for many industries, access to international markets is 
not achieved merely through designing, making and marketing new products. Instead, it 
involves entry into international design, production and marketing networks consisting of 
many different firms. Understanding how these value chains operate is very important for 
developing country firms and policymakers because the way chains are structured has 
implications for newcomers (Gereffi et al., 2001). Gereffi et al distinguish between buyer-
driven and producer-driven value chains in highlighting the role of retailers and brand-name 
companies (the buyers), such as Gap and Nike, in structuring global trade in labour-intensive 
fashion products, and the role of producers such as Ford and Compaq in structuring global 
production in capital-and technology-intensive industries (Gereffi et al. 2001). 
In this context, research has identified mechanisms and processes integrating particular GPNs 
with particular regions, such as types of strategic coupling-respectively decoupling and 
recoupling (Blazek, 2009). As Mackinnon has highlighted, the central concept of strategic 
coupling highlights the dynamic processes by which relational assets are matched to the 
strategic needs of lead firms within GPNs, with regional institutions playing a key role in this 
process (Mackinnon 2012). Mackinnon argues that a key characteristic of dynamic growth 
regions is that they are “typified by organic forms of implicit coupling based on the co-
evolution of regional assets and lead firms in GPNs.” He argues that FDI in developing 
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regions, on the other hand, “continue to be characterised by a lack of local linkage and power 
asymmetries between TNCs and regional institutions (resulting in corporate capture in some 
cases), pointing to a strong degree of path dependence in the relations between these regions 
and GPNs” (Mackinnon 2012, pp. 241-2). 
Coe et al have also focused on the strategic coupling of GPNs and regional assets, which they 
argue to be an interface mediated by a range of institutional activities across different 
geographical and organisational scales (Coe et al. 2004). Coe et al contend that regional 
development will ultimately depend on the ability of this coupling to stimulate various 
processes of value creation, enhancement and capture (Coe et al. 2004). However, they 
demonstrate with their case study of BMW that the developmental impact of the coupling 
process is highly variable and contingent, and not automatically beneficial for the region. 
They argue that regional development does not take place on a level playing field and, 
therefore, for the processes of value creation, enhancement and capture to benefit economic 
development in particular regions, the balance of power between the different actors involved 
is a crucial variable. Hence, they maintain that governance structures in different territorial 
contexts are variable and the possibilities for developmental policies to impact on a region’s 
assets will differ. Therefore, in newly industrialised countries, national policies set the 
dominant framework for regional development, with regional institutions often weakly 
developed or missing, whereas in countries with a more decentralised structure, regional 
institutions attempt to develop their bargaining power vis-à-vis focal firms in the context of 
nation state governance structures and inter-regional competition (Coe et al. 2004). 
As Gereffi has argued, while governance issues are important and have attracted a lot of 
attention among GVC scholars, the research on economic upgrading has been at least as 
important because many of the people who use the GVC framework have a very strong 
economic development focus (Gereffi 2014). The concept of ‘industrial upgrading’ suggests 
that a key way for firms to maintain or increase their competitiveness in an increasingly 
globalised economy is to upgrade their production. Upgrading involves engaging in the 
production of higher value-added products, employing more efficient production strategies, 
and/or increasing the skill content of activities by firms (Humphrey and Schmitz; Kaplinsky; 
Porter as cited in Pavlik & Zenka 2011). In the GVC approach, the concept of industrial 
upgrading refers to the “process by which economic actors – nations, firms, workers – move 
from low-value to relatively high-value activities in global production networks” (Gereffi as 
cited in Pavlik & Zenka 2011). These processes operate at different geographic scales: within 
factories, within inter-firm enterprise networks, within local or national economies, and 
within macro regions at the international scale (Gereffi as cited in Pavlik & Zenka 2011). 
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Industrial upgrading is vital for creating opportunities to enhance value and thus for economic 
development (Henderson et al. 2002).  
As Gereffi explains, the challenge of economic upgrading in GVCs is to identify the 
conditions under which developing as well as developed countries and firms can “climb the 
value chain” from basic assembly activities using low-cost and unskilled labour to more 
advanced forms of ‘full package’ supply and integrated manufacturing (Gereffi 2014). 
Humphrey and Schmitz have identified four different types of upgrading: process, product, 
functional and inter-sectoral. Process upgrading refers to the introduction of more efficient 
production methods and better technology leading also to the improved quality of produced 
goods and increased flexibility of producers. Product upgrading involves moving to the 
production of more sophisticated and higher value-added products. Functional upgrading is 
the process during which firms acquire new functions generating higher incomes or abandon 
old functions generating low incomes in the value-chain. Its goal is to increase the overall 
skill content of a firm’s activities. Inter-sectoral upgrading takes place when a firm uses its 
acquired production knowledge to move horizontally into new sectors (Humphrey & 
Schmitz). Additionally, Dunn et al point out that more recently the concept of channel 
upgrading has been developed, which refers to firms entering new higher value-added end 
markets in the value chain in order to lower their risk and increase sales volumes through 
diversification and receive higher prices for their products (Dunn et al. as cited in Pavlik and 
Zenka 2011). 
Gereffi has pointed out that the automotive industry represents a “typical example of 
producer-driven networks in which large industrial companies organise and co-ordinate 
investment-based vertical production networks of component suppliers” (Gereffi as cited in 
Pavlik and Zenka 2011, p.562). In addition to this, a specific network organisation and 
coordination may be influenced by the differences in the competitive strategies of the 
individual carmakers in different regions and markets and by the specific socio-political, 
cultural and institutional environment in which they operate (Coe et al. as cited in Pavlik and 
Zenka 2011).  
 
The role of the MNC in RIS 
 
The GVC/GPN debate sits within the ‘globalisation school’ who (as was maintained earlier) 
have often discounted the role of the region as it has been maintained that the role of MNCs 
and the flow of people, products, information and capital have generated a borderless, flat 
world in which distance ceases to play any role at all (Ohman; Friedman; Amin and Thrift 
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cited in Mattes, 2010). Common to this argument was that there is a global economy that that 
is dominated by large MNCs. The decisions of these MNCs and where they conduct such 
activities such as R&D and production, has determined to a large extent where economic 
activities agglomerate in particular places (Simmie, 1997).  
However, as Hird and Thomas suggest, since the 1980s, localisaton approaches have 
emphasised that national borders remain the basic constituents of modern societies and that 
economic and social actions are moderated by a dominant home bias (Hird & Thompson as 
cited in Mattes 2010). In the 1990s, a strong theme in the literature emerged that has 
maintained that “for regions to develop competitiveness in the global market place with 
innovation advances that they 'must face two directions at once' and build and maintain their 
own distinctive regional innovation systems capable of generating continuous change whilst 
simultaneously competing in global markets full of regions and firms attempting to do the 
same thing.” (Simmie, 1997). This two-way vision is described as the ‘global/local interface’ 
(Simmie, 1997) or ‘glocalisation’ (Robertson as cited in Mattes 2010).This perspective 
maintains that it not sufficient to look for ‘middle ways’ between globalisation and 
localisation, but regard them as a ‘complex of interrelated tendencies’ which needs to be 
looked upon in an integrative framework (Dicken et al. as cited in Mattes 2010). 
 
In this context, MNCs are perceived of as crucial actors in a global knowledge-based 
economy as they are able to ‘transfer’ knowledge across national borders without sacrificing 
the advantages of inter-organisational coordination” (Heidenreich 2012). Yet companies are 
not territorially disembedded, footloose organisations that are able to transfer knowledge 
across borders. They are important arenas for the creation of knowledge, especially by 
combining the advantages of organisationally coordinated cross-border production and 
innovation strategies with the advantages of local proximity and the use of specific regional 
and national factors. As Heidenreich points out, in this context, the R&D units of MNCs are 
often regionally embedded in a home country and one or more host countries. These external 
contexts can be important bases for the global innovativeness and competiveness of the 
company. Therefore, Heidenreich calls into question the evidence on the ‘non-globalisation’ 
of innovation and questions the assumption that MNCs are footloose companies operating in 
a globally interlinked economy. On the contrary, he argues that “they resemble a millipede 
whose subsidiaries represent multiple feet in different regional and national arenas” 
(Heidenreich 2012, p.2). 
 
The national and regional embeddedness of MNCs is an increasingly important topic in 
various streams of international business research (Heidenreich et al., 2012) because MNCs 
have to disembed their capabilities from their original context in order to transfer them to 
45 
 
foreign subsidiaries. They may also use locally embedded competences in the wider 
corporate network. The concept of embeddedness stresses the independencies between actors 
and the environment as socially interrelated action spheres (Granovetter; Polanyi; Uzzi as 
cited in Mattes 2010). Disembeddedness is defined as the absence of such links and as a lack 
of institutional fit between an MNC and the regional environment. In contrast to regional 
embedding, disembeddedness provides the chance of maintaining a higher degree of 
interdependence, of concentrating more on the inner-corporate network and resources 
(Zander & Solvell cited in Mattes 2010), and of not being reliant on upon one particular 
regional setting (Mattes 2010). 
 
In the debate on the embeddedness of MNCs, the role of the societal context has been 
conceptualised in international business studies in three different ways: as the result of 
political decisions; as inter-organisational networks; or as institutions (Heidenreich 2012). 
Mattes argues that “their choice, thereby, is whether to draw upon new knowledge and to use 
locally available goods (so called collective competition goods) in general and their 
innovation projects.” (Mattes 2010, p. 80). Thus they constantly strive for a balance between 
embeddedness and disembeddedness, whereby disembeddedness is defined as the absence of 
embeddedness (Mattes 2010). Heidenreich has argued that a major advantage of the regional 
and national embeddedness of MNCs is that they may facilitate learning processes with 
companies in the proximity (customers, competitors, suppliers and service providers). In 
addition to inner-organisational forms of learning and knowledge exchange between 
headquarters and subsidiaries, MNCs can thus rely on external competences. These external 
learning processes are supported by institutions that shape the cooperation between 
heterogeneous actors and that provide (what he terms) collective competition goods, for 
example qualified employees, basic research, advanced technological competences, 
consensual relations with employees or network brokers.  
 
According to Heidenreich (2012, p.10). 
 
This institutional environment also shapes the technological competences and 
market positions of subsidiaries. At the core of corporate innovation strategies is 
thus the ability of internationally distributed organisations to combine two different 
forms of learning: first, organisational learning within and beyond national 
boundaries; second, institutionally stabilised learning and external partners, usually 
within the same national or regional context. MNCs thus translate the relationship 
between globalisation and regionalisation that is characteristic of a globalised 
economy into an organisational challenge; the challenge of combining inner-
organisational and institutionally embedded learning with external partners 
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A major insight provided by the debate on embeddedness is that an MNC is not only linked 
to its multiple environments by personal relations, networks and non-economic motives, but 
by social institutions that are a crucial factor in corporate embeddedness. These institutions 
systematically shape the perception of organisational challenges, of the best and most 
appropriate organisational strategies and the available resources. These are dynamically 
reproduced by skilled social actors, for example MNCs (Heidenreich 2012). As Mattes 
argues, the idea is that MNCs and their subsidiaries can be embedded in a relevant regional 
innovation system. Key to the RIS approach is the idea that regional economic action can not 
only result from a cluster of firms co-locating in a particular setting, but also, institutional 
infrastructure of scientific, political and intermediary subsystems complement these clusters 
in a RIS approach (Mattes 2010). In this context, she argues that firms therefore constitute 
the subsystem focusing on the application and exploitation of knowledge, and the 
institutional framework becomes occupied with knowledge generation and diffusion and that 
RIS can therefore be understood as the aggregation of organisations and the related formal, 
but also informal institutions, all of which constitute the scientific, industrial, political and 
intermediary-related subsystems (Mattes 2010). 
 
Heidenreich’s definition of a RIS consists of, first, firms in the main industrial cluster in a 
region including their support industries; second, an institutional infrastructure must be 
present (i.e. research and higher education institutes, technology transfer agencies, vocational 
training organisations, business associations, finance institutions), which hold important 
competence to support regional innovation (Heidenreich 2012). This definition stresses that 
regional innovation systems are not only integrated through their production and value chains 
(e.g. by supplier and buyer networks) but also by formal and (informal) communities. 
Immarino et al. have argued that the potential strengths of these systems consist of the 
capability to provide collective resources for the regional embeddedness of MNCs, especially 
in Germany and the UK (Immarino cited in Heidenreich). Immarino et al point out that 
“examples of these regional collective goods are access to specialised technological 
knowledge, information about new markets, the vocational training of qualified and 
motivated human resources adapted to the needs of the regional industry, and also the 
stabilisation of regional networks and patterns of cooperation between regional companies, 
schools, universities, technology transfer, R&D facilities and political and administrative 
arrangements, by forms of local governance” (Immarino as cited in Heidenreich, 2012, pp.19-
20). Further, Heidenreich has maintained that the regional embeddedness of companies is 
also based on institutions that may stabilise inter-organisational networks and contribute to 
the provision of ‘local collective competition goods’. In contrast to the national level, these 
institutions are often closer to the specific companies, sectors and networks in the region, 
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thus increasing the possibility of providing goods and services targeted to the needs of 
specific companies. Therefore he argues that these network-based, institutional and cultural 
dimensions of regional embeddedness may contribute to the regional agglomeration of 
companies (Heidenreich 2012). 
 
Empirical research on Smart Specialisation policy implementation 
challenges posed by quality of governance 
 
The Smart Specialisation policy represents an ambitious attempt at devolved programming 
with respect to the scale of resources involved and the demands placed on public sector 
institutions such as the regional state, which is expected to orchestrate a collaborative 
economic search process (‘the entrepreneurial discovery process’) and craft more inclusive 
governance arrangements to enhance the diversity of ‘voice’ (Foray in Morgan 2016).  
 
According to Capello and Kroll the policy has represented a profound structural revolution 
in the way innovation policies are conceived because it seeks to discover a broad range of 
innovation types in a region and to dispense with the notion of ‘picking winners’ on an 
industrial basis, thus doing away with a previous approach whereby centralised planning 
methods identify industrial development priorities. The strategy calls instead for public-
private partnership processes of ‘entrepreneurial discovery’ and learning – a bottom-up 
approach based on the self-discovery of entrepreneurial capability. Entrepreneurial discovery 
is an endogenous process to identify local potential and local need, and seeking “a consistent 
match between investments in knowledge and human capital and the industrial and 
technological vocations and competences of territories” (Capello & Kroll, 2016, p.35). They 
argue that regional innovation policies have to be implemented in a certain territorial 
framework and specifically in a socially and politically negotiated environment (Capello & 
Kroll, 2016). 
 
In order for the Smart Specialisation policy to work effectively, Marques and Morgan (2016) 
suggest that inclusive economic institutions need to be supported by, and support, inclusive 
political institutions that distribute political power in a pluralist manner (Marques & Morgan, 
2016). Tripp et al argued that “the degree to which formal competences and power 
(autonomy) to design regional innovation strategies (and crucially, the financial resources to 
independently implement them) are decentralised is a key determinant of strong policy and 
governance capabilities of RISs” (Tripp et al Healy, 2018). In this sense, even in regions 
where a Smart Specialisation approach could in theory be viable and productive, barriers and 
complexity at the level of local policy and governance may keep this from happening. 
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Pronesti has maintained that policy and governance challenges for Smart Specialisation-type 
policy approaches include a lack of match between functional and political-administrative 
regions; lack of political inclination to admit bottom up-participatory processes; lack of 
capability to design and implement strategic regional innovation policies and lack of 
capability to engaged actively in processes of regional entrepreneurial discovery.” (Pronesti, 
2019). 
In this context of these challenges, Smart Specialisation should take into account the quality 
of sub-national governance arrangements and institutions when considering the capacity for 
effective implementation (Morgan 2017; Rodrik, 2003). The quality of regional and local 
government is considered a critical factor when considering the potential impact of the policy 
in European regions (European Commission 2014; Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo 2015). 
Regional institutions in Europe have been found to be key shapers of economic performance. 
In particular, it has been demonstrated, in the case of European Cohesion Fund investment, 
the returns to investment do not necessarily come from the amount of investment itself but 
from the quality of government in the region receiving it, and from how government affects 
implementation (Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo 2015). 
Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo suggest the policy focus should include an institutional 
component – to promote transparency and accountability and dealing with corruption as ways 
to improve government quality – as an essential part of the strategic planning process. They 
maintain that the implementation of one-size-fits-all policies may not yield the desired 
results. Basic elements of any development strategy should take into account place-based 
institutional conditions and learning, and the consistent improvement of institutional quality. 
Rodriguez-Pose has argued that “smart specialisation places considerable emphasis upon the 
role of local actors in the entrepreneurial discovery process of the policy design (and as such) 
there needs to be an empowerment of local decision makers and openness to the reality that 
many different and contrasting institutional arrangements may be needed in order to achieve 
sustainable development” (Rodriguez-Pose 2013, p.1044). 
Morgan has argued that quality of governance could lead to a significant challenge to 
implementation as presented by the so-called “regional innovation paradox” confronting less 
developed regions (LDRs) (Morgan 2016, p.578). Although LDRs have a greater need for 
innovation-related investment, they also have a lower capacity to absorb public funds 
earmarked for innovation, compared with economically more advanced regions. This weaker 
absorptive capacity in LDRs reflects a combination of mitigating factors, including old 
industrial structures and low-value-added activities in the regional economy, as well as weak 
and sometimes corrupt public administrations. According to Morgan, “the Smart 
Specialisation policy makes unprecedented demands on public sector bodies to nurture more 
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collaborative forms of economic search and craft more inclusive forms of regional 
governance.” (Morgan 2016, p. 578). 
A vast amount of research has been conducted into the particular challenges facing LDRs to 
implement regional innovation policies. The argument is that place-based region policy 
frameworks being implemented in CEE regions are likely to face difficulties because they 
require high-level capacity for cross-sectoral and cross-level coordination and for extracting 
and feeding local knowledge into the planning process. Many researchers argued that this 
situation was due to CEE states often having weak administrative capacity, centralised policy 
making, mistrust, politicised decision making and clientelism (Gorzaelak 1996; Bachtler & 
Mendez 2013, Bachtler & McMaster 2008; Paraskevopolous & Leonardi in Dabrowski 2012; 
Morgan 2016). For instance, Dabrowski found that in situations where a central government 
has control over the contents of a regional plan (e.g. in Hungary and the Czech Republic) it 
has defied the purpose of strategic planning tailored to regional specificities (Dabrowski 
2012).  
There are many more recent studies identifying governance barriers found in CEE states. In 
relation to North East Romania, Healy (2016) argued that central government priorities 
dominated the regional agenda, with a nationally driven science-led approach that took 
precedence over priorities that may have been established by the regional authority. Weak 
regional institutions led to a strong plan being developed that “signalled the region’s” 
economic strategy, but where implementation was ultimately determined by central 
government priorities. Cooke (2016) in his case study analysis of policy implementation 
challenges in three regions of Portugal found that power levels within the Portuguese state 
conspired against de-specialisation aspirations in Algarve. Regions were concerned that 
regional administrations were weak and disempowered in the MLG framework, meaning that 
they could not determine an alternative strategy to the one being imposed upon them from 
above. For instance, he found that “most important for Algarve, perceiving itself as regionally 
‘locked-in’ to tourism of the narrowest kind was to have its own Regional Innovation Agency 
for delivery of RIS3 outcomes in Algarve so as to pursue a diversification strategy based on 
the aspirations of the region, rather than referencing specialisation as mandated by the EU or 
Member State” (Cooke 2016, p.1509). 
 
In addition, Capello and Kroll argue that first, the diverse structure of governance in 
European Union Member States has led to a situation in which Smart Specialisation policy 
processes and strategy implementation has been assigned to widely varying sets of spatial 
levels of governance. They maintain that, while the European Commission has worked 
50 
towards achieving a certain level of uniformity, its influence remains limited as the final 
decision on remits in national governance set-ups lies with the individual Member States. As 
a result, for instance, most Member States tended to develop their Smart Specialisation 
policies centrally and were less inclined to support new, bottom-up approaches “reflecting 
either a lack of conviction in the utility and efficacy of the decentralised processes in a 
specific governance context, or a straightforward political inclination towards centralist, top-
down governance” (Capello and Kroll, 2016, p.1397). 
Morgan argues that even though regional innovation programs have been evolving for 25 
years, the Smart Specialisation program is the most ambitious iteration with respect to the 
scale of resources “involved and the demands placed on public sector institutions like the 
regional state, “which is expected to orchestrate a more collaborative economic search 
process (the entrepreneurial prices of discovery process) and craft more inclusive governance 
arrangements to enhance the diversity of voice.” (Morgan 2016, p.578). Morgan argues that 
in old industrial regions where political power is monopolised by a single party, it is often 
the case that the nurturing of novelty is that much more challenging. He claims that that one 
of “the greatest challenges facing the implementation of the Smart Specialisation policy is 
that it expects the public sector to be more agile, creative and experimental when the ‘age of 
austerity’ is eviscerating public sector budgets and undermining the competence and 
confidence of public bodies, especially in the LDRs that are more dependent on the public 
sector.” (Morgan 2016, p.578). He ultimately questions the capacity for the policy to be able 
to challenge the path dependence of old industrial regions (Morgan 2016). 
Studies based on large surveys of regional perspectives have found that while political efforts 
seem to support processes of entrepreneurial discovery that are already underway in a number 
of Central European regions, the future success of the policy may depend on increased 
political support in that respect. Kroll for instance, argues that the RIS3 policy agenda has 
yet to be translated from political into entrepreneurial practice in many peripheral regions, 
particularly in the East (Kroll 2017). He asserts that there is currently little evidence that the 
original Smart Specialisation concept’s arguably most important promise of better 
connecting regions through distributed development and application of technologies would 
stand a great chance of being realised soon. This he maintains is due to the dominant presence 
of public research (in traditional roles) in processes of consultation generally; actors from 
civil society and relevant firms in the periphery are underrepresented as they are too focused 
on processes of consultation rather than implementation, and too limited their perceived 
ability to change policy substantially and/or leverage private funding (Kroll, 2017, p.17). 
Similarly, Iocabucci has examined a broad range of regional strategies and argues that 
weaknesses include many undergoing “the selection of very broad areas of specialization, 
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lack of analysis of relations between the sectors, missing consideration of complementarities 
with other regions, and identification of a large number of specializing domains, some of 
which are only poorly founded in regional potentials and assets” (Iocabucci cited in Trippl et 
al 2018).  
 
Empirical research on Smart Specialisation policy implementation 
challenges posed by the characteristics of RIS 
 
There is mounting evidence that the Smart Specialisation policy also will face challenges in 
the implementation phase in LDRs, which are likely to find the economic challenges difficult 
due to unfavourable research and innovation systems characterised by” organisational 
thinness (weak institutions) lock-in to declining sectors and outdated technologies, 
fragmented systems that inhibit networking and knowledge exchange, and a weak capacity 
to drive transformative change”(Coenen et al. 2015; Healy 2016). Regions with unfavourable 
RIS have less potential to diversify into new industrial areas due to unfavourable economic 
structures and a weak endowment of knowledge organisations (Boschma cited in Trippl et al 
2016). They may also have low capability to use funds due to a weak capacity to absorb 
change; for instance, they often do not have an innovation ecosystem based on the triple helix 
model (Marques & Morgan 2018).  
Capello and Kroll argue that in LDRs that lack local preconditions for innovation, the policy 
emphasis upon moving towards a ‘practice-based innovation’ (or DUI – learning by Doing, 
Using and Interacting – mode), will face difficulties in these regions as they typically have 
few or no research institutions and high-tech clusters. The authors found that this risk was 
most evident in LDRs as these areas have difficulty in identifying their smart specialisation, 
simply because they do not have a relevant critical mass in any domain, they lack 
connectedness, entrepreneurial spirit, size in terms of market potential, industrial diversity, 
quality of local governance and a critical mass of capabilities to develop collective learning 
processes. They argue that this has made the identification of local technological domains a 
difficult process (Capello & Kroll, 2016). 
McCann and Ortega-Argiles also assert that one of the greatest challenges facing the 
application of modern regional innovation policies across EU regions concerns regions with 
very limited innovation-related assets. They argue that “some regions, for example, contain 
no research institutes; whole other regions, particularly in Eastern Europe, as yet exhibit only 
a very limited capacity for developing an innovation system, as they are constrained by 
institutional and governance issues, and by technological issues” (McCann and Ortega-
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Argiles, 2016, p.1410).  In addition, Veugelers maintains that the tendency towards policy 
homogeneity and therefore “will produce wrong policy priorities in particular places; for 
example, in weaker economies aiming to catch up with more advanced parts of Europe the 
main priorities should relate to the absorption and adaptation of existing frontier technologies 
rather than initiatives aimed at fostering features such as creativity” (Veugelers 2015 in 
McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2016, p.1410). 
In the case of path renewal (new industrial pathway) in old industrial regions, Coenen (2015) 
has argued that the infusion of new technology alone is often not sufficient to diversify 
regional economies; changing industry characteristics such as firm routines and encouraging 
institutional adaptation are also important and overlooked means of advancing innovation. In 
relation to the low capacity of LDRs to absorb state funding of innovation programs, Oughton 
et al (2002) suggest that resolution of the paradox requires policies that: “(i) increase the 
innovation capacity of regions by working on both the demand and supply side of the system 
to increase both private and public sector investment in innovation activity; and (ii) integrate 
technology policy and industrial policy by encouraging expenditure on innovation activity 
within mainstream industrial policy programmes” (Oughton et al 2002). 
Despite the wide view of innovation promoted by the Smart Specialisation policy, it is argued 
that the policy is still very science, technology and innovation (STI)-centric and that this 
model of innovation is deemed to be inappropriate for highly fragmented innovation systems 
in which the dominant features are public R&D institutes and FDI production-oriented 
facilities as well as weak governance at the level of place leading to poor implementation 
outcomes (Marques & Morgan 2016). According to Radosevic and Stancova, the policy 
needs to be less STI-centric, and more attuned to the heterogeneity of local conditions, and 
in the specific case of regions on the periphery, more openness to incorporation of FDI into 
policy prescriptions is needed (Radosevic & Stancova in Marques & Morgan 2016).  
LDRs are often rural, thus orientation of regional development policy around knowledge 
spill-overs to local industry is difficult to achieve because smaller regional universities face 
a lack of scale and a need to specialise, which works against the policy objectives (Charles 
2016). There are some exceptions to this situation. For example, in the old industrial regions 
in the north east of England, long-term bottom-up initiatives have generated an innovation 
ecosystem despite the centralising tendencies of funding R&D found in the national 
innovation system (Coenen 2006). Although the Smart Specialisation policy has recognised 
the extent to which universities are a critical asset for regions in developing an innovation 
ecosystem (European Commission 2011), for most LDRs, the policy is said to make ‘heroic 
assumptions’ about the institutional capacity for LDRs to design and deliver such a 
sophisticated regional innovation policy (Marques & Morgan 2016). 
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Tödtling and Trippl point out that there is no “ideal model” for innovation policy. They argue 
that empirical investigations demonstrate that preconditions for innovation, innovation 
activities and processes, and networks differ strongly between central, peripheral and old 
industrial regions. They maintain that the RIS approach allows for such differences by 
analysing the strengths and weaknesses of the various subsystems, clusters and the 
interdependencies within the region and beyond. Therefore, the innovation systems approach 
highlights the extent to which system failures can prohibit innovation and learning in a 
region; for instance, in relation to “system failures such as ‘organisational thinness’, ‘lock in’ 
or ‘fragmentation’” (Tödtling & Trippl, 2013, p.297). They argue that although regions often 
exhibit combinations of such innovation problems and learning barriers, some become more 
dominant than others in specific types of regions. In peripheral regions, the main problems 
are a low level of R&D and innovation due to a dominance of SMEs in traditional industries, 
weakly developed firm clusters, few knowledge providers and a weak endowment with 
innovation support institutions. In ‘old industrial regions’, although there may be many firms, 
dominant clusters and relevant organisations, they are often strongly oriented on old 
industries and technological trajectories leading to “lock in”. In metropolitan regions, often 
a specialised industrial pattern including complementary knowledge bases and innovation 
networks may be lacking (Tödtling & Trippl 2005). 
 Innovation policy may attempt to tackle these various system deficiencies, whereas the RIS 
literature regards the region as the preferred level to design and implement such policies. 
According to Balland et al (2017), the Smart Specialisation policy should help EU regions to 
develop new technologies, and has argued that regions can overcome this diversification 
dilemma by developing complex new technologies that build on local related capabilities. 
Balland et al found that relatedness had a positive effect on technological diversification 
within regions (Balland et al, 2017). Thus, as Tödtling and Trippl have argued there is a need 
for policy strategies that are customised to the specific organisational and institutional 
structures and knowledge bases of a RIS (Tödtling & Trippl in Isaksen & Trippl et al 2016). 
With the Smart Specialisation policy emphasis on the need to avoid simple imitation of 
successful policies pursued in other regions and “one-size-fits-all” strategies, varieties of 
innovation problems and barriers must be taken seriously, using a differentiated innovation 
policy approach (Trippl et al 2016) In peripheral regions, the key challenge is to strengthen 
and upgrade the regional economy by fostering “catch up learning”. Adequate policy 
measures might include the attraction of external companies and attempts to embed them into 
the region. Firms should be linked to external clusters and knowledge providers and to 
higher-level spatial innovation systems (national, European). In old industrial regions, 
innovation policy needs another orientation: the renewal of old sectors and the support of 
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innovation activities, and an upgrading of the knowledge base. Policy should focus on 
industrial and technological diversification and on the reorganisation of existing firms, 
networks and institutions. In metropolitan regions, policy should encourage the growth of 
internationally linked knowledge intensive clusters and foster science-based and radical 
interventions. Public authorities might draw attention to the fragmented state of the RIS by 
developing policies to enhance communication and interactive learning within the system. 
Thus, policy makers can develop strategies to avoid the pitfalls of an ‘ideal type’ regional 
innovation system policy approach (Tödtling & Trippl 2005). 
Trippl et al argue that the density and degree of specialisation of the organisational structure 
of RISs (i.e. the number, variety and ‘quality’ (capability and performance) of firms, 
industries and knowledge and support organisations) will influence how smart specialisation 
is adopted in a region. Differences in historically grown economic structures, the degree of 
heterogeneity in the industry mix, and varying firm capabilities to innovate and move into 
new fields, mean that regions can differ markedly in their innovation and diversification 
capacity and thus in terms of opportunities for selecting priorities that are in line with Smart 
Specialisation. They argue that these include its apparent overemphasis on a linear model of 
innovation of science and technology-led innovation with a focus on high-tech sectors 
(Cooke 2012; Marques & Morgan 2016); a focus on imitative innovation (Capello & Lenzi 
2013); and a strong orientation towards framing priorities alongside watering down of 
selected priority choices to more general categorisations” (Cooke, 2012; Capello & Lenzi 
2013; Iacobucci 2014; McCann & Ortega 2011 in Healy 2016). 
Trippl al further argue that existing empirical approaches fail to take into account conceptual 
insights into system failures regarding organisational and institutional thinness in relation to 
misconfiguration of RIS in relation to knowledge bases, and RIS structures for different 
forms of path development. They argue that there is still a tendency to measure narrowly 
defined RIS as analytical (R&D-based) knowledge and the STI mode of innovation, and that 
there is a need to consider different types of knowledge and innovation modes and more 
broadly defined RIS in empirical research and also to consider the transformative potential 
of RIS; that is, their capacity to support new path development. According to Trippl et al, 
“there is a need to develop new measures and indicators to be used in quantitative research, 
and new qualitative case studies to capture how Smart Specialisation can assist with a process 
of achieving diversified specialisation or specialised diversification amongst heterogeneous 
European regions” (Trippl et al 2016, need). 
According to Trippl et al, compounding this problem is the measurement of innovation 
activities in regions to identify less-developed RISs: the Regional Innovation Scorecard 
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(European Commission 2014) and the typology of regions suggested by the OECD (OECD 
2011 in Trippl et al 2016). They argue that the Regional Innovation Scorecard is arguably 
based on a low number of indicators and data is missing for many regions. In addition, there 
is a bias towards measuring R&D-driven innovation activities. Many of the indicators are 
narrow and targeted towards measuring analytical knowledge, the STI mode of innovation 
and narrowly defined RIS. This approach also fails to identify what system failures or system 
deficiencies might prevail in a region, including the degree of regional specialisation in cases 
where a region is dependent on an industrial mono-structure, has fragmentation problems or 
a lack of positive lock ins Similarly, the OECD typology does not take into consideration the 
heterogeneity existing within determined ‘innovation environments’ such as what factors are 
determining the transformative capacity of a RIS or what factors are resulting in a lack of 
such capacity, for instance, in the case of industrial production zones (Trippl et al 2016). 
Within this picture, a sub-stream of empirical research has emerged addressing the particular 
challenges facing regions located within the CEE. This focuses on particularities of RIS in 
post-socialist countries and regions, developing countries and cross-border areas (Radosevic 
2002; Blazek & Zizlova 2010; Asheim & Vang 2006; Trippl 2010; Lundquist & Trippl 2013 
in Isaksen et al 2018). Regions located in CEE countries are, for the most part, considered to 
be economically lagging in Europe, with many socialist-industrialised regions being 
associated with economic, social and environmental degradation (European Commission; 
Lux in Dyba et al. 2018). By the fall of socialism, CEE regions were more industrialised, but 
still said to be less developed as they lacked innovation in technology and processes (Berend; 
Chojnicki et al. in Dyba et al. 2018). In addition, high levels of specialisation between CEE 
countries led to overspecialisation and investment in obsolete technologies, a hallmark of 
‘old industrial’ regions, thus withering the competitiveness of CEE countries amidst 
globalisation (Berend in Dyba et al. 2018).  
However, socialist policies and a ‘forced industrialisation strategy’ during socialism, while 
producing many of the territorial problems facing CEE countries, are not sufficient in 
themselves to explain the creation of ‘old industrial regions’, with economic structures 
characteristic of these countries also said to be related to globalisation and widened spheres 
of competition. Thus Dyba has argued that while the traditional infrastructure investment 
focus of EU Cohesion Fund policy is a historically important determinant in the long process 
of transforming CEE economies and has played an important role in regional development 
in CEE regions, helping to overcome path dependence in some regional economies, the recent 
regional policy paradigm represents an opportunity for CEE regions to move into a more 
advanced economic standing within GVC competition (Bachtler, Yuill, Tödtling, Trippl, 
Barca, Vanthillo, Verhetsel in Dyba et al. 2018).  
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Thus, the Smart Specialisation policy is seen as a promising tool for CEE regions to support 
higher R&D spending, deliberative innovation strategies and better cooperation between 
business and research or education institutions (Dyba et al. 2018). The new policy emphasis 
is seen as assisting CEE regions to overcome the problem of Western mega-suppliers forming 
the top of automotive supply chains in these regions, to enable the development of high-
value-added locally owned first-tier suppliers capable of transforming into innovative firms 
(Rugraff 2010). However, despite the promise of the policy in assisting CEE regions to 
upgrade their innovative capacity, empirical research derived from the business studies 
literature reminds us that significant challenges still face LDRs in transforming their regional 
economies in attempting to upgrade and value add to local firms within GVP networks. 
Phillip Cooke has argued that policy makers should understand the important role of MNCs 
in shaping regional knowledge-based economic development, given the increasing 
outsourcing of R&D from large corporations. In this sense, regions should try and influence 
location and decision making of R&D by large corporations, to help shape and exploit 
knowledge-production processes and innovation systems in the context of globalisation 
(Cooke & Picculuga 2009). For countries located in CEE, attracting the settlement of research 
facilities owned by MNCs to regions will enable functional upgrading of knowledge capacity 
processes and hence the capacity to break out of their peripheral status in the global economy 
(Smaho 2012).  
Capello and Kroll (2016) maintain that repositioning of peripheral regions in international 
value chains, however desirable, can often not be controlled by policymakers from within 
these regions alone. Typically, the only link to the international economy is based on local 
MNE subsidiaries acting under headquarter directives and embedded in global corporate 
strategies. Consequently, they are not usually specifically interested to become engaged with 
a region’s local government or its strategies. Even if they were to become involved, any 
internationalisation strategy built upon their activities would remain vulnerable to more 
general corporate plans, as they can at any time by closed down or relocated following 
considerations entirely out of control of the regional government (Capello & Kroll 2016). 
Within the automotive sector, the global value chain (GVC) organisation of the company 
Volkswagen demonstrates how a core–periphery dynamic may be established in relation to 
the placement of R&D facilities across Europe. Research carried out by the Volkswagen 
Group has always been largely centralised, with the corporate research division at the 
company’s Wolfsburg headquarters providing support for all Volkswagen brands. The 
individual brands also maintain smaller research departments, which together form a research 
network, with the Wolfsburg headquarters as its hub. In addition, the Electronic Research Lab 
(ERL) in Palo Alto, California, carries out research in the field of electronic systems and 
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makes the results available to all of the corporate brands. The R&D activities of the various 
brands concentrate mainly on development efforts. Each brand has its own development 
department – Volkswagen in Wolfsburg, with a design branch in Potsdam; Audi in Ingolstadt 
(the electronics centre) and Neckarsulm (the lightweight-vehicle construction centre); Skoda 
in Mladá Boleslav, Czech Republic; and SEAT in Martorell, near Barcelona, Spain (Schmid 
and Grosche 2008).  
 
According to Schmid and Grosche (2008), the Shanghai Volkswagen Automotive Technical 
& Design Center in Shanghai has been developing models for the Chinese market for several 
years. The Shanghai site, the Technological Centre in Tokyo and ERL in Palo Alto also serve 
as outposts and pass on information to the corporate research division in Wolfsburg. In this 
sense, Volkswagen would only need to change strategy in relation to the organisation of the 
GVC in terms of the centralised configuration of research if new innovation clusters were 
established elsewhere or problems arose that made it difficult to carry out research in 
Germany (Schmid & Grosche 2008). Indeed, a baseline mapping exercise of advanced 
manufacturing capacity in European regions undertaken on behalf of the European 
Commission, found that ‘top layer’ advanced manufacturing capacity in the automotive 
industry is largely concentrated in regions located in Western Europe and Spain (Technopolis 
2014).  
Given the vertical nature of MNC GVC strategy, it is maintained by many GVC scholars that 
it is not feasible for regions that are characterised by a unfavourable structural features of 
economies (outside global economic cores) that are dominated by lower tier suppliers, have 
guaranteed demand (often in large volume) for standard goods produced with well-known 
technology, and do not tend to conduct activities such as market research to aspire to an 
industrial upgrading strategy (Blazek 2016; Todtling & Trippl 2005). It may be that public 
policies aimed at stimulating socioeconomic development by supporting innovation (e.g. via 
the promotion of cooperation between firms and academic R&D institutions) are to a large 
extent misleading. Instead, given the narrow profit margins of lower tier suppliers, as well as 
their limited growth potential stemming from their modest capabilities and consequent low-
road strategies of competitiveness, upgrading is not relevant to these firms (Blazek 2016; 
Tödtling & Trippl 2005). 
 
Pavlik and Zenka measured industrial upgrading at the plant level with their analysis of the 
Czech automotive industry between 1998 and 1996. They concluded that industrial 
upgrading in this time period was highly selective and uneven and mainly to do with product 
and process upgrading, rather than functional upgrading. The study showed that despite 
government incentives, the development of automotive R&D was very limited in foreign 
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subsidiaries and that the vast amount of foreign investors did not develop any R&D functions 
in their Czech subsidiaries. As a result, processes tended to reinforce the peripheral position 
of the Czech automotive industry in European value chains and production networks, rather 
than improving it. The authors argue that for the future success of the Czech automotive 
industry (and industrial upgrading), Czech-based automotive firms will need to maintain or 
improve their position in European and global automotive production networks and value 
chains through upgrading their production processes, products and competencies. This 
process will depend on the strategies and decisions of foreign TNCs that control the majority 
of the Czech automotive industry and its key players in the absence of effective state-led 
industrial or economic policies (Pavlik & Zenka 2011).  
 
Morris has also pointed out that a key policy issue for developing countries, is around the 
possibility of getting vertical firm cooperation (from the lead firm within the GVC) in order 
to upgrade and move into new more highly value-added activities. He argues that research 
has demonstrated that countries that complacently stand still within their existing value chain 
are vulnerable to the possibility of producers downgrading them. Hence, their best defence 
should be to embark on a process of functional upgrading in order to occupy some parts of 
the design-intensive activities in the chain (Morris 2001, p.128). 
However, Tokatli argues that ‘upgrading’ should not necessarily be the only strategy for 
seeking an improved economic development outcome for poorer regions (Tokatli, 2013). She 
showed, on the basis of her study of firms in the apparel industry (especially the case of the 
high-value garments producer Mithat), that: (Tokatli, 2013, p.998) 
firms’ trajectories are not unidirectional, such as moving into higher value-added 
activities while leaving lower value-added ones, but instead that firms are branching 
in several directions without leaving their other profitable activities, thus giving rise 
to more and more complex production networks. Therefore, in practice, overlaps, 
multiplicity and myriads of combinations of repositioning trajectories are common. 
Moreover, upgrading activities can differ vastly in scale and nature (e.g. 
introduction of incremental versus radical changes) and, consequently, there is 
much more continuity than the categories used in GVC/GPN research might suggest 
Tokatli argues that given the diverse and complicated ways that manufacturing firms try to 
improve their positions within the global apparel industry (or at least try and avoid allowing 
their positions to worsen), it is clear that the concept of upgrading “as conventionally 
conceived” has some serious conceptual limitations (Tokatli 2013). Accordingly, Smith 
maintains that there is a need to recognise the embeddedness of firm and sectoral changes 
within the context of political economies as well as state and no-state institutional actions 
(Smith et al. in Tokatli 2013). Tokatli argues that “there is an integration between the study 
of the vertical dimension of GPNs with the horizontal dimension, namely, with the “on-the-
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ground places and territories that constitute the interconnected global economy, as the 
intersection of vertical and horizontal forces that drives economic development and that 
instead of just looking at vertical ascension within a GVC, we need to integrate a GVC/GPN 
approach with institutional theories of regional innovation systems and related concepts” 
(Tokatli 2013). In this way, Tokatli argues that the repositioning strategies of firms rest not 
only on a firm’s internal capabilities and its path dependency, but also on the nature of the 
GVC/GPN in question and the broader context in which the firm is embedded, such as 
national and regional innovation systems (Tokatli 2013). 
Oztagen adopted a GVC approach to address the different forms of chain relations established 
by lead automotive firms with suppliers in Turkey and found that suppliers based in Bursa’s 
components industry increased their competencies in design and product development. In 
particular he found that when firm-level efforts and systems of innovation are aligned with 
strategies of global led firms in producer-driven value chains, peripheral production nodes 
are more likely to overcome the upgrading challenges they face in the global economy and 
maintain their competitive advantage in global chains. This indicated that suppliers in 
peripheral places, such as Turkey, have room to undertake higher value competencies and 
break power asymmetries in the value chain. His research implies that value chains are 
continuously constituted, transformed and reproduced through evolving power relations and 
that therefore governance structures in GVCs are not stable. Instead he finds that “local 
suppliers in the periphery may find ways to mitigate the asymmetric distribution of power 
between themselves and the lead firms, and may change the mode of GVC governance.” 
(Oztagen 2011, p. 91). He argues that firm-level efforts need to be complemented by regional 
and national systems of innovation, which will promote competence development. Systems 
of innovation will help firms to establish strategic links with leading research and 
development institutions and provide firms with technical support, well-educated researchers 
and technical staff (Oztagen 2011). 
Mattes combined an institutionalised RIS approach and an interaction-oriented notion of 
embeddedness to derive a more precise and project-related concept of regional embeddedness 
in her study of the degree to which MNCs relate through interactions within four subsystems 
of a RIS, and the degree of embeddedness of the MNC within them. She found that on this 
general level, MNCs face a dilemma between embedding and disembedding. Embedding 
themselves in a region allows them to draw upon external knowledge and competencies. As 
knowledge and expertise are important resources for corporate innovation, and as both factors 
are not exhaustively available internally, they may also be obtained in local universities and 
scientific institutes. At the same time, regional embeddedness also poses a threat to the MNC. 
Mutual interdependencies between large companies and their regional surroundings emerge, 
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and MNCs are endangered to lock into existing structures (Heidenreich 2004; Grabher 1993 
in Mattes, 2010, p.84): 
As soon as many of the regional actors orient themselves towards the MNC’s needs, 
regional variety gets lost, and drawing upon the available LGCs does not provide an 
innovative input for the company. Regional embeddedness is thus not necessarily a 
positive characteristic in that it may result in lock-in situations, dependence upon 
the regional economic situation and may narrow the scope of locally available 
variety. Therefore, MNCs also aim at regional disembedding in order to avoid these 
effects. At the same time, not adapting too strongly to its regional surroundings 
allows the subsidiary to maintain the global focus and integrate more easily into its 
company group. In this manner, MNCs face a dilemma between acting, on the one 
hand, as disembedded, so-called "footloose companies" on global scale, and on the 
other hand, embedding themselves in the regional infrastructure. Regional 
embeddedness is thus by no means an automatic phenomenon, but resides upon a 
mix of strategic choices and path-dependent evolution: companies can decide on 
which region they focus and whether they are willing to invest into strong 
connections to the regional surroundings or rather maintain a broader, more global 
orientation.  
 
Heidenreich and Mattes argue on the basis of four regional and organisational case studies 
that strong forms of embeddedness of MNCs are not always the best option for involved 
companies, and that likewise, for regional policy, a specific focus on MNCs may be risky. 
Solvell in her study on multi-home-based corporations links the debates on clusters and 
MNCs by analysing the choice between globalisation and localisation strategies as the 
dilemma between ‘insiderization’ and ‘outsiderization’. Insiders in a cluster can tap locally 
bound capabilities and gain access to local networks, but require a certain autonomy within 
the corporate network, outsiders can benefit from the advantages of global coordination and 
can exploit globally available capabilities, technologies and opportunities. Global markets 
are seen as central for MNCs’ cost position, while insider positions in clusters are central for 
their innovation processes. Multi-domestic and transnational corporations can exploit either 
the insider or the outsider advantage. By co-locating divisional headquarters, R&D and 
design functions in multiple home bases, the multi-home-based corporation attempts to 
mitigate the dilemma of increased insiderization in host clusters, leading to increased 
outsiderization of subsidiary units within the overall MNC (Heidenreich & Mattes as cited in 
Heidenreich 2012). 
 
On the basis of in-depth interviews in German and British MNCs, Immarino et al analyse 
three different dimensions of the regional embeddedness of these companies: the 
interdependence of regional and organisational knowledge creation; the influence of the 
regional environment on corporate R&D strategies; and the types of industrial and scientific 
patterns of cooperation between the subsidiaries and other companies within and beyond the 
group. Their research findings reveal that MNCs “make use of and provide skills to the local 
61 
 
labour market and benefit from the presence of regional universities and research 
infrastructure. Regional partners, especially in higher education, the regional availability of 
scientists and R&D resources as well as regional cluster and network initiatives significantly 
influence the regional embeddedness of MNCs” Thus that decentralised development 
activities facilitate their interaction with the environment. 
 
Narula and Guimon draw several political conclusions about the debate on corporate 
embeddedness (Narula & Guimon as cited in Heidenreich 2012, p.22): 
FDI by MNCs might play an ambivalent role in national innovation systems: they 
contribute either to the upgrading of domestic clusters or to the reduction of its long-
run potential (e.g. by the ‘crowding out’ of innovative domestic firms or the 
downgrading of a foreign subsidiary's R&D mandate). The role of MNCs in the 
upgrading of national innovation systems also depends on the level of domestic 
innovative capabilities. Only when these local competences are sufficiently 
developed can regions profit from the competencies of foreign MNCs by integrating 
them in local clusters.  
 
They observe that this finding is particularly important for new Member States of the EU, as 
the role of foreign subsidiaries in these countries is significantly higher than in Western and 
Southern European countries. The authors conclude that innovation policies in the new 
member states should focus mostly on the embeddedness and upward evolution of existing 
MNC operations by creating linkages between the MNC subsidiary and local organisations 
and clusters. Finally, they recommend that countries should try and attract “‘demand-driven’ 
rather than ‘supply-driven’ R&D” This they see as being achieved by upgrading human 
capital and public R&D as the most important focus (Hancke; Narula & Guimon, as cited in 
Heidenreich 2012). 
Smart Specialisation and overcoming the regional innovation paradox 
post 2014-20 
 
McCann and Ortega-Argiles find that in the economically weakest regions with less robust 
governance arrangements, and in particular, in Eastern Europe, Smart Specialisation has 
often proved very challenging placing pressure on fragile or limited institutional frameworks, 
but at the same time they argue that also this also offers real opportunities for institutional 
learning and the upgrading of governance capabilities in the longer term. They argue that the 
policy has already proved to be an important narrative for beginning to overcome various 
institutional blockages in LDRs and bringing about changes to policy making both within 
and beyond the sphere of technological matters. They argue that there should be attempts to 
find ways to better utilise policy resources to help with institutional upgrading and enhancing 
the quality of governance in these regions is also a key priority in order to better foster smart 
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innovation-driven growth and also wider aspects of sustainable and inclusive growth 
(McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2016). 
Other studies corroborate McCann and Ortega-Argiles’ (2016) study. Trippl et al through a 
meso-level analysis, examined a variety of regions drawn from across Europe and the ways 
by which organisational and institutional features of a RIS shape smart specialisation 
practices in less-developed, intermediate and advanced regions. Drawing on research from 
15 European regions, they showed that the implantation of the policy faced challenges in all 
three types of regions, but ultimately that policy has supported policy learning and system 
building efforts in LDRs and facilitated policy re-orientation and system transformation in 
more advanced regions. They found that regions with functioning mechanisms for policy 
alignment in MLG settings will be in an advantageous situation, whilst those where such 
mechanisms are largely absent could be expected to face severe coordination challenges. In 
relation to LDRs, they found that the future success of the policy will depend on efforts to 
further strengthen RIS building processes by enhancing the absorptive capacity of firms, 
integrating research organisations into regional development processes and improving the 
institutional structures (Trippl et al 2018). 
Trippl et al additionally have addressed the issue of uncertain funding and budgetary 
commitments associated with the policy itself, creating a fragile environment for 
implementing strategies fashioned at the regional level. The apparent lack of appropriate 
tools to deliver the RIS3 ambitions was a source of concern across regions analysed. 
Supporting the evolution of a Smart Specialisation toolbox should be a key priority for 
applied research in the future. Trippl et al 2018 argue that implementation may also be 
impeded by the presence of misaligned funding streams and the identified lack of resources 
dedicated to the delivery of RIS3 strategies. This is exacerbated by complex governance 
systems for innovation, reflecting vertical and horizontal coordination challenges that may 
also negatively affect the implementation of the policy. (Trippl et al 2018). 
Henderson and Morgan have also argued that policies such as the Smart Specialisation policy 
with its emphasis upon helping regions to help themselves through initiatives designed to 
mobilise local knowledge in a process of collective social learning which will assist in the 
process of institutional change and social capital, and the integration of technology policy 
and industrial policy, by placing innovation promotion high on the regional development 
agenda (Henderson & Morgan cited in Oughton et al 2002), Additionally, Musico et al 
maintain that resolving this paradox will require an ongoing investment in the machinery of 
governance to increase regional innovation capacity. This they argue would include the 
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“upgrading” of ministries and agencies to strengthen their strategic management capacity 
(notably a shift from direct financial aid to demand-side policies), as well as fostering the 
emergence of partnerships to manage “innovation platforms” and structure fragmented 
business capacities to deliver on the Smart Specialisation policy priorities (Musico et al 
2015). 
 
Kroll adds to the findings of McCann and Ortega-Argiles (2016), Oughton (2002) and 
Musico et al (2015) in maintaining that Smart Specialisation has the capacity to rejuvenate 
and reorient policy practice towards a more effective, stakeholder-driven approach, but calls 
for more contextual sensitivity when developing and implementing the policy. He argues that 
the extent to which the policy has induced policy change varies considerably across regions, 
distinguishing between ‘starters’ (mainly Eastern European regions, where governance 
principles were difficult to implement due to traditional planning cultures and centralist 
governance systems), ‘active beneficiaries’ (mostly Southern European regions, where the 
hard institutional framework proved to be more suitable to the introduction of bottom-up 
approaches) and ‘drivers’ (mainly Central and Northern European regions, where Smart 
Specialisation processes induced amendments of governance practices). Like McCann and 
Ortega (2016) Kroll concludes that an LDR’s capacity to reliably identify and commercially 
exploit specific societal challenges needs to be strengthened and greater administrative 
learning, professional capacity building and concrete political commitment will be needed 
(Kroll, 2017).  
 
Hassink and Marques propose, in relation to governance, that a vertical multilevel 
governance model is necessary, in addition to a horizontal (regional) model of coordination 
and collaboration. They maintain that regional innovation policy should be an integral part 
of the multilevel governance approach to innovation and they further argue that the 
effectiveness of innovation policy, particularly in structurally weak regions, “results from the 
interaction between these scales of activity and they should remain independent scales of 
activity” (Hassink & Marques 2014, p.2). In Eastern Germany, where there are strong 
regional governance arrangements in place, regional actors have been activated by the 
devolved governance arrangements under the Smart Specialisation policy, with sub-national 
mobilisation in European MLG arrangements increasing due to increased incentives from the 
European Commission, which has led to an openness of input and participation (Salegeanu 
2015). Overall, implementation of the Smart Specialisation policy remains politically 
sensitive to regional institutional capacity, with early indications from policy practice 
suggesting that strategies do not necessarily create anything new, but can help improve what 
there is. Across regions, however, there is a strong openness by regional policy makers 
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towards the new agenda. While regions with a ‘less robust’ background report higher 
expectations and relatively more substantial advances, all regional policy remains a 
cumulative process in which huge gaps in governance quality and capacity building across 
the EU will not be easily bridged (Kroll et al. 2014). 
 
Capello and Kroll argue that the future success of the Smart Specialisation policy will stem 
from its capacity to embrace a wider concept of territorial development than one narrowly 
defined by the concept of industrial renewal. They further suggest that this wider concept 
should embrace the exploitation of intangible assets, supporting development strategies based 
on resources such as natural and cultural capital assets, rather than a return to a ‘space-blind’ 
strategy focused on agglomeration economies and the innovation potential of large cities as 
the main priorities. They argue that the design of Smart Specialisation policy needs to be 
rethought to envisage the development of all ‘places’ with new awareness and institutional 
sensitivity. This might involve a focus on supporting medium and medium-large cities, which 
are widespread in Europe and are potentially productive areas rich in specific, not fully 
exploited territorial capital assets and unexploited agglomeration economies. They suggest 
that this could involve an outcome where there is a future “dual focus on the development of 
large cities (mainly with efficiency, market-based approaches) and of peripheral and rural 
areas (mainly with cohesive, public-driven resource development)” (Capello & Kroll 2016, 
p. 1401). 
 
Nauwelaers provides some important practical recommendations for the future 
operationalisation and implementation of the Smart Specialisation policy resulting from her 
examination of strategies submitted to the European Commission. She argues for future 
reform in the way that the policy intersects with other innovation policies (such as Horizon 
2020) and the design of policy evaluation mechanisms. For instance, in relation to 
entrepreneurial process of discovery, analysis of strategies submitted to the EC did not appear 
to indicate that participative governance was achieved, and there was little evidence of 
advanced methodological approaches or evidence-based guidance to position innovation 
ecosystems in global value chains. There seems to have been a gap in the availability of 
suitable indicators and processes for monitoring and evaluating policy mixes for RIS3, 
according to Nauwelaers, and there is still room for improvement (e.g. harnessing synergies 
with Horizon2020 policies and the large number of EU support programs available) 
(Nauwelaers, 2014). 
 
Nauwelaers argues that although the focus of attention of RIS3 is on the effective use of 
public research and innovation investment to optimise the contribution of the European 
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Regional Development Fund to the Europe 2020 Growth Strategy, this investment is only 
one component of a wider set of regional, national and European policy programs and 
instruments aiming at similar growth goals. She suggests that by linking those policies across 
governance levels to optimise their impact, especially if better harmonisation of strategic 
tools early in the policy formulation process can be achieved. One of the key aspects of the 
Smart Specialisation approach is a broad view of innovation. Transforming this into a 
successful policy strategy process reaches beyond traditional R&D policy, addressing the 
role of (higher) education with a broad human capital agenda, science, technology, 
entrepreneurship, industrial policies and FDI in fostering structural change (Nauwelaers, 
2015). She further maintains that for LDRs to transform their economies and overcome the 
regional innovation paradox, they must provide MLG coordination evolving from silo-driven 
to outcome-driven; good dialogue will be of utmost importance for efficient and effective 
policy implementation with positive interactions. More robust, systematic and systemic 
policy evaluations focusing on the transformative role of RIS3 and allowing different 
approaches for the different priorities are needed. She suggests that peer review methods can 
provide valuable contributions where policy learning requirements are particularly high, and 
argues that future ongoing impacts will be maximised by combining the valuable aspects of 
experience gained so far in peer review exercises conducted under the auspice of the OECD 
and the European Union (Nauwelaers, 2015). 
 
Many studies have suggested that the problem of weak regional institutional settings in LDRs 
located in CEE states might be resolved by increasing EU control mechanisms, including 
strengthening the ex-ante conditionality criteria to further encourage national ministries to 
strengthen the regional dimension, encouraging the use of intermediary bodies in 
implementation processes and encouraging quality governance within the new policy 
direction in the future (Potluka 2010, Molle 2015, Healy 2016; Bachtler & Ferry 2015; 
Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo 2015). However, a recent enquiry into a reform agenda to 
cohesion policy post-2020 indicated that given that regional policy (and the Smart 
Specialisation agenda) is governed by a shared management framework within the MLG 
system that emphasises cooperation between the EC and Member States in determining 
priorities, it would be difficult to move away from the functioning of subsidiarity as it has 
historically operated to a system of increasing use of ex- ante conditionalities or finance 
instruments to impose a rigid policy agenda. Instead, Bachtler et al. (2016) suggest that 
flexibility in the system should be encouraged and a results-orientated framework 
implemented to ensure that the emphasis remains on negotiation, as opposed to imposition 
of the policy agenda on Member States and regions. 
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Bachtler suggests that there needs to be a shift to a greater empowerment of regional and 
local authorities in the future in dialogue with the EU over the new emphasis upon 
‘competitiveness and cohesion’ in the future, thus enabling a better dialogue with the business 
community and public citizens in response to the challenges of effective policy 
implementation; investment in building greater institutional capacity especially in relation to 
leadership and human resources as well as the introduction of an EU-wide Technical 
Assistance programme for all levels of government to facilitate co-operation networks 
between different levels of government; a stronger commitment to human capital support, 
and finally a recognition of the different territorial opportunities and challenges for frontier, 
intermediate and lagging regions to deliver the structural transformation agenda through a 
process of differentiated support in the designation of regions, financial allocation of 
resources and the design of strategies (Bachtler et al. 2017; Capello & Kroll 2016 ). 
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Chapter 3 
Research process 
 
 
Introduction 
This study is an investigation of the challenges associated with the design and 
implementation of the European Union Smart Specialisation policy over the 2014 to 
2020 period European Commission. (2012a). Documentary data were drawn from 
relevant publicly available EU and Member State sources, and supplemented by 
interviews with European Commission staff and regional policy stakeholders. This 
chapter describes the research process, the theoretical framework for interpreting the data 
and the research methodology. 
The theoretical perspective underpinning the qualitative research study informed the 
methodology. The methodological approach, including the strategy, plan of action, and 
process and design, informed the choice and use of particular methods. 
Theoretical perspective 
This research was shaped by a ‘basic set of beliefs that guide action’ (Cresswell 2007, p. 
19), in this case, a pragmatic worldview focused on the outcomes of the research – the 
actions, situations and consequences of inquiry – rather than antecedent conditions 
(Cresswell, 2007). Pragmatism includes the notion that there is no commitment to any 
one system of philosophy and reality; that individual researchers have a freedom of 
choice in relation to methods, techniques and procedures of research that best meet their 
needs and purposes; that truth is not based in a dualism between reality independent of 
the mind and within the mind; and that research always occurs in social, historical, 
political and other contexts (Murphy as cited in Cresswell, 2007). 
Methodology 
The research design shapes the choice and use of particular research methods (Burns 2000); 
in this thesis, case study research is used to explore the issue through the use of one or more 
cases within a bounded system. By contrast, as Creswell acknowledges, some other 
researchers see case study research as a method rather than a methodology, whereas others 
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present it as a comprehensive research strategy that investigates a phenomenon in its real-life 
context, relating it to theory and seeking to understand what, in theoretical terms, the 
empirical phenomenon is a case of (Denzin & Lincoln; Yin as cited in Cresswell, 2007). 
The use of case studies in qualitative research is often justified on the grounds that it appears 
to offer in-depth contextual insights by taking into consideration “environment 
characteristics, resource constraints and cultural traits” (Thomas in Fletcher & 
Plakoyiannaki, 2010, p.306). Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki argue that case study research is 
seen as valuable in enabling researchers to reach a deeper cross-cultural understanding of 
investigated phenomena. They argue that this approach enables the minimising of cultural 
bias and ethnocentric assumptions (compared to the practice of using survey instruments) 
and it has therefore been used extensively in studies that have examined comparative and 
cross-cultural phenomena, as is the context that this method is being used in this study 
(Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2010). 
Methodological literature reflects different ontological orientations associated with this 
kind of research practice; to situate the case study research approach selected for this 
study, it is necessary to distinguish between those who take a positivistic approach to 
case study research (Eisenhardt; Yin as cited in Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2010) and 
those who view case study research through the “lens of critical realism or interpretivism, 
and who acknowledge its emergent nature and power to build logical argumentation for 
theory building and theory testing purposes” (Hillebrand; Kok; Biemans as cited in 
Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2010. p. 308). The positivistic approach, for instance, asserts 
that case studies can be exploratory, descriptive or explanatory, whereby deep insights 
are sought and gained through a process of theory generation through techniques such as 
pattern matching, rather than theory testing (Yin 2003). Alternatively, through the lens 
of critical realism or interpretivism, an in-depth case study approach enables 
comprehensive descriptions of the investigated phenomena and their context (Fletcher 
& Plakoyiannaki, 2010). This study takes an interpretive approach using inductive 
processes of analysis that are highly iterative and linked to data (Eisenhardt as cited in 
Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2010). 
Number of case studies 
In designing case study analysis, distinction should be made between single and multiple 
case designs. Yin suggests that there are three types of case-study design: a holistic single 
case, an embedded single case with multiple units of analysis, and multiple cases with 
one or multiple units of analysis (Yin as cited in Fletcher and Plakoyiannaki, 2010). Case 
study research explores a bounded system (a case) or multiple bounded systems (cases) 
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through detailed in-depth data collection involving multiple sources (e.g. observations, 
interviews, audio-visual materials, documents). This form of research results in case 
descriptions and case-based themes. This research adopts a collective case study design, 
within which a single issue is selected, with multiple case studies to illustrate it 
(Cresswell 2007). This intent of adopting this design is to provide a strong basis for 
theory building as according to Eisenhardt and Graebner, “multiple case studies can 
enable comparisons to clarify whether an emergent finding is idiosyncratic to a single 
case or consistently replicated by several case studies and [therefore can] create robust 
theory because propositions are more deeply grounded on varied empirical data” 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner as cited in Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki, 2010, p.13). 
Selection of case studies 
Sampling is a complex issue in case study research as there are many variations of 
sampling strategies and much confusion about what each technique entails (Coyne as 
cited in Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki 2010). Patton has identified 18 different sampling 
strategies that may be employed in case study research, two forms of random sampling 
(simple random samples, and stratified and cluster samples) and 16 forms of purposeful 
sampling, recommending that the selection of cases involve purposeful not random 
selection (Patton as cited in Fletcher & Plakoyiannaki 2010). There are many types of 
purposeful sampling identified by Patton including theoretical/theory-based/operational-
construct, convenience, extreme/deviant/ outlier, intensity, maximum variation, 
homogenous, typical, critical, snowball and criterion approaches. Purposeful sampling 
is distinguished from random sampling by enhancing sampling as ‘purposeful’ and 
providing ‘information-rich’ cases: those from which one can learn a great deal about 
issues of central importance to the purpose of the inquiry (Patton as cited in Fletcher & 
Plakoyiannaki 2010). 
This study used a purposeful sampling approach in the selection process in selecting 
regions. This approach uses the networks of a selected participant, who is originally 
determined by criteria of (a) representing local views of key stakeholders at the level of 
the region, and (b) providing a perspective from the EC. A second criterion applied was 
that each region selected have a subsidiary of the automotive firm Volkswagen located 
within it.  
The sampling method aimed to achieve a consistency of analysis and thematic 
integration in the empirical investigation of whether global decisions about production 
operations affect whether the Smart Specialisation policy could be designed and 
implemented effectively in a given regional context. 
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Selection of unit of analysis 
The definition of the unit of analysis is a fundamental element of case study research. In 
this study, the unit of analysis is a geographical unit that is an EU-defined regional entity 
representing a cross section of less-developed, transitional and developed regions as 
determined by the EU; selected regions were recipients of EU Regional funds (ERDF). 
Regions across the EU are categorised into ‘Objectives’, depending on their economic 
situation. During the two funding periods that are the focus of this project (2014–20) 
funds were allocated according to whether the regions (classified by their GDP level) 
were ‘less developed’, ‘transition’ or ‘more developed’ (Figure 3.1): 
• less developed regions – GDP per capita is less than 75 per cent of the EU-28 
average 
• transition regions – GDP per capita is between 75 per cent and 90 per cent of 
the EU-28 average 
• more developed regions – GDP per capita is above 90 per cent of the EU-28 
average. 
 
Figure 3.1: Classification of EU regions from 2014–20 (EC 2018) 
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Regions were selected to include in the study to provide data on how the Smart 
Specialisation policy was designed and implemented in different economic contexts. 
Like Cooke’s empirical study addressing the implementation challenges of the Smart 
Specialisation policy across diverse regions of Portugal, it was intended that each case 
study region would provide a “distinctive path dependence, technology or industry mix, or 
‘paradigm’ and regional ‘regime’ representing diverse stakeholder interests” (Cooke, 2016, 
p. 1499). 
The following regions were chosen as case studies: 
• Western Transdanubia – less developed 
• Bratislava – transition 
• Catalonia – more developed. 
Research problem 
This study has selected diverse regions across the economic categories of less developed, 
transitional and more developed regions. Interview participants were chosen from the 
quadruple helix stakeholder groups drawn from RIS across regions. The aim of the 
research is to highlight the capacity of regions to implement the policy given the 
particular “path dependence, technology mix and regional regime representing diverse 
stakeholder interests” similar to that of Cooke’s empirical study that addressed the 
challenge of implementation of Smart Specialisation across diverse regions of Portugal 
(Cooke, 2016, p.1499)..  However, this study is uniquely addressing the particular 
challenges of policy implementation in regions that have a strong industrial tradition, 
particularly in heavy industry associated with automotive production. In this way, the 
study incorporates an additional theme related to multinational embeddedness and 
disembeddedness. This additional theme will enable the study to highlight and capture 
the tension between the influence of multinational global value chain decisions and there 
intersection with policy interventions (Smart Specialisation) in impacting on regional 
economic development. 
This study used qualitative methods to theorise in making predictions about how a key 
supranational policy instrument may be able to generate a new economic growth model 
for regional development. The study is located within the economic geography discipline 
and works within the theoretical and empirical tradition of that discipline (Morgan 1997, 
Porter 1990, Storper 1997) who have highlighted the importance of institutions such as 
knowledge assets, clusters and physical networks at the level of place in generating an 
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effective RIS. 
Because the Smart Specialisation policy phase commenced in 2014, this study aimed to 
capture primary data, thus providing projected insights into the implementation 
challenges associated with the policy that the current literature has not yet covered. There 
is a growing body of empirical studies that have addressed in the particular challenges 
faced in policy implementation confronting LDRs, and this study aims to add additional 
value to these studies. Thus the study will add to a growing literature addressing the 
particular challenges confronting LDRs located in CEE in seeking to transition to the 
knowledge economy. 
This study includes interviews with regional stakeholders from Volkswagen, the well-
known multinational player in the automotive industry. The automotive industry is a 
major global industrial player in regional economic development. Volkswagen is 
headquartered in Germany and has subsidiary activities all over Europe (and elsewhere), 
including plants based in Western Transdanubia, Catalonia and Bratislava. Volkswagen 
was selected over other multinational automotive producers because it has a specific 
mode of global value chain governance that makes it unique for examining the different 
production sites situated in each region, and the implications for specialisation and 
diversification strategies under the Smart Specialisation policy. 
Volkswagen global value chain strategy in the context of the global 
automotive industry 
The Volkswagen Group has a highly centralised approach to coordination of its GVC, 
with centralised research and development facilities and a centralised management 
structure. The Volkswagen Group has a relatively low level of internationalisation in its 
Board of Management and Supervisory Board, compared with other major automotive 
companies. Volkswagen has several international R&D sites, but most of its core R&D 
activities continue to take place in Germany or Europe, so the company does not have 
global R&D active in all of the world’s important markets (Schmid and Grosche, 2008).  
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Figure 3.2: Configuration of the Volkswagen Group R&D activities (Source: 
Schmid and Grosche, 2008) 
However, there are regional exceptions to the centralised nature of the Volkswagen 
global value chain strategy. With the active support of the Hungarian Government, the 
Audi Hungry site has demonstrated that the Volkswagen Group can also cultivate their 
foreign subsidiaries by devolving additional responsibilities in the value chain, in 
research and development or high-value production activities. In this way, it is 
sometimes envisaged by Volkswagen that foreign subsidiaries can develop into centres 
of excellence, assume a leadership role in the corporate network and make good use of 
their unique strengths beyond their location. Importantly, the Hungarian Government has 
encouraged the clustering of R&D activities in Western Transdanubia – Nokia, Ericsson 
and Siemens all have facilities grouped together in the one location to create a site for 
high-quality value creation. In addition, eleven other automotive plants have been 
attracted to this cluster of high-value activities and located at the intersection of Hungary, 
Austria and Slovakia (Schmid and Grosche 2008).  
The GVC configuration of Volkswagen’s R&D activities has important implications when 
considering the design of Member State and regional RIS3 policies. Innovation in ‘design’ 
work in line with the European Automobile Manufacturers Association recommendations 
within its A Manifesto for a Competitive European Automotive Industry tend to focus on 
priorities that may only be relevant to regions located in the R&D investment sites, such as 
eco-innovations to encourage the development of eco-friendly and environmentally friendly 
vehicles as part of the European Green Vehicles Initiative. Regions located elsewhere would 
therefore not benefit from RIS strategies. 
This study contributes a perspective on Smart Specialisation policy design processes and 
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likely impact of the policy regionally from the perspective of a key corporate player from 
a traditional industrial development model (Volkswagen). This study aimed to explore 
the tension between global forces and local policy in shaping development at the level 
of place across diverse regions. 
Aim of the research study 
The study is guided by three research questions. The questions aim to assist in the aim of 
investigating the extent to which the policy will be able to be implemented effectively in all 
regions. As was outlined in Chapter 1, previous EU innovation policies have tended to be 
focused at developed regions. A key research objective is to analyse whether the policy can 
be delivered effectively in all regions of Europe, given factors such as quality of governance; 
characteristics of RIS and the role played by a multinational within the regional context. 
Research questions 
What opportunities and challenges are faced in the implementation of the Smart 
Specialisation policy at the level of the region in terms of the: 
a) quality of regional governance?  
b) characteristics of a regional innovation system? 
c) role of a multinational corporation in a region in the context of the global value 
chain/global production network? 
Two data collection methods were used: 
a) documentary analysis of key EU Member State and regional documents relating to 
EU regional and industrial policy instruments 
b) interviews with key public servants based at the EC and stakeholders based in the 
three regions representing different stakeholders as represented within quadruple 
helix representative groups. 
Documentary data 
According to Bowen, “document analysis is often used in combination with other qualitative 
research methods as a means of triangulation – the combination of methodologies in the study 
of the same phenomenon.” (Bowen, 2009 p.28). In this way, the qualitative researcher “draws 
upon multiple (at least two) sources of evidence; that is, to seek convergence and 
corroboration using different data sources and method (and) apart from documents, such 
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sources might include interviews, participant or non-participant observation, and physical 
artefacts” (Bowen, 2009, p.28). Bowen further states that by triangulating data, the researcher 
can produce a confluence of evidence that breeds credibility. Finally he maintains that 
“triangulation helps the researcher guard against the accusation that a study’s findings are 
simply the artefact of a single method, a single source, or a single investigator’s bias.” 
(Bowen, 2009, p.28). By this studies use of both interview and documentary data, it attempts 
to triangulate different data sources in the manner that Bowen envisages. 
Bowen also highlights how, as a research method “document analysis is particularly 
applicable to qualitative case studies – intensive studies producing rich descriptions of a 
single phenomenon, event, organisation or program. Non-technical literature, such as reports 
and internal correspondence, is a potential source of empirical data for case studies; for 
example, data on the context within which the participant operates.” (Bowen, 2009, p.29). In 
this way, it is argued that documents can help the researcher “uncover meaning, develop 
understanding, and discover insights relevant to the research problem” (Bowen, 2009, p.29). 
The documentary analysis in this research is not intended to support or validate 
observational or oral data. In this way, the advice of Atkinson and Coffey is followed 
who have maintained that “documentary materials are presented as data in their own 
right and it is intended that the data enshrines a distinctively documentary versions of 
social reality that contains their own conventions that inform production and circulation 
and should therefore be given ‘equal weight’ to the interview data.” (Atkinson & Coffey 
cited in Sliverman 1997). 
In this study, official documents published by public organisation were used as a resource to 
assist with understanding the policy narrative contained within documentary sources explain 
how the Smart Specialisation policy was designed and how it will be implemented. 
Documents were selected for analysis to gain an understanding of the consultation 
methodologies and economic evidence used in policy processes in designing policy 
strategies. Only official documentary sources were selected for document analysis, with the 
intention to supplement and contrast the ‘official narrative’ with the ‘unofficial’ views of 
local stakeholders from the case study regions using semi-structured interviews. 
The documents analysed are publicly available documents relating to EU regional policy 
over the time period 1999–2020. This time period was selected to capture the change in 
focus of EU regional policy away from the previous approach focused mainly on 
redistribution and towards an approach focused on an efficiency imperative, which has 
occurred since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 1999. The document are from official 
government sources, including from the EU, EC and from the Hungarian, Spanish and 
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Slovak governments. Table 3.1 lists documents used in the study and provides 
justification for why they were chosen. All documents were chosen to highlight, 
contextualise and provides analysis of the most recent policy phase, the Smart 
Specialisation policy. They were chosen because they were searched for on EU and 
Member State government websites on the basis that they would provide recent analysis of 
the state of innovation policy across different levels of government relevant to the policy 
period being examined (2014-20). Translated materials were cross checked by native 
speakers of the language. In relation to demonstrating external validity, we know that case-
study research attempts analytic generalisation in which the investigator tries to generalise a 
particular set of data to some broader theory. External validity is difficult to prove as it is a 
“presentation, interpretation and investigation of detailed information on a single unit 
developing idiographic interpretations” (Burns 2000, pp. 328-9). 
 
Table 3.1 Documents and data analysed 
European Commission  
Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies 
for Smart Specialisations RIS3, European 
Commission, 2012 
Operational implementation guide for 
Smart Specialisation policy, provides data 
on program methodology  
Investment for Jobs and Growth: Promoting 
Development and Good Governance in EU 
Regions and Cities: Sixth Report on 
Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion, 
European Commission, 2014 
Report on quality of government, 
innovation intensity in regions 
Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe, 
European Commission, 2002 
Industrial strategy articulating changed 
focus of industrial policy to decentralised 
approach and importance of industry to 
post-GFC economic recovery 
Some Key Issues in Europe’s 
Competitiveness- Toward an Integrated 
Approach, European Commission, 2003 
Industrial strategy articulating changed 
focus of industrial policy to decentralised 
approach and importance of industry to 
post-GFC economic recovery 
Fostering Structural Change: an Industrial 
Policy for an Enlarged Europe, European 
Commission 2004 
Industrial strategy articulating changed 
focus of industrial policy to decentralised 
approach and importance of industry to 
post-GFC economic recovery 
An Integrated Industrial Policy for the 
Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness 
and Sustainability at Centre Stage, European 
Commission, 2010 
Industrial strategy articulating changed 
focus of industrial policy to decentralised 
approach and importance of industry to 
post-GFC economic recovery 
A Stronger European Industry for Growth 
and Economic Recovery, European 
Commission, 2012 
Industrial strategy articulating importance 
of industry to post-GFC economic 
recovery 
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Re-industrialising Europe to Promote 
Competitiveness and Sustainability, 
European Commission, 2014 
Industrial strategy articulating importance 
of industry to post-GFC economic 
recovery and strategic response  
For an Industrial Renaissance, European 
Commission, 2014 
Industrial strategy articulating importance 
of industry to post-GFC economic 
recovery and strategic response 
CARS2020: Action Plan for a Competitive 
and Sustainable Automotive Industry in 
Europe, European Commission, 2014 
Industrial policy strategy articulating 
strategy to address the decline of the car 
industry in Europe 
Western Transdanubia  
European Structural and Investment Funds; 
Hungary, European Commission, 2016 
Economic statistics on regional GDP/head 
in Hungary and Structural Funds 
eligibility 2014–2020 
ERAWATCH Country Reports 2012; 
Hungary, European Commission 2012 
Report on political developments 
impacting upon the quality of governance 
in Hungary 
Nyugat-Dunantul Intelligens Innovacios 
Szakosodasi Strategia, Pannon Novum 
Nyugat-Dunantul Intelligens Regionalis 
Innovacios Nonprofit Kft, 2013  
Smart Specialisation strategy providing 
an analysis of policy governance 
arrangements, characteristics of RIS and 
economic priorities of the regional Smart 
Specialisation strategy in Western 
Transdanubia, Hungary 
National Smart Specialisation Strategy, 
Nemzeti Innovacios Hivatal, 2014 
Report providing an analysis of policy 
governance arrangements, characteristics 
of RIS and economic priorities of the 
national Smart Specialisation strategy in 
Hungary 
The Gyor Automotive District: 
Monographies of the Gyor Automotive 
Industrial District as the New Trend and 
Means of Spatial Development Research, 
Universitas Gyor Non-Profit Ltd, 2014 
Economic and industrial profile data on 
the history of automotive production in 
the city of Gyor, Western Transdanubia, 
Hungary 
WPI: Synthesis Report: Ex Post Evaluation 
of Cohesion policy programmes 2007-13; 
Focusing on the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) and the 
Cohesion Fund (CF): Task 3 Country Report 
Hungary, European Commission, 2016 
Economic data on the impact of the GFC 
on the Hungarian economy 
Bratislava   
RIS3 Peer Review Report: Slovak Republic, 
European Commission, 2014 
Report providing an analysis of policy 
governance arrangements, characteristics 
of RIS and economic priorities 
The Automotive Industry in the Slovak 
Republic: Recent Developments and Impact 
on Growth, Working Paper No. 29, World 
Bank, 2009 
Report on the economic foundations of 
and history of automotive industry 
production in Slovakia 
Through Knowledge towards Prosperity- 
Research and Innovation Strategy for Smart 
Smart Specialisation strategy providing 
an analysis of policy governance 
arrangements, characteristics of RIS and 
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Specialisation of the Slovak Republic, Slovak 
Republic 2013 
economic priorities contained within the 
Smart Specialisation strategy 
‘Bratislava Region: The Slovak Cradle of 
Prosperity’, Slovak Spectator, Nicholson and 
Bagota, Bratislava, 2007 
Newspaper article including a description 
of the industrial characteristics of the 
Bratislava region 
The Automobile Industry in Central Europe, 
World Economic Outlook Reports, 
International Monetary Fund, 2006 
IMF Report providing historical context 
and data on automotive industry 
production in Central Europe 
‘Industrial Policy in an enlarged Europe’, 
Ministry of Economy, Slovak Republic, 1999 
Data on recent history of Slovakia’s 
changing focus of industrial policy 
interventions to encourage innovation 
National Reform Programme of the Slovak 
Republic 2010, Slovak Republic, 2010 
Report describing recent history of 
Slovakia’s changing focus of industrial 
policy interventions to encourage 
innovation 
Catalonia  
RIS3CAT: Research and Innovation Strategy 
for the Smart Specialisation of Catalonia, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, 2014 
Smart Specialisation strategy providing 
an analysis of policy governance 
arrangements, characteristics of RIS and 
economic priorities  
‘SEAT generates 1.2% of Catalan GDP and 
Industry Employment’, Generalitat de 
Catalunya, 6th July, 2015 
International government communication 
providing analysis of automotive industry 
investment contribution to Catalan 
economy 
European Structural and Investment Funds: 
Spain, European Commission, 2016 
Economic statistics on regional GDP/head 
in Spain and Structural Funds eligibility 
2014–2020 
Annual Report Catalan Economy: 
Outperforming in an Uncertain Global 
Economy, Generalitat de Catalunya, 2017 
Report providing statistics showing key 
sectors of economic strength in economy 
Catalonia: the Strength of an Outward-
Looking Country, Generalitat de Catalunya, 
2017 
Report providing economic and social 
statistics showing key sectors of economic 
strength in economy 
‘Driving Growth? The Future of Europe’s 
Car Industry’ (CNBC, 18th April, 2016) 
Newspaper article providing statistics 
demonstrating economic and social 
contribution of SEAT to Catalan economy 
Surprising SEAT: Annual Report, SEAT, 
2016 
Report providing an analysis of the SEAT 
investment contribution to Catalan 
economy 
Universities and RIS3: the case of Catalonia 
and the RIS3CAT Communities, European 
Commission, 2016 
Report providing data on role of 
knowledge assets in the Catalan RIS 
The Barcelona Urban Lab: An Experience of 
Innovation Public Pre-Procurement, 
Barcelona City Council, 2016 
Report providing data on local 
government policy initiatives 
complementing the Smart Specialisation 
policy framework 
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ERDF Operational Programme Catalonia 
2014-2020 under the Investment for Jobs and 
Growth Goal, European Commission, 2015 
Report providing data on the European 
Regional Development Fund (Structural 
Fund) investment in Catalonia 
Universities and RIS3: the case of Catalonia 
and the RIS3CAT Communities, European 
Commission, 2016 
Report on the role of universities and 
R&D in innovation strategy 
Linking the Best, Barcelona City Council, 
Barcelona, 2016 
Report detailing local government 
strategy and how it complements Smart 
Specialisation 
 
Interview data 
As a complement to documents gathered around EU regional policy, semi-structured 
interviews with key informants were conducted. These interviews enabled the research 
to share informants’ unique specialised local knowledge (Burns 1996). Further, the 
purpose of interviewing is to capture perspectives of, for instance, a policy program, 
participants and staff or associated stakeholders (Patton 1980). 
A total of twenty-four participants were interviewed. Eighteen interviews were used for 
data purposes. Six “supplementary” interviews were conducted to provide additional 
expert insight into the Smart Specialisation policy. These interviews were also tape 
recorded but they were not used in relation to providing data for the study. The additional 
six interviews were conducted with two academics (Scotland), three European 
Commission representatives from the European Commission connected with the policy 
as it related to Saxony (Germany), and one European Commission representative 
connected with the policy as it related to Eindhoven (Holland).  Three interviewees were 
desk officers based at the European Commission (Directorate General Regional 
Development) as well as fifteen participants drawn from the three case study regions 
selected for this study; Catalonia, Bratislava and Western Transdanubia. Participants 
were selected through use of the snowball sampling technique and were sought from a 
cross section of key institutional domains in regions to ensure reliability and validity. A 
semi-structured interview style was adopted using a standardised questionnaire. The first 
interviews were organised with EC representatives and regional stakeholders nominated 
by EC representatives whose contact details were also publicly available. The nature and 
aims of the research were explained to potential participants via an official letter and an 
interview schedule sent to them. The length of the interview, confidentiality and 
anonymity were discussed. Assurance was given to participants that personal identifying 
information would not be revealed in any way without their prior consent. All interviews 
except one interview were conducted in English language. One interview was conducted 
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in Slovak with a translator present. 
The length of the interviews ranged from 1 to 3 hours. All participants were interviewed 
in their offices or in a restaurant setting. The interviews commenced in February 2015 
and were completed by November 2015.  
The data of interview participants served the following purposes: 
a) It provided access to past events and situations where the researcher was not 
present. 
b) It complemented documentary data sources with accounts and views on policy 
design processes at the regional level. 
c) It ensured a greater understanding of EU Regional policy development and 
design processes and perspectives relating to potential strengths and weaknesses 
of these processes. 
Table 3.2 lists the groups and organisations that were sampled. 
Table 3.2: Quadruple Helix groups and organisations (PNNDRIN 2013) 
 
Quadruple Helix Groups Organisation 
Science Higher education University 
 Research institute College 
 Knowledge centre Regional & sectoral knowledge centre 
Government Government and departments Ministries 
  National government offices 
  Regional government 
  County or local government offices 
Economy Enterprises Large and small to medium enterprises (SMEs) 
 Technology transfer 
organisations 
Innovation and technology transfer offices 
Civil society  Interest representation bodies (e.g. national and 
county chambers of commerce and industry) 
  Clusters 
  Trade associations 
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Table 3.2 lists characteristics of the participants in terms of their professional roles. The 
participants are divided into four categories. The first category were European 
Commission policy officers involved in the policy design, evaluation and 
implementation of the Smart Specialisation policy. The second were regional stakeholders 
drawn from the three case study regions. These participants worked in organisations reflected 
in the Quadruple Helix groups identified by the Smart Specialisation policy as being part of 
the design and implementation of the policy. The third category consisted of corporate 
representatives of subsidiaries of the case study firm Volkswagen. The fourth were academic 
experts in European regional policy. In order to preserve the anonymity of the participants, 
they were de-identified. 
 
Table 3.3: Participants in study 
 Current or past role Code 
European Commission Desk officer, DG Regio EUpolicy1 
 Desk officer, DG Regio EUpolicy2 
 Evaluation Unit, DG Regio EUpolicy3 
Western Transdanubia Manager, Innovation Hub Innopol 
 Manager, Automotive industry centre Autind 
 Academic Regdevac 
 Automotive industry executive Autex 
Slovakia Academic Autacad 
 Automotive industry executive Autex1 
 Automotive industry executive Autex2 
 Government policy officer Govpol 
Catalonia Academic Academic1 
 Academic Academic2 
 Government policy officer Catlangov1 
 Government policy officer Catlangov2 
 Automotive executive Autex1 
 Automotive executive Autex2 
 Council executive BCcouncil 
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Interviews with both the EC and regional stakeholders were designed to ensure exploring 
a range of opinions and representations on the issue of Smart Specialisation 
implementation in regional context. For instance to investigate the extent to which 
participants felt about regional political context and how this may have impacted on the 
entrepreneurial process of discovery; the main characteristics of the RIS and how it was 
operating from a stakeholder perspective and what the view of the areas of specialisation 
chosen by the policy meant to their sense of the successful implementation of the policy 
given the industrial characteristics within the region. Given that this study is not an 
evaluation of the policy, questions were designed to instead seek a sense of how the 
different aspects of the policy design were likely to play out regionally, given therefore, 
the political, economic and institutional arrangements at the level of place.  
Interview questions were derived from the Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies 
for Smart Specialization, (2012a). The design of the questions was organised around the 
research aims and objectives. Each interview was a directed conversation using the same 
set of questions; however, three different interview questionnaires were prepared, one 
tailored to EC policy officers, another to stakeholders at the level of the region and a 
third to corporate representatives of Volkswagen subsidiaries. The questions were 
specific around the key themes of the research questions and related to perceived 
strengths and barriers to implementation of the policy around three key lines of enquiry: 
(a) the role of politics and governance in determining robust policy process; (b) the 
economic characteristics of the region in enabling transformation; and (c) the extent to 
which the existence and organisation of knowledge assets in the region were going to 
assist with the policy vision. 
Of the 18 informants that were interviewed. 16 interviews were tape recorded. In two 
interviews notes were taken to record key points. The recording of the data was seen as 
integral to the research process and care was taken to ensure that the interview was 
recorded, where a participant consented. In relation to the legitimacy and credibility of 
the research design, all interviewees were provided with a copy of the research 
questionnaire before the interview took place to ensure that the limitations of the data 
were known and discussed before the interview. This approach is argued to lend 
“political credibility and legitimacy to the data being collected; there is a careful process 
of collecting the same information from everyone who is interviewed” (Patton 1980). 
The verbatim responses of 16 people being interviewed was recorded. Since the raw data 
of interviews are quotations, the most desirable data to obtain is a full transcription of 
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interviews. In order to achieve full immersion in the data, it was decided that 16 
interviews would be fully transcribed. In choosing to interview key participants, the 
study was able to draw upon a number of perspectives on historical events, as well as on 
current and future challenges and analysis of the policy design process. The interview 
data complemented the documentary data sources and provided regional stakeholder 
perspectives about the procedural and methodological implications of evolving EU 
regional policy approaches.  
A constructed matrix with the research questions was used to organise the data under 
subheadings. Codes were developed and coding was conducted for each interview 
transcript, paragraph by paragraph. Subheadings were created for each paragraph and the 
key message or theme of the paragraph identified. The data was then sorted under one 
of three research question-derived core categories: (a) politics and governance, (b) 
economic model, or (c) regional assets. Then subcategories were generated; for instance, 
in relation to the core category of ‘politics and governance’, a key subcategory was 
‘principle of subsidiarity a barrier as ERDF regulations weak’. 
In this way, the approach to analysis borrowed from the principles of classical Grounded 
Theory in that the coding processes were used to generate a theoretical model from the 
analysis of social processes. Specific concepts were identified in the transcripts. The concepts 
were labelled and then organised into categories, consistent with open-coding procedures. 
Following this process there was an exploration of how each of the categories related to one 
another; this enabled the transformation of categories to subcategories and the identification 
of broader thematic categories based on the data. Selective coding enabled conceptual ideas 
to emerge, which integrated the existing categories. 
A theoretical framework for analysis of data 
This study used a qualitative content data descriptive approach for analysis of data. This 
approach is a useful method of text analysis that has been developed within empirical 
social sciences and further as a medium of expression as to enable the researcher to 
“construct indicators of worldviews, attitudes, opinions, prejudices, stereotypes and 
compare these across communities” (Bryman & Burgess 1999). This study used Stake’s 
suggested forms of data analysis and interpretation in case study research (Stake cited in 
Creswell 2009). Stake describes “a process of categorical aggregation, where the 
researcher seeks a collection of instances from the data, hoping that issue-relevant 
meanings will emerge which then results in the research establishing patterns and which 
enables the researcher to look for a correspondence between two or more categories.” 
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(Stake in Cresswell 2009, p.154). Following on from Stake and Yin’s suggestion, the 
search used a constructed table that demonstrated the correspondence between two or 
more categories to enable a cross-case synthesis, which was a useful analytic technique 
when examining multiple cases (Stake; Yin in Creswell 2009). This process then enabled 
the researcher to look for similarities and differences among the cases and to develop 
naturalistic generalisations from analysing the data, to apply to a population of cases 
(Creswell 2009). 
As this study is seeking to provide a theoretical contribution, it does not seek to emerge 
with “findings”, but rather will use Grounded Theory in seeking to contribute to a 
theoretical understanding of the interaction between a key public policy framework and 
the economic model underpinning it, and how this interaction has played out in regional 
context. According to Barney Glasier (Glasier 1978, p.4): 
A Grounded Theoretical approach differs from an empirical approach in 
that for the Empiricist “they know what they know [and] it’s empirical and 
descriptive and his knowledge is non- theoretical.” A key difference in 
emphasis is that for the Empiricist they tend to work with deductive 
preconceived logic applied to understanding data. In relation to 
understanding the data, it is understood that the Empiricist will seek full 
scholarly coverage based on the literature available. Alternatively, a 
Grounded Theoretical analytical approach derives or induces logic from 
data and then applies it to the data, after ideas emerge. 
The theoretical framework described in 2 was used to document, analyse and compare data 
between the EC and the three regions.  
Importance and contribution to new knowledge 
Economic geography is the study of the location, distribution and spatial organisation of 
economic activities. The disciple of economic geography is strongly dominated by a 
methodological approach that has tended to favour quantitative methods. That is, neoclassical 
theorists following in the tradition of Alfred Weber tend to focus on industrial location and 
use quantitative methods. Since the 1970s, two broad reactions against neoclassical 
approaches have significantly changed the discipline: Marxist political economy, and the 
NEG school, which takes account of social cultural and institutional factors in the spatial 
economy. This study will contribute to the less-used methodological qualitative approaches. 
This study will contribute to the literature that is currently available on the policy design 
processes associated with the Smart Specialisation policy. It is not the purpose of the study 
to develop a whole new theoretical position on how the Smart Specialisation policy can be 
better designed and developed. It is hoped that the study will advance theoretical and 
conceptual constructs about policy design, processes and methodology, so as to contribute to 
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an understanding of the barriers that may be faced in the implementation of the policy cycle. 
It is hoped that it will advance theoretical and conceptual constructs about what political, 
economic and institutional factors may impact on policy design and implementation 
processes. It is also hoped that the case study research may enable a greater understanding of 
the differences between core and periphery regions in relation to their capacity to develop 
regional innovation systems for economic transformation at the level of place. 
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Chapter 4 
European Commission 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Smart Specialisation is not a new policy concept. It extends existing innovation strategies 
based on 15 years of refining of programs mainly targeted at advanced regions across Europe. 
Advanced regions have already been engaged in similar strategic exercises, such as precursor 
programs in the 1990s and 2000s: the RTP (Regional Technology Plans), RIS (Regional 
Innovation Strategies) and RITTS (Regional Innovation Technology and Transfer Strategies) 
programs and more recently the Regions for Economic Change initiative and the Regional 
Innovation Monitor. However, the difference with Smart Specialisation is that the European 
Commission made the development of Smart Specialisation strategies a pre-condition for 
ERDF (European Regional Development Fund) investments. European Union Member 
States and regions are obliged to have Smart Specialisation strategies in place before 
Operational Programmes supporting investments are approved. Therefore, EU Innovation 
policy applies to all regions regardless of the level of economic development. This has 
significant implications for the successful implementation of the policy in less developed 
regions (LDR). 
This chapter presents and interprets documentary and interview data: the first section 
analyses data sourced from key documents relating to the EU Smart Specialisation policy 
from the EC, and the second section provides analysis of new interview data gathered in 
parallel. Interview informants were key policy actors within the EC. Three informants were 
drawn from the Directorate-General Regional and Urban Policy (DG Regio) and are coded 
as follows: EC Policy Officer (Smart Specialisation implementation) EUpolicy1; EC Policy 
Officer (Evaluation Unit) EUpolicy2; and EC Policy Officer (Smart Specialisation 
implementation) EUpolicy3. All informants were asked for their perceptions of the strengths 
and challenges associated with Member States and regions designing and implementing 
Smart Specialisation policies. 
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Quality of governance  
 
As was outlined in Chapter 2, recent academic studies have suggested that the successful 
implementation of the Smart Specialisation policy can depend on the effectiveness of 
governance arrangements found at the level of the region. For instance, Boschma argued that 
although Smart Specialisation policy shares many of the features of precursor policy 
programs, the key difference is that Smart Specialisation policy explores in more detail 
devolved governance processes involved in identifying areas of economic growth. He argues 
that a key input to the concept is the entrepreneurial discovery, which details exactly how the 
policy process must select and prioritise areas where a cluster of activities should be 
developed, and determines the domains of future specialisation. This he argues enables the 
avoidance of local vested interests and allows new economic players to emerge, thus avoiding 
regional lock-in (Boschma 2013). 
A key documentary source developed by the EC to assist Member States and regions in the 
design and implementation of the Smart Specialisation policy is the Guide to Research and 
Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisations (RIS3) (2012) (hereafter, ‘the Guide’). The 
Guide indicates that the common governance model used in decentralised governance 
processes in policy design – the Triple Helix model limited to the involvement of industry, 
education, research institutions and government – is “is no longer enough” in the context of 
the new policy direction. It recommends the development of a new governance model – a 
Quadruple Helix model – in which innovation users or groups representing demand-side 
perspectives, and consumers and relevant non-profit organisations representing citizens and 
workers, should all be taken on board in the design of Smart Specialisation policies. 
Importantly, this model includes both market and civil society actors. The types of 
organisations that need to be involved are public authorities, universities and other 
knowledge-based institutions, investors and enterprises, civil society actors and international 
experts who can offer benchmarking and peer review services (EC2012a, p.34). 
The Guide recommends the involvement of multiple stakeholders at a regional level in the 
policy design process, to ensure that with the determination of strategic priorities, “a truly 
inclusive governance structure should be able to prevent capture by specific interest groups, 
powerful lobbies or major regional stakeholders”. The involvement of more diverse 
stakeholders is critical to the policy as “their knowledge and commitment [are] key to 
identifying priority areas and knowledge-based investments that are most likely to deliver 
growth and jobs in the regions, as well as the identification of more strategic cross-border 
and trans-regional cooperation to achieve critical potential and related variety. 
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Entrepreneurial actors should include whoever is best placed to discover the domains of R&D 
and innovation in which a region is likely to excel given its existing capabilities and 
productive assets” (EC2012a). 
The extent to which the entrepreneurial process of discovery may be implemented effectively 
in all or just some regions is a key question in this research project. The EC appears to 
acknowledge the potential problem for effective coordination of the policy at a local level 
that is posed by uneven governance quality across regions. Thus the Guide states that when 
Member States and regions develop their policies, ‘one size’ does not fit ‘all’ local 
circumstances (EC2012a, p.10). According to the Guide, the Smart Specialisation concept is 
intended to be used in all regions “even though some are more advanced in terms of 
knowledge production” (EC2012a, p.35). Further, the application of the concept in a regional 
context must be approached with care because the economic and institutional context varies 
considerably between and within European regions; therefore the development of Smart 
Specialisation strategies needs to take into account geographically specific characteristics, to 
help generate growth in all regions (EC2012a, 14). 
For instance, it is noted that the entrepreneurial process of discovery will work differently in 
each region and in some places, usually in core cities, “the process will be quite evident” due 
to the high density of innovators and entrepreneurs. However, the EC anticipates that the 
process is likely to be much harder in regions characterised by low population, a small 
number of sectors and large dominant firms, but with few external links. In these regions, the 
Guide suggests that links between local universities and strong public-private partnerships 
are the types of strategies that may ensure the policy works. The regional context is also the 
appropriate context in which to decide who is best-placed to lead the policy process, which 
should involve “analyses, experimentation, debates and decision-making” and should occur 
with the wide participation of actors and experts within and outside the region. This is a “time 
consuming process” that should be seen as an investment rather than a burden (EC2012a, 
p.36).  
As has been outlined, the EC have acknowledged the degree of difficulty for some regions to 
coordinate a sophisticated entrepreneurial discovery process that would enable entrepreneurs 
and key players within Quadruple Helix representative groups an effective voice in 
determining policy priorities in both technologies and new industries. Documentary sources 
and interview data collected in the implementation phase of the policy support the early 
prognosis of the EC relating to concerns about the potential of the policy to succeed where 
regional governance systems are weak and undeveloped. For instance, documentary sources 
such as the 2014 EC report addressing the impact of the new policy on regions Sixth Report 
on Economic, Social and Territorial Cohesion (hereafter, ‘the Sixth Cohesion Report’) 
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contains early observations of governance barriers and observes that, in the context of an 
early review of strategies submitted to the EC, the design and implementation of Smart 
Specialisation is very much dependent upon effective governance arrangements both in terms 
of the presence of “efficient institutions and high-quality, reliable public service and legal 
certainty (are) a major precondition for economic success” [and that] “…weak administrative 
and judicial capacity as well as legal uncertainty constitute key impediments in addressing 
economic development challenges” (EC 2014h, p. 161).  
Factors relating to quality of governance include the extent to which regions have a high 
degree of self-rule (and fiscal autonomy), and the ease of doing business and levels of 
corruption within a region. Thus, the quality of governance varies substantially across EU 
Member states and regions (Figure 4.1), and by a wide range of indicators, some Member 
States and especially the less-developed ones, have low-quality systems of governance, which 
hinders social and economic development and therefore limits the potential impact of EU 
Regional policy (EC 2014h).  
The Sixth Cohesion Report concludes that a lower standard of governance can thus have an 
impact on the effective implementation of Regional policy, both directly and indirectly. It can 
reduce expenditure if programs fail to invest all the available funding, lead to a less coherent 
or appropriate strategy for a country or a region and (potentially) to the selection of lower 
quality projects or a lack of applications from higher quality projects. A lower standard of 
governance may also result in funds having reduced leverage, because the private sector may 
be less willing to co-finance investment.  
A poor-quality governance system is not the same as one that is corrupt or fraudulent, 
although it may be both. Nor does it necessarily involve illegalities. Shallow decision-making 
process, badly organised public consultations, a focus on short-term electoral gain over a 
longer term development strategy, and frequent changes in policies and priorities can be 
perfectly legal, but they nevertheless tend to undermine the impact of Cohesion policy. EU 
concern about the quality of governance in regions has direct relevance to the Smart 
Specialisation policy, which places a lot of emphasis on regional stakeholders formulating 
the economic plan for the region. In response to increased concern by the EU about improving 
the quality of governance at the level of regions, considerable funds (€3.7 billion of ESF 
(European Social Fund) have been dedicated to improving institutional capacity and the 
efficiency of public institutions and public services at national, regional and local level over 
the 2007–2013 period (EC 2014h). 
A major aim of the EU accession process is to ensure that the rule of law, equality before the 
law and the principle of non-discrimination are firmly entrenched in the legal framework and 
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practices of countries before applying for entry, and are monitored after they join. A 
significant agenda item in this regard is the need to strengthen institutional and administrative 
capacity so as to foster economic growth and employment outcomes. The quality of 
governance at a regional level (efficiency of regional and local authorities) is important in 
relation to economic and social development goals, and a lower quality of governance may 
reduce the capacity of a region to implement effective regional economic development goals. 
A regional index constructed by the University of Gothenburg Quality of Government 
Institute (European Quality of Government Index) has been helpful in enabling an assessment 
of the quality of government in Member States and regions that are recipients of EU Regional 
Structural Funds. The results of a 2010 and 2013 survey utilising the index found that the 
perceived quality of government was lowest in less-developed regions such as Romania, 
Bulgaria and Hungary, implying that these regions may be stuck in a low-administrative, low-
growth trap. The findings have led to an increased focus on whether low quality of 
government hinders economic development (EC 2014h). 
Academic research also suggests that the policy faces significant implementation challenges, 
particularly in LDRs. For instance, the inclusive economic institutions required by the policy 
need to be supported by inclusive political institutions that distribute political power in a 
pluralist manner and implementation capacity must therefore take into account the quality of 
sub-national governance arrangements and institutions (Morgan 2017).  
Thus both policy and academic sources conclude that the quality of regional and local 
government is critical when considering the potential impact of the Smart Specialisation 
policy in European regions (EC 2014; Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo 2015). Many empirical 
studies have also highlighted specific governance challenges associated with implementation 
of the Smart Specialisation policy in CEE countries, which often have weak administrative 
capacity – centralised policy making and clientelism (Gorzalek 1996; Morgan 2016). One 
study found that central governments with control over the contents of a regional plan 
undermine the capacity for strategic planning tailored to regional specificities (Dabrowksi 
2012). 
The informants in this study corroborated the documentary data and empirical research 
findings. They observed that the centralised nature of CEE government policy 
administrations have complicated Multi-Level Government (MLG) negotiations, and the EC 
is reluctant to interfere with how members structure their states in relation to the 
establishment of regional entities. ECpolicy3 provided a recent example of Poland’s national 
cultural program as an example of a tendency towards centralised program development that 
sits outside the regional programming agenda of the Commission: 
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All of the Member States in the East, because they don’t have a regionalised set 
up… they are all centralised states… except for Poland, which is starting to develop 
a strong regional structure, so you will find in Poland that they will have mostly 
regionalised operational programs not national sectoral programs… but in Poland 
you still have a national cultural program that we fund… cultural heritage… but it’s 
not really integrated in a way… so we are not happy about that, but what can you 
do… right… this is the principle of subsidiarity and so we, the European Union, 
cannot force the Member States on how they structure their states and how they 
administer their states. 
 
Informants pointed out that centralised governmental processes often found in CEE Member 
States have consolidated weak administrative capacity in the regions. This development has 
undermined the level of sophistication of the Smart Specialisation plans being submitted. 
ECpolicy1: 
I would say that across the board… the capacity is weak [in CEE regions] to come 
up with sophisticated strategies… OK, I mean you look at the Eastern European 
regions, you could say, the capacity is weak to come up with sophisticated plans 
because of weak administrative capacity, they haven’t been around for long, they 
don’t have a strong regional set up. 
 
There was, however, a sense from ECpolicy1 that there was an increasingly strong 
willingness to engage with the Smart Specialisation concept in CEE regions, and that 
understanding different regional political contexts was important. For instance, s/he observed 
that in Eastern German regions there was a strong willingness to engage with the concept, 
whereas in Western European regions, there was ambivalence towards it. The enthusiasm was 
thought to be due to a stronger incentive to ‘catch up’ economically with the rest of Europe. 
ECpolicy1: 
In the Eastern German regions… you have much more of a critical awareness of the 
usefulness of the concept of Smart Specialisation… maybe because there has been 
all of this discussion already… you know… on wasting public funds… and they 
have tried a couple of things already you know, and so we have seen with all of the 
East German regions… particularly from Saxony, but also the others, a very strong 
willingness to engage with this concept… well, and in terms of the rest of the East, 
and so forth, you know, you can see Poland is growing now right? 
 
Despite this, Slovakia and Poland are now being seen as having a strong engagement and 
commitment to the new policy direction. ECpolicy1 indicated that the “entrepreneurial 
process of discovery” and the requirement by the Smart Specialisation policy for local 
stakeholder commitment is now being actively sought at the level of regions. For instance, 
s/he observed that in Slovakia, governance processes for determination of EU research and 
innovation investments had been dominated previously by sectional interests (e.g. university 
departments seeking technology upgrades associated with assistance to the automotive 
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industry): 
But now Slovakia has had a big turnaround… we said that they didn’t have a strategy 
and we need you to elaborate on it... and turn it around and apparently what we find 
out now, is that they have an excellent strategy… so there you can really see the 
promise and in many of the Polish regions you can really see the progress too as 
well… because they are really applying this concept of entrepreneurial discovery by 
involving stakeholders… and really trying to find out what are the opportunities 
from a business perspective… for this particular region… so I think that it really 
depends on where you come from and what your interest is... so in the Polish case, 
the interest is that as a region you want to be taken seriously… and there was a 
directive via the national government to the regions… and in the case of Slovakia… 
it is relatively small and I think there was political change, so is a change now… 
 
Thus, while some CEE regions are now seen to be engaging well with the entrepreneurial 
discovery process, others are seen as having significant work to do to lift administrative 
capacity within regions, to properly design and implement the new policy. ECpolicy1 
indicated that in Bulgaria, a lot of work was being done to assist with capacity building 
around regional governance processes to increase the number of business projects being 
developed in the region, and decrease the tendency towards submitting regional project 
proposals for infrastructure upgrades: 
Because you also have to see that there is a lot of money chasing few projects… you 
know they still have, in the Eastern countries, fewer than five projects… this is why 
so much money goes into gold-plating infrastructure… you don’t see business 
projects so much, because they don’t engage in the entrepreneurial process of 
discovery… its people sitting in the ministries running the program. That is why in 
Bulgaria we have to work with the World Bank to get something going with this 
process… because the administration doesn’t have the capacity. 
 
ECpolicy1 further observed that countries with stronger regional entities were easier to 
negotiate with around policy design: 
If you are in a situation like Spain, France and Germany where you have strong 
regional entities… then of course we would prefer to deal with those regional 
entities because that is the whole thing about Regional Policy ….it is place based 
and it is not designed at a national level… right… and so we can’t really force… 
and also these countries are so small, you know, I mean a country like Slovenia… 
it is smaller than a German region… in terms of population and in terms of size… 
like a region. 
  
Informants, however, also emphasised that despite the hope that regions would be 
predominant actors in the development and implementation of Smart Specialisation policies, 
the new focus on devolved policy development underpinning Regional policy logic had 
implications for the principle of subsidiarity that has historically favoured regional autonomy 
and underpinned MLG processes between the EC, member states and regions in negotiations 
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over policy design and implementation. This principle was associated with the ideas of 
decentralisation and that social problems should be dealt with at the most local level 
consistent with their solution. In a practical sense, for the EU this has always meant that the 
Commission has tried to play a supporting function, performing those tasks that cannot be 
performed at the local level. The principle of subsidiarity has played an important role in the 
political rhetoric of the EU concerning the relationship between its governing bodies and 
Member States. Given the shared management and legal framework where the Member 
States develop their own Smart Specialisation plans, coupled with ERDF regulations that are 
non-specific in many places, negotiations have tended to continue to favour Member States 
and regions. ECPolicy1: 
So what is very important in the European context is that the problem is that you have 
the concept, but then you have to make the concept fit to what is already there, which 
is the whole legal framework… a sort of shared management framework where you 
basically have the Member States and it is the Member State prerogative to decide 
what they spend the money on… and what kind of projects that they spend the money 
on, within a framework… that’s drawn up by the institutions, that is here within this 
regulation… then you have what we call a ‘negotiation’ where you have the Member 
State drawing up a program… where you can say “We don’t like this”… we would 
like you to not spend so much money here but more… here, and then they say no 
and… you know, you go back and forth and sometimes you find a compromise, but 
sometimes if they come with their lawyers there is not much we can do… you know, 
they will say… “But it says in the regulations that we can do…” and there is not much 
we can do. 
 
According to EUpolicy1, after a year of negotiations under the Smart Specialisation policy 
agenda, Member States and regions still hold a lot of political power in the determination of 
ERDF projects in MLG arrangements through their political representation on the European 
Council. Thus, policy officers reported finding it difficult to challenge national governments 
on ensuring that the new policy does not lead to business-as-usual with political projects 
having precedence over projects that are in line with the objectives of the new policy. 
ECpolicy3 noted that it was his role to negotiate with regions, and to scrutinise and sign off 
on Smart Specialisation plans. In doing so, he noted that power still sits with Member States 
and regions over the content of the plans, due to their capacity to exercise leverage through 
political representatives at the Council. He observed that the European Parliament and 
Council was where the real political power was centred, and Commission policy officers 
trying to implement the policy were powerless to ‘stand up’ to these representative bodies to 
enforce the new policy direction: 
It is hard for the geographic desk in the house here to really stand up… to these 
national governments or regional governments… it is easier to stand up to a regional 
government then it is to a national government… because the national government 
has channels through Council and they can complain directly to the Commission… 
and they say… people are telling us that we can’t do this… but why? 
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As ECpolicy3 noted, the new policy logic has overturned an entrenched system of sometimes 
overtly political determination of policy objectives, and that the policy officers could find 
themselves with political power overriding the EC policy program, such as in a recent 
negotiation with Estonia, which changed its policy completely after a political regime 
change: 
So yes, it is possible to add some themes, but not for political reasons. We want it 
to be evidence based… so you know, if they have a new minister and they want to 
suddenly fund … and they want to do totally different things. Then they will come 
back to you and they say, “No, no… we now want to do something totally 
different…” but the problem is that we want it to be long term and for it to be long 
term, then you need to have a sound methodology base.  
ECpolicy1 also highlighted the extent to which EC policy officers were not politically able 
to ensure that funds from the ERDF would go to regional entities, as these are distributed to 
Member States, not regions. Member States distribute the funds to regions, often to programs 
developed at a national level: 
… and then they come back to us and here is how they have to account once a year, 
for every expenditure that they make with the funds… on the basis of expenditure 
categories such as R&D… it is money that goes into the Commission and it is money 
that is being redistributed… according to population you know, et cetera and GDP 
back to the regions… and member states, and you can see that the limits of our 
power is that we cannot for instance force Slovakia… to spend the money in 
programs that are geared towards the need of particular regions, right… so they can 
say… no, we have national sectoral programs right, and we have one program that 
is geared towards regional needs specifically… so… .It’s up to them. 
A further issue relating to governance is the capacity of the Commission to exert influence 
over Member States and regions on policy design, given the legal base of the Smart 
Specialisation policy. EC policy officers rely upon Regulation (EU) 1301/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the ERDF (hereafter 
referred to as the ‘ERDF Regulations’) to define legal parameters, within which EU Member 
States and regions negotiate Smart Specialisation strategies (need source). Commission 
informants suggested that ERDF Regulations needed to be rewritten in places, in order to 
ensure that the EC has more leverage in negotiations over details of Smart Specialisation 
plans submitted by Member States and regions. For instance, informants indicated that they 
thought that many Member States and regions were not following the policy vision in relation 
to the “identification of priority economic areas.” (European Commission, 2012, p. 51). 
The ERDF Regulations are silent on some important areas of procedural detail with 
ECpolicy2 pointing out that to give policy officers the capacity to negotiate with Member 
States and regions with the aid of more specific details in the regulations. She pointed to a 
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recent problem in negotiation: that of being unable to require resources to be concentrated on 
a limited number of sectors, because regions have identified broad priorities that cover much 
of their industrial base, in order to avoid making choices. A key problem is that the ERDF 
Regulations refer to the need for the “concentration of resources on a limited number of 
sectors”, but do not define ‘limited’. The lack of specific detail around the entrepreneurial 
discovery process is also a problem. Procedurally, no detail is given in the ERDF Regulations 
as to how many stakeholders in the business world are included, for instance, so the Member 
State or region can have, in theory, a highly consultative process and become obliged to 
broaden the number of sectors they concentrate on, rather than limit themselves to a sector 
or sectors where a competitive advantage can be identified: 
…that means that they should exclude some industries… but what the Germans tend 
to do, including a bit in Saxony, is that they have a very hard time excluding 
anybody… but this is the whole plan… the whole point… is to limit yourself where 
you have competitive advantage… so in Saxony… they want to be big players in all 
of the Key Enabling Technologies (KET) but maybe they can’t be....and at the end 
of the day… when it comes to the regional negotiations… they send us a document 
saying that this is our Smart Specialisation strategy….this is the process, this is 
people we work with, this is the entrepreneurial process of discovery… of course it 
is down to this in the end, can we nail them down? I mean, what we can do? Well, 
at the end we can say… your SWOT is too generic… you have selected 10 or 12 
areas where you think you have a competitive advantage or areas that you want to 
invest in… can you provide us with documents where you show us the evidence 
base for this? Like a SWOT or a study? And this is what we did with the Germans 
and of course they send you stuff because they have done their homework and… 
they send you stuff, but at the end of the day… you still end up with too many 
priorities. 
The Sixth Cohesion Report also corroborates informant perspectives on the issue of the 
challenges of an MLG system that has tended to favour the power of Member States in 
negotiations, and has questioned how the new Smart Specialisation policy direction can be 
pursued given potential regional governance constraints (EC 2014h). Early indications on 
reforms in this area have demonstrated that many Member States and regions have found it 
difficult to formulate well-defined specific goals. Many draft programs have continued the 
practice of “expressing vague general aims” and “listing a large number of possible actions” 
so as to maintain maximum flexibility in the selection of projects at a later stage. Also, the 
EC expressed concern about the quality of partnership agreements. In many cases it has been 
found that dialogue with regional stakeholders was absent and that the European Code of 
Conduct on Partnership had not been applied by Member States.  
ECPolicy2 considered Bremen to be an example of where the ERDF Regulations were silent 
on what percentage of funds need to be earmarked for research and the need for the research 
to be basic research, rather than applied. ECPolicy2: 
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Take an example like Bremen… and it is now a Bundesland [Federal state] with its 
own legislative powers… but in fact it is a city and nothing else… it is a city with a 
little bit of territory... outlet at the sea… and so they get a small budget, but they 
still insist that they want to have eight priority areas… that are all relevant for 
them… and where they want to invest in the area, they get… and a lot of the funding 
is going upstream… so a lot is going into upgrading research infrastructure and of 
course this is applied research, not fundamental and pure research, because we don’t 
want to fund that… so what we really need is the downstream investment and if you 
go to the Regulations… and they have thematic objectives they can pick… and 80 
to 50 per cent of the money thematic objectives that are all kind of innovation 
related… because these are strategic from a European Commission point of view, 
they are related, they are key drivers of growth… they are related to the Europe 
2020… so… 50 to 80 per cent of the money goes to these goals… so it gives it an 
importance, right? …but it doesn’t really say how much money that they need to 
spend on research… 
The ERDF Regulations also mean that EC policy officers are not able to oversee programs 
funded under €50 million. According to ECpolicy1, this has meant that only projects that are 
worth over €50 million are subject to negotiation, “but anything below €50 million is 
considered below the radar and they can spend it on anything they want to do in line with the 
Operational Plan”. This s/he said, undermines the growth of SMEs. ECpolicy1 also observed 
that this key overarching policy objective is undermined by the desire of regions to continue 
to fund large corporations based in the region. Their capacity to do so under the ERDF 
Regulatory legal framework has meant that large companies are able to be funded just below 
the €50 million required for reporting to the Commission, so scrutiny of the investments by 
EC policy officers is not triggered: 
I know that there is… a strong interest from the governments to use the EDRF… to 
keep these companies there because it is tax income… it is jobs but it is not 
something that is really rooted into the economy… unless they start having R&D 
labs or they develop local suppliers, but if that doesn’t happen, then it makes one 
person rich and gives a couple of jobs to some, a couple, of people… and that’s it 
and that’s all that stays.  
ECpolicy1 gave an example of negotiations with Poland on funds going to large firms, to 
illustrate this point. Poland wanted to give IBM a large amount of money to set up operations 
and pay staff salaries. The EC policy officer indicated in negotiations that this investment 
was contrary to the ERDF Regulations and the intent of the RIS3 policy, but against his 
‘guidance and advice’ to the region, funds were eventually expended on this, as it was 
ultimately presented in the sectoral Operational Plan as a digital investment submitted under 
the threshold €50 million and hence allowable: 
… we argued… no, no, we don’t cover operational costs… of an enterprise… and 
they argued… no, this is an investment, because we work in the area of digital and 
digital is all about investment in human resources… so the Member State wants to 
support this, but we don’t want to support this… and then they will maintain that it 
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is a major project … but usually they know… so they keep it below the threshold 
so we can’t do anything. 
In addition to this, ECpolicy1 felt that ERDF Regulations needed to be more specific about 
what sort of SME should be created, given the strong focus on developing SMEs. Although 
the ERDF Regulations (Article 14) specify that SMEs “can include social economy 
enterprises (which) should be understood….as covering micro, small and medium 
enterprises”, there is no specific legal base for the type of SME to be funded. This specificity 
would ensure that funds were not being expended on, for instance, small operators in tourism 
rather than the promotion of entrepreneurship. It was explained by ECpolicy1 that grants 
allocated to SMEs are required to be linked to a rationale, but the rationale is very generic. It 
is difficult for EC policy officers to reject a range of proposals that may not actually conform 
with the intention of policy design principles. 
… looking at SME competitiveness for instance… promoting entrepreneurship and 
developing new business models and supporting advanced capacities for product 
and service development, whatever that means… could be anything and supporting 
the capacity of SMEs so if you want to fund a tourism SME so as to have more 
customers and so you can have higher quality and more services….then you would 
point to Article 3D and say, “I want to fund it under that”… and yes, we would 
support it. 
 
ECpolicy1 and ECpolicy2 both identified a weakness of the ERDF Regulations relating to 
the intervention logic of the monitoring system. While the EC Evaluation Unit is involved in 
negotiations around the indicators and the monitoring system established by Smart 
Specialisation strategies, there was concern that this area of the policy was still a “work in 
progress”. The early detail of indicators and monitoring systems viewed by the EC policy 
officers had led to the observation that this was an area needing more clarity to be properly 
evaluated according to outcomes. EUpolicy1: 
Under Smart Specialisation, Member States select their own result indicators… and 
we just make sure that these indicators are capable of measuring the change that 
they want to do and this is where our Evaluation Unit comes in, that they look at all 
the programs… in the negotiation phase and they look at all the indicators and in 
this negotiation phase we have a big discussion about indicators… but then again, 
at the end of the day, you can only encourage member states to choose better 
indicators… you cannot force them. 
 
ECpolicy2 also indicated that Member States and regions struggled with the development of 
result indicators for the various policy interventions in their RIS3 plans and how these might 
be measured. She pointed out that cluster initiatives and bringing products to market and 
measuring economic success, for instance, would be difficult given the complexity of 
processes involved, and the indicators needed to be developed to assist in measuring these 
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kinds of interventions: 
I think that the monitoring situation is certainly something that we need to look at… 
for instance, I just received a question [from a region] how we monitor, for instance, 
in relation to cluster development changes… and should this be or how would this 
be measured in a qualitative [or] quantitative way…. 
However, ECpolicy1 pointed out that the ERDF Regulations do give the Commission some 
power to leverage outcomes with Member States in the use of an audit: 
I have just had in the case of Latvia this exact situation… you discuss our 
interpretation what they can and what they cannot do… based on the regulation for 
the ERDF and the common regulation for all of the funds… which is complicated 
and basically from a legal standpoint allows you to do anything… pretty much 
anything and any lawyer will tell you everything is eligible, right? And our power 
extends to the adoption of the program and then we still have a word in the selection 
criteria and that’s it and then they go spend the money… and then we have annual 
reporting and we can look into things on the basis of that annual report and then well 
you know, the stick is always that there will be an audit… so the audit… so the 
auditor will come and they will look into the projects selected… why have they been 
selected and is this consistent with the program objectives? Is this consistent with 
your selection criteria? And does it make sense from a cost benefit analysis 
perspective… so you have this… you have the auditor looking into these things. 
 
The Sixth Report also detailed concern at the Commission level over the effectiveness of 
Smart Specialisation being potentially undermined by the possibility of weak governance 
arrangements at the level of place. The report notes that in relation to the implementation of 
the new Smart Specialisation policy, there is a risk of ‘business as usual’ thinking. Therefore 
the EC has introduced a range of safeguard measures to attempt to reinforce the policies 
intent and ensure the active involvement of local actors. Thus, in relation to governance 
arrangements established to oversee implementation of the policy, integrated mechanisms for 
monitoring and evaluating the strategies are strongly recommended.  
 
In addition, peer review processes are built into the implementation framework. To make the 
policy effective and results orientated, the Commission has argued that it is the role of public 
servants to ensure that the plans are detailed and specific on objectives. The EC indicates the 
importance of strong negotiations around evaluation methods such as results indicators to be 
integral to the success of the new policy direction. In this sense, the ongoing negotiations (are 
crucial) to develop robust strategies, identify a small number of key investment priorities, set 
ambitious targets, and ensure that micro and macro conditions maximise the impact of the 
investment co-financed under Cohesion policy (EC 2014h, p. 27). As has been discussed in 
this chapter, the perspectives of Commission informants, however, suggest that negotiations 
would be greatly aided by strengthened ERDF Regulations to assist them in meeting the 
policy objectives.  
99 
 
 
Innovation performance across Europe 
 
Along with the governance challenges facing implementation of the Smart Specialisation 
policy, are great regional disparities in the quality of innovation systems found across Europe. 
Chapter 2 provided a review of recent empirical research studies that have argued that the 
policy will face further challenges in the implementation phase in LDRs that commonly have 
undeveloped RIS in place, characterised by “organisational thinness, lock-in to declining 
sectors and outdated technologies, fragmented systems that inhibit networking and 
knowledge exchange, and a weak capacity to drive transformative change” (Coenen et al. 
2015; Healy 2016; Trippl et al 2016; Marques & Morgan 2018). In addition, Capello and 
Kroll (2016) have argued that LDRs “lack … local preconditions for innovation and that 
therefore the policy emphasis upon moving towards a ‘practice-based innovation’ (or DUI-
learning by Doing, Using and Interacting- mode), will face difficulties in these regions as 
they typically have few or no research institutions and high-tech clusters” (Capello & Kroll 
2016, p.1395). McCann and Ortega-Argiles have also pointed out that “one of the greatest 
challenges facing the application of modern regional innovation policies across EU regions 
concerns regions with very limited innovation-related assets”. Some regions, for example, 
contain no research institutes; “whole other regions, particularly in Eastern Europe, as yet 
exhibit only a very limited capacity for developing an innovation system, constrained by 
institutional and governance issues as well as by technological issues” (McCann & Ortega-
Argiles 2016, p.1410). 
 
The Sixth Cohesion Report confirms a picture of low innovation assets in LDRs based in 
CEE countries, finding that Sweden, Germany, Denmark and Finland are the most innovative 
economies in Europe (Figure 4.2). The European Union found that countries in the top two 
innovation groups perform positively across the board and have relatively high R&D 
expenditure, although many of them are still far from the Europe 2020 target. Private R&D 
investment is consistently larger than the share of public investment, particularly in the first 
group of innovation leaders. Scientific and technological excellence is transformed into 
knowledge-intensive jobs and exports, a benefit of the close relationship between academia 
and industry (EC 2014h). 
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Figure 4.1: Changes in performance and relative innovation intensity in Member States 
(European Commission 2014h) 
 
Compared to the top performers, countries such as Italy, the Czech Republic and Hungary are 
a step behind as they are “dragged down by low private investments” (EC 2014h). However, 
within the group of moderate innovators, these countries are developing rapidly and are 
catching up with the consistent innovators. It has therefore been determined by the EU that 
“further efforts to improve innovation would particularly benefit Romania, Bulgaria and 
Latvia”, which are in the group of modest innovators (EC 2014h).  
 
The Sixth Cohesion report finds that, in general, regional performance tends to be in line with 
national performance. Most of the regional innovation leaders and innovation followers are 
located in countries identified as such in the Innovation Union Scorecard (IUS) and similarly 
for the regional moderate and modest innovators. Innovation leader regions are located in 
just eight EU Member States: Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the UK. Excellence in innovation is concentrated in relatively few parts of 
Europe. Regions in Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Poland and Romania are assessed as having 
the worst performance (EC 2014). The report notes that there are some variations in regional 
performance within countries. Fourteen countries have regions in two performance groups 
and four – France, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain – have regions in three performance groups.  
 
The report notes that most of the highly innovative regions (innovation leaders and high-
performing innovation followers) have high scores on most indicators (e.g. human resources, 
R&D expenditure, entrepreneurship, and product and process innovations). Regional 
performance depends to a significant extent on a well-developed system of public financial 
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support for innovation, with many companies receiving some form of support. This suggests 
that public funding can compensate for a lack of private funding in stimulating innovation 
activity. Overall, the report finds that there is a wide diversity of regions in the EU in terms 
of innovation performance. This reinforces the notion that innovation has a strong regional 
dimension. Given this wide variation, programs for supporting innovation, including 
Cohesion Policy programs, need to take explicit account of the local and regional context 
when devising the kind of support to provide (EC 2014h).  
 
The Guide points out that regional asset analysis is crucial for providing an evidence base for 
the prioritisation process in formulating Smart Specialisation policies. It suggests that nations 
and regions, in undertaking analysis of the regional assets they have within their bounds, 
should undertake a thorough analysis of the specific regional context that involves “assessing 
the existing assets, evaluating major regional strengths and weaknesses, identifying 
bottlenecks of the innovation system and also key challenges both for the economy and 
society”. Apart from supply-side considerations being addressed by the policy in determining 
sector priorities, the Guide also indicates the need for an analysis to be undertaken of 
‘demand-side’ considerations. These include human capital assets, investment needs, and 
social, cultural and legal issues. Thus, local actor involvement through regional governance 
processes (and the entrepreneurial process of discovery) is important, as is the capacity for 
nations or regions to undertake an analysis of local context (local assets and capabilities) in 
shaping their policies: 
Nations and regions should not only be making an assessment of regional assets 
looking ‘inside’ the region, but also make their strategic decisions taking into account 
its position relative to the regions of Europe beyond their own regional administrative 
boundaries. A region should be able to identify its competitive advantage through 
systemic comparisons with other regions, mapping the national and international 
context in search of examples to learn from, or make a difference with, and performing 
effective benchmarking. Moreover, a region should be able to identify relevant 
linkages and flows of goods, services and knowledge, revealing possible patterns of 
integration with partner regions. The position of regional businesses within 
international value chains in this respect is a crucial element to be considered (EC 
2012a). 
 
The concept of Smart Specialisation warns against ‘blind’ duplication of investments in other 
European regions. Such duplication of efforts potentially leads to excessive fragmentation, 
loss of synergy potential and ultimately could hamper the reach of the critical mass required 
for success. On the contrary, interregional collaboration should be pursued whenever 
similarities or complementarities with other regions are detected. The Guide, however, does 
acknowledge that this ‘regional infrastructure’ gap analysis process and external global 
industry niche positioning for Smart Specialisation would be difficult without a robust 
methodological approach. Therefore, the Guide also proposes that nations and regions use an 
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array of evidence to provide a suitable basis for the identification process. The European 
Commission recommends that nations or regions identify a niche and undertake an analysis 
of matching scientific and technological specialisations. Given the imperative under the 
Smart Specialisation policy to lift the innovation performance of regions through a place-
based economic planning approach with an emphasis upon regional asset mapping and GVC 
analysis, the next section will detail the implications for this aspect of the policy in the context 
of the role of EU industrial policy developments and interaction with MNC GVC production 
decisions. This will contribute to a greater understanding as to how the Smart Specialisation 
policy can intersect with other policy instruments to lift the innovation performance of poor 
regions in Europe. 
 
Smart Specialisation, industrial policy and interaction with MNC 
GVC production decisions 
 
As was outlined in Chapter 1, at the beginning of the 1990s, both EU Industrial and Regional 
policy in the EC shifted from a ‘vertical’ approach to a ‘horizontal’ approach aimed at 
facilitating industrial clusters and innovation networks. Instead of direct financial transfers 
to enterprises, the emphasis switched to R&D, innovation and clusters of small firms. The 
new approach was defined in Article 130 of the Maastricht Treaty, the Lisbon Strategy, and 
then further developed in a number of EC Communications: Industrial Policy in an Enlarged 
Europe (2002); Some Key Issues in Europe’s Competitiveness-Toward an Integrated 
Approach (2003); and Fostering Structural Change: an Industrial Policy for an Enlarged 
Europe (2004) (European Commission 2002; 2003; 2004) A key focus of the new European 
industrial policy was to create an environment favourable to industrial development, and to 
overcome the negative effects of ‘deindustrialisation’ (Vladimirov, 2017). 
 
The global financial crisis highlighted to policy makers the importance of the manufacturing 
sector to the real economy. It was seen that, despite the crisis, the EU manufacturing sector 
was still contributing disproportionately to exports (80%), productivity growth (60%) and 
innovation, accounting for 77 per cent of business investment in R&D. In this context, further 
EC Communications were developed, such as an Integrated Industrial Policy for the 
Globalisation Era putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage (2010); A 
Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery (European Commission 
2012); Re-industrialising Europe to Promote Competitiveness and Sustainability (2014i) and 
For an Industrial Renaissance (2014). In response to the importance placed by the EU on 
vehicle production, the EC has also developed an industrial agenda for the industry. The 
CARS 2020 Action Plan for a Competitive and Sustainable Automotive Industry was adopted 
by the EC in November 2012 (EC 2014b).  
103 
The industrial policy reports emphasised the degree to which a strong industrial base would 
form the basis for growth and competitiveness, in order to support the goals of the Europe 
2020 agenda, and confirmed a commitment to re-industrialisation as part of efforts to increase 
industry contribution to GDP to 20 per cent by 2020 (European Commission 2014a). An EU-
wide weak industrial base with poor productivity performance in manufacturing was 
identified, one that continued to deteriorate in comparison to competitors. Further problems 
were highlighted, including weak internal demand which undermined European companies’ 
home markets and kept intra-EU trade subdued after the crisis. In addition to this, investment 
in R&D was too low, holding back the necessary modernisation of the industrial base and 
thus hampering future EU competitiveness. These industrial policy instruments asserted that 
“Europe needs to reverse the declining role of industry in Europe for the 21st century (as) this 
is the only way to deliver sustainable growth, create high-value jobs and solve the societal 
challenges we face” (European Commission 2012 in Vladimirov, 2017, p.191). 
The overall EU industrial strategy proposes the development of ecologies of innovation 
within regions to help increase productivity and resource-efficiency, and to enable high value-
added products to compete in global markets. The industrial strategy was guided by an 
understanding that, even following the crisis, Europe’s comparative advantage in the world 
economy continued to lie in high value-added goods and services, the effective management 
of value chains, and access to markets throughout the world; and that innovation and 
technological advancement remained the main source of competitiveness for EU industry 
(EC 2014i; EC 2014j). The main pillars of the new industrial policy included a commitment 
to an integrated and unified European market; industry modernisation; SMEs and 
entrepreneurship, and internationalisation (Vladimirov 2017, p.191). 
The evolution of industrial policy towards a horizontal approach to economic planning was 
therefore aligned with EC Communications relating to Regional policy, with Strengthening 
Innovation in Europe’s Regions: Strategies for Resilient, Inclusive and Sustainable Growth 
(2017) reaffirming the commitment to Smart Specialisation innovation policies as a central 
focus of Cohesion policy (EC 2014): 
The overall framework at European and national levels must be made more 
conducive to innovation. Smart Specialisation should be promoted at all levels, as 
this will facilitate contacts between firms and clusters and improve access to 
innovative technologies. The Commission has initiated policies to promote the 
participation of industry in Smart Specialisation strategies by facilitating 
collaboration between industry and regions (for instance by establishing a platform 
for information exchange). 
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Under Smart Specialisation, GVCs are seen as the key to technology upgrading; a key 
challenge in the implementation phase is how to link clusters internationally/inter-regionally 
both upstream and downstream. This calls for a new principle that place-based activities need 
to do more to embrace GVCs as levers of place-based growth. In this way, the diversity of 
EU regional ecosystems is able to drive an economic agenda for upgrading SMEs within a 
region such as in the case of the German-Central European manufacturing cluster. New 
initiatives, such as Vanguard, have been designed to establish inter-regional innovation value 
chains, with a view to aligning regional specialisations and capabilities to expedite 
technology deployment (Gereffi as cited in Foray et al 2018, p.2). Informants argued that a 
strength of the Smart Specialisation policy was in assisting regions to invest more in the new 
policy direction under the EU re-industrialisation strategy based on advanced manufacturing: 
We are keen with that re-industrialisation strategy and with EU Regional policy and 
KETs, which is all about using advanced manufacturing to, if you like, re-shore 
some of the activities and if you can and bring down labour costs and become more 
competitive, but… it does come down to… do you want to support dying industries? 
If a region comes to us with a textile sector that is basically dead, but they say to us, 
“Well, we still see some companies there and we still see a future there” and then of 
course we have to ask them twice… “Well, is there really a future there?” We then 
ask, “What is the niche that allows them to see these opportunities?”… because we 
don’t want this money to go and prop up dying industries… that doesn’t make sense. 
 
ECpolicy1 said that he believed the strength of the new economic agenda under Smart 
Specialisation was the linkage between big flagship initiatives that the Commission is 
investing in and the opportunities presented in cross-border cooperation. Alongside this, the 
EU is also trying with its Smart Specialisation policy to encourage regions to think about 
how they can encourage a move towards advanced manufacturing through greater use of 
KETs such as 3D printing: 
We want regions when they look at manufacturing to think about the tons of 
opportunities that are probably not used… for instance we have a long-running 
initiative here at the EU… we have a pilot on energy applications in harsh 
environments… and this shows you very much how they look at value chains… and 
supply chains and sub systems within supply chains which… will open up a lot of 
opportunities for regions, which we could say are not connected to these value chains 
but… instead off-shore energy, but they have capacity in engineering and materials 
science to connect to these value chains… through cross-border cooperation… so this 
is about a long-run initiative… where we are also looking at 3D printing and we are 
saying to regions, that we want you to look beyond and go a step further than even the 
Smart Specialisation strategy and really look at the manufacturing challenges… and 
in advanced manufacturing and really have a look at the possibilities that these two 
things have together because only together will you have these opportunities. 
 
However, as detailed in Chapter 2, Cooke has argued that a potential barrier for poor regions 
is that they face “industrial and political lock in”, given the potential for centralised 
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governance processes combining with global MNC production decisions that may have led 
to a low technology trajectory (Cooke, 2016). Morgan argues the combination of political 
and institutional weaknesses found within LDRs generates a “regional innovation paradox.” 
(Morgan 2015). This situation could well render these regions unable to join the EU ‘re-
industrialisation’ agenda in relation to advanced manufacturing initiatives, such as the 
Vanguard initiative, a program directed at largely developed regions in Europe, thus 
jeopardising the wider impact of the Smart Specialisation policy in, for instance, poorer 
industrial regions located in CEE Member States. 
 
ECpolict2 said he believed a further potential barrier to the effective implementation of the 
policy may be a conflict with State Aid Regulations. Articles 107 to 109 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union set out the application and control of state aid policy in 
the Member States. State Aid is defined as “an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred 
on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities” Although Article 107 (1) 
generally prohibits any kind of aid which distorts or threatens to distort competition. 
ECpolicy1 believed that State Aid Regulations are in conflict with the aims and objectives of 
the overarching Smart Specialisation policy agenda. He explained that the State Aid 
Regulations prohibit public investments to be directed to private beneficiaries. It is 
sometimes difficult to have EC oversight to ensure that the commercial outcomes envisaged 
by the new policy direction can be realised. Directorate-General for Competition oversees a 
research and innovation policy framework and a strict state aid regime that heavily proscribes 
investments made to companies to ensure that an unfair advantage is not given to one member 
state over another in competitive terms. ECpolicy1 indicated that it was the view of the 
Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy that competition laws should be made 
more flexible to enable the possibility for ‘downstream’ investment closer to the market. This 
would help firms with innovative new product development and commercialisation. He 
explained that the current state aid policy means that 70 per cent of investments are directed 
at public beneficiaries, such as clusters, rather than private firms:  
 
… we want more money in this, but at the end of the day we end up with 70 per cent 
of the investments… under Tier Ones going to public beneficiaries… basically 
public infrastructure… and 30 only going to private… we would like it to be the 
other way around but that is the reality. 
 
Further elaborating on this issue, ECpolicy2 highlighted the issue of global competitors in 
the nanotechnology field who are not confined by restrictions on state aid funding, and who 
are able to survive economic downturns in industry better than their European-owned 
competitors: 
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Silicon Saxony is a cluster that specialises in nanotechnology and it’s a cluster of 
research and business companies in the nanotechnology field so there are big 
companies and university departments who specialise in this field. But you’ve had 
problems, because of the competition from Asia… there is several nano-electronic 
micro-technology plants located in a cluster… but there were some problems in the 
past, because of the downturn of this industry… with this as well… a lot is this is 
linked to the State Aid questions… because they a lot of times sent people from 
Silicon Saxony and the big companies connected to this to the Commission to lobby. 
But to them, what was much more important was the State Aid competition 
question, then the ERDF… because they all said, “If were in Asia, we would not 
have this problem with the State Aid rules limiting support …”. But that is the most 
decisive thing in deciding about whether to relocate to another continent… and I 
think this factor limits the influence of our policy. 
In relation to the role of the MNC in the Smart Specialisation policy, EC informants said that 
they saw their role as trying to encourage the emergence of SMEs. EUpolicy2 indicated that 
the Smart Specialisation policy was trying to change emphasis from large companies to the 
development of SMEs. In the new policy period, the ERDF Regulations are explicit about 
not being able to give business support to large enterprises, and will only do so now if the 
enterprise is in collaboration with SMEs: 
…we always say, don’t focus on the big companies… focus on the SMEs… these 
are the ones that employ over 90 per cent of the people… and are the backbone of 
the Saxon economy… but then they always tell us, if we don’t support the big 
ones… you know, the small ones, are all connected to the big ones… if the big ones 
are there then the small ones settle around and they deliver certain elements of what 
the big ones need for their construction or whatever. 
 
For instance, it was pointed out by ECpolicy3 how the entrepreneurial process of discovery 
had generated the involvement of SMEs over the previously influential MNCs in Saxony, 
including Volkswagen. One of the critiques of the ERDF and the German application of the 
structural funds is that in Germany the list of beneficiaries of the ERDF is very long. The EC 
had noted that the list of recipients was nearly 50,000. Volkswagen in Saxony received ERDF 
structural funds for research and development projects to a total amount of €654,000. In the 
latest policy round, Volkswagen received funds for research and development and a couple 
of “very small projects”: 
The lead agency [for the development of the Smart Specialisation policy in Saxony] 
is the Saxony Ministry for Economy and Labour and they involved everyone at the 
industry level and the science world… it was in 2013 and there was a lot of 
stakeholders there, and they had a set of measures, about 100 or so… and we were 
all supposed to vote to give each measure a priority… and they had a list of 
consultants… that took part in the strategy building process. No Volkswagen though. 
The thing is that they mainly manufacture in Dresden… and the research they do in 
the headquarters in Wolfsburg… and because of the 2014–20 you are not allowed to 
give direct support to big companies for business development… it’s limited to 
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SMEs… so in relation to the competitiveness of the economy and that theme, they 
can only support SMEs… 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the arrival of the Smart Specialisation policy in the context of the 
evolution of innovation strategies based on 15 years of the Commission refining programs 
mainly targeted at advanced regions across Europe. However, a key difference with Smart 
Specialisation is that the Commission has made strategies a pre-condition for ERDF funding, 
with EU Member States and regions being obliged to have Smart Specialisation strategies in 
place before their operational programs supporting investments are approved. Therefore, for 
the first time, EU innovation policy applies to all regions regardless of level of economic 
development. This development has significant implications for the successful 
implementation of the policy in LDRs. 
 
A key question generated by the new policy agenda is that of the potential of the policy to be 
implemented effectively in LDRs given identified barriers found in many regions located in 
CEE, such as the ‘regional innovation paradox’ generated by the combination of centralised 
governance arrangements and weak regional innovation systems. It also a key question as to 
whether LDRs can overcome these barriers when industrial policy instruments promoting 
advanced manufacturing are mainly directed at advanced regions, thus having the potential 
to consolidate LDRs (given GVC MNC production decisions) into ‘industrial and political 
lock in’ on a low innovation trajectory. 
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Chapter 5 
Western Transdanubia 
 
Introduction  
 
Western Transdanubia is a region located in Hungary. Its history of automotive industry-
focused industrial development has greatly influenced its economic and social development. 
The dependency of the region on a single industrial giant – the foreign-owned Volkswagen 
subsidiary Audi – presents risks, as the performance of the region depends on the 
performance of the company. This risk became clear during the 2007–08 global financial 
crisis when world car sales faltered and unemployment within the region rose to 11.8 per cent 
(in 2008–09).  
 
The EU Smart Specialisation policy (2014–20) has the potential to either consolidate the 
existing economic model or assist regions to embark on visionary strategy and ‘place-based’ 
economic diversification founded in the knowledge economy. This Western Transdanubia 
case study explores, the regional political context of the governance processes of policy 
design, the economic context in which key players are embedded, and the extent to which the 
region has significant ‘knowledge assets’ to support building a model of economic growth 
based upon a regional innovation system. 
This chapter presents and interprets documentary and interview data. Documentary data 
relating to the Smart Specialisation policy was sourced from the European Commission, 
Hungarian Government and the Western Transdanubia region. Interview data was gathered 
relating to the Smart Specialisation policy, from informants identified as key policy actors 
within the Western Transdanubia regional innovation system ‘Quadruple Helix 
representative’ groups (government, business and university sectors) coded as follows: 
automotive industry specialist (Autind); innovation policy specialist (Innopol); regional 
development academic (Regdevac) and automotive business executive (Autex). All 
informants were asked for their perceptions of the ‘strengths and challenges’ of regional 
Smart Specialisation policy instruments. 
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Quality of Regional Governance 
 
In Hungary, the political context in which the Smart Specialisation policy operates, is an 
important consideration in determining the capacity of the policy to be developed and 
implemented. The quality of regional governance arrangements is an important factor in 
determining the capacity for a truly devolved process to be operationalised. The policy places 
demands on public institutions, such as the regional state, with the expectation that they 
oversee a collaborative economic search process (‘the entrepreneurial discovery process’) 
and craft inclusive governance arrangements to enhance the diversity of ‘voice’ in policy 
processes (European Commission, 2012a; Foray cited in Morgan 2016). 
 
According to official documentary sources, the consultation process for regional policy 
stakeholder input into the policy design process was managed centrally. This reflects the 
centralisation of political power in Hungary. In the elections held in April 2010, Hungary’s 
centre-right Fidesz political party secured a two-thirds majority in the parliament making it 
possible for the government to change so-called fundamental laws, including making crucial 
economic changes, without having to consult the opposition. Hungary became a unitary state 
and national regime change saw an increasingly centralised approach to government policy 
development processes with regard to major policy domains, including innovation policy. In 
this system, local governments are not financially powerful enough to finance innovation 
activities; they can only “influence these activities indirectly by operating local industrial 
parks (or cooperating with them) and by offering various advantages (like tax exemptions, 
favourable infrastructural conditions) to investments with a higher knowledge content” (Dory 
& Havas 2014). 
 
Political carriage was increasingly managed by the national government, and regional 
governance within the national policy framework became weaker after the dissolution of the 
Regional Development Councils (RDCs) came into effect in January 2012. The role of 
regional institutions, such as previously established intermediaries like Regional Innovation 
Agencies, also became uncertain. After the dissolution of RDCs, their role was performed by 
county-level authorities (Dory & Havas 2014). A new set of national institutions was created 
to oversee economic development at the local level and the previously democratically 
elected county government system was dismantled (PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
A newly constituted national authority – the National Development Cabinet – was set up and 
chaired by the Prime Minister; this in turn established a National, Research, Innovation and 
Science Policy Council or NKITT (Dory & Havas 2014). NKITT was charged with 
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coordinating the national innovation strategy and its power extended to the policy design 
governance connected with the development of the Western Transdanubia Smart 
Specialisation strategy (WT Strategy); the NKITT was given ultimate oversight of regional 
input. Subsequently, the Hungarian strategy was developed centrally with “input and design 
work” from the Western Hungarian Regional Development Agency. The regional plan was 
managed by a process initiated by the national Regional Innovation Strategy Council under 
their “guidance and supervision” (PNNDRIN 2013, p. 20). The National Office for Research 
and Technology Innovation developed the WT Strategy centrally, with a process reportedly 
involving extensive consultation with regional actors who were given “ample opportunity for 
feedback on the plan, based on principles of planning and public debate” (PNNDRIN 2013, 
p. 20). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Policy governance sub-system of the Hungarian national innovation system 
(Dory& Havas 2014) 
 
Despite this centralisation of power, documentary sources describe the extensive 
involvement of regional stakeholders in Smart Specialisation policy processes. For instance, 
the ERAWATCH Country Reports 2012: Hungary (hereafter the ‘ERAWATCH Report’) 
outlines how the regional Smart Specialisation strategies in Hungary started in early 2013. 
The regional strategies were coordinated centrally, with the Hungarian Ministry for National 
Economy overseeing the production of strategies and carrying out social consultation 
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processes. The regional plans were competed in April 2013 (Dory & Havas 2014, p. 19). 
According to the Western Transdanubia Smart Specialisation Policy (2013) (hereafter the 
‘WT Strategy’) careful procedural adherence was given to the European Commission 2012 
document Guide to Research and Innovation Strategies for Smart Specialisations (RIS 3) 
(hereafter the ‘EU Guide’) in designing the regional plan, with the input of stakeholders 
drawn from all of the Quadruple Helix representative groups (Pannon Novum Nyugat-
dunantuli Regionalis Innovacios Nonprofit Kft, 2013; hereafter PNNDRIN 2013). The 
regionally place-based entrepreneurial process of discovery consisted of consultation 
processes, such as two county workshops, and reviews of proposals by representatives from 
regional businesses, RDI (research, development and innovation) actors, and economic 
development and public administration professionals (80 to 90 people). A further 100 people, 
such as specialists and innovation actors, indirectly worked on the strategy (PNNDRIN 
2013). Table 5.1 details the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) 
analysis undertaken within the WT Strategy and Table 5.2 the areas of priority and main 
actions also contained within the WT Strategy. 
 
TABLE 5.1. SWOT analysis of the situation in the Western Transdanubia region 
(PNNDRIN 2013). 
STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES OPPORTUNITIES  DANGERS 
The economic 
performance of the 
West Pannon 
Region 
commonly used to 
measure 
the value of long-
term indicators 
and their dynamics 
higher than the 
national average, 
the first 
between countries 
in the region 
thanks 
foreign 
traditionally 
present 
capital an 
attractive 
corporate structure 
The distribution of 
economic potential 
in the region 
regionally uneven. 
The region’s level 
of development 
It is predominantly 
industrial maturity, 
other 
far it appears 
sectors such 
markedly 
The region borders 
with four countries, 
this geographical 
situation could be 
used to foster 
competitiveness 
and support economic 
regeneration  
The larger 
companies 
attracted by the 
relatively positive 
and 
cheap wage and 
salary work 
therefore 
economic 
development 
model based on 
mass production 
which could see 
long term 
opportunities for 
the region 
gradually 
exhausted 
The Region of A poor region of Corporate strategies The wages for 
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domestic and 
international 
standards 
favorable overall 
employment 
characterized by 
indicators 
north-south traffic 
infrastructure, it 
impedes the 
economy 
evolution 
worldwide strategic 
alliances 
working in less 
innovative 
activities does not 
follow the new 
higher added value 
abroad through 
FDI 
Strong German 
industrial type of 
corporate culture, 
production 
and export. The 
region’s leading 
sectors are 
mechatronics for 
the automotive 
industry, the 
timber industry, 
environmental 
industry 
and thermal 
tourism 
The region has 
small villages and 
there are areas 
within the regions 
development that 
contain peripheral 
conditions 
The presence of 
multinational 
companies enable a 
continuation of the 
strengthening of the 
global integration of 
the local economy 
with advanced 
technologies and 
establishing modern 
management and 
leadership methods 
As a result of the 
unfavorable 
situation on the 
world market 
innovative 
companies 
operating in the 
region have a 
situation that is 
deteriorating and 
the launch of new 
companies for this 
reason has been 
delayed 
The foreign 
(mainly German, 
Austrian, 
American, 
Japanese) 
investors are 
dominant regional 
presence. 
Large companies 
predominate as 
major employers 
The high-growth 
innovative capacity 
SMEs targeted 
promotion of products 
and service 
improvement 
Funding problems, 
the subsidy policy 
dependence on the 
unpredictability of 
budget 
The region started 
several industries 
and dynamically 
clusters which is 
an evolving 
process 
Industrial park 
services 
need improvement 
The possibility of 
becoming a dominant 
region, with strong 
industrial parks 
into technological 
park, innovation 
centers and 
competence centers of 
development 
excellences and key 
related industries 
service focus. 
The knowledge 
producing 
institutions cannot 
broker knowledge 
for companies 
operating in 
insufficient quality 
and quantity 
In recent years, the 
pre-existing 
innovation 
The region’s 
innovation and R & 
D activities have 
 The economic 
crisis has caused a  
deteriorating 
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paradox is 
reduced, 
increasing the 
region, the number 
of research 
centers, the R & D 
area 
The number of 
employees in 
research and 
number of topics 
low economic 
weight 
investment and 
employment 
situation in the 
region, so research 
staff is low 
and has been 
downsized, which 
has caused 
innovation 
spending resources 
to fall 
Academic 
background covers 
a region 
geographically, 
extensive 
international 
connections 
In the region, the 
scientific research 
sector and the 
relationship 
between economic 
gaps in the region 
the activities of 
operators found less 
innovation and R & 
D-oriented 
  
The regional 
innovation 
management 
organization 
developed and co-
operation system, 
easily accessible 
to businesses 
provide value-
added services 
Low funding for 
innovative supply-
side research and 
social innovation 
low due to low 
demand 
  
The innovative 
business 
development goals 
manifold needs of 
the mentoring 
major 
In the region in 
terms of economic 
development 
decisive, strong 
innovation and 
industrial parks 
centers operate 
Low levels of 
venture capital and 
business angels 
intensity of activity 
within the region  
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TABLE 5.2. Smart Specialisation policy thematic priority areas and industries and 
actions (PNNDRIN 2013). 
Key sector/industry Strategy Actions to strengthen the 
Western Transdanubia RIS 
The automotive industry 
will continue to develop 
and specialise in a wide 
range of domestic suppliers, 
system engineering, 
mechanical engineering and 
plastics industrial areas 
 
Provide up-to-date 
electrical and 
mechatronics training 
in region 
Encourage growth of 
domestic suppliers 
 
Renew related R&D 
infrastructure, knowledge 
production and use, and 
strengthen their relationship, as 
well as networking with SMEs 
 
Strengthen the social aspects of 
innovation and knowledge to 
raise awareness of sustainable 
growth and ensure integration 
of cross-cutting tools to support 
growth in agriculture, forestry 
and animal husbandry 
 
Pursue new innovations in 
biotechnology and biodiversity 
to ensure long-term economic 
security for the region’s rural 
population and increasing 
quality of life improvement, 
sustainable conditions for 
development 
 
Promote products derived from 
the region’s agricultural sector 
and on-site consumption and 
increase the competitiveness of 
services 
 
Improve the region’s R&D 
efficiency, differentiated 
development of resources in 
terms of background, which 
includes the traditional, 
emerging and ancillary 
industries and improve the 
infrastructure of social 
activities 
 
Improve technology and 
knowledge transfer, knowledge 
production and use of support 
services development 
environment, development 
tools and innovative service 
solutions for a wide-scale 
application including launching 
Forestry industry  
 
 
Build renewable 
energy sources through 
wood industry-related 
activities 
 
Health and thermal tourism  
 
Build a health tourism 
industry based on 
existing internally 
important spas in 
region 
Connect to an overall 
approach that also 
develops an organic 
food and health 
services  
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innovative regulatory and 
funding initiatives 
 
Establish a regional network of 
cooperation to further develop 
and expand cooperation 
development of intra-regional, 
inter-regional, cross-border and 
transnational context, 
innovative business products 
and services to facilitate market 
access 
 
Restore and consolidate 
economic cooperation 
networks and clusters, to better 
broker take-up of national and 
international research 
 
 
However, informants in the present study argued that the dismantling of regional political 
institutions led to the disenfranchisement of local voice in policy design processes, rendering 
involvement in these processes as symbolic and with local actors unable to leverage real 
power in determining economic priorities for regions. This has important implications when 
considering the extent to which the sector priorities determined by the WT Strategy actually 
reflect the regional preference for diversification, or instead reflect a centralised political 
preference for supporting specialisation focused on the existing dominant automotive sector. 
 
Informants pointed out that national political developments and the election of the Fidesz 
government in 2010 had an impact upon regional governance processes and the way in which 
the WT Strategy was formulated between 2009 and 2012. The changed political context was 
seen by both Innopol and Autind as a major factor in how regional governance processes 
operated in comparison with the policy design of the regional strategy. According to Innopol, 
the centralisation of power in Hungary led to a perception at a local level that any form of 
regional policy development – including the formulation of the WT Strategy – had actually 
been developed centrally on behalf of key regional decision makers. Autind and Innopol 
emphasised the extent to which these political developments had affected regional planning 
and a growing feeling among regional policy stakeholders that they were not genuinely part 
of centrally managed regional economic planning processes. Innopol observed that 
stakeholders in the region supposed that “regional development just happens around you” 
and that centralised political processes had reduced the capacity for local “seeding points for 
new ideas to emerge”, and undermined the development of a “politically active citizenship” 
engaged with regional development. 
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Consequently, despite local and regional focus and consultation processes employed by the 
national government in developing the WT Strategy, Innopol saw it as a process that would 
not deliver “large-scale innovation projects” to the region. Innopol emphasised the extent to 
which the policy focus on regions adopting key enabling technologies (KETs) to encourage 
innovation advances across horizontal cross-sectoral lines, was perceived very positively by 
regional policy stakeholders. They saw this as a significant opportunity to reach the scale 
required for new businesses to emerge as a result of investment in new manufacturing 
software technologies, such as 3D printing. 
According to Innopol, a tradition of low investment in KETs in the region had been a major 
contributing factor to its low innovation rate. The low-capacity 3D printing service in the 
Győr innovation facilities was aimed at small enterprises located within metallurgy, IT 
services, and conventional manufacturing, such as “laser cutting or whatever… is focused on 
solving repeat problems of local SMEs, especially those problems in which they are not very 
specialised”. The services offered were described as modest and mainly focused on 
assisting a lot of companies that required supply measurement equipment and components 
for large supply lines. Despite the ambition to build the small 3D printing service into a “large 
picture of a giant European Union innovation solution” based on the kinds of giant 
prototyping service providers that had been observed first-hand in Switzerland, the informant 
realised that Győr would need continuous high rates of investment to build that scale of 
service; this the region did not have access to. Innopol: 
We realised here in Győr that in order to start a large prototype service then we 
would need about €30 million to make a facility… and that you could never just 
invest €100,000 and then maybe invest another €100,000 in the next year… because 
the machine moves forward so rapidly you would not be able to catch the train… so 
I realised that it was an unrealistic goal to have so I thought I would just start to 
frame a small position for myself… what I have here [at the industrial park] is 
probably small cooperation projects, so regional projects… small projects… small 
funding for simpler solutions. 
Subsequently, it was the opinion of Innopol that, despite the policy indicating support for 
investment in technology, the required significant investment needed to make a large impact 
would not be forthcoming, given the history of “minimal grants” from the EU delivered 
through the national government to the region, to assist with a scaling and diversification 
strategy and the transfer of a more innovative model of production to the region: 
… the importance of 3D printing and prototyping is not so much about the new 
technology, but it is actually about the implications for scaling… it is about having 
something that is attractive for local enterprises… not about killing the business of 
local enterprises… that enables them to have access to new ideas… but is… 
positioned to be… accessible for them. 
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Therefore, the importance of regional political leverage exercised in the actual funding of 
specific components of Smart Specialisation policies was emphasised. Innopol stressed that 
while regional consultation processes had occurred, these were symbolic in nature when 
considering the lack of regional leverage to gain significant financial investments. This 
mostly resulted in exclusion from most of the innovation-focused projects in Europe, because 
innovation was then focused on the top level. In this context, the issue for regions becomes 
not so much about the introduction of KETs to the region, but rather the capacity for funding 
of the new technologies on a large scale, so as to make an extensive regional impact. 
 
Autex also noted that the governance process associated with the WT Strategy were 
developed and discussed with “all of the research institutes and all the companies and interest 
groups” within the region. However, given the political developments in Hungary and the 
removal of regional-level representation, the process was based on small county-led 
discussions. This undermined the regional focus of the policy. It was observed that large 
companies still play a major role in lobbying to establish the political agenda with state and 
EU-funded research outcomes. For instance, the establishment of a new joint cooperative 
research centre afforded a major role to Audi. This was thought to be a driver for the growth 
of innovative development and new SMEs emerging in the region in the automotive sector, 
potentially privileging that sector over other growth areas of the economy, such as the forestry 
industry. 
This perspective raises questions about the regional governance processes adopted with the 
centrally coordinated policy design of the WT Strategy. The Smart Specialisation policy 
aspires to a consultative approach to the process of determination of expert competences 
developed by key stakeholders in the region during the “entrepreneurial process of discovery” 
phase, to achieve a specialised, scientifically excellent strategy in the region. Yet Innopol 
warns of the danger of a ‘business as usual’ approach to regional economic development 
based on a traditional regional economic model underpinned by infrastructure projects. Such 
an approach will not work, given the fiscal dependence of the region on the national 
government and the small amount of funds allocated to regions to enable significant 
innovation advances in a decentralised model of economic planning. 
The insights provided by informants add value to existing research that has also suggested 
that the quality of regional and local government is increasingly considered a critical variable 
for the impact of the policy in European regions (Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo 2015; Morgan 
2017; Rodrik 2003; European Commission 2014). The perspective of informants adds weight 
to studies that have highlighted a challenge that confronts Less Developed Regions (LDRs) 
in achieving greater innovation: a single political party and often weak and sometimes corrupt 
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public administrations (Morgan 2015). Furthermore, given that the Western Transdanubia 
case study is located in a Central Eastern European country, it also adds value to existing 
studies that have observed that CEE states often have weak administrative capacity, mistrust, 
politicised decision making and a culture of clientism (Bachtler & Mendez 2013, Bachtler & 
McMaster 2008; Dabrowski 2012). Dabrowski (2012) observed that central government 
control over the contents of a regional plan (particularly in Hungary and the Czech Republic) 
defies the purpose of strategic planning tailored to regional specificities. A situation can 
emerge where a strong plan is developed that signals the region’s economic strategy, but its 
implementation is ultimately determined by central government priorities (Healy 2016). 
The role of the MNC in the region in GVC/GPN context  
The Western Transdanubia region is poor. The region has a gross domestic product (GDP) of 
50–75 per inhabitant, and lags well behind the highest performing region of Kopzag-
Magyarorszag with a 100–125 GDP per head bracket (EC 2016). Manufacturing production 
plays an important role in the regional economy. The manufacturing sector is made up of 
automotive, mechatronics, plastics and textile industries (PNNDRIN 2013). 
The Western Transdanubia regional economy has historically been highly dependent on 
external automotive investment, and the manufacturing industry/processing plays a dominant 
role within the Hungarian economy. Taking account of the national distribution of gross added 
value by sectors of the national economy (Figure 5.2), the manufacturing sector (at 22.7%) is 
as significant as agriculture is of declining importance (at 3.5%) (PNNDRIN 2013). In recent 
years, the manufacturing industry has increased its presence in the national economy, 
especially within the automotive, machine building and pharmaceuticals sectors, which have 
increased production significantly (Nemzeti Innovacios Hivtal 2014). 
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Figure. 5.2: Categories of regions for the ERDF, ESF and EAFRD 2014-2020 (European 
Commission, 2016) 
 
Historically, the automotive industry in the Western Transdanubia region has been the 
recipient of significant multinational investments initiated by United States car producer 
General Motors (GM) in attempting to reform Hungary before the collapse of socialism in 
1989. The GM greenfield investment in the town of Szentgothard, located in Western 
Hungary, introduced car production to Hungary. At the time it was an assembly factory and 
most of the parts arrived from other European GM subsidiaries (Berend 2009). According to 
Rechnitizer’s profile of the Győr automotive district, other major automotive multinationals 
then began investing in modern export-oriented car production in Hungary (Rechnitizer 
2014). Japan’s Suzuki built its new firm in the north-western town of Esztergom, and 
gradually increased production to 60,000 cars per annum. Finally, in 1993 Volkswagen 
established an engine factory in the city of Győr, which produced engines for its entire Audi 
production line (Berend 2009).  
Less developed regions (GDP/head < 75% of EU-27 average) 
More developed regions (GDP/head > 90% of EU-27 average) 
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Volkswagen chose Győr because of the presence of a high-quality industrial culture based on 
a previous tradition of automotive production, the high-quality labour and training facilities 
(from secondary schools to higher educational institutions), and because the city’s location 
was favourable geographically. According to informants in the present study, Audi took 
advantage of regional assets such as the logistical position of the region – the city of Győr is 
situated about halfway between Vienna and Budapest – in combination with a strong history 
of automotive production “based on the region’s 100-year-old history of producing passenger 
cars and trucks and undercarriages and the sort of larger machinery that was built in Europe”, 
and facilities that “were committed to the first stage of the factory and the possible manpower 
to operate this first stage”. The location’s advantages were enhanced when a motorway 
between Hegyeshalom and Győr was constructed in 1993 and the railway line between 
Hegyeshalom and Budapest modernised; a transport infrastructure project that constituted an 
“equally important factor” in consolidating the city’s position as a regional transportation 
hub and logistics centre (Rechnitizer 2014, p. 22). 
 
Informants spoke of the advantage of having GM’s pilot project production facility close to 
the Austrian border, which operated as a customs-free zone. They also said that Volkswagen 
was interested in Győr due to its Suzuki plant employing over 7000 workers and its steel and 
aluminium suppliers, established as a result of the region’s history as part of a military-
industrial complex. According to Autind, this model of industrial development was 
underpinned by the EU Structural Funds. These factors were seen as historically important 
in “elevating the region from a rural area to an economically more impressive area” of 
Hungary: 
… 20 years ago, when the Eastern Bloc collapsed and the new Structural Funds were 
opened up to us by the EU, we had a cross-border cooperation program that people 
from Austria and Hungary could apply together for funding for regional 
development projects and a lot of projects were started which shaped the face of this 
region and city for upcoming years [including]… the Innovation Hub, Chamber of 
Commerce, Győr Airport and the Harbor. 
 
These projects had a synergetic effect on underpinning economic development within the 
region and supported heavy investments by the automotive industry at the time. The arrival 
of Audi and the subsequent investment by Volkswagen into enormous production operations 
helped to ensure that the automotive industry would be the dominant economic player in the 
region: 
… in the past 20 years this plant of Audi’s has grown to be the largest engine 
manufacturing plant in the world, where over 2 million engines are produced each 
year, and cars are assembled here, but still the key part is engine manufacturing… 
and it’s really impressive… it’s a very large plant… so you can see in rolling back 
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the history… you… clearly see how this whole plant expanded into such an 
enormous facility. 
 
The heavy investment by Volkswagen in the city of Győr and the ‘Audi-effect’ is said to 
have resulted in several positive economic spin offs. In 2013 (Rechnitizer 2014), Audi 
established its own educational base in the region, financially supported vocational education 
and training institutions in Győr, and forged strong cooperative links with the Szechenyi 
Istvan University, which saw a new mechatronics department created there. Audi investment 
invigorated the local real estate market. It saw higher education and training reorganised and 
new segments of R&D created. Audi’s presence has been credited with the strengthening and 
repositioning of the city’s image particularly in relation to sport and culture. There were also 
significant multiplier effects for employment in the region, especially with the relocation of 
major subcontractors. New firms and new jobs have been generated in architectural design 
with the emergence of building industry contractors and firms involved in the vehicle 
industry. Development saw aluminium companies and related innovative businesses 
established and financial service providers, labour agencies and enterprises specialising in 
education and training set up (Rechnitizer 2014). 
 
Thus, Volkswagen constructed a total production system in Western Transdanubia with 
significant investment and knowledge bases that have helped to generate the firm’s 
dominance in the territorial economy. The large enterprise as a base sector has pulled 
industrial stakeholders to the region, including major subcontractors and producers. This 
effect in the city was assisted by the creation of an industrial park built with Austrian capital 
and the financial contribution of the local municipality at the end of the 1980s (Rechnitizer 
2014).  
 
However, documentary sources highlight the regional economic vulnerability of Western 
Transdanubia given the high dependence of the local economy on external investment, a 
problem exposed during the 2008 economic crisis. Because of the exposure of the regional 
economy to Western Europe, the Hungarian strategy warned that, in relation to future 
economic planning, stakeholders needed to be mindful that, where individual companies 
dominate areas of the region such as Audi in Győr, they can have an economic impact of a 
radius of a hefty 60 kilometres in Hungary (Nemzeti Innovacios Hivatal 2014). The European 
Commission report, Ex Post Evaluation of Cohesion Policy Programmes 2007-13 Country 
Report Hungary (2016) (hereafter the ‘EU Synthesis Report’) also placed emphasis upon 
the vulnerability of many regions in Hungary to external economic forces. This has led to the 
observation that the “economic impact of the GFC (2008–9) has led to significant economic 
disparities persisting across Hungarian regions” (EC 2016, p. 11).  
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The EU Synthesis Report noted that the only regional exception to this rule was Közép-
Magyarország in Central Hungary (which includes the capital Budapest and accounts for 
around one-third of the total population) which had maintained a GDP per head twice that of 
the other regions during the crisis. The gap narrowed a little over the period, but only slightly 
(EC 2016). The WT Strategy has also established that regional economies situated in Western 
Hungary took over 10 years to recover economically and to again be above the national 
average on employment and GDP figures (PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
Consequently, the Hungarian strategy central economic vision, that Hungary may become “a 
knowledge economy by the end of the decade”, is less dependent on external investment 
sources (Nemzeti Innovacios Hivatal 2014, p 46). This acknowledges the high economic 
dependence on foreign investment of regions located in the south west of the country and 
asserts that there needs to be better economic cooperation between regions to generate a new 
‘horizontal axis’ to break down a persistent ‘north-south’ economic divide. This vision is 
underpinned by a desire to strengthen the strong base of SMEs and family-sized enterprises 
within the country and the “number and competences of them in regard to exports and 
suppliers” (Nemzeti Innovacios Hivatal 2014, p. 46). 
 
According to the WT Strategy, the automotive industry is projected to grow significantly in 
the Western Transdanubia regional economy, with anticipated new investment by Audi 
leading to a prognosis that domestic production capacity could rise two-fold within a decade. 
In 2013, Audi invested €900 million in expanding the automotive industry in the Győr vehicle 
assembly site. As a result of this investment, the WT Strategy predicts that over 2000 new 
direct jobs will eventually be created. In addition, it is estimated that GM will also generate 
an additional 800 new direct jobs. It is predicted that the supply sector flow-on from these 
investments will result in a number of job opportunities for tens of thousands within related 
industries, such as electronics, mechatronics, vehicle technology, metal engineering 
techniques and tools, as well as in the fields of quality assurance and logistics. The WT 
Strategy found that in Western Hungary, by the end of 2010, in connection with the 
automotive industry’s expansion, 96 companies were registered. In addition, there was a new 
strategy for a project and training centre to be established at the Győr Industrial Park to supply 
training in the skills required by the growth in auxiliary industries associated with expansion 
of the automotive industry. The strategy argues that given this new expansion by foreign 
companies in the region, the state should negotiate with the companies for improved positions 
for domestic companies in supply arrangements (PNNDRIN 2013). 
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Thus, the WT Strategy identifies the automotive industry as having an ongoing dominant role 
and signals that other industries would be encouraged around this industry specialisation. For 
instance, the Hungarian strategy asserts that the automotive industry should continue to 
develop and specialise in a wider range of domestic suppliers. Future economic opportunities 
have been identified within related sectors such as mechanical engineering, plastics and in 
any industrial areas where concentration can be gained linked to the “needs of automotive 
multinationals” in the region. However, the WT Strategy also proposes that the automotive 
industry assist in the development of competencies in other local industries, to assist with 
diversifying the industrial base. The regional plan therefore outlines a vision for increasing 
the development of indigenous suppliers connected to the existing automotive industry, as 
well as building new competencies in, for instance, the forestry industry, which can service 
the automotive industry as well as other industrial opportunities (PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
Informants also mostly agreed with the strategy outlined in documentary sources and were 
in favour of the automotive industry being a driver for building capacity in domestic 
companies. The region’s industrial history was viewed as representing a “great possibility” 
for the region, but “also a critical possible danger” given the region is so dependent on Audi 
in economic terms. Regdevac argued that the company was embedded in the institutional 
fabric of the region, especially through the strong partnerships with the education sector. Audi 
are strongly committed to Western Transdanubia and in this sense, differ from other foreign 
companies who may “rent a place while there is a life cycle for a product and stay for a while 
and then move if there [are] better conditions somewhere else”. 
As you can see with Audi... the roots are built here with the relationship between 
the university and the education system and with the city and so you can see that if 
you embed them in the environment they cannot move as Phillips did 10 years ago… 
10 years ago they came and then 10 years later they moved… they were all over 
Hungary and they had received subsidies from Hungary… and they didn’t do 
developmental work because there wasn’t a relationship with the scientists etc… so 
what we see here with Audi is that the roots are very strong here and that represents 
20 years of evolution. 
 
The WT Strategy was seen by informants as a distinct opportunity for the region to further 
build on the positive relationship with Audi and to further develop the multiplier impacts of 
the firm within the regional economy. It was also suggested by informants that this could 
occur through improving local supply arrangements with Hungarian-owned firms and by the 
company becoming more integrated into or ‘chained’ to the local economy through such 
strengthened connections. In this sense, the strategy could be seen by the region as ensuring 
that it developed a plan reflecting its own economic development perspective to enable it to 
capitalise on the strong base of manufacturing in the rest of the regional economy, as opposed 
to a situation of “overall decision making coming from Western Europe”.  
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These insights add value to analysis on key characteristics of automotive GVC producer-
driven networks undertaken by Pavlik and Zenka, who in their study of the Czech automotive 
industry discovered that the capacity for industrial upgrading within large industrial 
companies, which organise and co-ordinate investment-based vertical production networks 
of component suppliers, was highly selective and mainly associated with product and process 
upgrading as opposed to functional upgrading. The authors argue that for Czech subsidiaries 
the process of improving their position in global automotive production networks depends 
on the strategies and decisions of foreign MNCs in the absence of an effective state-led 
industrial or economic policy (Pavlik & Zenka 2011). 
 
Informants were hopeful that Smart Specialisation represented such a state-led industrial and 
economic policy for the region. Autind said he believed that the industry alone would not 
enable the region to develop a unique European position of economic specialisation, but that 
the new policy direction articulated by the Smart Specialisation policy could limit the region 
to a low technology developmental trajectory because the automotive industry in the Western 
Transdanubia is about “forging, welding, and casting” and not high technology 
specialisation. He expressed concern that the Western Transdanubia region may end up with 
a typical ‘Western European’ version of regional economic development.  
 
This economic model was said by Autind to be emulated by “at least 200 cities all over Europe 
where some sort of car is assembled or a part of a car is assembled”; this model does not 
enable regions dependent on it to develop specialised positioning in global markets that is 
unique enough. Additionally, Autind suggested that the ongoing focus on the automotive 
industry based on the export of engines would only set the region up to compete with other 
regions in Hungary, rather than create a new and unique field of scientific excellence. As he 
explained, this could lead to a region having to prove that it has the capacity to be unique no 
matter how narrow the field: 
… at least unique on this continent… to innovate, to be able to provide services 
which would attract clients from Japan, and from the USA, to come here and buy 
your services. 
 
Informants tended to believe that the economic vision contained within the WT Strategy 
presented an opportunity for the region to build automotive expansion with a vision for high 
value-added capacity. To achieve its economic vision for a diversified knowledge economy, 
informants placed emphasis on the need to link the quality of regional governance institutions 
to economic development outcomes. According to Autind, Western Transdanubia was 
missing a regionally driven formal policy to build the industry up from the bottom, with 
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advisory groups, and a policy making process to match the region’s capacity to reach the 
level of having a strategic systemic approach. Innopol too emphasised the importance of 
building regional economic institutions capable of advocating for higher value-added 
capacity within the automotive industry. As he explains in relation to Western Transdanubia: 
… the possibility [for the region] to reach for a higher position and [the lack of 
regional strategy] is a critical weakness here I believe… I think it’s something that 
even the local municipality and decision makers are realising: that it’s important for 
companies to have design departments here, to have engineering work here, and to 
also have much more value added here… so I think by now it is common knowledge 
that these things are necessary to have a longer-term perspective of having these 
companies here. 
 
In line with his emphasis on the greater role the region needs to play in shaping its 
diversification strategy, Innopol also stressed that the local municipality needed to play a 
greater coordination role in building a policy and shape future strategic policy approaches: 
… we have an office for tourism but consider this… we are the city with the largest 
engine manufacturing plant in the world and a lot of automotive industry, but our 
city has not a single office with two people who should be responsible for actually 
promoting how the industry will be developed going forward… 
 
The Smart Specialisation policy was seen by informants as having the potential to enable 
systems of innovation linking firms to strategic research and development institutions, and 
providing firms with technical support, well-educated researchers and technical staff to 
overcome the upgrading challenges identified by GVC scholars (Humphrey and Schmitz 
2002). Oztagen (2009) for instance discovered in his study of the Turkish automotive industry 
that suppliers based in the Bursa component industry were able to mitigate the asymmetric 
distribution of power between themselves and the lead firms to change the mode of GVC 
governance, and to increase their competencies in design and product development. Thus it 
was discovered that firm-level efforts need to be complemented by regional and national 
systems of innovation to promote competence development, especially in peripheral places 
(Oztagen 2009). 
 
Autind echoed the economic analysis contained within the WT Strategy in relation to low 
rates of SMEs emerging as presenting a barrier to the plan’s economic vision. He described 
this as a problem resulting from a “disincentive of smaller spin off companies emerging in 
the region, given the dominance of Audi offering good wages, job security and a career for 
employees” although he noted that despite this some SMEs were still emerging with slow 
cultural change towards development of local manufacturing industries: 
Chaining already takes place on the lower management level… and we can see that 
at the moment it’s quite a large problem for the local economy, that these Western 
European companies, especially Audi, offer very good prospects for a career and 
they offer very good wages. Thus, the dominance of Audi has meant that local SMEs 
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cannot really compete with the company and that “all the good people go and start 
to work with Audi”. 
 
Yet, slow cultural change is being observed in the region with the automotive industry 
informant adding: 
…after 4, 5 years of existing in such a multinational environment that there are a lot 
of people who start to think “maybe I could be more innovative”, “maybe it is time 
to move forward and this very rigid structure is not for me”… “maybe I should start 
something” and it is said that then they start to make spin off companies or they 
simply leave the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and go to local SMEs 
and continue for maybe a little lower money, but for better perspectives or more 
interesting projects and so they are ready to leave these companies. 
 
In this sense, Autind believed that the WT Strategy with its focus on “growth in auxiliary 
industries and more domestic companies in supply arrangements with foreign automotive 
companies” was a positive economic vision to enable local people to leave the large 
companies and to support the growth of Hungarian enterprises: 
…one of the very important things for our region is that when people move away 
from the Western European companies, they are taking away the work culture… 
they already know how to manufacture to quality and high standards, and the 
processes and requirements of supplying products or services, and I have seen this 
culture slowly but steadily appearing in the local enterprises… 
 
A further barrier to innovative SMEs appearing in the regional economy is presented by the 
specialised focus on the production of engines. The result of this specialisation has led Autind 
to observe that entrepreneurs who leave the company have no chance of taking away design 
knowledge or strategic thinking, which has created knowledge gaps about innovation and 
building up a company to produce commercial products: 
I believe that these companies… the spin offs will be strong enough to be a key asset 
for our region maybe 10 years later… the problem is that because these OAMs like 
Audi operate in such a flat manner, [the start-up entrepreneur who leaves] has no 
chance of taking away design knowledge, they have no chance of taking away 
strategic thinking, because this just does not take place at the company… this 
situation has led to the observation that entrepreneurial efforts with new start-ups is 
that when [the entrepreneur] leaves the large company and starts their own small 
enterprise… they have a good idea of manufacturing and products, but they have 
almost no idea of innovation and they have absolutely no idea of how to strategically 
build up the product line and the company operations in a five-year perspective and 
while they try to learn it…they start from zero and not from a western European 
level and it’s a gap that we should be able to address, but at the moment I cannot 
think how we would address this gap. 
 
This insight confirms the insights of Grabher’s extensive research into the implications for 
industrial regions as a result of strategies of MNCs, which found that where a production 
system is dominated by a system of work organisation without local upper-echelon technical 
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and management staff, the region may end up with a differentiated social structure and an 
undermined entrepreneurial ‘seedbed’ (Grabher cited in Amin and Thrift, 1994). 
 
Since Audi do not assemble the entire vehicle in Győr, there was no need for Audi to build a 
large supplier base in Győr as they were involved in specialised component manufacturing, 
consolidated predominately on one production site. Autind noted: 
It was an interesting situation because, when Audi first started bringing suppliers to 
Győr it was not a very good proposition because at the time there was no automotive 
production… it was only very marginal… when you are producing engines and you 
consider the 2 million engines that Audi produce each year… not a huge volume… 
so when you consider the position of engine part suppliers… especially in relation 
to small parts… It is a lot easier to make the supplier comply with logistics… you 
don’t need to comply with just-in-time demands and definitely not just-in-
sequence… so it is where you have automotive production…You need a lot bigger 
and there is a sequential production method and there is more demanding logistics 
where it is almost impossible to make the supply without being actually there and 
producing on time or on sequence… whereas with engine parts… it is really quite 
easy. 
 
Autind also observed that Audi’s specialised component manufacturing production focus in 
Győr was further consolidated by the GFC, which put an end to the company’s plans to 
increase production volume and establish a supplier park in the region: 
When we talk about settling car production… ramping up from 150,000 to 
300,000… that’s a real volume and usually for that… everywhere… in the globe 
you are setting up supplier parks… but I remember actually in 2008 and 2009, when 
there was a very big… push towards establishing a supplier park… starting car 
production and ramping it up quite quickly and that’s when the crisis came in… and 
I remember that many things stopped at that time… and so for Hungary I would say 
2008–2009 was a significant pause… I would say… in a normal development path 
and then was a step back and then the whole thing started again. 
 
Innopol also emphasised an additional impact of the focus of automotive companies within 
the region on specialised component manufacturing production – such companies have a flat 
management structure. Simple assembly manufacturing production is undertaken, but 
decision making, strategic operations and design mainly occur elsewhere in Western Europe, 
not in Győr. This global division of labour also has consequences for the emergence of 
innovative SMEs and suppliers within the region. The Hungarian regional context lacked 
strategic thinking at the level of place to challenge a regional dependence on “one giant actor” 
as opposed to “several smaller companies to act on”. There was a concern that within the 
framework of the policy, Western Transdanubia could miss out on opportunities for industrial 
re-invention due to being by-passed in relation to funding for innovation projects.  
 
Innovation in the industrial manufacturing region of Western Transdanubia has developed in 
an incremental approach to advances within the manufacturing industry. Innopol described 
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how the industrial park in Győr had fostered the emergence of many small companies. Over 
100 companies now occupy the park. Innopol explained that none of the companies are 
“disruptive companies” that have emerged as a result of a process of independent ideas and 
capital, but rather were built up “step by step” over 20 years and as spin offs emerging from 
activity within the manufacturing industry. In this context, the manufacturing environment is 
associated with incremental innovation: 
Because of a situation, for instance, where manufacturing suppliers involved in a 
project are told “you should supply the same part but 5 per cent lighter” and “you 
should supply the same part but 5 per cent cheaper” and so there are incremental 
challenges to master and incremental solutions are developed and so the whole 
innovation model is step-by-step evolution going forward. 
 
Innopol observed that in Europe in general, the culture of spin offs is absent from the 
industrial landscape and the barriers to their generation are related to a lack of policy 
incentives at a regional level. This situation has led to the development in the region of a 
model of incremental innovation and a lack of interest in venture capital. As he explained it, 
“most companies aren’t interested” in starting new businesses because of the high risks 
associated with new firms and the historically weak policy incentives due to the region not 
being considered a ‘disruptive’ environment by the national government: 
We have not really had much destructive development here… mainly incremental 
innovation… so we have not enough history of free economic culture to have good 
business angels, but I can say it is happening… slowly… there are maybe two or 
three people already in this region, and I hope in 10 years there may be 20 people in 
this region who could be called business angels who would be ready to assist SMEs 
to start up. 
 
This insight confirms the SWOT analysis contained within the WT Strategy, which lists the 
region’s low venture capital and business-angel activity as a key barrier to the achievement 
of the goals of the Smart Specialisation policy, especially in relation to the goal of industrial 
diversification (Pannon Novum Nyugat-dunantuli Regionalis Innovacios Nonprofit Kft 
2013). Given the identified barriers by informants to the growth of Hungarian-owned SMEs, 
it was suggested that other strategies to encourage economic diversification within the region 
could concentrate on attracting foreign ‘smart’ companies specialising in high-level services 
to the region. Innopol suggested that the regional economy could trade off its strategic 
location and efficient public transport infrastructure to attract high-level services because the 
region is located strategically in a “scenic position between Budapest and Vienna”, which 
presents a good opportunity for services for offices and for larger parks of office workers. 
Budapest is not really interested in this respect… But Vienna is clearly trying to 
expand its radius of interest and offices would be much cheaper to operate here than 
there, and so we are in a competitive position, in this sense… in relation to Budapest, 
Győr is not in a competitive position… but I believe we could be attractive for a 
129 
 
company who would like to set up in a large city and start off – we are not a bad 
location to live in. 
 
Innopol further observed that the once-dominant position of the textile industry was seen as 
lost to the region due to the assertive stance taken by China in global value chain positioning: 
… at the time of the transition [from communism] we had several industries in 
Europe, one of them was automotive and engineering, and one of them was food – 
agriculture, food products, and the textiles industry… the textile industry we lost to 
China, like all the other regions…Bangladesh, Vietnam – wherever people are able 
to make cheap clothing… the Eastern countries in Europe lost out to regions in 
Europe that were investing a lot in innovation into specific design in new materials 
and new solutions, which were unique, which were hard to copy, which were 
branded very strongly… and we had none of this activity… we had plants that 
manufactured low-quality textiles in larger volumes… This industry won’t ever 
come back. As a result of the loss of the textiles industry all of the [industry] 
knowledge has disappeared by now… so the companies were dismantled and 
residential areas have been created on the old sites, so I don’t think that we have an 
opportunity of returning to this business. 
 
Therefore Smart Specialisation was perceived by informants to be an important policy 
instrument for the region to engage in ideas on how to get to a situation where there is less 
dependency on one or two giant corporate players in the automotive industry. In the words 
of Autind: 
… in Western Europe… they have a lot of automotive activity, but we noticed no 
such giant companies, only five or six smaller companies based in a region and I 
think that’s a healthier situation, for collaboration, for projects, for whatever. 
 
Autind described the situation, if Audi were to leave, as devastating for the region in 
economic and social terms: 
… we have ideas and… we have a lot of small SMEs, which are competitive, but 
still losing Audi would mean 11,000 unemployed people, which is 10 per cent of 
the city’s population and this would mean a lot of other companies which operate 
here would simply close down because they were actually supplying services for 
Audi… if Audi collapsed, they would just go away. 
 
Agriculture and forestry are identified by the WT Strategy as future industrial opportunities 
capable of being developed in line with the social and environmental objectives of the EU 
Smart Specialisation policy. Apart from the economic benefits to Western Transdanubia’s 
economy, a diversified economic base is not as vulnerable to external economic shocks and 
downturns, so the social imperative described by the WT Strategy emphasises a need to 
ensure that the region’s sizable rural population is retained locally. Policies need to focus on 
sustainable economic development through building a renewable energy industry in the 
region, one that better capitalises on the significant resources available. These include 
biomass, hot water, land and solar energy sources. Therefore, the regional plan presses for 
“due attention [to be given] to the development of internal resources, mobilizing economic 
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sectors such as wood and furniture production and the development of thermal tourism 
services industries” (PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
Informants agreed with the WT Strategy economic plan for diversification and also identified 
the agricultural and food products industry as a sector in which the region was once strong 
and which could be revived and targeted for future development. Innopol noted the 
Hungarian agricultural industry was sound and regional assets for the industry included 
“good solid land” and “good opportunities for raising crops”. One key barrier was the 
entrenched mindset of people dealing with agriculture and a traditional Eastern Bloc-
inherited economic focus on creating volume rather than complex small value-added 
products. This, he argued, was not relevant as “whether you make 10,000 tonnes of apples or 
20,000 tonnes of apples when you could be making more money by making 2000 tonnes of 
very high-quality apples”. This would entail making complex products out of a simple 
agricultural product: 
I believe we still have an opportunity… because the opportunity to manufacture the 
product actually exists, and we are able to do it here [Győr]… But the problem is 
that there are not a lot of people who have realised that it is possible even in small 
scale to produce very high added value into agricultural goods and that this would 
be necessary to have another stamp on the city. 
 
Regional Innovation System  
The WT Strategy compared regions in Hungary using R&D indicators (R&D research 
centres, research staff levels and expenditures). This indicated that, 10 years earlier, Western 
Transdanubia ranked near to last place on strength of R&D within the regional context, 
whereas today, the same R&D indicators have Győr, a sub-region of Western Transdanubia, 
in fifth place on R&D density. This is due to the distribution of research sites: the region is 
higher than the national average in the proportion of higher education and public research 
units. However, the number of patent applications in Western Hungary is the lowest in the 
country. The number of patents recorded in 2004–8 was seven, all in agricultural sciences 
(PNNDRIN 2013). To overcome this challenge, informants argue that formal knowledge 
assets in the region should be redirected towards basic research. 
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Figure 5.3: Sources of GDP Proportionate R&D Expenditure 1991–2012 
 
(Nemzeti Innovacios Hivtal 2014) 
 
Documentary sources reveal that Western Transdanubia has reached a “surprisingly high rate 
of innovation” as measured by R&D expenditure, employment in medium/high-tech and 
knowledge-intensive sectors as well as with the sale of new products (Figure 5.3). It is the 
third-most innovative region in the Hungarian economy. The report credits this outcome of 
high technological innovation to the vehicle manufacturing industry, as compared to other 
regions in Hungary that experienced high innovation in the pharmaceuticals, computer, 
electronic, electricity and gas, IT, water, and financial services industrial sectors (PNNDRIN 
2013).  
The strong performance of Western Transdanubia is in contrast with the national picture, with 
Hungary considered among only the moderately innovative countries amongst the EU 
alongside CEE countries such as Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Nemzeti Innovacios 
Hivtal 2014). According to the ERAWATCH Report, the relative strengths of Hungary are in 
human resources, exports of medium and high-technology products and knowledge-intensive 
services. Weaknesses in the Hungarian national innovation system includes inadequate 
knowledge bases and knowledge production, poor knowledge and technology transfer rates 
and low rates of knowledge exploitation activities by companies (Dory & Havas 2014). 
 
Despite the high rates of innovation found in the automotive industry, this has not extended 
to Hungarian-owned enterprises traditionally. According to the WT Strategy, small and 
medium enterprises are not engaging with innovation. For instance, slightly less than 15 per 
cent of businesses based in the region are engaged with innovative activities. The Western 
Transdanubia region was ranked last for SME-led innovation in Hungary. The report found 
that 70 per cent of small enterprises in the region were home-based businesses with low 
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turnover and minimal R&D expenditure. The companies consider themselves backward on 
innovation levels. This outcome suggests that high-innovation advances emanating from the 
automotive industry are not transferring to other sectors of the economy (PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
According to the WT Strategy, the region is classified predominately as an industrial 
production zone or ‘traditional industrial region’ where production, manufacturing industry 
and intensive company R&D presence dominate and the national goal translates regionally 
to ‘smart production’ and product development. The focus is on product development and 
raising the capability of manufacturing local products or improving existing products through 
technological renewal in the innovation value chain, providing a competitive advantage, in 
particular using smart technologies and/or advanced materials (Nemzeti Innovacios Hivtal 
2014). It was noted that the region could be jointly classified as it is highly urban in some 
parts, but it also contains parts where the classification of ‘only partially’ urban (rural, but 
close to an urban area) applies and some of the parts have declining population (PNNDRIN 
2013). 
 
Overall, however, the WT Strategy defines innovation as being about new knowledge 
brought about by improvements to product and processes, as opposed to the expansion of the 
knowledge base of the regional economy, as generated by R&D advances (PNNDRIN 2013). 
Of central importance to knowledge utilisation in Western Transdanubia is the idea that 
knowledge generation does not necessarily require R&D and technological breakthroughs. 
What should be sought and given priority is finding “specific manifestations of innovation 
naturally in the diverse regions of Western Hungary”. The innovation agenda in Western 
Transdanubia outlined by the report therefore describes modest goals in relation to economic 
innovation advances within the region that conform to the typology to which they have been 
assigned by the National Smart Specialisation strategy. Also, the goals relate to ‘product and 
process’ innovative advantages within selected industrial sectors that may be competitive in 
the future. The automotive sector is still the predominant industry in the economic vision for 
the region with wood, renewable energy and thermal tourism being other priorities. 
 
Analysis of the economic vision in the documentary data, therefore, confirms an ongoing 
commitment to the heavy role for Audi in Western Transdanubia. The strategic vision seeks 
to retain that heavy influence, but to influence the companies to work with the university 
sector on their process and product design improvements for the industry, for instance in the 
area of electrical technology, in strengthening the indigenous supply industry. It is envisaged 
that a project and training centre will be established in the region to supply training. The 
centre would negotiate with the companies for improved positions for domestic companies 
in supply chains (PNNDRIN 2013). 
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Informants also identified that a key challenge to Smart Specialisation in the region was the 
absence of basic research capacity to support applied research outcomes. Autind indicated 
that most researchers in the region were engaged with applied research and that basic research 
was “non-existent” and missing in the region because the “State is not strong enough to 
support high end researchers”. This identified deficiency in public sector research was 
consolidated by a situation of foreign companies (since the 1990s after the fall of communism 
in Hungary) also not conducting high-end private research in the region. This has led to a 
situation that he describes as the companies “obviously making their own research in their 
own home countries” with the region becoming a base for “low-end” research activities. 
 
This trend was seen after Hungarian companies were bought out by foreign companies (e.g. 
in the case of acquisition by General Electric of electrical company Tungsram and after the 
Ivaco-Renault consortium purchased the former Hungarian-owned bus company Icos). R&D 
activity almost completely stopped and was said by Autind be in line with a trend that was 
typically followed in Hungary and Central European regions, with foreign companies tending 
to determine that low-end research be located within these regions. Autind observed that a 
danger for regions is that low private and public expenditure into basic research results in 
less sophisticated outcomes in applied research. He observed that regions need “something 
more substantial in the background” as is found with high-end research as then “your capacity 
is so much wider”. This deficiency is seen as potentially undermining the capacity for 
universities to effectively support companies with applied research needs, as well as adding 
value to that research contribution by having a “wider tool set” of a strong publicly funded 
basic research capacity in the region. In addition to this, he felt that the low investment in 
public research has strengthened the influential role of foreign companies in the region, in 
determining R&D priorities and undermining the “power” of Hungarian universities. He 
indicated that he felt that this was a key barrier to innovation in the region. 
 
While investment in public and private R&D is low in the region, Audi has recently invested 
heavily in Szechenyi Istvan University to meet both applied research and human resource 
needs associated with its plant: 
Audi are financing some of these faculties, the university is investing at least as 
much. But with respect to Győr culture and knowledge about how things are done 
and frame this strategy of what we should research – a lot of help is coming from 
Audi in research. And that’s very important for us. 
 
For instance, Innopol stressed the importance of Szechenyi Istvan University to the 
automotive industry in the region and noted that the university had a close relationship with 
Audi within the region, but acknowledged that that there was concern amongst regional 
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stakeholders that the partnership had “largely focused on providing for the human capital 
needs of the company, rather than providing innovative research”. Audi had a joint faculty 
and joint departments with the university, but the “departments haven’t got a lot of experience 
with research cooperation”. Innopol observed that this trend was underpinned by the funding 
model of the university where Audi had financed some of the facilities and encouraged an 
applied research strategy for the region: 
When you visit one of those departments you really feel like you are at any kind of 
Western European university as they are clearly structured, well organised and have 
very specific research projects with great output and operate on a very high standard 
for Audi… However, a key issue for Audi is turning a culture around [which] is 
about making people smart and not about making the university smart in relation to 
generating more of a focus on research and innovation. 
According to Autex, Audi has invested heavily in the university in laboratory facilities, R&D 
capacity, industrial relations experts, educational quality and innovative technology, and even 
own a department, which is under the control of Audi’s Managing Director. The department 
has a liaison person based at the university to liaise between the automotive engineering 
department and all the faculties who want to set up a relationship with Audi. The company 
has been influential in attracting both national government funding and EU funds to support 
the establishment of research centres to assist with product and process innovation 
developments. This represents an incremental process of Audi investments in knowledge 
assets in the region over a 20-year period: 
In 1993 we started a process of close institutional cooperation between the 
university and Audi… We have a joint cooperative research centre and a chemical 
research group established by the university and a chemical research group, and 
there is a research project with three universities. 
According to Regdevac, the Hungarian Government assisted with the establishment of the 
first cooperative department at the university; a joint research cooperation centre (knowledge 
and excellence centre); a department group and, in 2015, a special Audi faculty was 
established. This evolved into four Audi departments with a director in a department 
specialising in logistics. The joint research centre was an initiative originally funded by the 
Hungarian Government, but was later funded by the EU in conjunction with the university, 
City of Győr, Audi and others in the private sector. The centre is an open institute, but is 
accessible to SMEs. 
Autex emphasised that the centre is not just about producing research advances to be used by 
international branches of the company: 
… but also, to generate advances in the engineering system that can be used by the 
local vehicle industry where GM are located at the industrial park… and… some 
suppliers that also utilise the system… can benefit from that knowledge that they 
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get here… from the university and the Audi departments… because that means that 
they can cooperate… you see they use the same language and they understand each 
other. 
 
Therefore, there is significant product development done in Győr and Audi has a “lot to do” 
with the design of engines and the development of engine-making processes. Autex: 
This can involve production, or logistics… And other faculties and departments are 
often involved in coming up with design strategies for Audi… the economics, 
marketing departments, and they talk to the public… and there are other faculties 
and departments on the technical side also involved in these kinds of projects. 
 
Nevertheless, Autind raised questions about the recent focus of Audi research in the region, 
arguing that despite the company having been in the region for 20 years, research activities 
have only very recently (in the past 7 to 8 years) relocated to the region and the nature of the 
research is more about development activities supporting the production line, with Hungarian 
engineers only able to make “tiny changes” to the end product. Thus, in relation to the joint 
cooperative centre established by the Hungarian Government and Audi 4 years earlier, he 
argued that it was important to understand that “engineers work together on contracted 
projects run by the centre [working on] sub-parts or steps or tasks in bigger projects but [they] 
do not have sole responsibility for product or technology development”. 
 
Autind emphasised the degree to which he felt that this would generate a model where 
assembly of cars or more complex research and design work would not, in his view, settle in 
Győr, as the “mainly engineering skilled work based in the region was increasingly being 
added to with more complex operational dimensions of manufacturing production such as 
marketing, organisation and logistics”. Logistics employs approximately 1000 workers and 
it is estimated that “in 4 years it will be four times bigger”: 
I think it was decided at Győr that Győr would be the competence centre for 
performance and efficiency… engine efficiency… but again… this was all related 
to engines and nothing to do with cars… so it’s a very nice learning path I would 
say starting from an assembly activity where everything came… as an online unit 
and where people… [were] just assembling it… to be able to support the 
production… production started… and then the production-related development 
started here… the next step was when some of the product engineering and the 
product development was located here… And that’s again in the line of the 
engines… So again, it’s the next step when anything to do with cars would come to 
here to Győr … so it’s always like a learning path or a learning process when the 
new Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) settles… and we keep seeing that… based on 
the environment… and the stage of that environment… the knowledge pool and the 
available skills. 
 
Innopol also emphasised the importance of understanding the regional historical context of 
the role of the private sector and large companies such as Audi in bringing technical 
knowledge to the region. This history of private sector-led industrial development has led to 
a weakness in the public tertiary education system in contributing to knowledge. Training in 
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new manufacturing technologies was identified as a potential problem for the region in 
relation to keeping up with the latest trends in industrial development and supplying human 
resources to companies with new technologies, capable of operating such technologies: 
… 20 years ago, when this economic boom reached our region and when all of the 
companies came here… one of the key assets we had was the workforce, a trained 
workforce. That means for the companies like Audi and all the suppliers, when they 
came here, people already knew how to operate the technology they had. 
 
Thus, according to Innopol, while there were some aspects of the manufacturing lines of Audi 
that were technologically more sophisticated than the labour force they had previously dealt 
with before economic transition: 
The processes, the qualities, the machinery were understandable and we already had 
the knowledge on how to operate a facility… So, in the recent past if someone 
decided to come to Hungary with a new company and said… OK… we would like 
to do plastic emulsion moulding and they open a new facility… they can be assured 
that there are a lot of experts in Hungary who would be specialised in plastic 
emulsion moulding and know how to operate the machinery and know how to do 
this project. 
 
In this sense, in moving to new technologies such as new prototyping services that represent 
a new manufacturing technology used in additive manufacturing, it was observed by Innopol 
that the current labour force based in the region would face the difficulty not being 
knowledgeable about the technology and unable to apply it, and an education system not 
capable of delivering new knowledge of advanced manufacturing technologies. In this sense, 
it is argued that the gap in public technical education enables manufacturing companies to be 
seen as critical players in regional economic development in bringing new knowledge about 
manufacturing technologies into the region. Innopol explains: 
Someone would like to establish a facility here which is not dealing with design, not 
dealing with strategy, just the same very flat manufacturing structure, but the plant 
would be specialised in additive manufacturing. They couldn’t get the knowledge 
from us locally…We would have to learn it… and I have no idea of where to learn 
it at the moment. 
 
The focus of the region’s education system is therefore seen by informants as militating 
against the development of an innovation culture in Western Transdanubia. Innopol further 
observed that the only way for the region to get state-of-the-art knowledge was from the large 
companies, from automotive and non-automotive firms, and not from the education system: 
Our education system is way behind… It does not have the financial resources, it 
does not have the knowledge resources, and it just has no way to keep up with the 
rapid pace of industrial development and that only knowledge about how to 
manufacture comes from the manufacturing companies right now… So, in this 
sense, it is very important for us to have companies which are really bringing in 
manufacturing knowledge into this region to have a chance to build up this 
manufacturing culture. 
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Autind expressed some scepticism about whether the universities in the region have the 
“capacity, skills, knowledge, R&D and power to absorb innovation funds” and convert the 
funding into business-related activity, such as transforming knowledge into commercial 
product development. It was his view that “local universities don’t know how to convert 
research into product… and if you say that companies are not allowed to take advantage of 
EU-sponsored research, then who is?” He further observed that, in the past, innovation 
projects in the Western Transdanubia region had tended to work best when funding was tied 
very specifically to encouraging university–corporate collaboration that resulted in 
measurable company results in relation to innovative products. 
 
Informants pointed out that a further challenge is presented by a characteristic of the 
Szechenyi Istvan University in its traditional focus on technical studies. Regdevac 
emphasised this as a potential barrier to the Smart Specialisation policy focus on economic 
diversification and hence the importance of a change in approach if an innovation policy was 
to be successfully implemented in the region. It was explained by him that the university was 
seen as important for the region to move to an open innovation model of regional 
development: 
In the 1990s a strategy was set up… and the view was that we needed to turn this 
technical college that specialises in transport and communication into a university… 
They realised that to get to an open innovation model… they needed more science, 
other than just technical science. 
 
The vision for the university to move away from a sole focus on technical studies was again 
hampered by a lack of funds. Plans to establish an economics faculty faltered due to the 
failure of the region to attract academic staff and students to the region. It was in this context 
that Audi arrived in the region and began a partnership with the university. The partnership 
made the institution a lot “stronger” and encouraged the development of a dual-education 
system where students would study and work in automotive companies for a semester. As 
the academic notes, “technical studies [are today] still the main focus… And the technical 
system in Győr endures, cooperating with more than 80 companies and students having work 
placements with the companies and then often [they] go on and work for the companies”. 
Regdevac noted that the technical orientation of universities in Hungary (and hence demand 
for engineers) is said to reflect national political priorities set by the current Hungarian Prime 
Minister Victor Orban, who supports technical sciences very much, and has said, “We need 
lots of engineers and we don’t need many sociologists”. The heavy focus of the City of Győr 
on technical studies is underpinned by a national funding system wherein “the company helps 
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to fund the system and therefore can help develop the education system they need for the 
workplace”. 
Informants identified that a key challenge for the region was the predominant focus on 
technical studies and training engineers, given an increasing propensity for young people to 
leave the region to work in either Budapest or other European countries: 
I am worried as my son works in Germany as does my daughter now, due to Hungary 
joining the EU, and they get more in salaries as a result than they would here, but 
who will then work for Audi in the future if all the young people leave? 
 
This concern was echoed by Autind who observed that “the biggest obstacle… for continuous 
development for our economy for this region is the lack of human capital… and we need to 
do something with it”. Related to the problem of young people leaving, is the declining 
number of engineers being produced in the region. According to Autind, this was an issue 
that should be dealt with by policy interventions directed at primary school age children, 
rather than secondary students: 
It is not enough to direct more students to the university because it is too late… we 
need to start the discussion with them a lot earlier, in order to convince them…and 
to put them on the path of engineering, as engineering leads to products, which in 
turn leads to economic growth… I don’t think [in this regional economy] that 
science leads to economic growth, and if you miss out on that then you probably 
don’t do too much good… and that’s why we have to work hard at retaining the 
interest of the region’s young people in working in the automotive sector. 
 
The long-term human resources challenge for the automotive sector is very much a focus of 
the region, which has invested in a large educational facility focused on exposure of young 
people to exhibits of engineering technology to help: 
… bring the joy and the passion of the automotive industry and physics and natural 
sciences close to kids… and their parents… in the young and early stage of their 
lives where they can make decisions and it will make an impact on career paths… 
and give access to schools so that they can also help the young along or give them 
access to some enthusiasm about this career path. 
 
For instance, Regdevac observed that Audi had over the “past 20 years”, except for a “brief 
pause in production of engines” during the crisis in 2008, consistently employed an 
increasing number of engineers who had graduated from the Szechenyi Istvan University. In 
2015, Audi employed over 11,000 engineers, who, according to Autind had mostly been 
recruited from the Western Transdanubia region: 
There are about 5000 engineers employed at the company… and almost half of them 
graduated from Győr… So, this is a significant statistic… and the four universities 
based in Hungary have a strategic management contract with Audi. The university 
is important to Audi… for development objectives in Győr as it is not the general 
thing that students from here can assimilate into other Audi plants or subsidiaries of 
Volkswagen… So, the work that the university does, provides the direct link and 
connection to Audi here… and the engineering systems developed here [at the 
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Szechenyi Istvan University] is the system used by Audi… So, getting the 
engineering students from here, familiar with Audi, and then a lot of them they start 
to work there… is very important to us. 
Informants also observed that they thought that the region also required more of a human 
resources base “able to work in the region’s future areas of comparative advantage” in the 
knowledge-based industries identified for regional economic growth. The WT Strategy 
identified the need for a strong role for business and government in overcoming the shortage 
in existing university training courses in growth areas. This imperative for the region to 
diversify its human resource supply pool of labour in order to generate innovative new areas 
of the economy was seen to be a key barrier to the aims of the WT Strategy by the innovation 
policy informant: 
We have a problem… of human capital knowledge in the region that is heavily tied 
to automotive industry production, rather than “customised unique product” 
development. In the case of manufacturing, I do believe that a lot of knowledge, 
which I mentioned, is accumulated in the working class or mid-management within 
the automotive industry, [knowledge] that could be convertible for different 
industries as well. But still, this would need to be industries which have come here 
to manufacture mass-produced goods and not tailor-made projects and not 
customised unique products. So, it’s much more difficult to tell what could be made 
in this manner 
 
He also felt more could be done to generate a human capital culture of entrepreneurs to reach 
this vision. Autind believed that in order for Budapest to generate a ‘start-up’ culture, the 
Hungarian education system would require an overhaul in relation to a new curriculum being 
developed to teach young people skills to be entrepreneurs. This process, he contended, 
would need to encompass high school as well as university students “as they will be ones that 
we are expecting results from in 2020, yet reform of the education system was not part of the 
strategy”. Autind: 
… if you had entrepreneurs on every corner… and you have these role models 
teaching at universities and providing these kinds of role models… and teaching the 
youngsters… Then you have success stories… that you can show these… and it is 
not a success story that you have been telling for 20 years continuously… 
 
According to Autind, there is a general attitude of negativity about the integrity of 
entrepreneurs deeply ingrained in the Western Transdanubia regional culture and, without 
positive role models, this cultural problem will be difficult to overcome. He identified the 
education system as not assisting with building an innovation culture in the region, as 
entrepreneurship, and commercial knowledge are not taught in Győr or part of a university 
curriculum. This gap in knowledge was identified as a “big problem requiring a big fight” to 
rectify. Rectifying it meant better links between universities and industry to generate more 
innovative products emerging in the region. 
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It was noted that, due to this knowledge gap, it would be difficult to gain conversion from an 
‘incremental’ model of innovation associated with the region's industrial manufacturing 
environment into a ‘disruptive’ model of innovation associated with small companies 
building up global markets: 
 
Whenever we participate in meetings dealing with innovation and innovation-
fostering activities, we are always confronted with the idea of start-up companies 
because start- up companies are very fancy right now…In Budapest we do have a 
start-up culture, to be honest, there are a lot of people who came back to Hungary 
from the United States and Western Europe and decided to copy the model of the 
West to try [to] make something of start- ups. So, in Hungary, there is definitely a 
‘start-up’ culture… But Budapest is a large capital city and you see a village culture 
that initiate start-ups… but in [Győr] for all of those guys who come and talk to us 
about start-ups… we have to tell them that honestly… we have never seen a start-
up grown here…Well, maybe two or three start-ups in this city over the past decade 
who received some development profit… But they are ‘destructive’ companies… 
starting small and then going to into the world market with many users, but that’s it. 
 
 
A way out of this innovation paradox is suggested by Tödtling and Trippl who observed that 
in the case of old industrial regions, that although they have many firms, dominant clusters 
and relevant organisations, they are often strongly orientated on old industries and 
technological trajectories leading to ‘lock in’ occurring. Thus, they argue, in peripheral 
regions a key challenge is to strengthen and upgrade the regional economy by fostering ‘catch 
up learning’. Recommended policy measures include upgrading the knowledge base though 
industrial and technological diversification and reorganising existing firms, networks and 
institutions (Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). 
 
The Smart Specialisation policy is seen as a promising tool for CEE regions to support higher 
R&D spending and better cooperation between business and research and education 
institutions to encourage innovation advances (Dyba et al. 2018). Certainly, the WT Strategy 
signals an intention to tackle some of these challenges. Most promisingly, in the area of 
revitalising new cluster initiatives, to encourage strategic alliances between private and 
public actors in new growth industries. Thus, rather than a strategy of greater state investment 
in the university system, a more realistic aspiration could be to develop the better functioning 
of the RIS in the region, by generating more cooperative arrangements between universities 
and firms. 
 
The WT Strategy notes that in order to achieve the economic vision of a more diversified 
economy, more work is needed to improve the performance of business networking in the 
region and, therefore, the regional industry clusters. The policy notes that “regional cluster 
initiatives tend to be concentrated in traditional industries that carry a lower potential for 
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innovation” and that clusters have traditionally been organised horizontally along sector 
lines, while vertical lines had not yet been explored (R&D, production, market research along 
with sales or even organisation in chains). Another identified opportunity is to improve 
performance of the agricultural industry by establishing a new cluster to better link the work 
of the Georgikon University sciences faculty with the needs of that industry. This reflects the 
currently low value adding in primary goods in the agricultural industry. The report noted 
that improving the performance of such industry clusters in the region would assist with 
lifting overall regional economic performance (PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
Thus, while the Western Transdanubia region is rich in formal knowledge assets such as 
major universities and research centres, in order to achieve a more diversified regional 
economy, the WT Strategy recommends more emphasis and investment in building 
university–industry collaborative partnerships in economic growth areas. One such plan is to 
better link the work of the Forestry and Wood Utilisation Knowledge Centre with the region’s 
timber industry so as to further raise industry standards and enhance the technological and 
economic development of the entire region. It is envisaged by the WT Strategy that these 
research centres will be able to provide industrial and scientific research and link some key 
industries together in the automotive, electronics, wood and renewable-energy industries, as 
well as increase cooperation between service innovation and commercialisation services 
(PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
The WT Strategy emphasises the need for ongoing support for regional networks established 
to facilitate business innovation in the region. Western Transdanubia has several established 
institutions to assist with the establishment of new businesses and to help generate a culture 
of entrepreneurialism (PNNDRIN 2013); for instance, the Business Development Foundation 
(initially funded by the EU) and an active Chamber of Commerce. A regional innovation 
agency was formed in 2008. The main agenda for the agency is to increase the 
competitiveness of SMEs and to enhance their innovative activities. Entrepreneurial 
incubators and industrial parks are dominant centres of the region's infrastructure support for 
start-ups, and operating micro and small enterprises. Each of the 30 industrial parks located 
in Western Hungary operates at least one incubator that provides basic services to local 
companies. An innovation and technology centre called the Automotive Technology 
Competence Centre has been established to strengthen the relationship between science and 
the business sector, and to promote the automotive industry. It plays an important role in Győr 
in advocating for industrial advancements. However, the report found a problem around SME 
access to “shrinking” innovation resources, saying that EU funds can only “partially 
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compensate” for a shortfall in resources going to the development of innovative SMEs 
(PNNDRIN 2013). 
 
Autind reported that some universities in the region were seen as performing well in the area 
of life sciences and others worked well with pharmaceutical companies. These developments 
have some potential in relation to outcomes that could be influential within the global market. 
However, despite the intention for ongoing support for business–university collaboration and 
opportunities for future collaborative arrangements identified in official documentary 
sources, informants identified some key challenges in the implementation process of the 
effective functioning of policy tools designed to encourage networking between public and 
private actors. First, Academic2 argued that there was a lack of a culture of social interaction 
between public and private actors in regions located in Central and Eastern Europe, due to 
the State tradition: 
 
In Eastern Europe you don’t have the institutional architecture in place to build an 
innovation ecosystem… In Eastern Europe, [the EU] have made a lot of investments 
in places, Slovakia and places like that, in science…and things like that… but in my 
opinion they don’t have a real innovation ecosystem… Because there is a State 
tradition and you need for an innovation eco system, you need a lot of different 
actors in society interacting… which is what you have in Brussels for instance… 
And this is very difficult to reproduce this in Poland, Czech, Hungary and even in 
Russia… I think this is one of the main problems that [the EU] have with the new 
policy direction... because then for instance in Germany, you have… an academy in 
Sciences… and you have Bonhoeffer and you have the Rhineland and all of the 
universities and there are all kinds of institutions and they very open to collaborating 
with the companies and building an open innovation system. 
 
Autind described the Eastern European political State tradition as being important to 
understand in trying to develop a more diversified model of ‘quadruple helix’ collaboration 
between economic, social and educational actors within the regional economy. He ultimately 
concluded that what was needed was a conversion from the old State model of corporatist 
collaboration between the university and Audi in shaping the triple helix model of university–
industry cooperation in the region (indicating the centrality of Audi to the development of 
the relationship) to a new network governance of devolved relationships between multiple 
economic and societal actors. Autind argued that it needed to be understood that: 
everything that happened since 1993… was somewhat related to a city that could 
support the early phase of a company… and obviously support their hopes for their 
production base could be fulfilled and there was a continuous discussion… with the 
city, the university and the company… so the triple helix did actually work… the 
intention of solving problems to foresee issues… to encourage regional 
development… In order to see that we all needed, to come together in order to satisfy 
FDI and a huge company… who did actually change the way that the city and the 
region actually work. 
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Autind described a scene in the contemporary context where economic stakeholders within 
the region had been attempting to overcome cultural barriers to the establishment of an 
innovation ecosystem: 
We have been fighting for [a new model of] triple helix cooperation for nearly 15 
years now and… we are actually at the very early stage of this development… we 
need to push for it and we need to do everything we can to attract smart citizens and 
highly skilled people who value services and consumers and obviously if your ‘net’ 
is better then you are going to have a better opportunity to attract companies… more 
towards the high end… Smart people would then find it easier to relocate to that 
place… so this is the classical model… with Silicon Valley as the successful 
model…. 
 
The informant concluded this discussion by saying the region is in the very early phase of a 
converted ‘triple helix model’ of networked cooperative relationships. 
 
As outlined within the documentary analysis section of this chapter, the WT Strategy 
emphasises the importance of greater use in the Western Transdanubia region of policy tools, 
such as regional industry clusters, to achieve innovation outcomes. The EU Smart 
Specialisation policy document states that “regional cluster initiatives [have] tended to be 
concentrated in traditional industries that carry a lower potential for innovation” and clusters 
have been “traditionally organised in a horizontal direction along sector lines and vertical 
lines are not explored” such as with R&D, production, market research and sales. Thus, the 
policy emphasises the need for new industry clusters to be established to “better link the work 
of [for instance] the Georgikon University with the needs of the agricultural industry 
[identified as an economic growth industry by the policy document]”. 
 
Autind identified key barriers in the region that may militate against the success of such a 
policy, with reference to his experience as manager of the first ever industrial cluster 
established in Hungary (between 2001 and 2004) in the automotive industry, and emphasised 
that the original intention was that it be a regional development tool where: 
…you bring many different actors together… on a platform… and you make them 
talk… and support them to find their business actions… through discussions that’s 
a great thing and not be built on a business model where we [were] supporting 
companies to come together and to produce something very specific together. 
 
Autind explained that the industrial cluster experiment (based on his vision of regional 
economic development) had “eventually failed” in 2004 due to a number of barriers 
emerging. The first factor related to the poor public funding of the cluster. The “small 
investment” was not enough to generate the network activities to enable the cluster to become 
self-sufficient in the longer term: 
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The cluster was not really funded. Most of the clusters are like that… there is a nice 
vision from some people and an initial investment made… by local government or 
national government… a tiny investment… definitely not sufficient… it was 
sufficient to bring companies together… but it was definitely not sufficient to make 
the thing work… and it got abandoned in Győr a lot longer before what was needed 
to probably get the system to work… because it is not the inherent hope or wish of 
companies to work together… you actually need to make them work together… and 
once the result is there you might feed it back. 
According to Autind, a second factor for the failure of the industrial cluster was due to the 
competing interests of the firms involved in the cluster. The cluster was made up of a 
combination of a “very prestigious group of large Hungarian and FDI automotive firms who 
had very different interests that could never be harmonised because they were so different”. 
The cluster was supposed to be about larger companies helping the smaller companies to 
become better suppliers “but due to the large companies not being able to agree on the sort 
of suppliers they wanted, the debate was lost and contributed to the collapse of the cluster 
initiative. There was some progress in relation to the development of indigenous suppliers 
but the vision of converting the suppliers into development suppliers was not able to be 
achieved”: 
It was 2004–2005 when I left the cluster… and 10 years have passed since then… 
and we still have not seen too many development suppliers… So even with a cluster 
and even without a cluster… the thing was just not coming together it seems. 
Further, according to Autind, it was said that the Hungarian companies in the industrial cluster 
were not interested in developing skills in market knowledge: 
On many occasions we tried to talk to companies and tried to convince them that… 
OK… whatever you have learnt in automotive, well… you’re allowed to use that in 
different fields as well… I mean… with that technology… with that knowledge of 
cost cautiousness… with that knowledge of quality systems… you might as well as 
be producing something that you can actually sell on the market. However, these 
skills were seen as difficult to teach Hungarian companies… as they have never 
been exposed to a culture of learning market knowledge... and they are not able to 
handle customer marketing… and selling… advertising… building a brand… on the 
customer market. 
This is a significant barrier in knowledge that needs to be overcome, according to Autind, to 
realise the Smart Specialisation policy focus on building innovation ecosystems. According 
to Autind, another reason for the industrial cluster having said to have failed is due to cultural 
reasons with a history of being a part of the Eastern Bloc. A culture of suspicion between 
people worked against a culture being developed in the region based on collaboration and 
trust built up between firms and an ‘individualistic’ spirit: 
In Hungary, we have had over 100 years of experience… Or many hundred years of 
experience in looking for shortcuts in the system and backdoors to find ways around 
things… and this history is not very good for the state of collaboration and this 
history means when in this region, when people first started to consider the idea of 
building clusters and organisations with any sort of network between companies, we 
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all were facing the problem that critical trust issues exist between local managers, 
SME owners, and these trust issues are very difficult to solve. 
 
Autind also emphasised the importance of a support scheme that had developed – the 
cooperation research centre in the region referred to earlier, where universities worked 
closely with companies on joint research projects on research required by companies: 
Autind: 
I believe this kind of approach is the kind of approach that we want to be leading 
companies toward to teach cooperation between companies and universities… and 
you should very clearly say that the goal setting should come from the companies… 
because they are the ones that can sell the product… so I think this is a really good 
model of building universities up and building cooperation up… allowing the 
university to value their services… and this is a big question because universities 
and academics tend to overvalue their added value to research… and until they are 
measured by the market then… it will always be very difficult to talk to universities 
because… they will sell their services at a lot higher price than it is actually worth… 
so with these cooperation activities you can actually value your services… to the 
market… and I think this is also a very important model. 
 
Many of the insights of informants support the vast amount of empirical research that has 
addressed the challenges confronting LDRs and found that many of these regions exhibit 
unfavourable RIS, with typical characteristics such as organisational thinness, lock-in 
associated with declining sectors and outdated technologies, fragmented systems that inhibit 
networking and knowledge exchange, and a weak capacity to drive transformative change 
(Stambach & Klement 2012; Tödtling & Trippl 2005; Weber & Rohracher 2012 cited in 
Healy 2016). In this sense, it adds to the claim that a more dynamic perspective is needed on 
how a region may lack capacity for regional renewal over time. Trippl et al (2016) argue that 
the traditional measures, for instance, of defining a RIS as analytical (R&D)-based 
knowledge and STI modes of innovation rather than consideration of different types of 
knowledge and innovation modes to support new path development (Trippl et al 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Western Transdanubia case adds significant weight to other empirical studies addressing 
early implementation challenges confronting LDRS located in CEE states confronted by 
centralised governance processes in policy design, (Morgan 2015; Bachtler & Mendez 2013, 
Bachtler & McMaster 2008; Dabrowski 2012). This case particularly corroborates the 
findings of Cooke (2016), where he showed how power levels within the Portuguese state 
had conspired through MLG processes against de-specialisation aspirations of the region of 
Algarve. In that case, Cooke demonstrated how regional policy-makers and firms felt that 
diversification of economic activity was superior to specialisation due to a widespread 
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distrust of the way the region has become over-specialised in sun and beach tourism. He 
argued that regional stakeholders wanted to see results from their best research centres being 
“transferred into innovations by seeking applications in related fields as well as within the 
dominant sector in the regional economy reflecting the importance placed by the region in 
seeing the value of variety in regional development” (Cooke, 2016). 
 
This chapter has highlighted the extent to which regional stakeholders felt that 
‘diversification’ in Western Transdanubia may be undermined by centralised political 
processes determining funding priorities of joint research centres and the scale of 
technological investments. Centralised political power was thought to ensure an ongoing 
consolidation for the dominant role of Audi in the region, and may act to suppress, for 
instance, other identified priority growth areas of the economy, such as the forestry industry. 
The Smart Specialisation policy was seen by the region – in its determination that the automotive 
industry be the main priority area for future growth and innovation – a potentially important 
missed opportunity to build related variety with other growth sectors. The GFC exposed the 
vulnerability of a regional economy dependent on a powerful embedded MNC, as is the case of 
Western Transdanubia with its reliance on industrial giant Audi, and regional stakeholders 
expressed nervousness at the industry’s selection as the main priority sector within the regional 
policy. 
 
The stakeholders also expressed concern about the WT Strategy, outlining a key objective related 
to supporting greater innovation in the automotive sector as being based on the development of 
domestic suppliers as opposed to ‘functional upgrading’ into design and R&D work in the region. 
As argued previously in Chapter 2, these insights add value to analysis on key characteristics 
of automotive GVC producer-driven networks undertaken by Pavlik and Zenka, who in their 
study of the Czech automotive industry discovered that the capacity for industrial upgrading 
within large industrial companies, which organise and coordinate investment-based vertical 
production networks of component suppliers, was highly selective and mainly associated 
with product and process upgrading as opposed to functional upgrading. The authors argued 
that for Czech subsidiaries the process of improving their position in global automotive 
production networks is dependent on the strategies and decisions of foreign TNCs, in the 
absence of an effective state-led industrial or economic policy (Pavlik and Zenka 2011).  
 
Cooke has also argued that policy makers should understand the important role of MNCs in 
shaping regional knowledge- based economic development, given the increasing outsourcing 
of R&D from large corporations. In this sense, regions should try and influence location and 
decision making of R&D by large corporations to help shape and exploit knowledge-
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production processes and innovation systems in the context of globalization (Cooke & 
Picculuga 2009). For countries located in CEE, attracting the settlement of research facilities 
owned by MNCs to regions will enable functional upgrading of knowledge capacity 
processes and hence the capacity to break out of their peripheral status in the global economy 
(Smaho 2012). In addition, Capello and Kroll argue that repositioning of peripheral regions 
in international value chains, however desirable, can often not be controlled by policy-makers 
from within these regions alone. Typically, these regions’ only link to the international 
economy is based on local MNE subsidiaries acting under headquarter directives and 
embedded in global corporate strategies. Consequently, they are not usually particularly 
interested to become engaged with a region’s local government or its strategies. Even if they 
were to become involved, moreover, any internationalisation strategy built upon their 
activities will remain vulnerable to more general corporate plans, as they can at any time by 
closed down or relocated following considerations entirely out of the control of the regional 
government (Capello and Kroll 2016). 
 
As was also noted earlier in this study, within the automotive sector, the global value chain 
(GVC) organisation of the company Volkswagen demonstrates how a core-periphery 
dynamic may be established in relation to the placement of R&D facilities across Europe. 
The research carried out by the Volkswagen Group has always been largely centralised, with 
the corporate research division at the company’s Wolfsburg headquarters providing support 
for all of the Volkswagen brands. A baseline mapping exercise of advanced manufacturing 
capacity in European regions undertaken on behalf of the European Commission, found that 
‘top layer’ advanced manufacturing capacity in the automotive industry is largely 
concentrated in regions located in Western Europe and Spain (Technopolis 2014). Given the 
problem of the vertical nature of MNC GVC strategy, it is therefore maintained by many 
GVC scholars that it is not feasible for regions that are characterised by unfavourable 
structural features of economies (outside global economic cores) that are dominated by lower 
tier suppliers, have guaranteed demand (often in large volume) for standard goods produced 
with well-known technology, and do not tend to conduct activities such as market research 
to aspire to an industrial upgrading strategy (Blazek 2016; Tödtling and Trippl 2005). In this 
sense, it may be that public policies aimed at stimulating socioeconomic development by 
supporting innovation, for example via the promotion of cooperation between firms and 
academic R&D institutions, are to a large extent misleading. Instead, given the narrow profit 
margins of lower tier suppliers, as well as their limited growth potential stemming from their 
modest capabilities and consequent low-road strategies of competitiveness, the concept of 
upgrading is not relevant for these firms (Blazek 2016; Tödtling & Trippl 2005). 
 
148 
 
However, despite the arguments of Blazek (2016) and Tödtling & Trippl (2005), informants 
emphasised that the economic vision contained within the WT Strategy presented an 
opportunity for the region to build a strategy for automotive expansion into the future, with 
a vision for high value-added capacity. In achieving the economic vision in the strategy, for 
a diversified knowledge economy, emphasis was again placed on the need to link the quality 
of regional governance institutions to economic development outcomes. The stakeholders 
felt that with the new policy direction, Western Transdanubia may be missing a regionally 
driven formal policy to build the industry up from the bottom, with advisory groups, and a 
policy-making process to match the capacity for the region to reach the level of cities with a 
strategic systemic approach to the process. Informants emphasised the importance of building 
regional economic institutions capable of advocating for higher value-added capacity within 
the automotive industry.  
 
Thus informants were of the view that rather than rely upon MNC GVC strategy, the roles of 
the state and the region were critical in playing a greater coordination role, in building a 
policy for automotive development to shape future strategic policy, and emphasised the 
degree to which this would generate a model where assembly of cars or more complex 
research and design work, would not settle in the region. 
 
Finally, the case of Western Transdanubia also corroborates the findings of many empirical 
studies that have sought to investigate the innovation paradox confronting LDRS posed by 
the characteristics of their RIS. Chapter 2 reviewed many empirical studies that have 
demonstrated how the policy would likely face challenges in the implementation phase due 
to such regions often exhibiting unfavourable research and innovation systems (Stambach & 
Klement 2012; Tödtling & Trippl 2005; Weber and Rohracher 2012 in Healy 2016). It is 
argued that regions with less-favoured research and innovation systems have a low potential 
to diversify into new industrial areas due to unfavourable economic structures and a weak 
endowment of knowledge organisations (Boschma in Trippl et al 2016) and have a low 
capacity to use funds due to a weak capacity to absorb change; for instance, by not having an 
innovation ecosystem based on the triple helix model (Marques & Morgan 2018).  
 
McCann and Ortega-Argilés have also argued that one of the greatest challenges facing the 
application of modern regional innovation policies across EU regions is in regions with very 
limited innovation-related assets. Some regions, for example, contain no research institutes; 
other regions, particularly in Eastern Europe, as yet exhibit only a very limited capacity for 
developing an innovation system, because they are constrained by institutional and 
governance, and technological issues. They maintain that the “tendency towards policy 
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homogeneity will produce wrong policy priorities in some places; for example, in weaker 
economies aiming to catch up with more advanced parts of Europe, the main priorities should 
relate to the absorption and adaptation of existing frontier technologies, rather than initiatives 
aimed at fostering features such as creativity” (McCann & Ortega-Argiles 2016, p.1410). 
 
In Western Transdanubia, informants also expressed concerns about the characteristics of 
knowledge assets within the RIS, identifying challenges in the region of low levels of both 
public and private funded research, and the technical focus of the main university in the 
region. In addition to this, there was concern that the WT Strategy focused on “bringing back 
the lost engineers” to the region to assist with the expansion of the automotive industry, as 
opposed to aspiring to a more diversified human resources base that would support a broader 
mix of industries and assist in the retention of younger people. Finally, in relation to the 
operation of the ‘quadruple helix’ model, concern was raised by the region that the policy 
focus on business and university networking would be undermined by a culture of mistrust 
and a history of underfunded cluster initiatives. 
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Chapter 6 
Bratislava 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The industrialisation of Western Slovakia, with the automotive industry an important 
feature, has seen Bratislava called the “Detroit of Europe”. In the 1990s, the region 
became home an automotive production cluster, including factories owned by 
Volkswagen and the French car maker Peugeot. In 2015, this trend continued, with the 
Slovak Government attracting the British firm Jaguar to the region. The EU Smart 
Specialisation policy provides an opportunity for the region to expand on this industrial 
history, particularly to build domestic capacity within the supply base of the industry. In 
the longer term, the plan proposes an eventual transformation of the region’s base from 
production-oriented to knowledge-oriented, to generate manufacturing exports of greater 
value. 
 
This case study of Bratislava explores the governance aspects of the design and institutional 
arrangements proposed to implement the new policy direction, the economic context and the 
extent to which the organisation of knowledge assets will assist the long-term strategic 
direction of the new policy. This chapter presents and interprets documentary and interview 
data. The first section analyses documentary data to gain insights from key documents 
relating to the EU Smart Specialisation policy from the European Commission and Slovak 
Government. The second section provides an analysis of interview data as a parallel research 
source. Informants were identified as ‘key policy actors’ within the Bratislava regional 
innovation system ‘quadruple helix representative’ groups. Four informants were drawn from 
the government, business and university sectors, coded as follows: automotive executives 
(Autex1 and Autex2), government policy officer (Govpol) and automotive industry academic 
(Autacad). Informants were asked for their perceptions of the strengths and challenges of the 
Smart Specialisation policy instrument. 
 
Quality of regional governance 
Documentary sources detail how the Slovak Government oversaw the development of a 
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single national Smart Specialisation policy Through Knowledge towards Prosperity: 
Research and Innovation Strategy for Smart Specialisation of the Slovak Republic (2013) 
(hereafter ‘the Slovak Strategy’). The policy was coordinated centrally by the national 
government and took the development needs of the country as a whole into consideration, 
while taking into account regional specifications. The centralised governance processes 
reflect geographical considerations due to the “small size of the Slovak economy”, a size 
comparable “to … a region in a larger EU country” (Slovak Republic 2013, p. 53). 
In relation to regional participation in the policy design, the Slovak Strategy describes broad 
participation of key relevant stakeholders. The policy consultation process involved 
scientists, entrepreneurs, businesses, academics, government and citizens. The regional 
governance processes of the policy involved consultation with European Commission 
experts, who heavily influenced the design and implementation processes of the strategy. 
Overall, 120 experts were involved in the entrepreneurial process of discovery established to 
guide the policy design (Slovak Republic, 2013). Analysis was undertaken by the EC in a 
peer-review process undertaken to provide commentary on the design of the policy. That RIS3 
Peer Review Report Slovak Republic (2014) (hereafter the ‘EU Peer Review’) found that 
Slovakia “had performed well in the governance processes associated with coordination of 
stakeholders across the spectrum of the triple helix representative groups” (European 
Commission 2014f).The Slovak Strategy emphasised the extent of the involvement of 
stakeholders in the policy design process. Extensive local consultation created the conditions 
for the establishment of informal networks of scientific teams involving innovation teams in 
industry, including key MNCs, and small and medium enterprises. In addition “the wide-
ranging discussions, dialogue and work of multi-departmental working groups resulted in 
formulation of governance processes of policy implementation [as] barriers of narrow 
thinking about the management of science and innovation of the Slovak Republic were 
dismantled”. The strategy also emphasised the important role for industrial clusters as a key 
policy instrument to promote diversification. The strong base of MNCs was seen as important 
in building a RIS where large companies could play a role in furthering innovation advances 
with domestic businesses. Further, the Slovak Strategy proposed that national institutions, 
rather than regional authorities, should be charged with implementing the policy (Slovak 
Republic 2013). 
Informants mostly agreed that the formulation of the policy was consultative at a regional 
level, that the concept of the policy was positive and that an organised vision for the next 
15 years was needed for Bratislava because “otherwise we will have to go back later and 
correct mistakes and this costs money… mistakes cost money… we need a strategy for 
our generation… with Eastern Europe we need to a to develop a strategy for the future”. 
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Thus, Autex2 saw the automotive industry playing a predominant role in the economic 
plan for the region: 
We selected six sectors, all related to the automotive industry, as Slovakia has a good 
network in the automotive industry… it is important to note that the biggest 
investment in Slovakian industry is Volkswagen with €11.5 billion and second is 
Samsung who invest about €8.5 billion and Slovakians themselves chip in over €5 
billion over 5 years. 
However, Autex1 disagreed that the companies themselves were intrinsically involved in the 
policy design processes, arguing that large companies such as Volkswagen Slovakia were 
only peripherally involved in policy design processes and was sceptical about what the 
policy was trying to achieve. He instead emphasised a preference for traditional regional 
economic development goals based around employment outcomes for the region, to be 
supported through industrial policy instruments such as tax breaks and land-use planning 
regulations. EU regional policy was seen as remote to automotive industry needs, and 
largely focused on infrastructure focused on education needs projects, rather than 
projects involving industry. There was also a sense from Autex1 that the increased GDP 
wealth of the region would prohibit Bratislava from receiving Cohesion Fund support: 
Bratislava is the fourth-strongest region [for] GDP per capita in the whole of the 
European Union… after Central London, Hamburg etc. For us this is a bit of a 
problem, as you can’t ask for the subsidies… I guess at the start of W project that 
arrived, back in 1999–2000, we got tax breaks… and this helped a lot because at 
that time it was a huge investment … and we had to build a lot… and invest in 
people… suppliers, so that was very helpful. 
In relation to governance structures and policy implementation, according to documentary 
sources, weaknesses in institutions overseeing innovation policy in Slovakia have led to failed 
regional innovation projects. One such was during the 2007–13 EU regional funding period; 
the Slovak Government initiated a project using funds allocated to innovation outcomes to 
create territorially based institutional structures, for a “more efficient connection between 
industry and selected services with research and development objectives”, overseen jointly 
by three national ministries covering diverse portfolios including Economy, Education, 
Science. Research, Sport, Labour and Social Affairs. These ministries cooperated in a project 
that focused on the creation of regional innovation centres. However, in 2011, the national 
government stopped building centres, citing a lack of “verifiability and sustainability of the 
projects” arising from a possible risk of unauthorised state aid for the commercial sector, 
leading to a lack of consensus between the ministries on implementation (Slovak Republic 
2013 p. 56). This policy experience led to a sense that a significant cultural shift was needed 
in the national innovation environment, and governance arrangements managing research and 
innovation policy needed to be overhauled (Slovak Republic 2013). 
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A key institutional reform established by the Slovak Strategy was a new national authority to 
oversee policy design and implementation: the Government Council for Science, Technology 
and Innovation. The Council has new powers to undergo nationally organised, direct 
engagement in policy making with all of the stakeholders in innovation, including regionally 
based research communities and industry associations. It has significant political weight in 
the national government, as evidenced by it being chaired by the Prime Minister. The Slovak 
Strategy proposes that the Council will act in concert with the Scientific and Technology 
agencies which are the two central coordinating organisations overseeing policy design and 
implementation, alongside the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sport, and the 
Ministry of the Economy. In addition, the strategy proposes the transformation of an existing 
network of seven implementation institutions, which will involve a merger of two new central 
public agencies, the Research and Technological Agency, and a Scientific Agency, with both 
agencies overseen by a newly constituted Board (Figure 6.1; Slovak Republic 2013). 
Figure 6.1: Organisational Scheme of institutional management of strategy of Smart 
Specialisation implementation until 2020 
(Slovak Republic 2013) 
Hence, the Slovak Strategy establishes reformed governance arrangements as critical 
institutional reform needed for the success of establishing a RIS policy. This reform aims to 
provide a national “central guiding authority” to coordinate policy in the region. In the past 
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responsibilities were fragmented across various government authorities, including across 
national government departments such as the education and economic ministries, and various 
agencies under their jurisdiction. This led to a situation where “vertical coordination between 
national and regional innovation systems” was not working effectively (Slovak Republic 
2013 p. 54). 
The EU Peer Review endorsed the new proposed governance arrangements and noted, in 
relation to the newly constituted Board, that it would be composed of an equal division of 
public and private-sector representatives to ensure a “continuous and permanent process of 
entrepreneurial discovery” occurring in Slovakia. The review also noted that the Slovak 
representatives involved in the process welcomed the new national approach to policy 
making. They acknowledged the fragmented nature of previous institutional arrangements, 
and how it represented a significant barrier to the cooperation of actors within the innovation 
system. However the report noted several institutional challenges that required further 
attention. Concern was raised about the design of the new proposed national system: “while 
the merging of the high number of existing implementation agencies into two agencies is 
rational and will make the system more consolidated, effective and transparent, the role of 
the Board(s) of Research Agency and Technological Agency as implementation structures 
needs to be better defined and their status, responsibilities, composition and negotiation 
processes legally codified” (EC 2004, p. 26).  
Questions were also raised about the election and nomination processes relating to board 
members, with the report stating that they needed to be clearer and more transparent, and the 
extent to which board members were independent in relation to their responsibilities and roles 
in the evaluation processes. It was noted that the Strategy did not clearly state how board 
members would evaluate the relevance of proposals to selected priorities and liaise with 
external experts (EC 2014f). Further governance reform to assist Slovakia with 
implementation and further integration into EU wide programs was proposed, to encourage 
research and innovation outcomes. The EU Peer Review acknowledged the involvement of 
Slovakia in several EU and international research and innovation initiatives, including the 
ERA-NET program, European Technology Platform, and the Joint Technology Initiative, but 
recommended greater involvement by Slovakia in the Horizon 2020 program, which was of 
“critical importance to achieving better innovation outcomes” (EC 2014f, p. 25). 
The EU Peer Review noted that the Slovak Strategy omitted details on how there could be 
better coordination of existing financial resources for research and innovation, including 
from the business sector, public budgets, EU structural and investment funds, the 
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Horizon 2020 program, banks, institutional investors and venture capital. According to 
the report, the Slovak Strategy is based on inter-departmental, inter-ministerial, inter-
agency coordination, and does take into account the existing level of policy coordination 
within the country. However, the report noted that, while the Strategy aligns EU, national 
and regional policies to support upgrading in identified areas, missing was the proposal 
on how to exploit synergies between different European sources, including ERDF and 
Horizon 2020, and national and regional funding sources (EC 2014f).  
The role of the MNC in GVC/GPN context 
The Slovak Republic is one of the fastest growing national economies within the EU. 
Bratislava is considered the most prosperous region in Slovakia. It is classified as an EU 
‘transition’ region for the purposes of calculating Structural Fund allocations, meaning it has 
a GDP between 75 and 90 per cent of the EU-28 average (Figure 6.2; Slovak Republic 2013). 
Figure 6.2: Slovakia, Structural Funds (ERDF and ESF) eligibility 2014–20 
(European Commission 2018) 
Bratislava is the capital of the republic and is strategically located at the junction of the 
Less developed regions (GDP/head < 75% of EU-27 average) 
Transition regions (GDP/head< Between 75% and 90% of EU-27 
average 
More developed regions (GDP/head > 90% of EU-27 average) 
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borders of the Czech Republic, Austria and Hungary in the extreme west of the country. 
Bratislava is considered predominately an industrial region, although the finance sectors are 
gaining dominance over industrial production. The strong economic performance of the 
region stands in contrast to the ‘periphery’, the areas of southern and eastern Slovakia that 
have a rural character, with below average rates of economic productivity, low investment, 
high unemployment, marginalised groups, and poor transport and infrastructure. Location is 
a key factor contributing to Bratislava’s economic success. It enjoys rates of almost full 
employment, due to considerable Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) the region has attracted – 
since 1993, almost 63 per cent of the country’s inflow – as well as the existence of an 
educated and skilled labour market (Nicholson & Balogoa 2007). 
The high industrial production of Bratislava has seen it designated an industrial micro-region. 
Due to the availability to Bratislava of per capita fixed asset rates well above other regions 
in Slovakia, the region has a distinct economic advantage in that it receives considerable 
revenue from this strong presence of industrial production (Slovak Republic 2003). In 2007, 
the main industrial sectors of the region include the chemical, automotive, engineering, 
electro-tech and food industries. Bratislava is also the administrative and financial centre of 
Slovakia. Major banks and insurance companies have headquarters in the city. Finance and 
insurance accounted for “almost a quarter of the region’s economic activity”. Several 
international IT firms, including Dell, IBM, Lenovo, AT&T, Accenture and SAP have 
established outsourcing centres there. Moreover, Bratislava is Slovakia’s technological and 
scientific educational centre. It has the highest percentage of university-educated citizens in 
the country. Over 40 per cent of Slovak students study at one of three universities in the 
region: Comenius University, University of Economics, and the Slovak University of 
Technology (Nicholson & Balogoa 2007). 
According to a key documentary source The Automotive Industry in the Slovak Republic: 
Recent Developments and Impact on Growth (2008) (hereafter the ‘Slovak Automotive 
report’), Bratislava’s automotive industry is the single most important industrial sector 
in the national economy. Nationally, the sector employs more than 10 per cent of the 
Slovak labour force engaged in manufacturing. By 2010, the industry was predicted to 
produce approximately 500,000 cars per year. The Slovak Republic is the world’s leading 
car producer as measured on a per capita basis (Jakubiak et al. 2008). In the broader 
European geo-political regional context, the automobile industry is seen as a driving force 
of economic development in many CEE countries, the Czech and Slovak Republics, and 
Poland and Hungary (Tirpak 2006). It is estimated that the four CEE countries accounted for 
12 per cent of the total EU-27 production of passenger cars, or 2 million cars in 2006 
157 
(Tirpak 2006). 
The emergence of central Europe as a major car manufacturing hub is compatible with 
global trends in the automotive industry. Automotive production in Slovakia takes place 
within a circle of production with a diameter of about 400 kilometres, concentrated in 
three regional clusters (Figure 6.3). The first and the strongest cluster is in the western 
part of the country, where Volkswagen and Peugeot have factories. The second regional 
cluster is located in the northern and central part of the country, centred on the Kia 
Motors plant. The third is in the east, with the Kechnec industrial park in Kosice housing 
several key suppliers, including Gertrag Ford transmissions and Molex. The 
establishment of manufacturing plants in CEE serving the EU market is said to be 
evidence of the emerging new ‘network-led’ model of industry, of firms producing 
within every large market. The need for just-in-time delivery processes that are 
characteristic of vertically integrated production has made the CEE regional context 
attractive for automotive investment (Jakubiak et al. 2008). The assembly plants’ 
clustering was underpinned by a well-developed road and rail infrastructure. Automotive 
production assembly’s dependence on just-in-time auto parts deliveries from suppliers 
demands an efficient logistics network. This was important for the sale of final products 
and the proximity to both western and eastern markets being advantageous (Tirpak 
2006).  
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Figure 6.3 The Slovak Republic: geographical concentration of automotive 
production 
(Jakubiak et al. 2008) 
As the Slovak automotive report indicates, the presence of foreign investors and their 
successful operations has proved to be a positive signal for others to invest in locations 
where foreign operations are already established in the same or similar industries. This 
generated a pattern of car production over many years after with investors preferring to 
invest in places that have already attracted suppliers and benefit from the externalities of 
the agglomeration. Increased competition in the global automotive industry and low 
wage levels in the CEE countries have often been combined with a relatively well-trained 
and educated workforce. Foreign investors, especially in medium-high technology 
sectors such as the car industry, have preferred the combination of wage competitiveness 
and a qualified workforce (Jakubiak et al. 2008). The strong base of basic research and 
talented specialists in important sectors have also been combined in CEE countries 
(Berend 2009).  
The Slovak Government played an active role in expanding the automotive industry. It 
actively courted Volkswagen to get them to locate their production base within their network 
of suppliers in Bratislava in the 1990s. In 1997, Prime Minister Meciar’s cabinet developed 
a “Program for the Development of the Automotive Industry in Slovakia”, which set a general 
strategy and stipulated the goals and measures to be implemented. Volkswagen was granted 
significant tax incentives, and the company received €31.2 million in tax allowances in 1999. 
The rapid expansion of Volkswagen’s operations attracted a number of large foreign 
suppliers, many of them (such as Johnson Controls and the Lear Corporation) located as part 
of an industrial cluster in an industrial park in Bratislava.  
Informant Autacad felt that a minimum of two to three companies were needed in the 
region to encourage supplier optimism. He explained how important it was to then build 
up the supplier base: 
We now have 250 foreign companies… the biggest suppliers, from the top 20, all 
are here… for example Johnson Controls, has eight companies here… Continental, 
and we have here Bosch and Manuetti Morelli and Dana… from the top 20 suppliers, 
OEMs in the Tier 1 category… we have the top 20 here. 
The positive experience of Volkswagen in Slovakia is said to have had a demonstration effect 
on other car producers and impacted on their decisions to locate to Slovakia in subsequent 
years (Jakubiak et al. 2008). As Autacad explained, Volkswagen were in turn attracted to 
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Slovakia and the initial investment by Volkswagen in the region reflected the company’s 
interest in the strong mechanical engineering tradition (resulting from the former dominance 
of the military industry). The volume of production in Volkswagen’s “initial period” was 
“only eight SUV buses daily”. In 2015, the company produced 400,000 SUVs a year, around 
1500 vehicles a day, a huge leap in production. Autacad further observed that the government 
strategy of attracting and retaining automotive production and developing auxiliary firms 
to support it consolidated an “intra-regional” cluster that could service the needs of the 
“12 brands” associated with Volkswagen globally.  
According to Autex2, all of the engines for Slovak car assembly are sourced from Gyor 
in Hungary and the whole Volkswagen Group works together with the production of 12 
brands in an intra-regional context to source components and to produce vehicles. Autex2 
explained that, in the course of negotiations between the Slovak Government and Volkswagen, 
strong advocacy was entered into to attract the company to the region, as the government 
knew other companies would follow. He emphasised that, at that time, automotive production 
was considered essential for regional economic development: 
The Slovak Government… at this time in 1991… decided to call up 40 car producers 
around the world and only three came back with proposals… General Motors, 
Renault and Volkswagen … They asked Renault and Volkswagen. Renault decided 
that they were not that interested… Volkswagen and General Motors were interested 
in the Slovak car company Skoda, so they gave exclusivity with General Motors in 
negotiations. Then the Slovak Government discovered that General Motors just 
wanted to build gear boxes. But the Slovak Government had a plan that they did not 
just want to build and finalise cars here and that they wanted the three components 
therefore built here, including gear boxes and components, and to finalise cars here 
so you almost [do] the whole production, just not engines… as well as this… 
General Motors, they wanted a lot of money… and at this time the Slovak part of 
the state, they did not have this kind of money… so they did not come to a 
conclusion, so then Volkswagen came with a proposal that all of the three products 
would be built… and in 1993 they started production.  
Following on from Volkswagen production location investment in Slovakia came 
announcements of greenfield investments by Peugeot Citroen and Kia Motors. These 
investments were of significant economic importance for Slovakia, and critical to the 
consolidation of the ‘Detroit of Europe’ in its strength in automotive production. Autex2: 
I sold Slovakia to potential automobile producers thinking about where to situate 
their plants on the basis of our suppliers, for the logistical advantage being in the 
sea for shipping purposes and I personally convinced in the year 2000 Peugeot 
Citroen to come here and told them about the amount [sic] of suppliers we had in a 
500-kilometre circle and so on this basis they came to Slovakia and they started the 
production of the Peugeot Citroen Picasso here… 
The Slovak Government presented the country as a reforming and rapidly developing 
CEE nation which was increasingly attractive for foreign investors. Slovak media at the 
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time of this immense economic activity predicted that the investment would “draw the 
attention of the whole Europe” and that it was therefore “probable that various investors 
deciding to invest in Eastern Europe will focus on the Slovak Republic more” (Jakubiak 
et al. 2008, p. 38). Informants explained how the Slovak Government wanted specialised 
production rather than just a simple assembly line with a regional economic development 
perspective in focus. The government negotiated for “significant production facilities” to be 
built in the region for the “entire car” to be built at the new facilities, rather than just 
component parts to be built there. Instead, a cluster of component suppliers were built in CEE 
countries close to Slovakia. Autex2: 
In 1990, we had Volkswagen here and at that time I was General Manager of Skoda 
and we had discussions with Volkswagen about having a joint venture in Slovakia… 
it was such a lucky step Volkswagen coming here… because of the fact that we had 
Skoda and they produce small cars, and Bratislava could become a new production 
base for the Volkswagen company and so at this time… in 1992… slowly, we 
started assembling cars for Volkswagen in Bratislava. 
Autex1 indicated that 80,000 people work in the Slovak automotive industry and quoted 
a Slovak Automotive Industry Association survey that estimated between 200,000 and 
240,000 people in Slovakia are somehow connected to the automotive industry, 
including the service industries: 
There is definitely a lot of SME flow on development from Volkswagen … when 
Volkswagen came, it means a lot of components to cars, but it also means a lot of 
flow-on activity to the service sector… means a lot of services that are supplied… 
from smaller companies for example, the cooking and the catering is all done by a 
Slovak company that is located here in Bratislava… so all the catering services for 
our workers, the cleaning services… for not just the workplaces but also the paint 
shop, which has to be cleaned with special chemicals… we take it to a Slovak 
cleaning company and they also do this cleaning in a special factory and then we 
get it back… there are a lot of these positive effects… and also one of the other 
positive effects is that the workers… their salaries are quite high… and the stability 
of salaries, they can also take credit, but… they can also spend the money in the 
shops and buy a lot of things and in restaurants and so on, and so they are supporting 
the manufacturing sector as well. 
A robust supplier base was considered important as the automotive OEMs used just-in-
time production methods and required maximum flexibility in changing the line of 
production quickly. Just-in-time methods meant the supplier network had to be situated 
near the plant, within 100 kilometres. In the outer circles of production suppliers that do 
not need to conform to just-in-time can be within the “second circle” from the factory 
and can supply modules, systems and engine gear boxes with a 2-week turnaround. Ten 
per cent of European-built vehicles emerge from Bratislava’s three plants. Informant 
Autex2 said the Slovak Government recognised the economic imperative of attracting 
automotive investment in order to attract lots of other industries that “would then give 
us a big regional advantage to then develop other manufacturing industries, for instance 
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with the development of the glass, steel and plastics industries” and emphasised the 
extent to which the regional model was underpinned by a strategy of understanding the 
importance of building up an entire manufacturing industry: 
You need all of these industries that provide components to cars and so we built 
capacity in the electronics industry that is now quite strong, for instance we have 
Samsung here… and some other companies that are now somewhat in decline 
because of the competition in European markets… for instance with Sony. 
The original production model involved importing parts from Germany and conducting 
assembly work. Once the car was assembled, it would be exported back to Germany. This 
model was in operation for the first 10 years of Volkswagen operations, from 1992. 
According to Autex2, the quality of the product was thought to be excellent, so Volkswagen 
head office decided to think about creating companies in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. 
Due to the high logistical costs associated with the export model, there was a new strategy 
employed to relocate suppliers to the CEE countries and to create a big cluster. The Slovak 
Government then strategically developed “three regional circles of production” where the 
largest 500-kilometre circle of production within Central Europe takes in 12 countries. 
Autex2 explained that in “each of these countries there are 20 plants and their capacity is 51/2 
million cars and that that represents 30 per cent of Europe in that circle”.  
 
A 500-kilometre circle becomes important for investors and suppliers who formed the basis 
of an economy built around automotive production. There are today over 220 suppliers in 
Slovakia, most of them component suppliers. Autacad: 
… now on a map you can draw a line between the big three companies and then you 
see Györ is also not very far on the map… and then on the northern part of the border 
on Hungary there is a Suzuki plant… so there is a connection there and they have 
also Mazda that has a factory, I think, somewhere in Hungary… so somehow you 
can work with the supplier network and it is always easier when you have the 
supplier network closer… than far away. 
The Slovak Strategy reinforces the strong role of the automotive industry in the country’s 
future economy by making the industry a key sector targeted for ongoing specialisation. 
Table 6.1 demonstrates how the automotive and mechanical engineering industries play 
a central role in existing areas of specialisation in the economy. Importantly, the 
automotive industry retains a central role in the nominated prospective areas of 
specialisation under the Slovak Strategy. Other industries nominated for specialisation 
are the cultural and creative sectors, and there is emphasis on increasing the value of the 
domestic raw material base to increase the potential for renewable energy in areas such 
as water resources, magnesite and wood (Slovak Republic, 2013). 
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Table 6.1 Areas of economic specialisation (Slovak Strategy, 2013) 
Existing areas of 
economic 
specialisation 
Actions 
Automotive and 
mechanical engineering 
industries  
Consumer electronics 
and electrical equipment 
Information and 
communication 
products and services 
Production and 
processing of iron and 
steel 
Increase domestic value-added products, 
particularly through the effective transfer of 
technology and science and research results into 
the production process. 
Develop production processes in industry focusing 
on better use of available resources, greater use of 
recycling materials and environment-friendly 
materials through the R&D led development. 
Encourage the use, placement and replacement of 
previously used materials for advanced materials 
with a new and more complex performance, 
including technological processing (machining, 
forming, joining). 
Develop technological investment units, 
particularly in the field of metallurgy, engineering, 
energy and integrated industrial equipment, with 
respect to the application and use of light metals 
and advanced materials in the production of 
transport and construction facilities to reduce 
overall weight and contribute to the green 
economy, development and application usage of 
composite materials. 
Develop technological investment units, 
particularly in the energy and industrial facilities, 
with respect to internationalisation activities and 
the development of so-called ‘emerging countries’. 
Make more efficient the production and logistics 
processes and use ICT and robotics in the 
production processes. 
Involve in supply chains and internationalization - 
"the purchase of cooperation is also a purchase“, - 
know-how transfer from large to small subjects 
and vice versa in the framework of the 
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cooperation, - energy efficiency and renewable 
energy sources 
Prospective areas of 
economic 
specialisation 
Actions (technology) 
Automation, robotics 
and digital technologies 
Processing and 
increasing the value of 
light metals and their 
alloys 
Production and 
processing of polymers 
and progressive 
chemical substances 
(including smart 
fertilisations) 
Creative industry 
Increasing the value of 
domestic raw material 
base 
Support of smart 
technologies in the area 
of processing raw 
materials and waste in 
the regions of their 
occurrence 
N technologies allowing the transmission, 
processing and storage of data 
Smart production system 
Smart and industrial transport 
Smart technologies for the intelligent management 
of smart products consumption 
Progressive chemical technologies for the 
production of modern fertilizers 
Technologies and services for the active life and 
aging, i.e. health care, diagnostics and wellness 
Support of smart technologies in the area of 
processing raw materials and waste in the regions 
of their occurrence. 
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Areas of prospective 
specialisation 
considering scientific 
and research capacities  
Actions 
Research of materials 
and nanotechnologies 
Information and 
communication 
technologies 
Biomedicine and 
biotechnology 
Environment and 
agriculture including 
modern enviro-friendly 
chemical technologies  
Sustainable energy and 
energetics 
R&I in the field of new materials, their 
components, polymer composites and their 
application in the business practice 
R&I in the field of linking dynamic parts of 
machines and mechanisms in order to increase the 
life and performance of devices 
In the field of plastics it will be realized a research 
focused on for e.g. the use of recycling and 
biodegradable plastics in specific applications 
with reduced burden on the environment after 
their lifetime 
R&I in the field of welding, surfacing and 
untraditional coupling of components 
In the field of R&I technologies for the 
exploration and mining of raw materials 
R&I technologies for acquiring of the electricity 
and heat from renewable sources (water, sun, 
wind, biomass and geothermal energy) 
Research in nuclear energy with a focus on safety, 
storage of spent fuel; research of Generation IV 
reactors and problems of the nuclear fusion, 
Slovakia’s participation in global projects 
Development in the area of improving the 
efficiency of energy transfer systems 
Development of innovative solutions enabling the 
rational management in the agriculture and 
forestry and reducing environmental burdens such 
as advanced fertilizer systems and chemical 
substances used in these sectors 
Technologies with a focus on the special chemical 
and pharmaceutical substances 
Development of solutions in the context of the 
climate change adaption and strengthening of the 
internal security 
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The major economic priorities described in the Slovak Strategy are outlined in Table 6.1. 
For instance, the automotive industry and consumer electronics sectors are dominated by a 
high level of marginal consumption and low level of value adding. Therefore, a strategic 
objective to improve innovation in these industries is to create the conditions for stimulating 
research and innovation activities of enterprises in collaboration with the academic and 
research and development sectors, and for implementing the results of research, development 
and innovation into practice. Table 6.2 outlines specific actions include increasing the 
number of large companies that become Tier 2 suppliers this said to be due to low number of 
companies in higher tiers, caused by their inadequate innovation activity. The result is their 
low competitiveness. To improve this, the strategy outlines that conditions will be created for 
implementing the innovative technologies. In addition to this, the strategy argues that the 
stimulation of enterprises to develop their own technologies, products and services will be 
especially supported. Improve the linkages of local SMEs with large MNC suppliers. A 
further action proposed is to improve the linkages of local SMEs with large MNC suppliers. 
In this way, it is argued that by increasing the value added of supplied products and services 
of domestic companies as well as improving the position within the framework of supply 
chains, this will cause an increase in the embeddedness of key industries through building of 
corporate research and innovation centres. 
 
Table 6.2 Strategic objectives, aims and measures for the automotive industry 
(Slovak Republic, 2013) 
Strategic objective  Aim Measures 
Strategic objective 1: 
Deepening integration and 
embeddedness of key major 
industries increasing local 
value added through the 
cooperation of the local 
supply chains and turning 
local supply chains into 
embedded clusters  
The Slovak economy is 
driven by large "key" 
multinational companies. 
Therefore the important 
factor is the support of the 
innovation and research and 
Create conditions for growth of 
added value generated at home in 
total exports by 5 % until 2020 in 
comparison to the current status.  
Value added in total export will 
be supported through the 
restructuralisation of industrial 
sectors identified within the scope 
of the specialization of the 
economy, especially in 
automotive industry and 
consumer electronics, since these 
sectors are dominated by high 
Development of 
innovative capacities 
through cooperation 
between enterprises 
and research 
institutions in key 
sectors of the Slovak 
economy 
The measure aims to 
support the creation of 
consortia for solving 
multidisciplinary 
problems and 
embedding sectors 
through clusters and 
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development activities in 
domestic enterprises 
operating in the supply 
chains or enterprises that 
have the potential to become 
sub-suppliers for supply 
chains. 
level of marginal consumption 
and low level of value added.  
This will be done by creating the 
conditions for stimulating 
research and innovation activities 
of enterprises in collaboration 
with academic and research and 
development sector and the 
conditions for implementing the 
results of research, development 
and innovation into practice. 
Increasing the number of large 
companies that become Tier 2 
suppliers   
Low number of companies in 
higher Tiers is caused by their 
inadequate innovation activity. 
The result is their low 
competitiveness. Conditions will 
be created for implementing the 
innovative technologies. The 
stimulation of enterprises to 
develop their own technologies, 
products and services will be 
especially supported.  
Improve the linkages of local 
SMEs with large MNC suppliers. 
Increasing the value added of 
supplied products and services of 
domestic companies as well as 
improving the position within the 
framework of supply chains will 
cause an increase of 
embeddedness of key industries 
through building of corporate 
research and innovation centres. 
other forms of 
networking in order to 
develop innovation 
capacities.  
Technological upgrade 
for structural changes 
in industry   
The measure aims to 
support the increase of 
the technological level 
of companies in order 
to increase their 
competitiveness.  
Support for building 
research and 
innovation capacities in 
Slovak enterprises  
The measure is aimed 
at creation of industrial 
R&I centers and 
support of existing 
industrial R&I centers 
in Slovakia. The 
measure will allow the 
establishment of 
industrial centers with 
the participation 
(ownership and 
partnership) of 
academic and 
university sector.  
1.3 Establishing 
indirect motivational 
tools  
Indirect motivational 
tools for the support of 
R&I development will 
be looked upon, 
especially in relation to 
private sector. 
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As Table 6.2 shows, the centrepiece of the Slovak Strategy hinges on the cooperation of large 
firms and SMEs, and the cooperation of these entities with R&D. Slovakia belongs among 
the group of OECD countries in which the share of enterprises in funding research and 
innovation is relatively low. Thus, the strategy is heavily focused on an ongoing state strategy 
to continue to stimulate MNCs operating within Slovakia, to transfer R&D capacities and to 
support the creation of R&D centres in large companies and SMEs. This, the strategy 
maintains, will contribute to an increased “embeddedness of major export sectors to domestic 
economy” (Slovak Republic 2013).  
The EU Peer Review validated the ongoing dominant role afforded to MNCs in the Slovak 
economy. In relation to the objective to “deepen integration and the embedding of key major 
industries increasing local value adding through the cooperation of local supply chains and 
turning local supply chains into embedded clusters” it noted that the Slovak economy is 
driven by large ‘key’ multinational companies. The report therefore confirmed the 
importance of building on the concentration of domestic suppliers operating in supply chains 
or enterprises that have the potential to become sub-suppliers for supply chains. It argued that 
the key to achieving this objective will be in the building of research and innovation activities 
within the domestic supplier base and collaboration with the academic R&D sector, and by 
the creation of conditions for implementing the results of R&D and innovation into practice 
(EC 2014f).  
Sub-supplier companies operating predominately in the automotive and the complementary 
electro-technical industry and ICT sectors are encouraged by the Slovak Strategy to continue 
to work closely with MNCs to identify new strategic export and cross-sectoral opportunities 
within GVCs, to build domestic production capacity and to add value. The Strategy sees a 
particular and priority potential added value in metal and non-metal materials research. ICT 
products may often be sold as both a separate article and as an input to automobiles and 
consumer electronics; for example, navigation software, management systems, 
communication systems. A key challenge identified in the Strategy relates to collaboration 
among countries with similar positioning within GVCs; therefore complementarities in niche 
activities need to be explored and considered. To reach this objective, emphasis is placed on 
the importance of working with local companies to encourage more effective production and 
logistical processes. Alongside this aim, the Strategy also emphasises that companies should 
also be encouraged to focus on materials research, especially in the area of metals (steel, light 
metals and alloys), plastics and compression moulding, and joining of materials, with the aim 
of improving a product’s quality and durability – such product and process innovation will 
improve the country’s global competitiveness (Slovak Republic 2013, EC 2014).  
The strength weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis (Table 6.3) within 
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the Slovak Strategy also reveals that a key ‘opportunity’ under Smart Specialisation is 
presented by “broadening the connection of domestic sub-suppliers to global supplier 
MNC chains”. This strategic approach was supported by informants, who emphasised 
the importance to the Slovak economy of retaining the significant supplier base in the 
country. Autex1 emphasised the importance of more than 1000 suppliers to the region 
and indicated that this was also a factor for the Volkswagen head office in ensuring 
ongoing investment in Bratislava with Govpol arguing that the degree of effort to “move 
our entire supplier structure as the cars are not built anywhere else… in the world”. He 
believed the same would eventually apply to Kia, where “it does not make sense [to 
move], when they set up a factory in Europe they also set up an engine shop there, they 
have the suppliers’ network set up there… and a lot of qualified people”. According to 
Govpol, the Slovak Strategy in its objective of broadening the connection of domestic 
sub-suppliers to global supplier MNC chains was based on a sound economic strategy, 
particularly from a human resources perspective. 
Table 6.3 SWOT analysis (Slovak Republic, 2013) 
Strength Weakness Opportunities Threats 
Key industrial 
sectors represented 
by MNC 
Competitive 
technological level 
and production 
level in export 
sectors  
Increasing interest 
of businesses and 
industrial clusters in 
rebuilding of 
industrial R&I 
structures (entities) 
Increasing share of 
information 
services in export 
services 
Good results in 
selected scientific 
Insufficient share of 
own (Slovak) R&I 
activities in export 
sectors in Slovakia 
Absence of corporate 
industrial research in 
Slovakia  
Insufficient 
integration of 
domestic businesses 
into sub-supplier 
chains for MNCs  
Undercapitalisation 
of businesses 
associated with low 
innovation 
performance, 
especially SMEs  
Marginal application 
of revolving schemes 
Broadening the 
connection of domestic 
sub-suppliers to global 
supplier MNC chains  
Creation of linkages 
between MNCs’ R&I 
and domestic business 
R&I frameworks  
Concentration of R&I 
centres on the limited 
number of RIS3 
priority areas 
Deepening the 
trialogue between 
academic, business and 
public sectors  
Potential for using land 
and strategic domestic 
natural resources 
(water, timber, 
The shift of 
investors into EU 
territories with 
different 
comparative 
advantages in 
comparison to the 
Slovak Republic 
Insufficient 
investments in 
products and 
technologies based 
on knowledge also 
due to insufficient 
links between 
MNCs and local 
R&I infrastructure 
Reluctance of 
businesses to invest 
in R&I in Slovakia 
169 
 
and technological 
disciplines, with 
concentrated 
research teams and 
workplaces 
(materials and 
nanotechnologies, 
information and 
communication 
technologies, 
biomedicine and 
biotechnologies, 
industrial 
technologies, 
energetics and 
energy, 
environment and 
agriculture, social 
sciences and 
humanities) 
Dynamic growth of 
ICT usage in all 
business processes  
The quality of 
human resources in 
the competitive 
production sector 
 
including venture 
capital for R&I 
support 
Absence of a system 
for the application of 
venture capital  
Low added value of 
production of 
domestic businesses  
Absence of a 
complex R&I strategy 
and its 
implementation  
Excessive number of 
broadly defined 
priorities of state 
policy in the area of 
science  
Fragmentation of 
resources for building 
R&I infrastructure on 
a national level (state 
budget, structural 
funds)  
Extensively built R&I 
infrastructure  
Barriers for 
companies to access 
the infrastructure of 
public R&I 
workplaces  
Administrative 
barriers to 
implementation of 
projects financed 
from structural EU 
funds into practice  
Low level of 
cooperation between 
academic sector and 
industry  
magnesite) in an 
innovative economy  
Support for the 
conversion to green 
technologies, materials 
and products due to 
legislation and 
undesirable ecological 
changes 
New “EU Industrial 
Strategy (Industry 
2020)” heading 
towards the 
revitalisation of 
European industry  
Dismantling the 
barriers to cooperation 
(increasing coherence) 
through quadripartity 
(quadruple helix) as a 
basic governance 
principle of R&I 
The support of R&I 
projects within 
Visegrad Four 
countries and the EU 
Strategy for the 
Danube Region and 
interlinking within 
ERA also by utilising 
the Centrope region 
potential (Bratislava-
Brno-Vienna) 
Better use of 
community programs, 
especially Horizon 
2020 and the system of 
ESFRI programs and 
projects  
Use of European 
technological platforms 
by integrating national 
Limitation of 
desirable financial 
support for the R&I 
system in the 
Bratislava region  
Autonomous 
functioning of 
sectors of 
education, R&I and 
business practice, 
resulting in 
different 
understanding of 
R&I 
Changing 
population structure 
with increasing 
share of population 
with insufficient 
quality of education 
and low 
professional skills  
Persisting 
educational 
orientation towards 
the areas that do not 
correspond with 
economic practice 
and knowledge 
society needs  
Deteriorating 
composition and 
quality of graduates 
in the educational 
process 
Lack of graduates 
especially in 
technical and 
natural sciences  
Persisting brain-
drain abroad  
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Low share of national 
resources allocated to 
financing R&I  
Low involvement of 
Slovak bodies in the 
Seventh Framework 
Program (FP7)  
Insufficient 
competitiveness of 
Slovak R&I 
organisations within 
EU  
Dysfunctional 
national innovation 
system  
Barriers to utilising 
the protection of 
intellectual property 
rights  
Ineffective use of 
resources for the 
transfer of knowledge 
and technologies into 
practice  
Absence of indirect 
tools and 
motivational 
environment for the 
R&I support  
Low levels of law 
enforcement 
Absence of 
legislation 
stimulating the 
acquisition of 
innovative products  
Educational system 
not linked to practical 
needs, especially in 
the area of technical 
and natural sciences  
technological platforms 
into their activities  
Broader use of Slovak 
Republic’s knowledge 
in carbon-free 
energetics including 
the level of security 
that is accepted by 
society  
Insufficiently used 
agriculture and water 
resources management 
potential  
Development of social 
innovations and the 
creative industry  
Entry of national 
innovative firms into 
global markets  
Support for the 
creation and 
development of 
innovative spin-off and 
start-up businesses  
Utilising the potential 
of networking 
(enterprises, R&I 
structures)  
Motivating businesses 
to support the 
innovations and 
technological transfers 
by financial tools 
(innovation vouchers, 
venture capital funds) 
Utilising the potential 
of services and 
products in the area of 
ICT in the context of 
Digital agenda 2020 
Imbalance of 
employees’ age 
structure 
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Absence of a system 
and support of 
business education 
and development of 
creativity in the 
educational process  
Low number of 
efficient R&I 
employees focused on 
practical utilisation of 
the results  
Renewal of the 
tradition of vocational 
and technical education 
Creation of a suitable 
environment for the 
return of Slovak 
citizens employed in 
foreign R&I 
organisations  
Support for inflow of 
foreign R&I workers 
and foreign students to 
Slovakia  
Involvement of young 
R&I workers in solving 
practical business 
problems  
 
The health of the automotive industry was emphasised by Govpol as evidenced by British 
company Jaguar building new facilities in Bratislava in 2015. However, he also raised 
concern about the implications of industry expansion on increasing dependence of the 
region on this industry and, as the region is located in Eastern Europe, further 
consolidating its presence in the region. Govpol argued that this could lead to problems 
in the future in relation to the division of labour and the corporate supply chain because 
Bratislava is subject to material shortages and not exposed to the innovation advances 
that occur in the West: 
The European Federation of Steel has argued that some countries have become very 
dependent on industry but that some regions house the premium product and some 
are the producers. Here in the EU, we are very dependent on car production and 
traditional industrial production… this is a big problem between North and South 
and East and West. We have a problem with materials shortages and funding 
innovation in the East. 
 
Govpol also noted that while the Volkswagen production model was about assembly, it was 
not focused on development work in relation to the cars and components being made in the 
region and this production was typical of that found in most CEE countries, where “very few 
countries [are] involved with R&D in the automotive industry” as they are mostly product-
oriented. He noted the component supplier Johnson Control was the only automotive 
company involved with R&D situated in Bratislava. Autex2 also stressed the importance of 
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moving from what may be termed a problem of a “labour-seeking model” of routine 
assembly work in the region, to a “complementary specialisation” model where 
technological-structural advances are possible. Thus, in order for there to be innovation 
across sectors, for instance between Samsung and Volkswagen, and to get cooperation 
from Volkswagen for cross-sectoral work, Bratislava needed to show its German partners 
that it could produce a future model of car: 
We have 12,000 people working here for Volkswagen in Bratislava… but we need 
to show that we are capable of building a luxury model of car like Porsche, not just 
that we can produce the cheap cars for the market because of our low costs compared 
to Germany… this is the challenge for us. 
 
As has been discussed in this chapter, the perspectives of informants raises questions as to 
whether the Slovak Strategy objective to increase the number of large companies that become 
‘Tier 2’ suppliers (recognising that Slovakia had low numbers of companies in high tiers, and 
that this is caused by their inadequate innovation activity) really represents a comprehensive 
enough program for innovation to emerge in new domains and niche markets around activity in 
the automotive industry, according to the vision of the Smart Specialisation policy architects. 
The Slovak Strategy outlines how “conditions will be created for implementing innovative 
technologies”; and further, the “stimulation of enterprises to develop their own technologies, 
products and services will be especially supported”. Given these informant perspectives, it is 
apparent that there is a strong sense from local stakeholders within Bratislava that more could 
be done by both the state and the MNC to more concretely embed subsidiary activity within 
the RIS. This would enable industrial upgrading in a more substantial manner, beyond sub-
supplier development, thus reducing the capacity, as Morris has argued, for the potential of 
car producers to downgrade them in the producer chain, rather than undergo a process of 
functional upgrading as represented by occupying design-intensive activities in the value 
chain (Morris, 2001). This leads to an analysis that give the Slovak Strategy has a heavy 
focus upon strengthening the existing car industry through supply chain development, 
that this may represent a traditional cluster approach to developing a RIS, rather than 
regions aiming to identify a radical foundation of a new domain, as envisaged by the EC 
in the Guide, where it was explained that this would entail concentrating R&D on a 
certain field in previously low-growth activities to become attractive with the co-
emergence of R&D innovation areas and the emergence of a niche market (EC 2012).  
 
Autex2 also expressed concern about the ongoing dominant role afforded MNCs in the 
region under the Slovak Strategy and the potential for regional economic advancement 
depending on ongoing large company investment, employment and technological 
advancement. MNC activity has led to the observation that there has been an 
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overshadowing of the capacity for small Slovak-owned companies to emerge and 
compete in that economic environment. Autex2: 
Therefore we started with 900 employees in 1991 when we set up and now we have 
10,000 employees and the investments are… altogether are about €3 billion... until 
the end of last year… so all of this investment came from Volkswagen 
headquarters… and basically we are producing models that you do not see anywhere 
else in the world… at that time, Volkswagen had 106 factories in the whole world… 
and we were the first that produced the only electric car that didn’t need diesel or 
petrol in 2014… if you did this with a small company, there would be not enough 
money and… not enough connections to qualified people or connections to do 
that… we have the best qualified experts from Germany who are helping in our 
factories and our training centres and they are highly qualified and specialised… 
how can small companies compete in this environment, when the big companies 
have so much money and can bring the newest technology and bring the technology 
faster and easier than any local source… 
A further issue associated with the ongoing role afforded to automotive MNCs in Slovakia is 
that this development would potentially further consolidate in the long term the structural 
vulnerability of an export-orientated economy with an over-reliance on external foreign 
investment due to industrial development in Bratislava. Most of the passenger cars 
produced in the three Slovak car factories are exported, with the Wold Bank observing 
that “car exports are growing faster than overall exports since 1998, with the share of car 
exports rising from 20 per cent in 1998 to more than one-third in 2006, with Volkswagen 
being the lead exporter”. Over that same time period, the largest market for Slovak 
exports of motor vehicles and parts was Germany, with 47 per cent followed by the US 
at 10. The large US share is said to be explained by high sales volume of SUVs – the 
Volkswagen Toureg and Audi Q7, both manufactured exclusively in Bratislava – on the 
American market. It is estimated that almost half of the production volume of the Audi 
Q7 targets this market (Jakubiak et al. 2008). A high diffusion of knowledge in the 
country occurred because of the role of FDI driven by foreign companies based in the 
country (Slovak Republic 2010, 2013). For instance, in 2011, the share of FDI in the 
total GDP of the Slovak economy reached 57.4 per cent (Slovak Republic 2013).  
The previous economic strategy for the country entitled the National Reform Program of the 
Slovak Republic in 2010 (hereafter the ‘National Reform Strategy’) warned that, while 
Slovakia’s economic performance was strong it was built on a model of competitiveness that 
was not sustainable in the long-term and that the strong economic outcome was primarily 
fuelled by strong performance outcomes in labour productivity. According to the Slovak 
Strategy, in 2005 labour productivity in Slovakia was only 47 per cent of the EU27 average, 
whereas it was 73 per cent in 2011. Breaking this down further, the strong performance in 
labour productivity growth can be explained by a strong rate of total factor productivity (TFP) 
growth based on diffusion of knowledge from abroad. This economic model has had 
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implications in the long term for the national economy in relation to value adding to exports. 
The prosperous countries of Western Europe are technologically more developed and have a 
higher share of advanced technologies in economic activities. According to the National 
Reform Strategy, “sectors with higher technological complexity of production are able to 
achieve good results on foreign markets due to high quality (and not only due to low prices) 
and create higher added value and lead to technological development of a given country”. 
Moreover, the Slovak economy is highly specialised in the area of industry, especially in the 
area of industrial production associated with medium-high technology, and that 65 per cent 
of this production is created by the production of motor vehicles and their spare parts. Such 
a high share in production demanding medium-high technologies is not seen in any other EU 
state (Slovak Republic 2013). 
 
The status of Slovakia as a medium-high technology country has also impacted on its 
production capacity within industries demanding high technologies. It explains low export 
performances in sectors such as pharmaceutical products and preparations, and knowledge-
intensive services. This has implications for the capacity of Slovakia to pursue an economic 
specialisation strategy in these growth industries, despite the focus upon them as identified 
growth areas under the Slovak Strategy, as depicted in Figure 6.4. 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Triangle of areas of RIS3 Smart Specialisation 
(European Commission 2014) 
 
Slovakia’s share of knowledge-intensive service exports is low, with 23.13 per cent of this 
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sector being exported, compared to an average rate of 48.13 per cent in most EU Member 
States. This has meant that service exports in Slovakia are mainly of low added value as they 
are dominated by the transport and tourism industries. The Slovak Strategy noted, however, 
that Slovakia holds a relatively good position in the area of computer and information 
services, particularly with its export performance to the US. In line with this observation, the 
Slovak Strategy has recommended that to overcome this problem of knowledge diffusion 
“Slovakia should create conditions for further technological convergence through the 
development of its own technological solutions and not only through the purchase of foreign 
technologies, especially from developed countries” (Slovak Republic 2013). 
Thus, overall it can be seen that the implications of the Volkswagen production model found 
in the Slovak economy are significant in relation to innovation policy objectives. The Slovak 
Strategy perceives MNCs as the predominant actors in transfer of research and innovation 
capacity in Slovakia. The strategy outlines a “realistic self-assessment” that its economy is 
heavily open market and, due to its small size, it has a limited internal market. Therefore “the 
Slovak economy will always be open” and this means that, in order to sustain competitiveness 
based on export ability, the involvement of all economic actors needs to be concentrated 
towards this objective. It also notes the imperative of the MNCs in connecting and linking 
export industries to domestic production and the impact that capacity building will have on 
strengthening the position of growth export sectors in the Slovak economy. The predicted 
outcome is positive effects on employment and economic growth, and a reduced risk of 
economic collapse in the case of departure of important foreign investors from Slovakia. 
However, as discussed earlier, a key question is to what extent the MNCs can play this more 
ambitious role in the Slovak economy, given the barriers presented by dependence on 
imported technology, and the international GVC challenges associated with MNC location 
of production decisions (in the case of VW) being made from foreign countries, for instance 
Germany.  
Furthermore, according to the EU Peer Review there are governance challenges for the 
implementation of these objectives, and it will be important for Slovakia to overcome cultural 
and legal differences across countries and introduce common standards and educational 
programs. The administrative procedures associated with EU initiatives for trans-regional 
collaboration are complicated and need the removal of administrative barriers. Slovak 
representatives in the EU Peer Review highlighted additional problems to do with GVC 
analysis within the region and argued that data is difficult to access and complex analysis 
requires time, money and human resources (EC 2014f). The next section will discuss the 
implications of these identified implementation challenges of the Slovak Strategy posed by 
176 
the role of the MNCs in the context of the challenges posed by the characteristics of the RIS 
found in Bratislava. 
Regional Innovation System 
Chapter 2 discussed the extent to which the state can shape the production decisions and 
organisation of MNC GVC activity in a regional context is dependent on the degree of 
embeddedness of that MNC within the context of a RIS (Heidenreich 2017). It was argued 
that a major advantage of the regional and national embeddedness of MNCs is that they may 
facilitate learning processes within other companies in their proximity (competitors, suppliers 
and service providers) and have a strong role in the transfer of learning between research and 
higher education institutes, technology transfer agencies, vocational training organisations, 
and business associations that hold important competence to support regional innovation 
(Heidenreich, 2017).  
However, a challenge for embedding an MNC within a RIS located in a CEE are the particular 
constraints that can impede an effective innovation system from functioning at the level of 
place. Such regions can exhibit unfavourable research and innovation systems, which are 
often characterised by organisational thinness, fragmented systems that inhibit networking 
and knowledge exchange and a weak capacity to drive transformative chained (Coenena et 
al 2015; Healy 20156). In addition to this, a high level of specialisation in CEE countries has 
led to overspecialisation and investment in obsolete technologies, thus undermining the 
competitiveness of CEE countries in the context of globalisation (Berend cited in Dyba et al 
2018). 
For instance, Slovakia as an entire country greatly lags behind the EU average in innovation 
performance. It belongs to a group of ‘moderate innovators’, the second-lowest innovation 
performance rank among 27 EU Member States, and occupying the twentieth position in 
2011. Slovak R&D investments are one of the weakest links in the Slovak innovation system, 
reflecting a 20-year history of neglect in this policy area. Slovakia has historically invested 
little in R&D. Total expenditure was on average 0.5 per cent of GDP growing to 0.6 per cent 
in recent years, and in 2011, just 0.68 per cent. In comparative terms, the total expenditures 
for R&D in other European economies indicates that Slovakia is still one of the countries 
with the lowest public expenditure into R&D. R&D funds have historically been given to 
basic, rather than applied, research (Slovak Strategy 2013). 
Slovakia directs a high proportion – 77 per cent – of public spending on R&D to basic 
research. This figure represents the highest proportion in the EU. The Slovak Strategy 
identifies insufficient support for applied research and the lack of institutions for the transfer 
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of scientific knowledge into commercial practice as representing a major barrier to 
innovation. An exception is the development of departmental research institutes and centres 
embedded in the universities, where some applied R&D does occur. This history of 
underinvestment has led to a low graduation rate of PhD students in technical and scientific 
fields, few excellent research teams, insufficient innovation activity of SMEs, insufficient 
cooperation among innovation stakeholders (especially companies and R&D departments), 
low representation of knowledge-intensive activities in the economy, and poor patent activity. 
Slovakia also rates poorly in international comparative terms (in the second half of 144 
assessed countries) on innovation indicators, such as the quality of scientific and research 
institutions, availability of scientists and expenditure on R&D (Slovak Republic 2013). 
Slovakia’s low investment in R&D has also been historically concentrated in the public 
sector and two-thirds of overall expenditure on R&D still occurs mainly in universities 
or other public-sector research organisations. A relatively low proportion of Slovak 
universities were involved in public research and development (48%) compared to other 
EU countries. As the Slovak Strategy indicates, this trend is said to be a typical 
characteristic of CEE economies where national scientific institutions and, to a limited 
extent departmental research institutes, played an important role in the communist era. 
The Slovak universities rank low in quality in international terms because legal 
regulation has enabling a relatively large number of universities both public and private 
to be established, leading to fragmentation of funding across a large sector and 
undermining high-quality state institutions’ prosperity (Slovak Republic, 2013). 
The Bratislava region stands in contrast to the national performance on scientific research 
indicators. This is due to the agglomeration of technical and research capacities in the region; 
50 per cent of the country’s capacity. However, according to the Slovak Strategy, the good-
quality publications from Bratislava’s universities do not outweigh the poor overall 
performance in basic research and world-class R&D compared to, for instance, outputs 
associated with Denmark and Germany. Public R&D has been heavily concentrated on the 
Slovak Academy of Sciences based in Bratislava. The main mission of the university is to 
implement basic and applied research in engineering, natural sciences, humanities and social 
sciences with the support of specialised service organisations (Slovak Republic 2013). 
According to the Slovak Strategy, private expenditure on R&D in Slovakia, represents about 
0.25 per cent of GDP, which is very low in European terms. In Finland in 2011 expenditure on 
private R&D was 2.67 per cent of GDP, in Sweden 2.34 per cent, the Czech Republic 1.11 
per cent, and Hungary 0.75 per cent. Slovakia has been lagging behind in innovation in 
private enterprise, including low levels of technology transfer; patent activities; cooperation 
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between research institutions and industry; venture capital; and the effective use of human 
resources (Republic of Slovakia 2013). The low level of patent registrations in Slovakia is 
due to enterprises investing insufficiently in their own R&D and the purchase instead of 
‘ready-to-use’ technologies and knowledge. The low level of private activity in R&D. 
Slovak-based MNCs carry out most of their R&D in Germany, France, the UK and Korea; 
hence R&D is conducted in isolation from activities in Slovakia. Low levels of private R&D 
has led to overall poor outcomes in knowledge-intensive services, except in key economic 
sectors such as motor vehicle, consumer electronics, and machinery and metal trades 
industries. The Slovak Strategy concludes that the strengthened position of these sectors 
needs to be better supported by more intensive investment into R&D (Slovak Republic 2013). 
To address this low investment in R&D, the Slovak Strategy recommends increasing 
state investment to “at least” 1.2 per cent of GDP by 2020, with financing targeted to 
R&D projects in priority areas. It is noted that this development is likely to motivate the 
private sector to increase R&D investment. This increased investment in public R&D 
will then stimulate investment in private sector R&D spending. Greater publicising of 
venture capital investment and public procurement policy tools, and further tax 
incentives, have been proposed by the EU Peer Review as additional policy mechanisms 
to achieve this outcome (EC 2014f).  
To address system-wide problems with the Slovak education system, the higher 
education system has been subject to a government review to identify and rectify 
“systemic distortions” impeding the quality of higher education and undermining the 
“scientific excellence” that the university system in Slovakia aims to achieve. The Slovak 
Strategy notes that, although the review is still under way, the national government has 
recognised the need to reform the current funding system so that high-quality universities 
are the main beneficiaries. Thus, the Strategy outlines an intention to direct funding 
increasingly to elite universities seeking to engage in applied research, with the aim of 
commercialising the results of their R&D (Slovak Republic 2013). Govpol thus 
confirmed the empirical research findings of Coenen et al (2015) and Healy (2015) that 
note the challenge of implementation of Smart Specialisation faced by CEE regions with 
weak innovation systems. A key problem facing Bratislava is a culture of public-private 
industry collaboration that is still seen as underdeveloped, given the political background 
under communism. Govpol noted that, even though in 1993 the Slovak Republic was 
formed based on a democratic political institutional platform, there was still very much 
“a mentality… that is very communist”, which undermines business innovation.  
Govpol observed that even though Slovakia had adopted the new EU industrial emphasis 
on developing an innovation system focused on institutional collaboration, this was still 
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not making a large impact. He believed that policy makers felt they were still in a 
capacity-building phase and therefore only took small steps to generate closer 
cooperation between the business and academic world. According to Govpol, the private 
sector is still driving commercial innovation outcomes in the Slovak context, with the 
government still trying to drive the start of a new economic culture embracing “business 
innovation” in public administration: 
There are some developments… many universities have partners with business for 
example… on their own, for instance under the last policy period, a centre was 
established by a university… where they closely cooperate with Siemens which is a 
German company... same with the company and Otis and the ICT academics, so 
faculties are often wanting to cooperate and collaborate according to their fields of 
studies. 
 
The same informant also identified an additional potential barrier to the Slovak Strategy 
objective of increased links between research institutions and industry – the dominance 
of technical universities in the region: 
For example, we have eight universities… we have new technical development 
centres but Slovakia is very small… we have university sectors… but we have a 
problem in that they are very technical and focused on the technical nature of 
science… we have seven universities that are working in the science area… we have 
Slovak Academy for Science and many others… and we have many scientists, about 
18,000 of them. 
 
Despite these constraints in the organisation of R&D infrastructure in Slovakia, Bratislava is 
still seen as critical to the building of an R&D innovation ecosystem across other less-
developed regions of Slovakia. Since 2007, EU funds in Bratislava have been heavily 
directed towards R&D programming priorities, with heavy emphasis on the creation of 
centres of excellence within the research community. Arising out of this, eight new research 
centres have been established in Bratislava, including centres of excellence (support of top 
fundamental research), R&D centres (industry–academia collaborations) and competence 
centres (relatively large clusters of academic institutions and industry). These provide 
support for applied research projects and technology transfer. In addition, EU Structural 
Funds have been directed towards university infrastructure, equipment and the building of 
university science parks and research centres. The centres and projects have been focused on 
materials research, nanotechnology, environmental protection, biotechnology and 
biomedicine (Slovak Republic 2013). 
 
Autex1 asserted that Smart Specialisation had encouraged a new policy of “tying grants” 
to researchers who cooperate with industry, to overcome the focus on heavy involvement 
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in basic research. Over 30,000 people in the region are engaged in basic research, but 
working “in isolation from industry”, leading to a situation where there is research 
without innovation, which is described as a big problem. Autex1: 
We made a big mistake in Europe by sending our high technologies to China and 
we lost a lot by doing this… we have a big problem now and it’s not easy, but it is 
important for the future, the companies need from us… companies are working in 
development and innovation processes and we need to create the innovation 
conditions and the potential… and we would like to cooperate with our partner in 
one segment. In this context, it is understood that with the Smart Specialisation 
policy we have to change this and we have to define what is important in our future, 
so now under the new policy direction we have developed our six priority areas… 
and what we would now like is to still give more money to our scientists and 
research and development centres… but what we will be saying is that we want to 
give money, but that that you need to cooperate with industry. 
 
Autex1 also indicated the need in the shorter term to build more R&D capacity in the 
region to deal with operational requirements of VW. He gave the example of a significant 
multi-million-Euro investment in a new body shop attached to the production facilities 
in the region. The facility is entirely automated by approximately 1000 robots and has 
introduced new technologies into the production process, which had not previously been 
used in the welding or car-producing industries. He conveyed that there was a sense that 
Slovakia had fallen behind in its capacity to resolve technical issues relating to more 
sophisticated production: 
I would have to say that I think that this is the part that is not working well in 
Slovakia… in the sense that the technological centre of the Volkswagen Group is 
still located in Western Europe, as in Germany and Austria… there is a technical 
university that is located in Vienna and we are cooperating with them as well…. and 
we find that, when we have a problem or issues on the line, we have to ring Austria 
and ask the guys to come up and take a look and find a solution… they come up and 
they do some tests… see it in production, they take into the laboratory at the 
university and they find a solution after some time… and they come up with 
something after some time… they are expensive, but they come up with something 
after some time… our goal is to have this capacity in Slovakia. 
 
However, Autex1 did not express the same concern for the long-term implications of 
much of the research and design work of the GVC organisation being located in key 
regional centres globally, and Slovakia mainly doing “routine production” work on the 
global assembly production line; Autex1: 
I don’t think this is a problem because [the way the GVC is organised for 
Volkswagen] you have R&D centres for each brand… for SEAT in Spain, Germany 
every brand, Audi has one, Volkswagen has one, Skoda has one in the Czech 
republic… in general, you would need a history of this… it can come from some 
components in Slovakia for instance… but to build the R& D for the whole product, 
the whole car… you need tens of thousands of experts from all of the fields, the 
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suppliers…it makes no sense to do it here when we have it already set up in 
Germany… or in Skoda… there are Slovaks… [who] are training in design… here 
is a famous design school in Slovakia… where quite a lot of design people are 
working, BMW or Volkswagen… both interior design or exterior design… but there 
is no sense that they stay here… they tend to go and work elsewhere… like Germany 
and so forth. 
 
Autex1dentified a further key challenge for the region in moving the system of 
innovation away from expecting universities to come up with “small process 
improvements” within the automotive industry, such as with a recent university-firm 
collaborative project where a special transport system was developed to bring 
components to the lines without any need for human support. He argued that the region 
needed to see innovation advances as more about assisting with bigger R&D projects 
that encouraged “cross sectoral” innovation through more comprehensive collaboration 
between universities and firms.  
Autacad argued that centres for excellence could assist with more comprehensive 
innovation advances. EU Structural Funds contributed to a public-private funded R&D 
facility, bringing together academia and industry to develop innovative advances in the 
areas of aluminium, steel and plastics. These important institutions enable flow-on 
effects, up-skilling automotive industry employees to set up their own companies and 
filling the gap left by a lack of investment in R&D by Volkswagen in Slovakia: 
So, even though Volkswagen has 6000 employees, but only 70–100 of those are in 
R&D… which is not giving them a chance to set up their own companies through 
supplier networks… so compare this to Stuttgart that has 12,000 workers alone in 
R&D. So, Volkswagen has a global R&D network where problems are solved within 
24 hours which is good but still a problem for us… so what we have done with the 
EU and RIS3 strategy is to develop a strategy to co-finance an R&D facility. 
Johnsons are an external engineering centre and we have argued that we should 
build an R&D facility together… so with the Slovak Government we can build 
together a centre for excellence in aluminium, steel and plastics. And we can bring 
in private companies through tied grants of EU R&D grants, we can get the R&D 
investments in aluminium and IT to create some interesting technology… for 
instance, in making toasters with hydrogen we are able to add value here and have 
good cooperation with the suppliers. 
Yet, Autacad cautioned that although the new centre for excellence was seen as a key 
plank of Smart Specialisation in action, to cooperate on shared projects, policy 
stakeholders were concerned that government funds could actually be indirectly 
benefitting Volkswagen’s headquarters in Germany rather than assisting with advances 
in innovation in Bratislava, given the extent of private funding by Volkswagen in the 
new cluster. Autacad:  
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Volkswagen agreed to be involved in the Centre of Excellence project. We 
approached them for the prototype and they said that they would pay for it for 1 year 
and then they will bring the product into their production… they will collaborate 
with the Central European Technology Institute. In the production plants, you have 
a very bureaucratic process with the logistics all in the one place and materials for 
the car being produced around one vehicle…. but with the Centre of Excellence, 
you have academia, private capital and with the support of the State... you have 
specific product... plastics... and specific technology... so what we are trying to do 
here in Slovakia is emulate the model of clusters that have been so well developed 
for the automotive industry, for instance in Sweden and Canada. So, the strategy 
that is needed for building the cluster is getting one big OAM, some suppliers, some 
plastics industry expertise. Then you have the problem of the suppliers not having 
R&D money, so that is where the EU money can be very helpful, but the EU cannot 
give money to private capital and this is a problem… and we don’t want our indirect 
state funds to help Germany rather than Slovakia. 
 
Autex1 maintained that collaboration between competing firms in the automotive sector 
may be undermined by heavy competition between car companies and a lack of research 
departments within the firms: 
With car producers in Europe… for example, in Russia, Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic, there is huge competition… everyone wants to produce engines… and 
everyone wants to be better and better… there is competition between Volkswagen 
and Kia and this creates a strong innovation wave and this innovation wave has a 
big influence on car attractiveness to the customer, and European cars from this 
region are sought all over the world… this competition is about creating new brands.  
 
Collaboration was therefore limited between Kia and Volkswagen. As Autex1 explained, 
when Kia arrived in Bratislava, they communicated directly with the Slovak Automotive 
Association in establishing operations: 
For us it’s no problem [that we don’t collaborate with Kia] as they are about 250 
kilometres away so it basically has no impact on us… and we have a small 
factory in Martin, a small city about 50 kilometres away… for us we are just a 
production site, we don’t sell cars, 99 per cent of our cars are exported all around 
the world… to 28 countries and for us, they are building other classes of car. 
 
In addition to this, Autex1 also said he believed that the capacity for collaboration 
between Volkswagen and KIA in the regional context would be undermined by Kia’s 
use of Korean rather than Slovakian suppliers. The Korean suppliers, in turn, supply a 
factory site owned by Hyundai in the Czech Republic producing other models of cars. 
 
Autex1 also believed that Kia, which in Slovakia employs about 4000 people, was also 
undercutting Volkswagen in human resources supply, through lower labour costs: 
They also have a Peugeot factory in Trnava that is about 40 kilometres from here… 
that was more competition for us, more in terms of labour market, they were sucking 
183 
 
our people… especially at the beginning, but they have much lower salaries then we 
do, and now especially that the Bsark group is not doing well… we are still the most 
attractive employer in the country… but at the beginning when we came in 2005… 
it was different. 
According to Autex2, however, the region hoped to be able to design cars, but this would 
require more public R&D investment in the future: 
… for example, with Skoda… the designer is from our university and it is a very 
interesting design and we would like to support it. Thus, in relation to the 
support for links between the university and the production sector and there was 
hope that this cooperation results in the future in European policy as it is 
understood in the region that without research and development… without good 
people… we have no future and that every year we have to pay the EC a lot of 
money to support research and development… and within the CEE we have big 
countries that have a lot of potential… the people are very clever… we just need 
to create the base – we need to construct the base – for research and innovation. 
 
The Slovak Strategy notes the importance of a superior workforce and human capital 
strategy to its economic plan. An important strategic objective is the need to “change the 
structure and the orientation of schools” as a basic precondition for long-term 
competitive positioning in the global economy. In order to do this, the Strategy states 
that there is a need for a better plan to match market demand with supply. It notes a 
decline in primary school student numbers over a 13-year period and, since 2002, a 
decline in enrolments in secondary vocational schools with an industrial specialisation. 
At a tertiary level, students are found to be increasingly more focused on social sciences 
and humanities than engineering qualifications, despite insufficient job opportunities in 
the labour market for these qualifications. Slovak employers are seeking IT and building 
industry graduates and, to a lesser extent, mechanical engineers and scientists. Despite 
this preference, the system is mostly producing social scientists and engineers (Slovak 
Strategy 2013). 
 
As Table 6.4 demonstrates, the Slovak Strategy proposes generating an increased interest 
in technical training and improving the attractiveness of vocational schools to support 
the teaching of mathematics, natural sciences and engineering subjects. It proposes a new 
‘dual education’ system designed to be consistent with the needs of the labour market. 
Besides an increased focus on vocational education, new information campaigns and 
programs are intended to increase motivation amongst young people towards careers in 
entrepreneurship. In addition, there will be on-the-job training, and collaboration 
between schools, universities and enterprises. There is also a plan to encourage science 
and research workers to return to Slovakia (Slovak Republic 2013, EC 2014). 
 
184 
 
Table 6.4 Strategic objectives and measures for human capital 
Strategic objective 4 
Improving the quality of 
human resources for an 
innovative Slovakia  
In a long-term perspective it 
is impossible to sustain 
economic growth or 
employment without superior 
workforce. Change in the 
structure and orientation of 
schools is a basic 
precondition for long-term 
competitiveness. A demand 
for graduates is necessary to 
link with the market demand 
in relation to demographic 
development. 
 
 
 
 
a) Increase the employability 
of secondary school and 
university graduates The 
reform of educational system 
starting from the primary 
schools in order to harmonize 
education with the market 
demand and ensure the 
flexibility of employees. The 
improvement in PISA.  
b) Improve linkages between 
educational system and 
practice The educational 
system does not currently 
reflect the needs of practice to 
a sufficient extent. It is 
therefore necessary for 
schools in collaboration with 
businesses to take part in 
preparations of education 
programmes and enabling 
mutual linkages and usage of 
capacities on secondary or 
university level. It is 
necessary to motivate 
enterprises to take part in the 
education of their future 
workers.  
c) Lifelong learning The 
changing society and labour 
market dynamics necessitates 
educated people in all age 
categories. It is therefore 
necessary to improve the 
population access to all forms 
of education (formal, 
informal, non-formal) during 
the whole life. This will 
enable them to include, 
broaden, and deepen the 
acquired education, to 
requalify themselves or fulfil 
their interests while 
preserving their information 
and knowledge. The aim is to 
4.1. Improving the 
quality of secondary 
education The measure 
will ensure the 
corrections and changes 
in state educational 
policy in secondary 
education, especially 
vocational schools in 
order to increase the 
quality and harmonize 
the interests of 
individuals with the 
needs of society.  
4.2. Improving the 
quality of higher 
education The measure 
will ensure the 
realization of EUA 
Audit, legislative 
changes leading to the 
amendment of 
institutional financing 
of public universities 
(especially in the area 
of technical and natural 
sciences) and 
amendments leading to 
changes in 
categorization of 
universities, reflecting 
the mission of concrete 
universities in order to 
increase the 
employability of 
graduates.  
4.3. Improving business 
involvement in 
education The measure 
will support the training 
centres in businesses, 
common technical 
departments of schools 
and businesses, 
motivational tools for 
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elaborate a system of 
acknowledging the results of 
non-formal education and 
informal learning. This 
includes a legislative 
solution. 
d) Increasing the intersectoral 
mobility of workers The 
important factor for 
improvement in 
communication and an 
increase in cooperation 
between public and private 
sector in the area of science, 
research and innovation is a 
mutual reciprocal possibility 
of worker exchanges in order 
to unify the “mentality”.  
e) Supporting the creation of 
international R&I teams The 
return of our science and 
research workers back to 
Slovakia is one of the 
possible keys how to create a 
generation of highly skilled 
workers in the future. The 
possibility to cooperate with 
world-renowned scientists 
and building of strong teams 
of global importance should 
bring new possibilities for 
increased competitiveness of 
the Slovak Republic and the 
whole EU as well. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
businesses in order to 
involve them in 
vocational training. 
There will be a support 
for the improvement of 
facilities in specialized 
(vocational) secondary 
schools and universities 
in selected programmes 
and there will also be 
the involvement of 
experts from practice in 
the educational system 
in order to improve the 
linkages between 
educational system and 
practice. 4.4. Improving 
the quality of life-long 
education The measure 
focused on the adults in 
productive age will 
ensure strengthening of 
the vocational 
competencies 
verification system and 
the establishment of 
quality of consultant 
services verification 
system.  
4.5. Increasing 
emphasis on education 
in fields relevant to the 
RIS3 priority areas The 
measure will put 
forward legislative 
changes for improving 
the financing of priority 
fields; there will be 
motivational tools to 
study priority fields 
(conferences, 
exhibitions, workshops, 
etc.) and lastly there 
will be improved 
conditions for 
involvement of young 
scientists in grant 
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programmes of science 
and research. 4.6. 
Supporting the mobility 
of highly skilled 
workers The measure 
will support the 
compatibility of 
qualifications and 
academic degrees 
between research and 
academic sectors and it 
will also create the 
conditions for return, 
immigration or drawing 
of highly qualified 
personnel to the SR. 
 
 
 
 
According to Autex2, the EU vision for greater links between the university and 
industrial sectors is being supported by heavy EU investments in the university sector in 
Bratislava. For instance, “in the last 4 years, it was decided that eight centres will be 
built… more than €320 million from the EU… and this is important, and this money 
supports the cooperation activities, for instance with Volkswagen and other producers in 
the region.” This investment was to increase the potential in the region for process 
improvements in technology and to generate strong results for product development. 
Govpol indicated the importance of EU Structural Funds to increasing investment in 
research and development in the region of Bratislava: 
Many universities would not have been able to finance projects without the 
Structural Funds… and from the Slovak Government’s state budget, not so much is 
going into research and development… we are very grateful for the European 
Union’s support as we could not finance all the activities we want to without this. 
 
In relation to publicly funded research, Govpol observed that organisations involved in 
science and technology were leading the way in Bratislava, and that extensive science 
research infrastructure was a key strength in the region. The “active science community” 
in Bratislava was coupled with an extensive scientific research institutional infrastructure 
that included “about five science parks heavily focused on bio-medical research and 
micro-electronic engineering and technology”. The five main priorities identified for 
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research and greater cooperation between the sectors are medicine and bio-medicine, 
agriculture, micro-electric technology, environmental and information technology. Thus, 
the Slovak Academy of Sciences is focused on engineering and information and 
communication technology. Govpol also observed that the 2007–13 policy phase had 
focused on building ‘hard’ research infrastructure: buildings and science parks. He also 
observed that most of the R&D connected with the automobile industry tended to be 
generated in other countries, such as Germany, and this represented a problem, from the 
subsidiary perspective, to the long-term regional economic development goals of 
Bratislava: 
… we need to develop research and innovation in our countries [in Eastern Europe] 
because long term… not only in Slovakia, there are 200,000 working people 
working in the automotive sector and… about 12 or14 per cent work in the 
automotive industry [nationally] so the automotive industry is very important. 
 
According to Autex1, a key public policy challenge for Bratislava is to encourage the 
‘young generation’ to study relevant courses qualifying them to be employed in the 
automotive and electrical MNC-based industries, given that young people increasingly 
want to work in diverse industries and occupations. This is a concern for public policy, 
as a key competitive advantage for Slovakia in attracting large automotive firms to invest 
in the country has been the quality of human capital available. Autex1: 
… 70 per cent of young people want to work in management, sociology or to be 
a scientist and this is important, but we can’t produce 15,000 sociologists and 
we have to be prepared for future positions in the market… the world is open…it 
is a global market and workers can work anywhere… capital can go anywhere… 
China, Russia… America. 
 
Finally, Autex1 said that he perceived a key challenge for Bratislava was to encourage 
young people into traditional industrial qualifications and career paths: 
It is not correct anymore to talk about countries… we need to talk about regions… 
we in Slovakia need to be producing students who can work in the electrical 
industry… for Samsung who are producing metal parts for videos and televisions 
and for the automotive industry. We have to say to the young people that, without 
state money you can study what you want… but we have priority areas and we need 
the best people. We also need to join up the students from the universities with the 
companies… not just the theory but also the practice. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Bratislava case study has demonstrated the extent to which policy design processes have 
been driven centrally. Despite this, informants indicated their confidence in the plan and the 
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new set of nationally driven institutional arrangements established by the Slovak Strategy to 
implement Smart Specialisation in Bratislava. The informants interviewed were positive 
about the automotive industry continuing to retain a dominant position of specialisation in 
the regional economy. There was, however, some concern about the strategy representing a 
‘traditional cluster model’, which may reinforce the ‘core-periphery’ dynamic in GVC 
production decisions of MNCs by its focus on supplier development, as opposed to a more 
ambitious plan for upgrading production capacity. In relation to human capital, informants 
largely agreed with the official narrative of the policy in its emphasis on a future intensive 
focus on technical training at secondary and tertiary levels of education. This was seen as a 
key imperative to enable the future competiveness of the automotive industry in the region. 
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Chapter 7 
Catalonia  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The Catalan economy is highly dynamic, diversified and open, with a large industrial base. 
No one sector dominates the regional economy. Catalonia’s strategic location favours links 
with other Mediterranean countries, continental Europe and Asia. The Research and 
Innovation Strategy for the Smart Specialisation of Catalonia (hereafter, ‘RIS3CaT’) seeks 
to decrease the reliance of Catalonia on the international economy by further broadening the 
economic base of the region through developing leading sectors, such as the agricultural, 
energy, transport, health and cultural sectors. The plan seeks to boost the entrepreneurial 
sector in the region, especially through increased support to technological start-ups. 
Catalonia’s strong industrial sector is also important in driving innovation advances. The 
strategy aligns with the EU industrial policy direction aimed at re-shoring industry to regions 
and the developing advanced manufacturing capacity. The Volkswagen subsidiary SEAT is 
a major player in the Catalan economy and an important economic driver in establishing a 
regional innovation system. In this case study, the governance aspects of the policy design 
and institutional arrangements proposed to implement the new policy are explored. The 
economic context is considered, as well as the extent to which the organisation of formal 
knowledge assets will assist in the long-term strategic direction of the new policy agenda.  
This chapter presents and interprets documentary and interview data collected in Europe, and 
particularly Catalonia. The first section analyses documentary data. Here, insights were 
sought from key documents relating to the Smart Specialisation policy from the European 
Commission, Spanish and Catalan governments and the Barcelona City Council. The second 
section provides analysis of interview data as a parallel research source to the documents. 
Informants were key policy actors within the Catalan regional innovation system’s 
‘Quadruple Helix representative’ groups. Seven informants were drawn from the 
government, business and university sectors and coded as follows: automotive industry 
specialists (Autex1 and Autex2), academics (Academic1 and Academic2) and government 
representatives (Catalangov1 and Catlangov2, and BCcouncil). Informants were asked for 
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their perceptions of the strengths and challenges of the regional Smart Specialisation policy. 
 
Quality of Regional Governance  
 
As was argued in Chapter 2, given the devolved character of policy development processes, 
for effective policy implementation, inclusive political institutions that can distribute political 
power in a pluralist manner are ideal (Marques & Morgan 2016). The degree to which formal 
competences and power (autonomy) to design regional innovation strategies (and the 
financial resources to independently implement them) are decentralised is said to be a key 
determinant of strong policy and governance capabilities of research and innovation 
strategies (RIS) (Tripp, Zukauskaite & Healy, 2018). In this sense, even in regions where a 
Smart Specialisation approach could in theory be perfectly viable and productive, barriers 
and complexity at the level of the local policy and governance system may keep the agenda 
from being transferred into an effective policy program (Capello & Kroll 2016). 
The Catalan case highlights the extent to which strong political institutions found in the 
region have ensured a robust policy design process. According to documentary sources, the 
Catalan Government played a central role in the policy design of the region’s Smart 
Specialisation policy, RIS3CAT. In 2013, the government established a Steering 
Committee and designated it to promote and coordinate the policy process. The group 
was collegiate, made up of representatives of Catalan Government economic 
departments and representatives from the influential Barcelona City Council (BCC). The 
committee coordinated the drafting of the RIS3CaT document. The policy was developed 
using a “two-way iterative process that combined both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches”. In July 2013, a draft of the RIS3CAT document was submitted to 
stakeholders and civil society through an online public consultation process and 176 
contributions were received, mainly from the universities, research bodies and 
businesses. In relation to policy implementation, the plan specified the need for a strong, 
multi-level governance structure involving both representatives of the Catalan 
Government as well as active participation by stakeholders drawn from the quadruple 
helix representative groups as specified by EU policy methodology (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2014).  
BCcouncil pointed out that Catalonia’s sophistication in its approach to the RIS3CAT 
policy was due to the strong political governance found across two levels of government 
at the level of the region, and pointed to the leading and coordinated role of both local 
and regional governments in driving the policy development process: 
The council is not neutral. We have decided to create ecologies of innovation 
from the demand side. For instance, in the area of photonics… this is a 
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technology that can be applied. It can be cross sectoral… and in building 
ecology of innovation, we believe you need hard factors and you need soft 
factors. A key element of the strategy is the concept of place and the concept of 
urban. You need, on the demand side, ecology of innovation and the concept of 
the city as a lab. 
According to BCcouncil, local government was a political partner in the development of 
the RIS3CAT policy and it was determined that the BCC would strategically develop its 
city-based urban strategic priorities to fit Smart Specialisation. He described the shift 
from a traditional approach about developing an urban strategy based on issues such as 
“waste management and parking… all the things that matter when developing a strategy 
for the city”, to a new approach based on seeing development of a strategy for the city 
as urban planning in the context of regional, state and supranational policy priorities: 
We now as policy makers need to ask ourselves when designing our strategies... 
what kind of Europe are we building? How is Europe going at a regional level? How 
is it looking at a regional level? Regions now need to fit in with the new Smart 
Specialisation policy and the research and innovation objectives. And for us the big 
concept is mobility... and technology is a key driver in the strategy… we need to 
have four things to build our innovation ecology and sectors in each territory, for 
instance with priorities such as key technology… key talent… key finance and 
[fourth] internationalisation. So, mobility is important. In the City of Barcelona, cars 
are one element of mobility. Perhaps the people can share cars? Technology in real 
time that shows people where they are at any given time, it is a US approach. 
According to BCcouncil, BCC priorities in the 2014–20 period were part of the Smart 
Specialisation policy framework. A new strategic approach was adopted where urban 
innovation projects were to be trialled and the city conceptualised as a laboratory 
experiment. In line with the Europe 2020 strategy, the policy was developed to 
incorporate three pillars: smart growth, inclusive growth and green growth. According 
to the council, another key concept in developing the Smart City framework was putting 
the “person in the centre” at the start of planning and being conscious that this also made 
a contribution to the Kyoto Protocol: 
We need to take a look at what is happening between public and private sectors. 
It must also be green as an initiative. Public and private must be using green 
energy. In this sense, we need to also be looking at how we can connect in with 
the electric car, but this is also about money. 
Alongside Barcelona City Council, the Catalan Government is also a strong political 
institution and has significant responsibilities including the provision of key services of 
the welfare state (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014). 
Aademic2 also asserted that there was strong political support for Smart Specialisation, with 
its economic focus seen by the community as avoiding the political nature of determination 
of previous EU projects by centralised decision making processes. Support for the new 
policy direction was partly driven by the sense that, prior to 2015, “billions of Euros” 
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dedicated by EU Structural funds to infrastructure projects in southern Europe had not 
been spent on projects resulting in positive economic-development outcomes. In this 
sense, the policy direction was seen as a positive development in relation to the future 
accountability of expenditure of Structural Funds in the 2014–20 policy phase. 
Academic2: 
What happened in 2008 was that Europe faced the biggest crisis since the 1930s… 
so, something went wrong… so the EU started to think, “What went wrong?” And 
the Parliament and the Commission started to develop a new approach… and they 
call it Europe 2020… and so it was one of the benefits of the crisis... because the 
old policy … was a traditional regional policy based on the idea of building a lot of 
infrastructure and by some miracle you get a lot of economic growth… and that’s 
not true. That’s very old fashioned. 
Therefore, it was the view of Academic2 that RIS3CAT represented a radical change in 
policy direction. He hoped that the new policy direction would enable the EU to 
implement the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy particularly in relation to the knowledge 
economy. There was strong support for the strategic nature of the methodology, based 
as it is on regions undertaking a combination of external and internal economic 
examinations of positioning in relation to developing a regional economic plan. He felt 
that many regions were not “on the right track”, for instance, with technology. 
Academic2: 
… this has resulted in a Europe of more than 100 biotechnology regions… but most 
of them didn’t succeed after spending a lot of public money. So now regions must 
demonstrate that they are spending a lot of public money on something… [and 
demonstrate that when] they dedicate the money to something, that they have a 
critical mass of public and private agents [for it] to have a reasonable probability of 
success of this object or this priority… because in the old times… last year… the 
regions just say, “OK, I’m going to dedicate this money to this building?” …and 
nobody asks whether this was a successful idea or not, or smart or stupid… now this 
is not possible. 
Documentary sources highlighted how, in relation to the deliberative governance 
processes established by the policy and its focus on inclusion of stakeholder groups in 
policy development, the Catalan Government indicated that it believed the policy to be 
bringing about “a fundamental transformation” in the orientation of public policy design 
and implementation processes in the delivery of research and innovation policy in the 
regional context. To implement the policy, the Catalan Government established 
RIS3CAT communities called Territorial Specialisation and Competitiveness (PECTS) 
projects as the main tool to promote cooperation among the Quadruple Helix 
stakeholders. RIS3CAT communities consist of voluntary associations of companies and 
stakeholders in the Catalan research and innovation system, which cooperate to 
incorporate innovation into production activities in leading sectors (Generalitat de 
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Catalunya 2014). 
Catalangov1 argued that the Smart Specialisation policy’s governance model was 
impacting on devolution of policy development processes at a regional government level. 
He indicated how the new approach had encouraged the government to move away from 
a traditional policy development approach, led by government and ‘top down’ in 
orientation (in the determination of infrastructure projects) to a more decentralised 
approach where sectors are approached to design innovation policies: 
… how we will work, not just inside the government but also with companies 
from these sectors, and we have mobilised and tried to get their opinion and 
their active participation, and they have had an active role, in this sign-in and 
tell-us [approach, which asks] “Which are the main projects?” that they are 
interested in. 
Academic2 noted that a further strength associated with the decentralised policy design 
processes would be in the elevation of SMEs into a more influential standing in industrial 
policy terms. This development was seen as challenging the previously privileged 
position of large corporations, which are able to influence the economic program for the 
region through their own negotiations in Brussels, to produce industrial policy outcomes 
favourable to individual firms: 
Traditionally, all of the R&D resources were developed from a policy frame 
developed by seven framework programs, and there has been a big change recently 
with Horizon 2020. There are two elements of the big change… one element is 
putting more the accent on innovation, not so much on research… and they say that 
the innovation that pays for the research and the second change is trying to 
encourage the development of SMEs… before this, SMEs were not implicated in 
the programs... so complex and before this that only the big multinationals went to 
Brussels... in practice... and they are trying to change this. And this is not easy. 
 
According to Autex1, there was optimism in the corporate sector about the Smart 
Specialisation policy that would build on the role of the EU Framework programs in 
encouraging the most highly competitive bodies within Europe to join and work together 
towards regional economic goals. He argued that the cooperation between corporate 
players forces partnerships at the regional level and generates a synergic effect: 
You form partners that are closest to you... and this has an impact at the level of the 
region where it is forcing partners, especially in industries where logistics costs are 
important... to work together... this is especially so for industrial sectors that rely on 
logistical processes, so the geographical effect is important... so... a company like 
this, [asks] “Where we are getting parts from suppliers close by because we don’t 
want to spend a lot of money... and also we have our research partners, we have the 
university here... the University of Catalonia in Barcelona so at the end of the day, 
for our business we have a lot of partners right here in this sector... and we have 
that?” And in some regions, they are concentrating partners in certain sectors and 
some regions they are growing and becoming more competitive in that sector and ... 
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people working on an idea together and ... developing partners in a chosen sector... 
those regions are becoming more competitive in that sector. 
 
Autex2 also noted that the new governance communities involved with policy had 
consolidated and acted to focus the work of an informal stakeholder policy, a network 
already in place. He argued that RIS3CAT had made it easier at a regional level for 
people to work together on projects. This has in turn had the positive impact of building 
a base of professionals in a region who are working together, and from there a 
psychological effect emerges “that you are getting more competitive at a regional level”: 
We had already been working together in a community, and we already knew all of 
the actors in the community, and what we are seeing now is a community that has 
been built in the past… so this is a good thing, when you are trying to put together 
an action plan and you are trying to explain the future of a project and you can 
explain that in context of a past, where these actors have actually already worked as 
a community … so we are currently working on and running on new projects but we 
have also had a history in the past…we [SEAT] are participating in the cluster and 
we are also represented in the community established by the new RIS3 policy as 
well. So, we are actively involved in the network. 
Informant Academic2 also indicated his hope that RIS3CAT policy would assist in 
enabling a more long-term development process in relation to industrial policy in 
Catalonia in the future. Informant Academic2 argued that “short-term political cycles and 
calibre of political leadership” had meant that “industrial policy has not been something 
very strong… [not] well established or settled in time” in the Catalan public policy 
context. He also emphasised the strong engagement with Catalonia in designing place-
based governance processes for the design and implementation of the policy. Catalonia, 
he said, conducted a very consultative entrepreneurial process of discovery in 
formulating policy. Sector priorities were determined by industry communities 
established to administer the policy’s development and implementation process: 
For instance, with the fruit industry… we used an administrative instrument called 
a ‘community’… and so the agents of this community… they agree about the 
projects to develop in favour of the food industry… and then they present both this 
to the companies and the research institutes and they present these projects to the 
Catalan Government… and now we are in that process exactly… 13 communities 
have been approached or [approved] in Catalonia… and now they are preparing the 
initiatives to receive financing and to develop during the next years.  
The complexity of the processes was, however, seen as a potential barrier to the success of 
the new policy direction. Both Autex1 and Autex2 raised concerns about the degree of 
administrative complexity involved with the governance processes established by the 
policy’s design. They thought a vast number of stakeholders were needed to form the basis 
of the sector-based communities that have been formed under the policy, and coordination 
and establishing focus within such a large group would be difficult. Autex2: 
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The community itself has to present an action plan... so then the community, it puts 
forward a project and then the best project is then presented… and I would say from 
the point of view of the difficulties… is the getting together of all the partners and 
to try and organise this, not in a project… not just the community, but in an action 
plan… and make sure that we do not forget any important issues. In addition to this, 
the partners need to be certain that they are covering all the important aspects for 
the community. 
Autex2 believed the policy relied on partners within a community being able to reach 
consensus around important aspects of policy and reach a sophisticated position: 
Where you have a highly complex topic like mobility we have to have the OEMs, 
Tiers one and two, we need to have the public-transport operators, we have to have 
the whole value chain… what else is there… if you lose one significant player, then 
your community is not represented. 
He identified a further barrier as being presented by the small funds attached to the policy, 
given the ambitious nature of its objectives: 
… if you make some comparisons between the programs that have been running in 
the last decades, namely the Framework programs and now Horizon 2020... then 
you see these kinds of programs have high complexity. So, while it is important for 
there to be cooperation at the international level and with universities on research 
projects here... you have to understand the high complexity and with that I am 
meaning the administrative complexity. And in the end, the money that we receive 
is not that significant... and so that is what I am afraid of when we talk about this 
so-called RIS3 and the communities being generated as part of the policy, because 
the degree of complexity is enormous and... in fact... it is not yet well known how 
this will all work... the funds will be not so... not so... significant... and if you take 
into consideration that the ‘community’ has a lot of projects with a lot of participants 
in the end... but with the funds allocated... it is not so significant... So, Horizon 2020 
is at the international level, the EU level, and now RIS3 is at the regional level... in 
Catalonia... in Spain, in different communities... this is very administratively 
complicated.  
 
 
The role of the MNC in the region in GVC/GPN context 
 
According to documentary source Catalonia: the Strength of an Outward-Looking Country 
(2017) (hereafter ‘the Economic Outlook’), the Catalan economy is similar in population size 
to other middle-size economies in Europe. Catalonia has 7.5 million people and a GDP of 
€223.6 billion, of a similar size to Switzerland, Austria, Finland or Denmark (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2017a). It notes Catalonia’s strategic location in relation to other Mediterranean 
countries, continental Europe and Asia (Generalitat de Catalunya 2015). Catalonia is 
considered ‘more developed’ in the EC’s categorisation of regions, with a GDP that is 90 per 
cent of the EU-27 average (EC 2016). According to the Annual Report of the Catalan 
Economy (2015) (hereafter ‘the Annual Report’) the Catalan economy is strong in 
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macroeconomic terms, with strong export growth rates recorded in 2015 despite generally 
weak growth in the European economy (Generalitat de Catalunya 2017a). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Categories of regions of Spain for the ERDF, ESF and EAFRD 2014-20 
 (European Commission 2016) 
 
The Catalan economy is highly dynamic, diversified and open, with a large industrial base 
and no one predominant sector. Catalonia has had a long industrial tradition and has a 
powerful established manufacturing base. This tradition is seen as key to long-term 
economic success, having the capacity to contribute to boosting technological 
innovation, export capacity and to improving production processes, considered essential 
in laying the foundations of a stronger growth model. Commerce is also a major industry 
operating within the regional economy. Public administration, however, represents a 
smaller component of the economy compared to the weight it has in the rest of Spain and 
of the EU (Generalitat de Catalunya 2017). 
Less developed regions (GDP/head < 75% of EU-27 average) 
Transition regions (GDP/head< Between 75% and 90% of EU-27 
average 
More developed regions (GDP/head > 90% of EU-27 average) 
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Figure 7.2: Industrial production in Catalonia and selected other EU entities 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2017a) 
 
In this context, the strong history of industrial development underscores the importance of 
the automotive industry to Catalonia’s long-term regional economic growth strategy. 
Volkswagen subsidiary SEAT (Sociedad Espanola de Automoviles de Turismo) is the 
top company in the region as measured by turnover and exports and is a major player in 
the Catalan economy (Generalitat de Catalunya 2017b). SEAT was originally founded in 
1950 as a state-owned industrial holding company and forged a partnership with Italy’s 
Fiat until the 1980s. In 1990, the German Volkswagen Group acquired SEAT as a 
subsidiary. SEAT’s importance to the Spanish economy is integral; contributing about 1 
per cent of Spanish GDP, as well as being a major employer. The company employs over 
14,000 people worldwide and, since 2016, it has indirectly employed over 70,000 people 
(CNBC 2016). 
As was pointed out in Chapter 2, the GVC organisation of the company Volkswagen 
demonstrates how research carried out by the Volkswagen Group has always been largely 
centralised, with the corporate research division at the company’s Wolfsburg headquarters 
providing support for all of the Volkswagen brands. The individual brands also maintain 
smaller research departments which together form a research network, with the Wolfsburg 
headquarters as its hub. The R&D activities of the various brands concentrate mainly on 
development efforts. Each brand has its own development department including SEAT in 
Martorell, near Barcelona, Spain (Schmid & Grosche 2008). In 2015, SEAT accounted for 
39,356 jobs in the regional economy, 12,810 direct jobs and 25,546 indirect jobs, as well 
as representing 5.1 per cent of the total industrial employment in the region. While jobs 
in the manufacturing industry are the predominant economic beneficiaries (90.6%), the 
services sector has also greatly benefitted from the company’s investment in Catalonia 
(9.1%). SEAT has two plants in Catalonia, in Barcelona and Martorell. These factories 
have generated sales organisations and dealerships in over 70 countries beyond Spain. 
Accordingly, SEAT has had a significant economic impact on the whole Catalan 
economy. 
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The SEAT Annual Report (2016) indicates that the company is the largest industrial 
investor in R&D in Spain, which in 2015 invested almost €400 million in activities 
relating to R&D and innovation in Spain, representing 2.9 per cent of the total amount 
spent on R&D in the country (SEAT 2016, p. 22). A major component of this investment 
has been directed to the SEAT Technical Centre. This centre of excellence was 
established in 1975 within the complex that includes the Martorell factory. The centre 
operates as a hub of knowledge and innovation and is focused on brand development and 
the incorporation of the most advanced technologies into its vehicles. More than 1000 
engineers, designers and technicians are employed at the centre (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2015) (Table 7.1). 
 
 
 Value of 
production 
Added value Employment 
Direct effect 5,443.73 756.72 12,810 
Indirect effect (a) 2,241.14 781.01 18,754 
Indirect effect ( 837.18 380.06 7,792 
Indirect effect total=(a)+(b) 3,078.32 1,161.07 26,546 
Total effect 8,522.05 1,917.79 39,356 
Multiplier 1.57 2.53 3.07 
Values in millions of Euro 
Table 7.1: Impact of SEAT’s activities on the Catalan economy 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2015) 
 
Despite major R&D investment by SEAT in the Catalan economy, RIS3CAT identifies 
several other significant sectors within the Catalan economy, including food processing, 
chemicals, pharmaceutics, transport equipment and metallurgy industries (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2017) (Table 7.2). Increasingly, a growing ICT sector is also driving industrial 
outcomes, with many companies basing themselves in Barcelona to develop technology 
such as 3D printing (Generalitat de Catalunya 2018).  
 
Figure 7.3: Description of leading sectors 
(RIS3CAT) 
Food Agri-food industry and other links in the value chain: 
primary industry, distribution, packaging, machinery 
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for the food and drink industry, additives and raw 
materials, cuisine and restaurants 
Energy and resources Management of energy and natural resources, the water 
cycle and waste treatment and recycling (energy saving 
and efficiency, new, more efficient materials, 
combined heat and power automation, energy control 
and management, renewable energy, organic 
chemistry, nuclear fusion).  
Industrial systems Activities focused on the management and 
development of efficient industrial systems (plant and 
machinery; robotics; data-processing, electronic and 
optical products, and electrical material and 
equipment), particularly related to process engineering 
and advanced manufacturing, in which ecodesign plays 
a key role. 
Design-based 
industries 
Industries closely linked to design as a key cross-
cutting factor: textiles, garment making, leather, 
footwear, jewellery, furniture, and perfume and 
cosmetics, amongst others. 
Industries based on 
sustainable mobility 
Management systems for mobility, public transport and 
infrastructure; automobile industry and related 
activities; electrochemistry, nanomaterials, Internet, 
mobile telephony. 
Health industries Fine chemicals, pharmaceutical preparations, medical 
technology industry, insurance industry and hospital 
systems. 
Cultural and 
experience-based 
industries 
Creative and cultural industries and key services for 
Catalonia, such as tourism and sport. 
 
 
RIS3CAT reinforces the need to sustain a diverse economy that includes its “industrial 
base” alongside an “open, competitive and sustainable economy” that combines talent, 
creativity, a diversified business fabric and an excellent research system located within 
the framework of a dynamic, enterprising and inclusive society. The policy notes that 
the region is home to both MNCs and local companies in industries that have become 
international leaders, and emerging technological sectors that should drive a 
diversification agenda. In all of these sectors, strategic plans are put into place and 
knowledge hubs attached to each, which it is hoped will foster innovation. In relation to 
these identified KETs, the strategy lists for special attention ICT, nanotechnology, 
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advanced materials, photonics, biotechnology and advanced technology (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2014).  
Three key economic vectors are identified. The first vector is said to reflect the “great Catalan 
industrial tradition”, which it argues was driven in the 19th century by the textile, chemicals 
and iron and steel industries, and the railways, and in the 20th century by the electrical 
industries (energy generation and machinery production) and the automobile, pharmaceutical 
and agri-food sectors – which, as they have developed, have placed emphasis on competitive 
factors such as innovation, design and training. The second vector focuses on people’s 
wellbeing and concerns food, health, leisure and lifestyle. Here, R&I generates, not only 
economic opportunities, but also direct benefits for individuals and society as a whole. The 
third vector is the firm commitment to transforming the Catalan economy towards a green 
economy. In response to the global challenges caused by climate change, the impact of human 
activity and scarcity of natural resources, the green economy offers promising niches for 
specialisation and generates opportunities to improve and enhance efficiency in all economic 
sectors. 
Figure 7.4: Venn diagram of leading sectors in Catalan economy 
(Generalitat de Catalunya 2014) 
RIS3CAT establishes four priority pillars of action for research, innovation and 
competitiveness (Table 7.3). Pillar 1 focuses on seven leading sectors whose importance and 
potential enable them to act as cornerstones for economic recovery and to reorient the Catalan 
economy towards a growth model that is smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive. Pillar 
2 identifies new economic opportunities in emerging sectors, based on technological 
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capabilities (new activities generated through technological change and cutting-edge 
innovation) and the synergies between related sectors. Pillar 3 focuses on cross-cutting 
enabling technologies, the main tools for transforming the production system and generating 
new scientific, technological and economic opportunities. Finally, Pillar 4 focuses on 
improving the innovation environment. 
 
Table 7.2 RIS3CAT Structure: Pillars and Tools 
Pillar 1 Pillar 2 Pillar 3 Pillar 4 
Leading sectors Emerging activities Cross-cutting enabling 
technologies 
Innovation 
environment 
(public policies) 
Food 
Energy and 
resources 
Industrial systems 
Design-based 
industries 
Industries linked to 
sustainable mobility 
Health industries 
Cultural and 
experience-based 
industries 
To be identified in 
the entrepreneurial 
discovery 
 
ICTs 
Nanotechnology 
Advanced materials 
Photonics 
Biotechnology 
Advanced manufacturing 
 
Digital agenda 
Entrepreneurship 
Eco-innovation (green 
economy) 
Non-technological 
innovation 
Training and talent 
RIS3CAT communities 
Emerging activities 
Development of key technological capacities 
Research and technology transfer infrastructure 
Collaborative R&D projects 
Technology valorisation and transfer 
International cooperation 
Innovative public procurement 
Specialisation and territorial competitiveness projects  
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Academic2 noted that RIS3CAT emphasises the importance of GVC development across 
sectors rather than an industrial strategy based on just one sector in isolation from another. 
As has been outlined, the plan identifies seven economic priorities: food and drink, 
agriculture, mobility, design, health sciences, energy resources and industrial systems. 
Academic2: 
It is not easy to say what ‘sectors’ we are building, as one of the characteristics 
of the new EU policy direction is that it is supposed to be very diversified. 
Actually, in the RIS3 Catalonia, they have defined seven different priorities… 
seven different sectors, and it’s not the traditional concept of industrial sector… 
it is more about global value chains. For instance, we try not to talk about the 
‘automotive industry’ or ‘sector’ but instead we use the mobility concept… so 
going to that point… the two most powerful sectors… are the mobility one and 
the food industry one…. these are the two that have the most capacity to 
innovate… and develop new activities and new services around these two 
concepts. 
 
In relation to the automotive industry, informants agreed that, given the cross sectoral 
nature of the plan, a tripartite approach to coordination and planning was occurring 
across all levels of government, and with the corporate sector. For instance, in relation 
to Barcelona City Council, BCcouncil explained how the new strategic direction of 
council is now being built around ‘concepts’ and ‘communities’. The concept of 
‘mobility’ has replaced a traditional ‘vertical’ concept, the policy directed at the 
automotive industry. The concept of ‘mobility’ allows a capacity to deliver on vertical 
sector plans, but also across horizontal value chains. At the Catalan Government level, 
Catalangov1 explained how the concept of mobility has been adopted and now 
transcends traditional sectoral planning based on just one industry(e.g. automotive) and 
instead enables the recognition of the wide scope of the automotive industry and “not 
seeing the sector as comprising SEAT and Nissan which are the main players here, but 
also seeing mobility sector as being about electric vehicles and other stakeholders, such 
as public transport mobility and transport logistics, so therefore perceiving of a wider 
scope of the sector”. The SWOT analysis contained in RIS3CAT also places emphasis 
upon the future of the industry being about sustainable mobility (Table 7.4). 
 
Table 7.3: Select elements of the strengths and opportunities of Catalonia’s RIS3 
leading sector ‘sustainable mobility’ (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014) 
 
Strengths  Opportunities  
The automotive sector forms a highly 
complete cluster: two car assembly plants; 
Over the last few decades, growth in the sector 
has been based on manufacturing and the 
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five design centres; specialised technology 
centres; the Circuit de Catalunya 
racetrack; a leading international car 
show; more than two hundred spare parts 
suppliers; and powerful related industries 
Catalonia has all the other elements 
necessary to become a leader in the new 
model of sustainable mobility: a dynamic 
ICT sector; a firmly-established energy 
industry; and cities highly suited to the 
application of these new solutions 
In Catalonia there is a huge diversity of 
new “born global” companies in the field 
of sustainable mobility, and these 
enterprises have enormous growth 
potential. 
massive use of combustion vehicles. This 
situation is now changing: mobility is going 
through a period of transition in which more 
sustainable vehicles are emerging and the 
phenomenon of carsharing or carpooling is 
growing, as is the use of cleaner fuels and new 
concepts of mobility based on the development 
of new mobile applications 
 
Autex1 strongly endorsed the strategy outlined in RIS3CAT relating to sustainable 
mobility. At a corporate level, Autex1 indicated how SEAT’s operational decisions on 
production organisation are also now being guided by the new policy framework. He 
emphasised that SEAT is working closely with the Barcelona City Council and the 
Catalan Government to “move from a situation of producing and selling cars… to 
providing mobility” as part of new sustainable strategy for the implementation of 
electrical vehicles in the city: 
We are now moving from a situation of producing and selling cars… to providing 
mobility and of course this implies a huge transformation… and the main place that 
this transformation will happen is in urban places… it is for this reason, that we are 
working very closely with Barcelona [City Council] and the Catalan Government 
and we are founding members of the so-called LEAF platform… the logistical 
implementation of the electrical vehicle… this was an initiative of the Catalan 
Government and the Barcelona City Council… to develop further implementation 
of electrical vehicles in the city.  
 
The commitment by the automotive industry to the sustainable concept of mobility in 
Catalonia was underpinned by a sense that industrial production needed to change to 
reflect the challenge of consumer preferences for electric vehicles, social trends like car-
sharing schemes, an ageing society, and aspirations for young people today to buy a 
mobile phone rather than a car. Autex1 pointed out that, after more than a century of 
production, for instance the Czech car company Skoda had disappeared because it could 
not adapt to changed technology in the digital world, “so the lesson is that you have to 
move fast”. He added, “that is why we are working hard with public institutions such as 
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the City of Barcelona and the region of Catalonia to reinforce our commitment to this 
society so as to ensure that the automotive industry will continue to be the main driver 
of economic growth in the region, alongside tourism” and indicated that SEAT had 
determined, based on the 2014 results, that it would be adding about 100 additional 
engineers for the technical centre to meet the demands of the sustainability and social 
commitments that involvement in EU-funded regional innovation projects had bought 
about. This was spurred by recognition of the need for the company to be “drivers of 
technological change” rather than being “driven by change”, to be a trend setter and 
remain competitive.  
The involvement of SEAT in the LEAF project has served to widen the field of action of 
LEAF to other technologies. Autex1: 
… sometime later, we wanted to widen the field of action of LEAF… to other 
technologies… especially to natural gas… which had become available… and 
which we are now producing… and as has just been pointed out, the E in LEAF is 
now not just about Electrical but really now stands for Ecological… and we are 
working closely with the city council in developing this platform. Also, two years 
ago, we proposed to the Catalan Government and to the City of Barcelona to work 
jointly on the so-called Future of Urban Mobility project with almost the same actors 
as on LEAF, but working specially to develop specific projects on human 
mobility… and we are also now looking for European funds… for those projects, 
which have also been included in the list of the RIS3 Community… for sustainable 
mobility… everything in the end has been included in the same plans.  
 
The economic vision under RIS3CAT was seen as having to incorporate the industrial base 
of the region. While the Smart Specialisation focus on diversification of economic sectors 
was welcomed, the importance of rebuilding the manufacturing industry was equally 
emphasised. Academic1 emphasised the importance of the relationship between 
manufacturing production and the innovative design and creativity involved in 
manufacturing processes. Academic1 highlighted the degree to which Catalonians were 
thinking about the Smart Specialisation strategy as very much to be implemented alongside 
other important EU framework programs, such as the EU’s Reindustrialisation of Europe 
strategy. He explained that, in this sense, Catalonia was following a movement in the US to 
de-industrialise when they lost their industry 20 years earlier. He argued that the ‘re-
industrialisation’ movement was now being embraced in the region and that the “wind is 
blowing in favour of industry in general”. This project has been embraced by regions such as 
Catalonia, which also want to revive their manufacturing sector: 
Catalonia is an industrial country. Twenty years ago, I said this… and now I say the 
same… because it is very important… we cannot lose industry… it is not possible 
for a country to be strong on innovation without production… innovation is research 
and design and creativity and this is related to the production process, so some of 
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the European countries that went to China, they are now taking back some of the 
elements of industrial production. 
BCcouncil also emphasised the value placed by Barcelona City Council on re-
industrialisation for the future of the Catalan economy. He indicated that the council 
wanted to align with the Catalan Government in seeing technology such as 3D printing 
as a priority KET to develop in the regional economy. He argued that “there are lots of 
technologies here such as printing and robotics and the manufacturing industry and the 
concept of re-shoring industry is important to us”. He indicated that the council strategy 
is underpinned by the concept of creating ecologies of innovation in Barcelona. 
BCcouncil: 
There is a whole push at the moment towards the ‘re-industrialisation of Europe’ 
and the EU manufacturing document [Towards an Industrial Renaissance] is an 
important one, as it also looks at public and private partnerships and clean industries. 
We have been somewhat interested here in the American experience and strategy 
for re-industrialisation and we are influenced by key reports such as the Brookings 
Report entitled America’s Advancing Industries which talks about the importance 
of 3D printing as a KET. 
Academic1 highlighted the importance of industry to the Catalan GDP, which “theoretically 
represents about 20 per cent in Catalonia, but in practice is about near 50 per cent if you 
consider the secondary sector and considering the value chain related with industry”. He 
argued that, with the RIS3CAT plan, Catalonia needed to capitalise on the importance of 
manufacturing to the economy and to value add to industry through creative innovation. 
Academic1: 
That means, and I said this yesterday during the debate at the Steering Committee… 
that the future of the country will depend on the future of industry… the future of 
the economy… because Catalonia represents about 16 per cent of the Spanish 
population… we represent about 20 per cent of the GDP… and we represent more 
than 25 per cent of the exports… and so most of the exports come from here and 
this is because of the university… so… I think that with the RIS3 and this new 
approach of Europe 2020… and so on, will be a good opportunity to take advantage 
of this, and as a result… to have a more competitive industry and not only to boost 
manufacturing, but also to add value to manufacturing. Innovation comes from the 
relationship between creativity and manufacturing. 
The automotive industry informant Autex1 also emphasised the degree to which MNCs 
such as SEAT are strongly embedded in the Catalan economy and an important economic 
driver in the region, especially during the 2008 global financial crisis, with its strong 
export figures. Autex1: 
Spain has been doing its homework, because in spite of the crisis, the news now, 
that we have from the worldwide ranking, shows that we have jumped from the 
12th... to 9th place... to the 9th position worldwide and this is thanks to the results 
of the work done by Spanish industry... and the confidence that we have given to 
the OEMs because you know that there is... one single Spanish automotive company 
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which is SEAT... But as you know, this company is not independent, it belongs to 
the Volkswagen group... but in any case, I think we have done a good job, giving 
confidence to the OEMs. 
He pointed out that the combination of high expertise in the workforce, extensive 
auxiliary industries developed around SEAT from the second half of the century, and 
high productivity, had all contributed to the recent assignment and production of new 
models (including premium products) to the SEAT factories in Catalonia. He added that 
the confidence of the Volkswagen Group in SEAT has led to an economic flow-on of 
activity in the automotive industry, including investments from Ford, General Motors 
and Renault improving manufacturing figures for Spanish industry by €2.4 million in 
2014: 
Both the Catalan Government and the Barcelona City Council see the RIS3CAT 
innovation strategy as being aligned with building technological capacity, especially 
through Key Enabling Technologies, within the manufacturing industry… with the 
automotive industry, it is about 7 per cent of the GDP… and that is a lot… and that 
means that it is important… and if we also look in detail at how many technologies 
can be developed and impact on other sectors, then you really see the impact... so a 
lot of technologies from stamping, painting, welding, plastics, electronics… these 
technologies… across… you can use them in a lot of sectors… And given that the 
automotive sector is so competitive, and you can go into other sectors that are 
competitive, then you have a lot of advantages. 
Catlangov1 emphasised the important role of the Catalan Government in securing 
production decisions from Volkswagen, Nissan and Renault consortiums to remain in 
Catalonia, by negotiating for industrial conditions to be favourable in attracting projects 
to Catalonia: 
The best example was in 2010 when in the middle of the financial crisis, we had a 
high risk of off-shoring the plant of Nissan and also reducing production in sales… 
in the case of SEAT, we had the opportunity and the ability to attract a new model 
[the Audi 3] which the production could have been done in Barcelona or in 
Bratislava or maybe also in other countries, maybe the Czech Republic or some 
parts in Germany, and thanks to the joint work of other companies and unions, we 
were able to present an offer of this project to Volkswagen and we have won. SEAT 
has managed to increase the labour force and is now thinking about projects for the 
next four to five years… and we are sure that, had we failed to attract this project, 
the situation would have been a little more dramatic. 
According to Catlangov2: 
… it was not until the 1960s… that Catalonia began to wake up in terms of 
industry… in about 1967 and so since then, the automotive industry developed 
in Catalonia and today now we can say that Catalonia is one of the most 
important regions in Spain and the fact that we can say that more than 30 per 
cent of the components that are produced in Spain are produced in Catalonia… 
that means Catalonia is really a very important regional actor in the Spanish 
economy. 
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He also emphasised the importance of advanced technologies in generating innovation 
in the manufacturing industry. The need to ‘catch up’ on technological advances in the 
industry was said to reflect a ‘black hole’ occurring in industrial development after the 
Spanish Civil War, which held back the evolution of the automotive sector in Catalonia 
relative to industrial development trends in the rest of Europe: 
In Catalonia, we have a large tradition in the automotive industry. If we look at what 
happened in Catalonia, we started in the beginning of the last century being, I would 
say… a… not an important but I would say… a relevant actor in the automotive 
industry in the beginning of the 1890s, 1910 and 1920… there was a lot of 
industry… then we had the Civil War… and we have a black hole for 25 years… we 
lost the pace… in terms of evolution… in terms of technological evolution… I 
mean… 25 years behind the rest of Europe… you had the Second World War and at 
that time, Europe was very competitive in terms of technology… because of the 
Second World War and then after that… but Catalonia was a black hole. 
The Volkswagen Group’s competitive position in the global automotive market, relative 
to that of Toyota and Renault for instance, has reflected the strategy of market planning, 
where they have different plans for different segments of the market. The Skoda brand 
was developed for the low-value, Audi for the high-value and Volkswagen for the 
medium-value segment of the market. In this sense, the devolution of marketing strategy 
to Catalonia helped to revive the profitability of a “nearly bankrupt” SEAT, with the 
Catalan Government and SEAT developing a research centre for designing cars in 
Barcelona. The research centre employed over 1000 people designing different models 
for different segments of the export market. The success of new innovative models 
resulted in their becoming global brands (e.g. the Leon model hatchback developed for 
the younger segment of the market) and ensured the competitive position of the SEAT 
production facility in Catalonia. Academic2: 
Volkswagen do very well... they are very efficient… I think the most efficient 
industry in the world is the automotive industry because they have a big share of the 
market, and when you see a car and you see it is for sale for say €10,000… this is a 
miracle. This is because… when you consider the price of the pieces… this is 
because of the production methodologies starting with Taylor in the middle of the 
20th century… and then with the Fordist approach and then with all of the 
production methodologies that have developed since… if you look at it, the 
automotive industry has been the leader… of efficiency, because they need to be… 
they are very innovative in the production process… in terms of robotics and not 
only just robotics and logistics… also in the automotive parts… for instance the 
SEAT plant here in Barcelona… they have a park… where all the suppliers are 
integrated … and most of the added value is made by the suppliers! So, they transfer 
the innovation to the whole system! 
With the RIS3 plan it is so important… to be in a place with a lot of externalities… 
activities, people, research companies and things like that… and build them at the 
place where the company is based and this has been one of the advantages of Silicon 
Valley or Baden Württemberg… and places like that and so, at that moment, now, 
in the creation of these kinds of positive externalities, in terms of innovation… are 
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so critical… because the companies need to open to make a network, an innovation 
network around the company… to build the externalities. 
Informants further observed that in order to aid the process of large companies transferring 
technological innovation advances to the regional economy, an open innovation system 
needed to be built in Catalonia to generate “positive externalities” in the regional economy, 
such as research and innovation groups, which can then collaborate with larger companies to 
take ideas into new commercial products. According to Academic1, large companies should 
be part of the new policy direction, rather than operating outside the new institutions 
established by Smart Specialisation policy. The companies would be “dragged in” and be 
participants because of the externalities that the regional government would build around 
them to encourage economic flow-on from their activities. Large corporations in the region, 
such as SEAT, are seen not as a barrier to the implementation of policy, but as a potential 
collaborative partner in the delivery of the policy: 
Yes, SEAT can be part of an open innovation system in Catalonia. They must be. 
Any industry in the world must follow an open innovation system that follows after 
the Henry Chesbrough formulation… and not because of his formulation because it 
was something based in the real world… based on networks… all big and small and 
medium companies… must follow an open innovation scheme for their innovation 
strategy. 
Autex2 pointed out that SEAT is already operating to assist the development of SMEs and 
process innovation improvements through R&D centres such as the Centre Verde. However, 
the low level of funds attached to the centre militate against its success: 
In Catalonia we actually have mostly very small companies… we have 20,000 
companies and of those the majority are small or actually... some medium but 
mostly small companies and they are trying to get the big companies like 
SEAT… [to] become part of a collective pool, or a driver… so as to make a 
consortium and include these small companies… so that they can become 
integrated in really big projects… and this is one of the points of Centre Verde 
right and what we have been doing in the last years... and for instance in relation 
to Centre Verde... was a clear example of cooperative research in which we have 
participated in the last few years, but also the [2008] crisis has affected this kind 
of cooperation because the amount of funds and the quality of subsidies has 
decreased due to the crisis... but at the end the critical point is the average R&D 
with respect to GDP has decreased... because now we received the maximum 
rate in 2011 and 2012... because the policy in the former years was very 
research-devoted but in the last couple of years, in 2013, 14 it has unfortunately 
again decreased... and because of this... we are again now facing a situation... 
we are trying to look for more funds, but the problem is that on both sides... the 
state on the one side and the region on the other... but the funds are not so high 
at the end... but we all have our elements... on the one hand the cluster... which 
is also integrating those OEM Tier One companies and SMEs related to the 
automotive sector.  
Although boosting capacity in the manufacturing industry is an important objective 
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under RIS3CAT, in order for innovative SMEs to emerge, a change in thinking would 
be required about the innovation model in Catalonia from a ‘micro-innovation’ model 
based on incremental process innovations associated with industrial production, to a 
‘radical’ innovation model based on ideas, start-ups and information technology sectors. 
Academic1: 
I think you know, that I think that in Catalonia, that the SMEs have a big 
challenge… to change the innovation model… because you know in Catalonia, 
you know, it took part in the first and the second Industrial Revolutions and… 
and very soon in Catalonia… during the first part of the 19th century… there 
were a lot of… all of these places up there are made up of old companies that 
developed in the 19th and 20th centuries… and it is important to understand that 
we have an industrial tradition… but the innovation model of all the SMEs is 
based on what some actors have defined as ‘micro-innovation’, which is an 
incremental innovation processes not a radical innovation model but an 
incremental innovation model based on machinery… and is about adapted 
innovation… you buy the machinery and then you follow a learning process… 
where you adapt and make small innovations little by little, and we did this very 
well, this kind of innovation. 
Academic2 has argued that the move to a global open economy has led to the need for 
knowledge-based competition and R&D-led innovation. Globalisation has led to a model of 
competition where “time matters very much” and where the innovation and knowledge base 
is about building a talented human resource base capable of attracting high-technology 
industries associated with ICTs to the region, similar to Berlin and London. Academic2: “the 
challenge for traditional SMEs here is to be more innovative, but in a new way… but then 
there are many, as more SMEs start to start up, coming from the uber-talented people who 
are coming to Barcelona… because they wish to live here and so on”: 
… so now you have to adapt your traditional innovation model… and that 
is the big challenge for the SMEs in Catalonia… and for doing so they need a 
rich environment of creativity… innovation culture… the capacity to attract 
talent… For instance, Barcelona is in a good position to attract talent, we have 
attracted many international and European talents because they want to live 
here… and we have a research incubator with co-working spaces… and most of 
the people working in the co-working spaces… there are more than 100 co-
working spaces in Barcelona… are foreigners. They have come here because 
they love working here. This is an example of [urban theorist] Richard Florida’s 
ideas here being put into motion. 
 
Regional Innovation System  
 
As was argued in Chapter 2, a significant barrier to the successful implementation of regional 
innovation policies across EU regions is faced by regions with very limited innovation-
related assets. McCann and Ortega-Argiles argue that “some regions, for example, contain 
no research institutes; whole other regions, particularly in Eastern Europe, exhibit only a very 
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limited capacity for developing an innovation system, being constrained by institutional and 
governance issues, and technological issues.” McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2016, p.1410). 
Veugelers maintains that the tendency towards policy homogeneity will produce wrong 
policy priorities in particular places; for example, in weaker economies aiming to catch up 
with more advanced parts of Europe, the main priorities should relate to the absorption and 
adaptation of existing frontier technologies rather than initiatives aimed at fostering features 
such as creativity (Veugelers 2015 in McCann and Ortega-Argiles 2016, p.1410). 
 
Catalonia, in contrast, has a dense and specialised RIS (Isaksen and Trippl 2016) with many 
regional assets identified by the RIS3CAT SWOT analysis providing a distinct opportunity 
for the region to implement Smart Specialisation (Figure7.5). According to documentary 
sources, such as the ERDF Operational Programme Catalonia 2014-2020 under the 
Investment for Jobs and Growth Goal (hereafter the ERDF Report), R&D expenditure 
in Catalonia in 2011 accounted for 1.55 per cent of regional GDP, representing a 146 per 
cent increase since 2000, a spending higher than the Spanish average (1.33 per cent), but 
far below the 3 per cent target set by Europe2020 and below the EU-27 average of 2.03 
per cent. Nevertheless, the Catalan government has attempted to raise the productivity 
of the economic base by fostering new R&D activities in recent years, including efforts 
to strengthen existing facilities such as research and technology centres. Corporate R&D 
spending has fallen in recent years. However, Catalonia has performed well on other 
innovation indicators in the same period. For instance, scientific publication numbers 
have increased, Catalonia accounting for 1 per cent of global and 3.7 per cent of EU-28 
scientific production by this measure. Catalonia is also known for its innovative 
outcomes in the health sector and clinical research in human health: the region has over 
18 university hospitals, nine hospital research institutes and 11 hospitals considered 
among the 20 best hospitals in Spain (European Commission 2015a). 
 
Figure 7.5 Select elements of the strengths and opportunities of Catalonia’s Research 
and Innovation System (SOURCE?) 
Strengths  Opportunities  
With 1.5% of the EU-27 population, 
Catalonia generates 2.9% of scientific 
publications, receives 2.2% of funds 
allocated under the Seventh 
Framework Programme for Research 
and attracts 3.29% of European 
Research Council projects (Catalonia 
is the third-most important EU 
R&D&I processes are becoming 
increasingly global and open. The Catalan 
R&D system occupies a good position: it 
is a centre of attraction for researchers of 
international prestige and is fully 
interconnected with European networks 
and platforms (strong presence in 
framework research programmes and 
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country by number of projects per 
million inhabitants). With 0.1% of 
the world population, Catalonia 
produces 1% of scientific 
publications 
Catalonia has an important network 
of centres for the generation and 
application of knowledge (12 
universities and three of the top 25 
business schools in Europe). This 
network generates a significant 
critical mass of qualified and highly 
valued professionals in the world of 
employment and science. There are 
also hospitals and research centres 
with great international prestige in 
the fields of science and knowledge 
transfer. 
Over the last 20 years, stable public 
policies have been agreed in 
Catalonia, reflecting political 
commitment to R&D 
The Institucio Catalana de Recerca i 
Estudis Avançats (ICREA) 
programme is a successful model, 
recognised internationally, for 
attracting and retaining talent 
Catalonia has scientific and 
technological infrastructure that 
enjoys great international prestige 
(the National Centre for Genome 
Analysis, the Alba Synchrotron and 
the Barcelona Supercomputing 
Centre) 
Catalonia’s R&D&I is sufficiently 
competitive to meet new challenges 
and play a role major scientific and 
technological projects in the future 
Incentives are provided for the 
concentration and consolidation of 
research stakeholders in order to 
increase critical mass and 
competitiveness 
European Research Council funding, 
participation in both regional organisations 
such as the Four Motors for Europe and 
the Working Community of the Pyrenees) 
and international networks (stable research 
and innovation cooperation with Israel, 
Massachusetts, USA, Quebec, Canada, and 
Santa Catarina, Brazil). 
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Catalonia’s highly developed 
network of technology centres is 
gradually gaining position in 
European and international platforms 
and projects 
There are many collaborative 
initiatives amongst research and 
innovation system stakeholders 
Catalonia and, especially, Barcelona, 
are internationally renowned for 
design and creativity, important 
assets for the Catalan innovation 
system 
Barcelona is the world mobile capital 
and, in 2014, European capital of 
innovation 
 
In relation to human capital, documentary sources have highlighted how Catalonia has a 
strong pool of human resources talent, with more than 236,000 university students, one 
of the highest numbers in Europe. There is a strong presence of scientific research centres 
attached to Catalan universities, with research groups coordinated by internationally 
recognised postdoctoral researchers. Most of the financial aid given by the ERC to Spain 
is concentrated in Catalonia, the fourth region in Europe in terms of the numbers of ERC 
grants per million inhabitants (Generalitat de Catalunya 2018). The proportion of the 
population with higher education remains above the EU average: 37.5 per cent of the 
population aged 25–64 years, compared with 30.1 per cent in the EU28 (Generalitat de 
Catalunya 2017b). Yet informants pointed out that despite the positive picture of the state 
of graduate research in Catalonia, a mismatch in supply and demand was occurring in 
the labour market; for instance, the identified human resources shortfall in the region in 
relation to engineers. According to Catlangov1, to retain the current competitive position 
of the automotive industry and to improve on it meant a need for better trained people 
and better student outcomes. This human resource issue was identified by Autex1: 
Increasingly we are needing engineers… we have started a new program called the 
‘Start Up Europe’ program… and through that we have hired some engineers [of 
whom] we expect two qualifications… one that they be a ‘hydro’ engineer, but that 
they also should be a German speaker… and then we offer them two opportunities: 
to either work at SEAT or for a Volkswagen plant in Pamplona where we produce 
the Polo. And then we say, after… a learning period in the company in Spain, then 
they have the possibility to move to Germany.  
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RIS3CAT proposes a policy strategy to address the identified shortfall of engineers 
within the region. First, the government is working to develop the region’s skilled 
professional people. They have created a dedicated training centre for the education of 
people working in welding, machining or painting, with the capacity for more than 2000 
students based at the facility per year. Second, the government is working with a local 
university to deliver the most important automotive engineering program in Southern 
Europe to train young engineers in the automotive industry. Finally, the government is 
preparing a third level of training, targeted at professional managers of the automotive 
industry. Academic1 believed these policy interventions will address the shortage of 
engineers in the longer term. 
A further identified key barrier in the RIS relates to a history of insufficient public and 
private R&D investment, and insufficient cooperation and strategic alliances between 
companies and knowledge production systems. In relation to private R&D, Autex1 observed 
that the economic crisis had a heavy impact on government subsidies to large companies, 
which in turn influenced the capacity of companies to invest in R&D. He also noted 
the constraint of the European State Aid regulation for private subsidies to assist firms. 
Autex1 argued that the combination of these two factors had dramatically influenced the 
level of public support to R&D projects occurring in Spain in recent years: 
Until 2011, there were specific programs for investment and direct subsidies into 
R&D for big companies and this was important. But due to the crisis, and for 
example in Catalonia... the money... it seems to have disappeared... and in relation 
to Spain and Spanish Government, the conditions of the support, mainly in the past 
operated in the form of interest-free loans... now these have disappeared. 
 
He further emphasised the commitment of SEAT to the concept of RIS3CAT and 
provided some examples of some recent initiatives of the Volkswagen research group in 
Catalonia, which have sought to reinforce research capabilities in the automotive sector. 
For instance, an initiative initiated by Volkswagen, described as still in its preliminary 
phase but that “shows that Volkswagen have the clear intention to reinforce the research 
capabilities particularly in SEAT... and also with their direct suppliers”. Autex1: 
This initiative is very important because Spain now recognises that the region of 
Catalonia is an elevating region and because Barcelona is such a big city and is 
recognised as one of the most dynamic and innovative biggest cities in Europe… 
the theme of urban mobility presents a challenge for our sector in the future. Because 
of this new policy direction, Volkswagen has decided to establish here with SEAT 
and the local university UPC a new open research network focused on urban 
mobility topics in the same way that they have done in Palo Alto… which is a 
facility near to the Silicon Valley for new transformative electronics and IT sectors 
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and the idea is that that we can become more specialised in concrete topics relevant 
to the future associated with the automotive sector… in this case research on urban 
mobility… so we are working on this initiative together with the City of Barcelona 
and university departments and together we will fund it. 
 
Accordingly, he argued that SEAT was pleased to be involved with the open research 
network as it generated a “good connection with the public administration” and is 
ultimately a good thing for the competitive position of the company to assist rival 
companies such as Nissan and SMEs in the region to improve their competitive 
positioning. He argued that “these initiatives around research and mobility are making 
the regions stronger. We have found out in Catalonia that we have the ingredients to 
make this possible”: Autex1:  
The research network is open because we want to have a good connection with the 
public administration and as part of that we want to provide small and medium 
enterprises with research and development capabilities… some of these companies 
do not have any R&D departments so they have to outsource these activities… and 
we are trying to establish here in Catalonia, with a focus on urban mobility… but 
also in general applying the capabilities of other research centres… is one central 
research R&D capability in the region through this R&D network… so this is not 
about establishing the network in a concrete building, but it is about a network that 
shares facilities and capabilities and where there are a lot of strategic partners and 
Nissan can be part of that – why not? And the idea is that we get everyone together 
who is creating value in Catalonia… who will also profit from these facilities… and 
then we have the R&D network and we have strategic partners and Nissan is one of 
those strategic partners… and IDIADA... one of the biggest test centres for the 
automotive industry located here in Catalonia… so we have to join our capabilities 
and all together we have to work together to become competitive at a worldwide 
level. 
Within the Catalan region, automotive MNCs, including SEAT, are strongly embedded 
in the RIS, enabling a strong role in the future vision of the economy to upgrade 
production with the use of new technologies in advanced manufacturing. In this way, the 
MNC can, as Heidenreich maintained (Chapter 2), facilitate learning processes with 
companies in the proximity (customers, competitors, suppliers and service providers) to 
provide regional collective goods to other actors within the regional economy. Examples of 
these regional collective goods include access to specialised technological knowledge, 
information about new markets, the vocational training of qualified and motivated human 
resources base adapted to the needs of the regional industry, and the stabilisation of regional 
networks and patterns of cooperation between regional companies, schools, universities, 
technology transfer, R&D facilities and political and administrative arrangements, that is by 
forms of local governance (Heidenreich 2017).  
For instance, Autex1 also describes the support of SEAT for the development of an open 
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innovation system in the Catalan region as elevating the whole automotive industry; 
ultimately a key goal of the regional economic plan. Catalonia is seen as having the 
automotive industry infrastructure that could enable it to expand and become a more 
important economic player, along the lines of the large French and German cities where 
the headquarters of OAMs are based: 
Spain is now the second biggest car producer in Europe… and has jumped from 
12th to 9th place in the world wide ranking of manufacturing… and it has been put 
to me that there has been this leap because of the trend towards… the use of smaller 
cars… and because of Spain and our production costs, we are typically A Class and 
B Class car producers… small compact cars… the most expensive cars, the 
premium cars are mostly produced in Germany… because they make more profit… 
but if you are talking about compact cars… then you are looking at them being 
produced here and in France…and this is our advantage… of course the evidence in 
Catalonia for the development of the automotive industry in Catalonia is 
exceptional… because we have everything… we have two big OAMs present… 
.SEAT and Nissan… and on the one hand we have powerful technological centres 
that need to act more rationally but… the know-how is there… And on the other 
hand, we have technical centres like IDIADA… we also have a racing park here in 
Barcelona… so we have really a situation which is not comparable to other regions 
in Spain… well, when you look at Europe and Germany and France… well, they of 
course house a lot of the headquarters of the OAMs, but in Catalonia it has no 
comparison with Spain… regarding the infrastructure that we have, to be a base for 
the automotive industry expansion. 
Catlangov1 impressed upon the importance to their regional economy of having the 
SEAT technical centre based there. Innovation advances were seen as linked to advanced 
manufacturing capacity in the region. The informant argued that since the GFC in 2008, 
the growth of SEAT and the manufacturing industry has been critical to the regional 
economy, and there has been a philosophical return to seeing industrial jobs and the link 
to vocational education as particularly important. The region has seen the building 
bubble burst, and the Spanish economy has been over reliant on the construction 
industry. Catlangov1: 
SEAT is relevant to all of manufacturing. SEAT is a big manufacturer in Spain and 
it makes the whole car, so it is important… SEAT can make the whole car here in 
Spain because SEAT has the technical centre based here in Catalonia, and this is the 
only R&D centre… and if you make a line from Paris to North Italy… to the 
South… [it is the] only R&D centre which is able to design new cars so as to work 
not just for SEAT… but also for the whole of the Volkswagen Group… they design 
new cars, they make R&D projects… not just for SEAT in Catalonia but for other 
Volkswagen plants around the world, and then… manufacturing of course… the 
steel, the metals, pieces… until you have the whole car made. 
 
Catlangov1 maintained that if SEAT had not established the R&D centre in Spain, then 
the situation for the regional economy would have been very different. The Catalan 
Government argued that the decision by SEAT to build the centre represents about €500 
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million to the Catalan economy in R&D investment. In turn, SEAT’s profit made each 
year is €600 million. In that sense, a Catalan Government industry policy expert argued, 
his government had strongly supported SEAT building technical capacity in the region, 
believing it would also lessen the risk of off-shoring: 
This is the only R&D centre… yes, this is the key… because we talk about 
manufacturing but if SEAT didn’t have this centre… then the situation would be 
very different… because it would be similar to Nissan… Nissan have a small 
technical centre, but it is not really an R&D centre so it depends… on the high level 
development it made in Japan… the developments are therefore made in other sites 
around the world and then bought here to some manufacturing plant… so we believe 
that it is important to have the R&D function here, and that the government can get 
some agreements with the company and the union, and the risk of off-shoring 
becomes less… so you can see here in the case of SEAT and Volkswagen, which 
have here a very important technical and R&D centre this is so important to our 
economy as it represents about €500 million in R&D investment in SEAT… in 
comparison, SEAT turnover each year is around €600 million… so if we have this 
park… then it is key… to maintain and retain all the manufacturing activity. 
Academic2 also highlighted the importance of the technical centre for the competitive 
position of SEAT, citing technological process development, marketing and branding 
strategy. He highlighted too, the extent to which the company has applied creativity and 
development to robotics in its production strategy, improved logistics around just-in-
time processes and the successful structuring of the supplier park, and, in relation to 
design branding, that the Volkswagen Group had decentralised a regional design 
department to Catalonia, which enabled them to retain creative design professionals in 
Barcelona. They can design cars such as the Lear for the group and the cars “get exported 
all over the world, but the design is done here”. Catalangov2 too emphasised the critical 
role of SEAT to regional economic development: 
If you look at the Catalan Government’s input and output figures for the Catalan 
economy from 2007, figures where they are talking about the impact of SEAT 
and Volkswagen on GDP… It represents 1 to 2 per cent of total industrial 
workforce, but then you have to see that regarding every euro that is invested in 
Volkswagen and how this impacts on other sectors… so here you can see… 
vehicle manufacturing, you can see is the main sector… and then look at the 
impact of this sector and investment on other sectors in the Catalan economy… 
metal products, plastics… rubber, commercial sector in terms of the dealers… 
research and development machinery… furniture, chemical products, ICT, 
telecommunications, financial services, electrical machinery, all of the electrical 
products industry, transport by rail, because they transport a lot of exports by 
rail and other services… so the impact starts from the manufacturing of Beagles, 
and it arrives to right through to services so this €600 million profit per year… 
implies that a lot of sectors have benefitted from this activity, so it is for us not 
just about securing the OAM SEAT and the Volkswagen workforce, but it is 
about all of the other auxiliary industries… If something fails with SEAT, then 
we have a very big problem for the whole region. 
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In relation to public R&D, RIS3CAT proposes to enhance existing R&D policy 
interventions to give them sectoral and technological orientation, and to promote new 
policy tools, such as encouraging public-private partnerships to continue to advance 
Smart Specialisation. A key component of this vision is to build an innovation ecosystem 
around key universities in Barcelona, such as the Autonomous University of Barcelona, 
the UAB. The strategy outlines a plan to capitalise on the centres located on the UAB 
campus with technology parks, companies and local councils to create a hub of 
knowledge and innovation, with a special emphasis on specific areas of specialisation in 
order to act as an engine for socio-economic development (EC 2016a). These 
interrelationships with the university are seen as integrating it as a fundamental part of 
the regional strategy. Hence a centrepiece of the RIS3CAT is to build closer ties between 
public and private actors. The EC (EC 2016a): 
Though Catalonia has first-rate R&D centres and universities as well as a solid 
industrial tradition, it registered a lack of technology transfer. Consequently, 
connecting its research and innovation system to the existing business and 
industrial fabric is identified as the strategic priority in their RIS3CAT. 
According to Autex2, “before this new approach we had a problem in Spain in that in the 
past, we had more technical and research centres than Germany and France put together! So, 
you have all of these university professors and you had all these research centres and then 
they would have a spin off and nobody would know”. He argued that in addition to this, Spain 
was missing in the past a focus on specialisation, especially in Catalonia “where you had a 
lot of centres, but they were all doing the same kind of work... and following on from the 
pattern of the last century... but there are not enough research funds, then they cannot 
survive… and they should therefore follow the famous example of Germany who have the 
strongest research centres with different sides… to it… to the whole county... And this makes 
more sense and this makes cooperation with the big OAMs easier.” 
In addition to these initiatives, a further policy being promoted under RIS3CAT is that of 
improving research and technology transfer infrastructure in the region. Research and 
technology transfer infrastructure and R&D cooperation projects are proposed to assist 
with the application of basic research to the business sector. The technology market is 
being targeted as a driver to differentiate Catalan companies through Technology 
Valorisation and Transfer strategy, as well as fostering collaboration with global 
companies though international cooperation projects and finally improving innovative 
public procurement. Further, RIS3CAT promotes the use of public policies including 
promoting ICT tools through a variety of plans: a digital agenda, promotion of an 
entrepreneurship agenda, promotion of eco-innovations, encouraging non-technological 
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innovation through new organisational models based on professionalism and improving 
business management, improving social innovation cooperation processes at a societal 
level, and strengthening the education system, particularly in relation to science and 
technology-based training (Generalitat de Catalunya 2014). 
 
Informants noted, for instance, that industrial clusters in the region have been successful in 
encouraging cross-sector growth with the use of KETs. The technologies that have been 
utilised across the health and automotive sectors are IT and nanotechnology. Catlangov1 
maintained that there was a strong relationship between the activities of the automotive 
cluster and Centre Verde, the SEAT technical centre, and that there is a “very good 
relationship and we are cooperating a lot with them, with new technologies, with electric 
vehicles… we are cooperating a lot with them, we have about eight or nine projects with 
them”. Therefore, the impact of the automotive cluster has been very important to regional 
economic development. Catlangov2: 
For years and years, the Catalan Government has tried to promote the automotive 
cluster in Catalonia… SEAT and Nissan never agreed. One would agree to set up 
the cluster and the other would not agree… so for years and years… Finally, two 
years ago, surprisingly, Volkswagen decided on their own to set up an automotive 
cluster in Catalonia in the context of promoting a new training centre for the 
automotive sector which was set or located in Matamay, close to the Volkswagen 
premises. The training centre generated collaboration and it was thought that this 
had to be not just with SEAT and Nissan, but also with complementary industries. 
The Catalan Government assisted in the establishment of the cluster with subsidies 
and promotion and office space and now the cluster is a success story and it works 
on its own and doesn’t have much help from the government anymore… there a lot 
of different clusters here, almost 25 clusters here in Catalonia and they have some 
support and some of them are linked to activities and they have their own 
independent lives and they work well, and they work well together… the automotive 
cluster is a big success as it has the two big OAMs and over 100 other companies 
attached… we have two OAMs… that is SEAT from the Volkswagen Group and 
that is Nissan Group and Tier One, Tier Two and Tier Three and engineering 
services and a lot of companies that make up the complete picture of the automotive 
business in Catalonia and we are really trying to force… and I say ‘force’ because 
we are really trying to force the companies… to cooperate in a small island… 
because Catalonia is a very small island… we are a sea view with a very big 
garden… and we are trying to cooperate in Catalonia… in order to become more 
competitive… on a worldwide basis… and that is very important… here… we are 
able to cooperate between competitors… in order to be more competitive outside of 
Catalonia… that is one of the key issues, we are trying to explain, and try to join 
companies… and try to force them to work together and cooperate… and this is 
quite difficult. 
 
According to Catlangov1 the cluster has worked well in relation to encouraging 
collaboration between the many multinational firms located in the cluster including 
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SEAT, Nissan and Johnson Controls: 
Now, you see, Volkswagen and Nissan, they take their own decisions… but even 
Volkswagen and Nissan, they are able to cooperate… and for instance we make, for 
example, some common trains… to reduce costs for logistics… such a type of 
project… they are not competing and there are some advantages for both Nissan and 
Volkswagen… that is a win-win solution… and for instance, if Volkswagen or 
Nissan have some advantages in costs in transporting their work… that is an 
advantage in cost… this is good… and they will be more competitive… 
Catlangov1 pointed out that the cluster has developed many different fields of cooperation 
and collaboration among companies to generate competitiveness among the firms in the 
cluster, and in turn regional economic development: 
Yes, we are also looking at infrastructure, and for instance are talking to the 
government about whether they should invest to make the fuel more competitive… 
we are looking also at training programs together… so we have a lot of activities in 
terms of competitiveness… training programs, activities, product technology, 
production technology… we have different fields of cooperation… and the 
companies are really working with us… and today, I can say that we have more than 
240 companies working in cross-collaboration projects with other companies… that 
is a lot of people… and in some of these cases the government will contribute some 
money to get the project off the ground and running. 
Catlangov1 argued that corporate activity had enormous indirect benefits and the strategy by 
Catalonia is to retain the corporate activity as well as to value add to it: 
I see more activity with the Tier One than I do with the Volkswagen and those sort 
of companies… because Volkswagen they are a big direct employer but they are 
also an indirect employer and the biggest impact that they have is indirect with the 
suppliers etcetera... the Volkswagen Group in Catalonia have maybe about 20,000 
people indirectly employed… they have directly about 3000 people working for 
them, but it is more important what they are doing in terms of pulling from the 
market from Tier One and Tier Two suppliers who are the major employers within the 
regional economy  
 
Autex2 sees RIS3CAT as an important framework for ensuring specialisation in research 
directions in Catalonia, as well as rationalising the technical and research centre 
relationships with industrial commercial outcomes: 
So… in a way… the cluster… this is a great opportunity for SEAT to make 
connections, not only with other OAMs but also with Tier Ones… and you can 
see really quickly which of these companies are really active with innovation… 
and I can give you some really concrete examples of some really small 
companies… that had very quickly, some really quick, sound ideas where they 
could collaborate with big companies like SEAT… and also from the help from 
funding from the automotive cluster… they got some small funds that helped 
them put together some applications for the bigger funding programs, but… also 
applied for short- term projects… it is much easier to find financing, also from 
the companies… so if someone comes here to SEAT with an idea and it could 
be applied in one year and make savings in two years… they will get financing 
also from us, because then we can also be able to get the profitability in the short 
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term… which is, nowadays, the most important decision criterion for these 
projects and… so therefore the focus in very much on the short term nowadays 
rather than on long-term research topics… and in Catalonia, I have to say, most 
of the SMEs today are focused on industrial topics rather than pure research 
topics… and then the Catalan Government now, is focusing very much on the 
problem of these small companies and… putting all the technical centres and 
the research centres all together. 
According to Autex1, the greater encouragement of cooperation between companies 
through their participation in R&D and technological centres was a positive policy 
direction for the region. He said that overall this was considered a positive change in that 
it encouraged a focus on regional economic outcomes, but he expressed concern about 
the low funds attached to the new RIS3CAT policy direction to deliver on this policy 
objective. Autex1: 
Now the RIS3 strategy of the EU… to devote funds from the Regional funds and to 
focus them on strategic fields... and there is one area... sustainability. 
...We are integrated into one of those so-called RIS3 communities... which 
theoretically should receive money from the Catalan Government to develop 
research and development into sustainability projects... but unfortunately... 
nowadays... the funds will be much lower than in the past. We have been told that 
the allocation in the annual Catalan Government allocation of EU Regional across 
all of the communities that are being established by the policy... so it is not so 
much... this is the unofficial information that we have received. 
 
As discussed earlier, Barcelona City Council at a local level is complementing the work 
of the Catalan Government in implementing the RIS3CAT strategy by developing an 
open innovation system in Barcelona using the policy tools (such as public procurement) 
available to it, and by ensuring that citizens are combined into the strategy from a demand 
perspective (Barcelona City Council 2015). The council has developed a policy tool, the 
‘Urban Lab’, which is designed to provide a space in Barcelona to carry out tests and 
pilots on products and services that have an urban impact. The central idea behind the 
initiative is the use of the city as an urban laboratory. The aims of the policy are threefold, 
and include the objective of fostering innovation so as to be a benchmark of innovation 
for the rest of the city and for other cities’ administrations and companies, to enable 
companies to trial innovative products in a real place, and, if they prove their value, 
commercialise these on a large scale in Barcelona or in other cities in the world; and, 
third, to learn and create new products and services that are capable of offering 
improvements to the citizens of Barcelona. Some of the BCC pilot projects that have 
been successfully trialled include the implementation of bicycle lanes, charging points 
for electric cars, and the use of new sustainable outdoor public street lighting that uses 
Eco Digital with LED technology (Ajuntament de Barcelona 2016). 
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Apart from Catalonia having strong ‘hard infrastructure’ such as its network of industrial 
clusters, and the smaller infrastructure initiatives at a local level to encourage demand, 
informants also argued that Catalonia was well placed to implement the RIS3CAT policy 
because of the long history of investment in so-called ‘soft institutional factors’ in 
building innovation capacity there. This is due to the long involvement of the region with 
the EU’s Horizon 2020 and it being allocated Structural Funds to innovate on the basis 
of being a developed region. BCcouncil: 
Catalonia gets about €800 million from the EU. The money goes to Spain. The EU 
money is delivered to ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ factors. In relation to the €800 million that 
Catalonia gets, the breakdown is as follows: 300 million, R&D; 60 million-IT, 152 
million, SME development; 128 million, to generate a low-carbon community… 
Horizon 2020 is a big policy and worth about €79.40 million to Catalonia. 
 
Informants all agreed that in the past 10 years, EU Regional funds have in the main been 
specifically directed to innovation objectives. They argued that this development had 
contributed to the consolidation in the region of an ‘informal’ social institutional milieu 
reinforcing an economic environment conducive to implementation of a policy such as 
RIS3CAT. Catalangov1 argued that “with Horizon 2020 we have already had companies that 
present projects together and that means we try and align projects with the Horizon 2020 
strategy locally with the partners we have”. Academic2 also emphasised that the EU policy 
framework that encouraged informal institutional networking between universities and 
corporations was having a significant impact and had laid the foundation for the success of 
the policy in Catalonia, particularly in relation to the development of an open-innovation 
system. Academic2: 
In the past you had a system of closed innovation where you had ideas and views 
coming from the market and you had screening of the idea and then the end result 
was the product. All the time, you had 15 ideas and then you got the product. There 
were several stages of development and they were all in-house. Then times changed 
and the realisation [grew] that it was more and more important to build external 
expertise and skills. And also, to explore the notion of letting the ideas go, and 
outsource the ideas we are not using on the market. This was called the open 
innovation model. At the same time, we were looking for external capabilities… 
buying research from universities. 
 
According to Academic2, with the EU grant system moving more generally to open 
innovation systems, there was initially no incentive for corporations to join in. But gradually 
they came to understand that in order to meet their own needs, they needed to build teams 
with members who were outsiders: 
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This has been a learning process for corporations… because what I observed with 
previous funding rounds for Horizon 2020 was that corporations wanted the 
funding, but that they didn’t want to share information, so they built false projects 
so that they were not sharing too much with the outside world and not revealing 
secrets… but now, more and more, they are realising that it makes no sense that 
there be artificial projects and this itself is a competitive positioning because if you 
build a good relationship for instance with a university, then you can share the risk. 
This is an open innovation system in practice and it is happening right here now in 
Catalonia. 
 
Academic1 highlighted the impact of EU framework agreements like Horizon 2020 that 
“with over 15 years of operation of the programs in Catalonia” had resulted in a 
sophisticated applied research system at the level of the region in several important 
industry fields, such as biomedical research, health, design and information technology: 
The EU Horizon 2020 scheme has made a big impact on building an applied 
research system at the level of the region in that, as an instrument, it has forced 
collaboration projects between research and industry in relation to pilots… it has 
forced scientists who think they are not being funded to do applied research to 
engage with industry and it has at the same time encouraged industry to share risk. 
 
Academic2 further observed that the Horizon 2020 scheme had laid the foundations for large 
corporations to engage with smaller companies through making it a requirement of funds that 
they invest in SMEs with new business ideas and experiments. In this sense, the RIS3 strategy 
represented an extension of Horizon 2020 to the broader regional context and that this would 
potentially have a broader social impact with the development of an even greater open 
innovation system which, in order to be achieved, would need to bridge a research and 
industry continuum. This required a “lot of work” to integrate more closely key research 
institutions like UBC with technological centres and corporate stakeholders. Catlangov1 
emphasised the importance of seeing the RIS3CAT strategy as aligning with the EU’s 
re-industrialisation strategy in policies around encouragement of linkages between R&D 
and education and training systems to encourage industrial outcomes: 
… since the GFC there has been a general movement towards re-industrialisation in 
Catalonia with companies and business organisations and our stakeholders and 
economic institutions coming together and saying, “We are in a terrible crisis… and 
we have seen that the countries that have overcome the crisis and that have had better 
performances during the crisis have been industrial countries such as Germany.” 
And there has been a realisation that we have to return to our industrial roots and try 
and restore industrial jobs that are more stable, have better wages than other sectors, 
and a clear link between R&D technology and a clear link with technology centres 
which have an applied link to market and finally a clear link between the education 
system and a strategy to link the training and vocational skills to the industrial reality 
and there is now some consensus around this agenda in Catalonia. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Catalan case demonstrates that Catalonia is committed to a diversified and open 
economy and broadening the economic base of the region through developing leading 
sectors, such as the agricultural, energy, transport, health and cultural sectors. Catalonia’s 
strong industrial sector is seen as important in driving innovation advances. The strategy 
aligns with the EU industrial policy direction aimed at re-shoring industry to regions and the 
development of advanced manufacturing capacity. The Volkswagen subsidiary SEAT is a 
major player in the Catalan economy and is seen as an important economic driver under 
RIS3CAT. 
 
In Catalonia, the presence of strong political institutions has contributed to a robust policy 
design process. A sophisticated policy development methodology has been employed and 
policy communities established that are well represented by stakeholders across quadruple 
helix groups in the region. SMEs were well represented alongside large MNCs. SEAT is a 
strong MNC player within the regional economy and has indicated that RIS3CAT policy is 
encouraging it to become increasingly embedded within the regional economy, towards 
contributing to an economic agenda in developing a sustainability strategy in conjunction 
with public institutions, around the implementation of the development of electric vehicles. 
Yet, this case showed that while Catalonia is rich in knowledge assets within its RIS, the 
most significant challenge in the implementation of the policy may be the facilitation of 
linkages between research institutes and corporate stakeholders. It is the functioning of the 
RIS in this regard that has been historically a problem in the development of public-private 
collaborations. 
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Chapter 8 
Discussion 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The implementation of the Smart Specialisation policy has faced many challenges at the level 
of the region posed by various factors including quality of regional governance arrangements; 
the characteristics of a given regional innovation system and the role that the MNC plays in 
a region in the context of where the subsidiary sits within the governance of its global value 
chain and global production network. Transforming Smart Specialisation strategies into 
action has emerged as a complex task, particularly in LDRs, as was emphasised in the review 
of recent empirical research. This is corroborated by the research from this study which has 
showed that strategies faced significant impediments both in formulation and 
implementation, in their potential to bring about significant economic reform. Therefore, the 
research raises questions as to the extent to which these impediments constitute a failure of 
the policy in the case study LDRs located in CEE countries. This chapter provides a 
discussion of the main findings from the research and, where applicable, links the literature 
to the research outcomes. 
 
Quality of Governance  
 
The first research objective investigated the extent to which the quality of governance found 
in a Member State or region would impact on successful implementation of the policy. A 
number of conclusions can be drawn from the case study analysis presented in Chapters 4-7. 
Data analysis revealed that there were many barriers impeding effective implantation of the 
policy, including entrenched power dynamics in MLG processes favouring Member States; 
centralised political power in many CEE countries and ERDF Regulations that lacked 
specificity of detail on policy parameters. 
 
Firstly, Commission informants revealed that they were finding it difficult to negotiate 
around key elements of the new policy direction due to entrenched power dynamics within 
MLG processes, favouring Member States. New regulatory measures were established by the 
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Commission to oblige Member States and regions to develop Smart Specialisation policies 
to stipulate specific requirements that must be adhered to in gaining approval of submitted 
strategies. The new powers afforded to the Commission seemed to have the potential to 
challenge the long-held principle of subsidiarity where Member States and regions had the 
power to determine the scope and nature of projects funded under Structural funds 
investments within the context of broad criteria. The EC argued that the success of the new 
policy in large part hinged upon the capacity of EC desk officers to be “strong negotiators” 
to ensure that the plans are detailed and specific on objectives. However, it was identified in 
Chapter 4 that a significant barrier to the successful implementation of the policy was in the 
lack of power afforded to EC desk officers responsible for negotiations with Member States 
and regions. While negotiations take place in the context of a “shared management 
framework” it was noted by Commission informants that the concept has not been fully 
realised due to power dynamics entrenched in the system that enabled Member States to often 
“move around” the EC, by exercising power through the European Council if they want to 
influence politically-driven economic priorities against the advice of the EC on the new 
policy direction.  
 
Secondly, it was noted that consultations with regional stakeholders under the policy had not 
necessarily occurred due to the poor state of governance arrangements (efficiency of regional 
and local authorities) within Member States prohibiting regional partnerships. This was seen 
as a major impediment to the successful implementation of the new policy, as the EC in its 
Guide for implementation of the policy had emphasised the extent to which it was their 
intention that Member States and regions design their Smart Specialisation policy policies 
utilising a decentralized process with an “entrepreneurial process of discovery” involving 
regional stakeholders drawn from a broad range of representative fields in society inclusive 
of the educational, scientific, government and civil society realms. The EC describes the role 
of regional actors as paramount to the policy’s success “as it is believed that no one has a 
greater commitment to knowledge of a region than the individuals and organisations that are 
based there” (EC 2012a, p.35). Interview informants however stated that they could not 
ensure that regions were involved, in the receipt of funds attached to Smart Specialisation 
strategies, as funds were distributed to Member States, not to regions. It was noted that the 
quality of government was found to be lowest in LDRs such as Romania, Bulgaria and 
Hungary, with governance problems tending to undermine the impact of Regional Policy 
interventions. It was further observed by EC informants that this was the case in regions 
located within CEE countries, where strong central governments tended to predominate. At 
a regional level, this in turn had led to weak governments and weak administrative capacity 
to deliver the policy objectives. Bulgaria was singled out as an example of a Member State 
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where “a lot of work” still needed to be done in capacity building within that state to properly 
design and implement the new policy direction. Marques and Morgan have also pointed out 
that the collaborative economic search agenda involved with the entrepreneurial process of 
discovery in the policy requires inclusive governance processes to ensure the diversity of 
‘voice’ and that this needs to in turn be supported by inclusive political institutions capable 
of distributing political power in an inclusive way (Marques & Morgan 2016). In addition, 
Rodriguez-Pose and Garcilazo have also postulated that that the success of Cohesion Policy 
investments is directly linked to the quality of regional and local governments. They argued 
that if the Smart Specialisation policy is to be successful, then it needs to build in an 
institutional component, including promoting transparency and accountability and dealing 
with corruption to improve the quality of government as an essential component of the 
strategic planning processes of the policy alongside economic planning (Rodriguez-Pose & 
Garcilazo 2015). 
 
The impediment of centralised governance arrangements to successful policy implementation 
was also supported by conclusions drawn in the Western Transdanubia case, where a 
nationally-driven policy design process was seen by interview informants as reflecting the 
political context in Hungary, where regional governments were dismantled resulting in 
increased centralisation of power. These political developments had led to regional 
stakeholders feeling disenfranchised in economic development planning in both the design 
and the implementation phases of the policy. An impact of the centralised process in the WT 
case study was that “large companies” had played a major role in setting the agenda for the 
policy. A further impact was said to be in the loss of regional leverage in securing extensive 
funding allocations, for instance, attached to new KETS such as 3D printing facilities, 
potentially impacting on what could be achieved with the new policy direction. The fiscal 
dependence of the region on the national government, and “small amounts of money” being 
allocated to innovation in the region, have led to a concern that the new policy direction 
would just result in a ‘business as usual’ approach to regional development based on the 
existing industrial development model underpinned by infrastructure projects rather than the 
more transformative model that the policy hoped to engender. The Western Transdanubia 
case confirms the empirical research that has addressed the policy implementation challenges 
faced by CEE regions, with Healy observing that in East Romania, the centralisation of fiscal 
power had undermined regional agency in the policy design process rendering the regional 
plan as a strategy that signalled intentions for an independent regional vision but was 
ultimately hamstrung by central determination of national priorities on innovation given a 
centrally driven budgetary process (Healy 2016). This case also corroborates the findings of 
Cooke where he showed how power levels within the Portuguese state had conspired through 
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MLG processes against de-specialisation aspirations of the region of Algarve (Cooke, 2016), 
Similarly, in the case of Bratislava, it was shown that the Slovak Strategy was designed 
centrally. Policy design processes involved consultations with representative stakeholders 
that were coordinated by the national government. A new national authority, the 
Government Council for Science, Technology and Innovation, was formed. It was given 
considerable political weight within the government and charged with implementing the 
Slovak national plan. Despite the centralised policy design processes in Slovakia, the 
case of Bratislava emphasised the extensive nature of consultation with regional 
stakeholders, although it was noted that more could have been done to include the large 
MNCs in the process. The omission of large companies was seen as a barrier to 
implementation. There was concern that MNC players may lose sight of the regional 
development focus of the policy while pursuing their own commercial interests in 
isolation from broader economic and social objectives of the plan.  
In contrast to this situation, EC informants noted that in countries with strong regional 
governments such as those in Spain, France and Germany, policies were sophisticated and 
regionally driven. The Catalan case clearly demonstrated the extent to which strong regional 
and local governments that were empowered to oversee the policy’s development assisted 
with a rigorous policy design process. Therefore, in Catalonia, the policy governance 
process consisted of a “two-way iterative process that combined both top-down and 
bottom-up approaches”. The RIS3CAT strategy was submitted to stakeholders and civil 
society through an online public consultation process with contributions from 
universities, research and business. The policy established consensus-based communities 
made up networks of companies and stakeholders in the Catalan R&D system around 
sector and thematic priorities of the strategy. Sector priorities were determined by the 13 
committees formed. They presented projects to the Catalan government and then 
received financing. The Smart Specialisation policy overturned a ‘top down’ model of 
public policy development resulting in a sophisticated decentralised model of cross 
sector committees being formulated to develop and implement the new policy direction. 
It was observed by interview informants that the broad governance process did not favour 
large corporations in the region, with the new policy focus being about encouraging SME 
involvement in governance processes. It was said that this had led to an overturning of 
the traditionally privileged position of the large corporation in influencing economic 
planning at the level of the region and was seen as a positive policy development as it 
had led to the old system of state negotiation with corporatist elites at a peak level, such 
as the automotive industry, being replaced by a devolved model of consultation with a 
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broad range of economic actors. It was shown that the Catalan government played a central 
role in the policy design of the RIS3CAT, and it was emphasised how the policy had 
encouraged for instance, Barcelona City Council to change its priorities away from a 
traditional focus on waste management and parking to fit with the Smart Specialisation 
agenda around the concept of mobility. A powerful Steering Group was established made 
up of representatives from across the Catalan government and the city council. This 
enabled the development of the policy alongside a broad group of local stakeholders and 
companies.  
The case of Catalonia demonstrates a devolved consultative approach to policy design. 
However, informants raised concerns about barriers emerging in the policy 
implementation phase. The policy was said to have “administrative complexity” 
associated with the governance processes involving many stakeholders to consult with 
in design and implementation phases, as well as low funds attached to the new 
decentralised policy direction with “such ambitious objectives.” These concerns 
reinforce the observation of Marques and Morgan, whose analysis of the potential 
governance pitfalls of the policy design process also highlighted the potential problem 
of the deliberative governance model and administrative complexity in implementing the 
new policy direction (Marques & Morgan 2018). The EC chapter also emphasised the 
extent to which the low funds attached to such a sophisticated policy direction may 
present a barrier for Member States and regions and render it an “exotic exception” rather 
than having the power to transform regional economic reform. 
A third impediment to Smart Specialisation implementation relating to the governance 
of the policy was argued by EC informants to be presented by the legal framework 
attached to the policy. Specifically, Commission informants stated that they felt that the 
ERDF Regulations needed to be strengthened, to become more specific on detail to enable 
the EC officer to have greater leverage in negotiations with nations and regions. It was 
observed by the EC that the only capacity for leverage in negotiations experienced thus far, 
was to use the ‘stick’ of the EC auditing process to ensure funds were expended according to 
the policy objectives only after plans had been implemented. For instance, they argued that 
the new regulations lacked specific detail relating to governance requirements associated 
with the entrepreneurial process of discovery that should be undertaken; to what projects can 
be approved, and in specifying indicators for required evaluation and monitoring systems that 
need to take place. They argued that Member States and regions had submitted draft programs 
that express “general and vague aims” and “listing a large number of possible actions” so as 
to maintain maximum flexibility in the selection of projects at a later stage. EC informants 
observed that the ERDF Regulations were vague in many areas. However, a recent key report 
229 
 
addressing the future governance arrangements under Cohesion Policy post 2020 has 
indicated the political difficulty of moving away from the functioning of subsidiarity in the 
operation of the shared management framework in the MLG system. The report emphasised 
the degree to which Member States are strongly in favour of negotiation and flexibility in 
determining policy priorities and suggests that a better results-orientated framework should 
be the priority for reform, rather than the imposition of financial penalties or greater ex ante 
conditionalities (Bachtler et al. 2016). 
The role of the MNC in the region in GVC/GPN context 
The second research objective investigated the extent to which the role that the MNC plays 
in a region would impact on successful implementation of the policy. A number of 
conclusions can be drawn from the case study analysis presented in Chapters 4-7. Data 
analysis revealed that there were many barriers impeding effective implantation of the policy 
including a supplier led strategy of development in the automotive industry and low levels of 
private and public R&D in CEE regions. In contrast, SEAT in the Catalan economy was 
observed to be strongly embedded in the regional economy and focused on development of 
greater product innovation, for instance on the development of electric vehicles. 
 
The case study regions face varied challenges in planning for structural transformation of 
their economies. Both ‘less developed’ Western Transdanubia (WT) and ‘transitional’ 
Bratislava identified themselves as being situated as ‘industrial production’ regions within 
the OECD typology of region matrix, and the ‘developed’ Catalonia identified as a 
‘knowledge region’. The broad view of innovation adopted by the policy – that innovation 
may occur anywhere and in different forms – was seen as a potential limitation by informants 
located within Western Transdanubia and Bratislava. Both regional strategies concentrated 
on an approach that would consolidate their region’s automotive industry as the centrepiece 
of a specialisation agenda. Both saw their automotive industry as the most important 
economic player in innovation advances over the long term. This was seen by informants in 
Western Transdanubia as potentially reinforcing an existing industrial economic base rather 
than taking a more ambitious strategy of more rapidly transforming to a diversified 
knowledge economy in the long term, which Catalonia has aspired to do under 
RIS3CAT. In both the industrial regions of Western Transdanubia and Bratislava, 
innovation advances were seen as being achieved by aiming for ‘smart production’ 
focused on product development within manufacturing industries found in the region, 
rather than new knowledge generation through R&D directed at technological 
breakthroughs or a more radical model of innovation associated with the endogenous 
growth of disruptive firms. Due to the regions identifying as ‘industrial production 
230 
 
zones’, they instead seek to connect to the innovation chain through R&D activities 
through the development of high value-added products, especially by strengthening the 
SME sector. The regions see this occurring by MNCs assisting with the development of 
innovative SMEs that “want to become suppliers” linked to the needs of the MNC 
automotive firms located there. An increasingly diversified economy would be made 
possible by the development of place-based economic networks facilitated by new 
institutions established by the policy such as Centres of Excellence.  
 
However, this economic vision was met with concern by informants in the Western 
Transdanubia case who expressed concern that the Smart Specialisation strategy 
supported greater innovation in the automotive sector based on the development of domestic 
suppliers as opposed to “functional upgrading” into design and R&D work in the region, feeling 
that this would not be a radical enough approach to bring about innovation advances within the 
region. In this context, the Smart Specialisation policy represented an opportunity to diversify 
the economic base. While the automotive sector was seen as having an important role in the 
region, it was emphasised in the WT case that focusing too heavily on it in the new policy 
environment may have various negative consequences, such as limiting the region’s 
economic future to a low-technology development trajectory given that the Audi production 
in the region is built on a model of complementary specialisation and export of components. 
This was seen as potentially impeding the capacity to develop internationally competitive 
niche products based on scientific excellence; providing a disincentive for innovative 
strategic SMEs to emerge as the company has a flat structure not enabling spin off activity to 
occur. These insights add value to the empirical analysis on key characteristics of automotive 
GVC producer-driven networks undertaken by Pavlik and Zenka who in their study of the 
Czech automotive industry discovered that the capacity for industrial upgrading within large 
industrial companies, which organise and coordinate investment-based vertical production 
networks of component suppliers, was highly selective and mainly associated with product 
and process upgrading as opposed to functional upgrading (Pavlik & Zenka 2011). 
 
Cooke has also argued that policy makers should understand the important role of MNCs in 
shaping regional knowledge based economic development, given the increasing outsourcing 
of R&D from large corporations. In this sense, regions should try and influence location and 
decision making of R&D by large corporations to help shape and exploit knowledge-
production processes and innovation systems in the context of globalization (Cooke in Cooke 
& Picculuga 2009). For countries located in CEE, attracting the settlement of research 
facilities owned by MNCs to regions will enable functional upgrading of knowledge capacity 
processes and hence the capacity to break out of their peripheral status in the global economy 
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(Smaho 2012). In addition, Capello and Kroll argue that repositioning of peripheral regions 
in international value chains, however desirable, can often not be controlled by policy-makers 
from within these regions alone. Typically, these regions’ only link to the international 
economy is based on local MNE subsidiaries acting under headquarter directives and 
embedded in global corporate strategies. Consequently, they are not usually particularly 
interested in becoming engaged with a region’s local government or its strategies. Even if 
they were to become involved, moreover, any internationalisation strategy built upon their 
activities will remain vulnerable to more general corporate plans, as they can at any time by 
closed down or relocated following considerations entirely out of the control of the regional 
government (Capello & Kroll 2016). 
As was also noted earlier in this study, within the automotive sector, the global value chain 
(GVC) organisation of the company Volkswagen demonstrates how a core-periphery 
dynamic may be established in relation to the placement of R&D facilities across Europe. 
The research carried out by the Volkswagen Group has always been largely centralised, with 
the corporate research division at the company’s Wolfsburg headquarters providing support 
for all of the Volkswagen brands. A baseline mapping exercise of advanced manufacturing 
capacity in European regions undertaken on behalf of the European Commission found that 
‘top layer’ advanced manufacturing capacity in the automotive industry is largely 
concentrated in regions located in Western Europe and Spain (Technopolis 2014). Given the 
problem of the vertical nature of MNC GVC strategy, it is therefore maintained by many 
GVC scholars that it is not feasible for regions that are characterised by unfavourable 
structural features of economies (outside global economic cores) that are dominated by lower 
tier suppliers, have guaranteed demand (often in large volume) for standard goods produced 
with well-known technology, and do not tend to conduct activities such as market research, 
to aspire to an industrial upgrading strategy (Blazek 2016; Tödtling & Trippl 2005). In this 
sense, it may be that public policies aimed at stimulating socioeconomic development by 
supporting innovation, for example via the promotion of cooperation between firms and 
academic R&D institutions, are to a large extent misleading. Instead, given the narrow profit 
margins of lower tier suppliers, as well as their limited growth potential stemming from their 
modest capabilities and consequent low-road strategies of competitiveness, the concept of 
upgrading is not relevant for these firms (Blazek 2016; Tödtling & Trippl 2005). 
These insights from the literature are relevant to the case of Western Transdanubia, where 
informants were of the view that rather than rely upon MNC GVC strategy, the roles of the 
state and the region were critical in playing a greater coordination role in building a policy 
for automotive development to shape future strategic policy where they emphasised the 
degree to which this would generate a model where assembly of cars or more complex 
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research and design work, would not settle in the region. Thus informants from Western 
Transdanubia expressed concern that regional Smart Specialisation strategy focused heavily 
on supplier development, and that this could potentially consolidate the existing production 
model of export of engine components, rather than a more expansive strategy based on 
functional upgrades to the production site. In this way, Western Transdanubia faces the 
challenge described in the literature of potential industrial lock in an MNC GVC 
organisation that often determines an international division of labour and a spatial 
division of innovation (Massey; Aydalot in Simmie 1997).  
Bratislava shares many structural similarities to WT, especially a large presence of heavy 
manufacturing industry and having a VW-owned plant as a large player in the regional 
economy. As discussed earlier, in the 1990s this reflected a GVC strategy by the VW 
Group to invest heavily within CEE and develop auxiliary firms to support a central 
production model and to consolidate an “intra-regional cluster” that would service the 
needs of 12 brands associated with the VW Group. As a result, a cluster of production 
facilities emerged across CEE regions based on big OAMs such as VW, Peugeot and Kia 
that then bought about a close economic cooperation between regions such as Western 
Transdanubia and Bratislava. The Slovak Smart Specialisation strategy also consolidates 
the strong role for the automotive industry in the region with priority sectors for 
economic specialisation, all of which relate to the automotive industry. It was observed 
of the policy design process how six sectors were selected “… all related to the 
automotive industry, as Slovakia has a good network in the automotive industry” with 
VW a key player in the regional economy. The Bratislava case emphasised the 
importance of the automotive industry to its regional economy and that the factories have 
attracted foreign suppliers into the region. However, the WT case highlighted 
considerable concern about the vulnerability of the region, based on this strategy, to a 
long-term reliance on external foreign investment. The strong performance of 
Bratislava’s economy is driven by growth rates in TPF which reflects a diffusion of 
knowledge and medium-high technology from foreign sources. The fiscal problem of 
low state funding for R&D was said to probably consolidate the economic dependency 
of the region on the import of foreign technology. The Bratislava case also demonstrates 
how MNCs generally have their technological centres in Western Europe, a situation 
compounded in Slovakia due to both low private and public funding into R&D. A further 
structural flaw preventing advances in innovation in the economy was that SMEs tended 
to be concentrated in the ‘low technology’ service sector. 
Hence, both the Western Transdanubia and Bratislava cases highlight the potential for their 
respective Smart Specialisation strategies to generate path-dependent economic ‘lock in’ 
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associated with the form of industrial production located in their regions. As has been 
outlined, in Western Transdanubia, informants noted the economic vulnerability associated 
with the ‘routine assembly’ production model found regionally. It was felt that by not 
producing ‘premium product’ that a North-South-East-West GVC divide was consolidated. 
Similarly, the Slovak case demonstrated attitudes that the model of automotive production 
found in Bratislava would be unsustainable in the long term, given predicted material 
shortages and the increasing introduction of more sophisticated technology such as that of 
robots, which would eventually, it was feared, undermine employment capacity. Informants 
were concerned that the GFC in 2008 had resulted in an economic downturn in the region 
and the experience was seen as contributing to a view that the region needed to reduce its 
dependency on one giant industrial actor or major MNC for economic success. 
 
The Catalan case has also highlighted how its large industrial base in the region is considered 
integral to the regional economic vision. However, in contrast to the CEE regions; the case 
study of this developed region demonstrated that the region wanted a highly diversified 
strategy. RIS3CAT outlines seven major leading sectors in the regional economy including 
food, energy and resources, industrial systems, design-based sectors, sectors relating to 
sustainable mobility and health. Catalonia has a highly diversified and open economy, with a 
large industrial base but still not one ‘predominant sector’ within the regional economy. 
While the automotive industry is central in the RIS3CAT strategy, an industrial plan is seen 
as working equally alongside other sectors, including ‘quality of life’ and the ‘green 
economy’ as priorities in shaping Catalonian economic development. RIS3CAT points out 
that Catalonia is already a highly diversified and open economy, with a large industrial base 
but no single ‘predominant sector.’ VW subsidiary SEAT is a strong MNC player within the 
regional economy and has indicated that RIS3CAT policy is encouraging it to become 
increasingly embedded within the regional economy, contributing to an economic agenda in 
developing a sustainability strategy in conjunction with public institutions, around the 
implementation of the development of electric vehicles.  
 
With these priorities, RIS3CAT states that it aims to develop its innovation strategy around 
‘horizontal’ plans across global value chains and industrial sectors around key concepts such 
as ‘mobility’. The concept of mobility was thought to then enable a transcending of 
traditional sectoral planning based on just one industry, for instance the automotive industry, 
and focuses an economic plan on recognising the wide scope of the automotive industry. This 
would then create a situation where regional economic development goals could be forged 
on horizontal cross sector planning, thus no longer having a narrowed focus on large 
automotive players such as SEAT and Nissan, but also seeing the mobility sector as being 
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about electric vehicles and other stakeholders such as public transport mobility and transport 
logistics. 
 
In relation to boosting entrepreneurialism the Catalan case highlights the intention of the 
region to move away from an economy built on ‘micro-innovation’ to a ‘radical’ innovation 
model based on ideas, start-ups and information technology sectors. The ‘developed’ region 
of Catalonia is concerned that the ‘model of innovation’ found in the region could be 
described as a ‘micro-innovation model’ based on incremental process innovations 
associated with industrial production and machinery. The move to a more destructive 
innovation model is associated with Catalonia’s position, according to the OECD typology of 
regions classification, as a ‘knowledge region’. It was emphasised in the Catalan case that 
SMEs faced a big challenge to change the innovation model under the new Smart 
Specialisation policy direction as they had an industrial tradition where the innovation model 
of SMEs was based on a micro innovation model, based on machinery and adapted 
innovation. In this sense, the wide view of innovation adopted by Catalonia stands in contrast 
with the less ambitious interpretation of possible advances adopted in the Western 
Transdanubia and Bratislava cases, restricted as they are to aspiring for innovation advances 
in product and processes associated with the industrial context that they are situated in. 
 
In relation to the RIS3CAT, the public policy perspective from both the regional 
government and the Barcelona City Council emphasised a direction of seeing the need 
for continued support for the automotive industry in the region, but also trying to assist 
with an advanced manufacturing strategy that supports the industry with investment in 
new KETS such as 3D printing, robotics and sport to clean industries. According to the 
Catalan case, the economic importance of manufacturing production and innovation 
linked to research, design and creativity is seen as integral to the success of RIS3CAT. 
Hence, RIS3CAT policy has highlighted the importance of regions having a sound economic 
strategy based on trying to move to ‘advanced manufacturing’ through encouragement of the 
take up of KETS rather than “propping up dying industries. “ 
 
In Catalonia there has been a strong “philosophical return” to seeing the need to re-shore 
industrial jobs and build a strong vocational education system to support re-industrialisation. 
This view emerged after the GFC in 2009, the “building bubble” and a sense that the regional 
economy of Catalonia was too dependent on the construction industry. A strong view 
emerged from the Catalan case that the Smart Specialisation strategy should be implemented 
alongside other important EU Framework programs such as the EU’s Reindustrialisation of 
Europe strategy. It was seen in this case that the strategy to re-industrialise Catalonia was part 
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economic and part social, with the realisation in the region that there needed to be a return to 
its industrial roots and try to restore industrial jobs that are more stable, have better wages 
than other sectors and a clear link between R&D technology, and a clear link between 
technology centres which have an applied link to market as well as a clear link to the 
education system and to training and vocational skills linked to industrial reality. 
 
Regional Innovation System 
 
The third research objective investigated the extent to which the particular characteristics of 
a RIS would impact on successful implementation of the policy. A number of conclusions 
can be drawn from the case study analysis presented in Chapters 4-7. Data analysis revealed 
that there were many barriers impeding effective implantation of the Smart Specialisation 
policy especially for LDRs located in CEE. Barriers included low levels of private and public 
R&D; cultural factors impeding networking based on a quadruple helix model of co-
operation and a human resource supply problem, with young people relocating to Western 
Europe, and an education system heavily focused on technical studies. 
 
Chapter 4 emphasised the extent to which the EC Guide to development of regional 
strategies highlighted expenditure on R&D as being an important but not the only 
characteristic to the development of a successful RIS. The EC data highlighted how 
regions with high expenditure on R&D are the most highly developed ones and of the 20 
regions in the EU with the highest expenditure on R&D, 16 have a level of GDP per head 
above the EU-27 average. Conversely, it was observed that most of the regions recording 
low levels of expenditure on R&D are either located in southern, central and eastern 
Member States, or are in regions with relatively low levels of GDP per head in western 
ones. According to the EU, “not all regions can or should try and reach national targets” 
since regional differences are described as being an inherent feature of regional systems. 
The Smart Specialisation policy encourages a broad view of innovation to be derived 
from many sources of knowledge, yet, as the Bratislava and WT cases demonstrate, 
many regions located in CEE still perceive R&D as an integral feature of building a 
regional innovation system to enable a more transformative economic program.  
 
For instance, Bratislava and Western Transdanubia focused heavily on building R&D 
capacity in their respective Smart Specialisation strategies. The Western Transdanubia based 
informants observed that its region was rich in formal knowledge assets such as major 
universities and research centres. However, the region had recorded low levels of basic R&D 
conducted there, given that most research in the country has tended to be developed in the 
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regions of South Plains and Northern Plains of Hungary. Most researchers in the region were 
engaged with applied research due to a history of long-term decline in state investment in 
R&D. This was seen as a problem by informants as they considered basic research to be 
essential to fuelling developments in applied research outcomes. The Western Transdanubia 
strategy addressed this problem by outlining a plan to place “more emphasis and investment 
into building university-industry collaborative partnerships in growth areas of the economy”. 
The case identifies Szechenyi Istvan University as the most important regional asset, due to 
the university’s strong focus on automotive research and educating engineers for automotive 
companies situated in Western Transdanubia.  
 
The Western Transdanubia strategy also argued that applied research needed to be extended to 
many more universities and research centres to enable industrial and scientific research and 
to link some key industries together in the automotive industry, such as electronics, wood and 
renewable energy sources. It was stated in the plan that there needed to be increased use of 
policy tools such as clusters to facilitate cooperation between universities and industry (for 
instance in the agricultural sector). However, both the Western Transdanubia and Bratislava 
cases found that in CEE countries, a history of socialism leading to particular cultural factors 
presented a barrier to building regional innovation systems. Informants argued that this 
history would make collaboration between public and private actors difficult to encourage 
due to a long state corporatist tradition; it was observed by a Slovak informant that “you don’t 
[yet] have the institutional architecture to build an innovation ecosystem” based on 
collaboration between companies and universities.  
 
Informants in Western Transdanubia also highlighted their concern that long term state 
underfunding of R&D compounded an additional problem, that of foreign automotive 
companies conducting ‘high end research’ in their home countries and only ‘low end 
research’ in CEE regions. The Slovak strategy also highlighted the extent to which there is 
low private R&D spending in Slovakia. Private R&D spending represents only 0.25 per cent 
of GDP. Multinational companies based in Slovakia also have tended to carry out their R&D 
activities mostly in their home countries and separated from practice in the Slovak context. 
The weakness of private R&D in Slovakia was seen as an important issue to address with the 
Smart Specialisation plan as, according to an informant “there are 200 000 people working in 
the automotive sector directly and indirectly [in Slovakia] and given that there is 600 000 to 
700 000 people in total in the country”, a figure of 28-33% of employment in that industry 
makes it very important. It was further argued by the informant that the lack of R&D capacity 
within the region impacts on the capacity for the subsidiary to resolve technical problems, 
with new technology having to be bought in from Western Europe.  
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A key component of the Slovak Strategy is therefore to encourage MNCs to cooperate with 
SMEs and share R&D through newly established EU- funded R&D centres. R&D centres are 
said to be key institutions in enabling integration of major export sectors in local economies 
and to embed local supply chains in clusters. Like in Western Transdanubia, it is hoped that in 
Bratislava the new Centre for Excellence model would fill the gap in private R&D in the 
region. A major component of the Slovak Strategy is that large firms cooperate with SMEs 
and share R&D towards this objective. An identified challenge in this regard is for both WT 
and Slovakia to move from such a narrow interpretation to a more ambitious strategy around 
large scale R&D projects between universities and firms, and to encourage cross-sectoral 
innovation advances across the whole regional economy. Also seen as key to a more 
ambitious strategy is the importance of building public investment in technology to reduce 
dependency on using foreign imported technology to enable higher value adding to export 
investments in aluminium and IT. However, while the Centre for Excellence model was seen 
as a positive development for the encouragement of MNC support to supplier development 
and cross sectoral innovations, concern was raised by an informant as to whether this would 
result in EU funds indirectly supporting advances in predominately VW-owned rather than 
Slovak-owned innovation advances, benefitting Germany rather than Slovakia. Again, this 
point highlights the problem for CEE regions in economic dependence on foreign owned 
companies, with the associated implications for the development of “a spatial division of 
innovation” (Massey; Aydlot cited in Simmie 1997). 
 
The Bratislava case also finds that the region has considerable formal knowledge assets, 
despite Slovakia lagging well behind the average EU innovation performance. However, 
like the case of Western Transdanubia, the proportion of Slovak universities involved in 
public R&D is low, and universities are considered to be of low quality. In Bratislava, 
most researchers are engaged in basic research but generally have not linked to applied 
research outcomes. Hence the Slovak Strategy identifies the need to reform the funding 
system of universities to ensure elite universities engage in more applied research in 
engineering, and lower emphasis on funding to scientific institutes. The Slovak strategy 
is said to be a vehicle for Slovakia to start to challenge this culture by increasingly tying 
EU grants to applied research outcomes, particularly in the science and technology field 
and focusing on more sophisticated industrial technological priorities such as 
automation, robotics, as well as technology for forming, cutting and joining of new 
metallic and non-metallic materials and composites, logistic technologies and processing 
technologies. Considerable state funds will be directed to the region to boost capacity within 
research infrastructure projects and clusters already established, and to further encourage the 
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role of research institutions in their activities.  
 
The Bratislava case emphasised the degree to which the region was still ‘capacity building’. 
That is, building a model of cooperation between economic actors and focusing on 
consolidating a successful model of cooperation research centres in the region, rather than 
pursuing a more ambitious plan, given the fiscal problems with state funding to universities. 
This confirms the insight of Marques and Morgan who earlier in this study observed that a 
key barrier for lagging regions was a weak capacity to implement the new policy direction 
due to not having an innovation ecosystem based on the Triple Helix model (Marques & 
Morgan, 2018). LDRs and even ‘transition’ regions such as Bratislava therefore face the dual 
challenge of systems that may work against “new path development” in the manner envisaged 
by Isaksen and Trippl who, as was noted, argued that these elements are required for 
successfully building a dynamic RIS (Isaksen & Trippl 2016, p. 51). Similarly, in the case of 
Western Transdanubia, policy tools such as clusters were important to the implementation of 
the strategy but a whole range of barriers to their success were identified. These included the 
aforementioned cultural reasons to do a suspicion of collaboration due to a history of Hungary 
being part of the socialist regimes within the Eastern bloc. The failure of the automotive 
cluster in the region was also seen as reflecting a situation of poor public funding, competing 
interests of firms involved, and a lack of interest by firms in developing skills in market 
knowledge. The Catalan case stands as a contrast to this experience. This region has 
successfully built a strong base of highly functioning industrial clusters which was seen by 
informants as a key strength in the implementation of RIS3CAT. The clusters were perceived 
as encouraging cross-sectoral growth and specialisation between, for instance, large OAMs 
in the automotive sector and developments in public transport infrastructure. 
 
In contrast to the Catalan experience, there was a sense from a Slovak informant that the 
‘cluster model’, in trying to generate collaboration across competing car companies to 
develop innovation advances in Bratislava, would probably not be able to overcome an 
entrenched culture of heavy competition between the car companies. Competition 
between car companies such as VW and KIA was said to be a better mechanism for 
generating an ‘innovation wave’ than collaboration as the “competition is about creating 
new brands… and everyone wants to produce engines and be better and better” in the 
broader CEE regional context. In addition to this, the Slovak case showed that 
collaboration between competing car producers was not necessarily of regional value in 
relation to innovation advances, given that the Slovak operations for both car companies 
are routine production sites – competing on labour costs and using different supplier 
companies: the KIA production site for instance uses Korean suppliers rather than Slovak 
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suppliers connected to the VW facility in Bratislava. In addition to this, in Bratislava it 
was noted that clusters that have been generated or that have emerged within automotive 
and electrotechnic and creative and cultural sectors face a key barrier. They are 
insufficiently linked to final producers and, while this situation is “slowly improving,” 
but it was felt this had not yet occurred in a comprehensive enough way. The Slovak case 
will be interesting to observe in the ‘post 2014-20’ policy phase as to whether the ‘Centre of 
Excellence’ model supported by the Smart Specialisation policy has managed to create the 
cultural and institutional foundations for forms of strategic coupling and co-evolution of lead 
firms in GPNs and regional assets, in the manner described earlier by Mackinnon (2012). 
Mackinnon noted that a barrier for regional innovation was generated by “FDI in developing 
regions … [which] continue to be characterised by a lack of local linkage and power 
asymmetries between TNCs and regional institutions, which in some cases results in 
corporate capture and points to a strong degree of path dependence in the relations between 
these regions and GPNs” (Mackinnon 2012, pp. 241-2). 
 
The role of culture in the CEE regions was also identified as a factor impeding the success 
of business innovation initiatives in the regions. An informant pointed to the role of culture 
in generating a suspicious attitude directed towards entrepreneurs, one “deeply ingrained 
within the Western Transdanubia regional culture” and, “without positive role models in 
society”, a cultural problem that “will be difficult to overcome”. Culture aside, insufficient 
funding for SME development, low venture-capital investment, little business angel activity, 
a lack of skill development, and a lack of focus towards entrepreneurialism in the education 
system, were further barriers. The Western Transdanubia strategy proposes measures to 
address this challenge, such as changes to tax incentives and a shift from a supply- to a 
demand-led funding model, which it is hoped will assist with driving private investment. 
Private sector R&D outcomes are to be encouraged through a reformed system of venture-
capital financing. Internal R&D to develop advanced technologies will take precedence over 
the purchase of external ‘finished’ technology, and the use of public procurement as a new 
policy tool will be promoted. 
 
The cases of Bratislava and Western Transdanubia corroborate the findings of many 
empirical studies that have sought to investigate the innovation paradox confronting LDRs 
posed by the characteristics of their RIS. It was argued in the literature that that regions with 
less-favoured research and innovation systems have a low potential to diversify into new 
industrial areas due to unfavourable economic structures and a weak endowment of 
knowledge organisations (Buchman in Tripp et al 2016) and have a low capacity to use funds 
due to a weak capacity to absorb change; for instance, by not having an innovation ecosystem 
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based on the triple helix model (Marques & Morgan 2018). In addition, McCann and Ortega-
Argyles have also argued that one of the greatest challenges facing the application of modern 
regional innovation policies across EU regions is in regions with very limited innovation-
related assets. As was established in Chapter 2, they argued that “some regions, for example, 
contain no research institutes; other regions, particularly in Eastern Europe, as yet exhibit 
only a very limited capacity for developing an innovation system, because they are 
constrained by institutional and governance, and technological issues” (McCann and Ortega-
Argiles 2016, p.1410). 
 
The Catalan case differs substantially from those of CEE regions due to Catalonia having a 
sophisticated innovation ecosystem in place in the region. Catalonia has benefitted from long 
term investments from the EU Horizon 2020 program leading to a sense from informants that 
the region had already made progress in establishing an innovation ecosystem based on ‘soft 
institutional factors’ such as collaboration between universities and corporations in product 
development. Informants noted that a sophisticated applied research system existed in several 
fields including biomedical research, health, design and IT. In this sense, the RIS3CAT policy 
describes the need to build an even greater open innovation system. However, like the CEE 
regions, despite Catalonia spending more in public R&D than any other region in Spain, 
spending remains low by European benchmarks.  
 
To address this, RIS3CAT proposes to boost institutional R&D facilities through investment 
in the existing research and technology centres. The plan further proposes to build a strong 
eco-innovation system around key universities such as the UAB in Barcelona. The BCC 
complements this policy agenda through its Urban Lab policy which seeks to further the 
innovation ecosystem through demand-led local government initiatives. And in sharp 
contrast to the CEE case study regions, private R&D investment is high in Catalonia. SEAT 
has invested heavily in R&D in the regional economy. The company has established a 
technical centre in the region which has acted as a hub of knowledge and innovation. This 
again reinforces the extent to which while Catalonia is rich in knowledge assets within its 
RIS, the most significant challenge in the implementation of the policy may be the facilitation 
of linkages between research institutes and corporate stakeholders. It is the functioning of the 
RIS in this regard that has been historically a problem in the development of public-private 
collaborations. 
 
The role of advanced manufacturing in industry is seen as important for innovation 
advances under RIS3CAT. The role of the automotive industry is acknowledged for 
innovation advances through product innovation, advances in both robotics and logistics, 
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and transferring innovation to the whole system through the supplier base. Initiatives in 
Catalonia like the public-private Centre Verde project have already demonstrated that 
large automotive producers such as SEAT can be involved in an open innovation system 
where the government has played a large role in building positive externalities to 
encourage regional economic development. The Catalan case demonstrated the 
prevalence in the region of small companies, estimated to be 20 000 mostly small and 
some medium companies. SEAT was identified as a driver to make consortiums with the 
small companies in the regions so that they could then get involved in big projects, of 
which Centre Verde was given as an example. RIS3CAT has encouraged MNCs like SEAT 
to become increasingly embedded within the regional economy, contributing to an economic 
agenda in developing a sustainability strategy in conjunction with public institutions, around 
the development of electric vehicles.  
 
Human resource supply problems were also found to be a barrier to policy implementation 
in the CEE regions. The case of Western Transdanubia emphasised the extent to which 
business and government needed to play a greater role in generating a supply-led transition 
to a diversified economy by overcoming the shortage in existing university training courses 
in growth industry areas, including advanced manufacturing. A key weakness identified was 
the region’s traditional focus on technical studies as attempts to diversify tertiary courses 
were said to be “hampered by lack of State funds”. The region also faces a challenge with its 
young people, however, who are turning away from the study of engineering, and leaving to 
work in Budapest or other European countries. Thus, a major focus of the WT Strategy is 
dedicated to ensuring ongoing investment into institutions formed to encourage educating the 
region’s young people in engineering. 
 
According to the Slovak case, employers are predominately seeking IT and building-industry 
graduates, and to a lesser extent mechanical engineers and scientists. However, “despite this 
preference by employers, the tertiary education system is mostly producing social scientists 
and engineers”, so a key public policy problem for the region of Bratislava was about 
encouraging the ‘young generation’ to study courses qualifying them to be employed in the 
automotive and electrical multinational companies based in the region. That young people 
are increasingly wanting to work in diverse industries and occupations and live in other places 
is the evolving human resources challenge, and one Slovak informant noted that it was the 
“key public policy challenge” to generate a diversified economy facing Slovakia, arguing 
that the region “can’t produce 15 000 sociologists… we have to be prepared for future 
positions in the market”. To address this challenge the Slovak Strategy has outlined an 
ambitious education system plan for the better encouragement of secondary students into 
242 
 
vocational education schools that teach mathematics, natural sciences and engineering 
subjects, to better match economic demand with skilled labour supply. In addition to this, 
students will be encouraged into vocational education, entrepreneurship, and more on-the-
job training and collaboration between schools, universities and businesses with a further 
policy to attract departed science and research workers back to work in Slovakia again. 
 
The Catalan case also highlighted a problem of mismatch between supply and demand 
in the regional labour market. Catalan informants noted with concern the shortage of 
engineers in the region. However, the RIS3CAT policy proposes to address these 
shortfalls through support for a new dedicated vocational training centre, and new 
university courses in engineering and management training within the automotive 
industry. The Catalan case also demonstrated the advantage of the region in relation to 
building its knowledge economy sectors, as Barcelona is seen as an attractive 
international city which will enable the development of a ‘creative class’ able to work 
in high technology jobs in IT and other knowledge economy sectors. Catalonia was seen 
to be in a good position to adapt and transition to becoming a knowledge economy given 
its significant regional assets.  
 
It was seen in Catalonia that globalisation had led to a model of competition where “time 
matters very much” and “where the innovation and knowledge base [required] becomes 
more critical for a regional economic development strategy”: hence the move to a more 
radical model of innovation. To become a ‘tech city’ requires a “rich environment of 
creativity” and an “innovation culture”. It was seen that Barcelona was in a good position 
to attract talent as companies associated with ICT needing special talent, wanted to live 
in the city. The Catalan commitment to generating an attractive, tolerant region capable 
of building a creative class of human capital to the region underscores the proposition 
by Florida, that regions must generate a supply led economic path to regional economic 
development through progressive investments and policies (Florida 2014). However, the 
WT and Bratislava cases stand in stark contrast to this approach, given the significant 
barriers to building such a strategy, due to their situation in semi-rural regions, low state 
investment capacity and inheritance of a culture unsympathetic to urban elites. 
 
Conclusion 
For the first time in 2014, EU Innovation policy (Smart Specialisation) applies to all regions 
regardless of level of economic development. This development has significant implications 
for the successful implementation of the policy in LDRs. There is a vast amount of existing 
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empirical literature that has demonstrated the degree of difficulty of implementation in LDRs 
given identified barriers found in for instance many regions located in CEE, presented by the 
‘regional innovation paradox’ generated by the combination of centralised governance 
arrangements and weak regional innovation systems. It also a key question as to whether 
LDRs can overcome these barriers, especially when industrial policy instruments promoting 
advanced manufacturing, are mainly directed at advanced regions, thus having the potential 
to consolidate LDRs (given GVC MNC production decisions) into ‘industrial and political 
lock in’ on the path of a low innovation trajectory. 
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Conclusion 
The Smart Specialisation policy represents a major reinvention of EU Regional policy – an 
amalgamation of industrial and regional policy instruments, with an emphasis upon 
establishing regional innovation systems at the level of place. The policy envisages structural 
transformation of regional economies based on regions identifying development 
opportunities and inducing structural change. The policy is seen as having the capacity to 
provide a strong approach for regions to transcend economic ‘path dependence’ and generate 
opportunities for ‘new path development’ in, for instance, many old industrial regions facing 
economic stagnancy. In the 1990s, for regions located in CEE, the traditional model of 
economic growth based on FDI was already seen as being exhausted, and many CEE 
countries were aspirational around trying to shift towards an innovation-based development 
model – based on building a functional local innovation base of R&D, improved education 
and training, well-functioning institutions and improved social capital based on trust, 
cooperation and political stability – to enable rapid economic growth (Berend 2009).  
This study has noted that Smart Specialisation is not a new policy concept and extends 
existing innovation strategies based on 15 years of refining of programs mainly targeted at 
advanced regions across Europe. The key differences that have been observed related to the 
universality of the policy, with all regions now obliged to have Smart Specialisation strategies 
in place before Structural funds are approved. EU Innovation policy applies to all regions 
regardless of the level of economic development. This has significant implications for the 
successful implementation of the policy in LDRs. In addition to this, a further difference is 
that the Smart Specialisation policy explores in more detail the devolved governance policy 
processes associated with identifying areas of economic growth.  The key input to the Smart 
Specialisation concept is the process of entrepreneurial discovery that details exactly how the 
policy process must select and priorities fields or areas where a cluster of activities should be 
developed, and to let entrepreneurial discovery determine the right domains of future 
specialisation. Dominique Foray has argued that it is these governance processes that would 
have the effect of “improving the capacity for the avoidance of vested local stakeholder 
interests, and enable new economic players to emerge to avoid regional lock-in” (Foray et al. 
as cited in Boschma, 2013, p.4). 
This study employed a qualitative approach to address the opportunities and challenges 
associated with the implementation of Smart Specialisation policy plans over a cross section 
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of regions across Europe at different stages of economic development. Unlike earlier largely 
quantitative work in the field of economic geography, the focus in this study has been about 
providing a qualitative analysis of the strengths and challenges associated with the 
overarching design of the policy. The study utilized a case study methodology, examining 
documentary data to explore the implications of policy design at the level of the EU and the 
region, and secondly using original interview data to provide parallel evidence gained from 
official documents about the strengths and challenges associated with the policy design. It 
included interviews with regional stakeholders from a large MNC in the automotive industry 
with subsidiaries in regions across Europe. This study has contributed a perspective on Smart 
Specialisation policy design processes and the likely regional impact of the policy from the 
perspective of a key corporate player from a traditional industrial development model. This 
has allowed the study to explore also the tension between global forces and local policy in 
shaping development at the level of place. 
 
The research objectives were to assess what impact would be made on policy implementation 
in diverse regional contexts given – the quality of governance, characteristics of an 
innovation system and the role of a key MNC in in the context of the global value chain/global 
production network governance arrangements. The study found that there were many 
challenges facing policy implementation, particularly for industrial regions located in CEE. 
For instance, in relation to quality of governance arrangements, it was found that the policy 
faced policy design and implementation challenges in Western Transdanubia given the 
centrally driven policy design processes. In addition, both in Bratislava and Western 
Transdanubia, there were a range of barriers impacting on institutional capacity building 
within RISs located in these region. These included factors such as the presence of corporatist 
state actors, historical factors impeding social capital between actors within networks and 
low capacity in relation to R&D and knowledge assets. In addition it was found in Bratislava, 
that the MNC in this region was not embedded in the RIS, thus potentially consolidating an 
incremental approach to product and process innovation in the region. In contrast, the 
developed case of Catalonia demonstrates the capacity of the Smart Specialisation concept 
to be implemented more successfully given the presence of strong regional political 
institutions, a diversified economic base, the presence of an international city and a 
professional knowledge economy class. The study also found that the European Commission 
policy officers implementing the policy are finding the legal framework a significant 
impediment to policy implementation. 
 
This study has highlighted implications for implementation of the policy in the future and 
future research. In relation to governance, there is a need to address how regions can become 
246 
more empowered in negotiations with the EC over policy design and implementation 
processes. This has particular implications for the capacity of LDRs to implement the policy 
as clearly, where there is centralised governance processes, regions are unable to negotiate 
their own strategies reflecting stakeholder perspectives, in the manner that the policy 
envisages. In the words of Rodriguez-Pose and Garcilazo (Rodriguez-Pose & Garcilazo 
2015, p. 1044): 
Otherwise the implementation of one-size-fits-all policies may not yield the 
expected results. Taking into account place-based institutional conditions and 
learning and how institutional quality can be consistently improved, needs to 
become basic elements of any development strategy. Thus, for regional 
development policies to be successful, there needs to be an empowerment of local 
decision makers and openness to the reality that many different and contrasting 
institutional arrangements may be needed in order to achieve sustainable 
development. 
Also related to governance, more research could be directed to  how the role of the MNC can 
be improved upon in the process of policy design, enabling them to become more ‘embedded’ 
into a RIS and able to contribute more fully to innovation strategies throughout the entire 
regional economy. A greater role for MNCs in the Smart Specialisation policy may also bring 
about more private R&D development in industrial regions, thus compensating for low state 
capacity in knowledge assets and helping to overcome the problem faced by some regions of 
having large automotive subsidiaries engaged in routine production or export of component 
parts, not enabling economic spin-offs to occur. It is also clear from the findings of this study 
that LDRs require significant capacity building in the task of building functioning regional 
innovation systems, that go beyond the scope and resources attached to the Smart 
Specialisation policy remit. The study found significant political will at the level of the region 
for Smart Specialisation and has highlighted many of the challenges that need to be overcome 
in future phases. 
Because the Smart Specialisation policy phase commenced in 2014, this study has captured 
original data, collected in the early phase of policy implementation, thus providing a 
contribution to existing research on Smart Specialisation policy implementation challenges. 
As such, the study will add to a growing literature addressing the particular challenges 
confronting LDRs located in CEE. As there is already a substantial body of work addressing 
policy design and implementation challenges associated with the policy, the focus of this 
study reflects a preference for it to have practical value to suggest reform of policy design 
processes directed at regions associated with industrial production located in Central and 
Eastern Europe. As such, it is hoped that it provides a valuable addition to the existing 
literature to provide further insights for policy reform in future phases of the Smart 
Specialisation policy experiment 
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